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Abstract
WTiitehead’s metaphysical and ethical arguments accomplish two related goals. The first 
is a criticism of modem ethical theory - the Utilitarian views of Sidgwick and Mill and 
the Theistic Intuitionism of the Cambridge Moralists (itself founded on Kantian 
Deontological commitments). I argue that Whitehead's rejection of these views depends 
on a rejection of the subject/predicate substance metaphysics inherited by Sidgwick, et al, 
from Aristotle, a rejection of the method of philosophizing that is drawn from 19***- 
century interpretations of Aristotle, and an amended view of the role of common-sense in 
speculative philosophy. From these negative views, along with his positive metaphysical, 
ethical, and methodological commitments, 1 show that Whitehead provides a theory of 
virtue that replaces its Utilitarian and Intuitionist competitors and stands as a rival to 
generally Aristotelian virtue ethics.
vu
The Role o f Metaphysics, Common-Sense, and 
Interpretations of Classical Greek Philosophy in 
Sidgwick's Utilitarianism and 
W hitehead's Virtue Ethics
Part I: The Project
Chapter 1 -  Introduction
Henry Sidgwick is one of the most influential and least remembered philosophers
of the 19* and 20* centuries. His sphere of influence includes opponents - e.g., the
Cambridge Moralists; commentators from a variety o f  philosophical schools - e g ,  C D.
Broad, J. B. Schneewind, Terry Irwin, and Nicholas White; students - e.g., G.E. Moore;
and later admirers - e.g., John Rawls. In the two latter cases (Moore and Rawls), it is
perhaps easiest to measure the extent o f Sidgwick's influence. Moore’s Principia Ethica
and Rawls’ Theory of Justice make more references to Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics
than to any other work, the two central themes of Principia Ethica are developments of
themes explored in Methods of Ethics, and Rawls writes in the preface to the seventh and
final edition of Methods that this ^fundamental work is the clearest and most accessible
formulation of what we may call ‘the classical utilitarian doctrine He continues;
What makes The Methods o f Ethics so important is that Sidgwick is more aware 
than other classical authors of the many difficulties this doctrine faces, and he 
attempts to deal with them in a consistent and thorough way while never 
departing from the strict doctrine, as for example, did J. S. Mill. Sidgwick’s book 
is the most philosophically profound of the strictly classical works and it may be 
said to bring to a close that period o f the tradition.
' John Rawls, Pre&ce to Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. 7* ed , (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1981), v.
Beyond these accolades, C D. Broad adds that “Sidgwick's Methods o f Ethics seems to 
me to be on the whole the best treatise on moral theory that has ever been written, and to 
be one of the English philosophical classics However, one needs do but little survey of 
the late 20*-century philosophical texts (from Introductions to Philosophy through 
graduate curricula through professional journals) to discover that except for the few 
mentioned above, Sidgwick himself is little remembered
In both contemporary remembrance and influence, Alfred North Whitehead 
shares Sidgwick’s fate Whitehead’s influence, like Sidgwick’s, extends to opponents - 
e.g., W V O Quine; commentators from a somewhat more narrow range of 
philosophical traditions though a somewhat broader range of academic ones^, e.g., Lewis 
Ford, Maijorie Suchocki, Charles Hartshome, among others; students - e.g., Bertrand 
Russell; and later admirers - e.g., John Cobb, Quine and Schubert Ogden. As with 
Sidgwick, Whitehead’s influence is clear - Quine, for example, has written that 
Whitehead is one of the foremost pioneers in the field of logic since Aristotle/ Again, 
though, a brief survey of philosophical literature of the late 20*^-century is illustrative of 
how little Whitehead is remembered.
While their respective influence and accomplishments are unquestionable, the 
causes of their unfortunate fate in philosophical memory are debatable. While 1 will not
 ^C D. Broad, Five Tvpes o f Ethical Theory. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1930), 143.
 ^ Whitehead is considerably more popular and more widely read in theological circles, 
mathematics, and education than in contemporary philosophical circles
* For a surprisingly detailed summary of Whitehead and Russell’s Piincipia 
Mathematica, see W V O Quine’s "Whitehead and the Rise of Modem Logic”, The 
Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Paul Arthur Schiipp, ed., Tudor Publishing
go into this overmuch, I suspect that, in at least Whitehead’s case, his fate is largely 
attributable to style. Whitehead writes in an intricate style reminiscent of his 
mathematical training. Process and Reality begins with definitions, categories, relations, 
and postulates from which the fuller view, complete with schemes of implication that 
range over a tremendous breadth of subjects, is then developed. Structurally, Process and 
Reality is a stylistic cousin o f Spinoza's Ethics. Because of his highly compressed style, 
reading Whitehead is very much like reading a mathematics text; one is best prepared if 
one approaches the task with pencil, pad, erasers, and patience at the ready to fiilly grasp 
the implications drawn from the fundamental concepts To read Whitehead in a cursory 
way is to almost insure misunderstanding. Beyond this difficulty, Whitehead’s 
“philosophical” works^ were mostly written in the latter part of the second decade of the 
20'*' century through the 1930’s. This, of course, coincides with the rise of the positivists, 
analysts, philosophers of science and logic, the Vienna Circle, and philosophers of 
language. In many ways, these trends exemplify a method that is antithetical to 
Whitehead’s. These trends in 20*** century philosophy accept as given philosophical 
commitments that are diametrically opposed to those advanced by Whitehead.
Company, New York. 125-164 (especially, 124, 130-135).
 ^ There is a commonplace division of Whitehead’s works into mathematical and scientific 
on the one hand, and philosophical on the other. I find this division artificial at best and 
damaging to Whiteheadian scholarship at worst. Whitehead does not make a distinction 
between his efforts in the various fields in which he writes. Whether mathematics, 
philosophy o f science, philosophy of education, metaphysics, epistemology or some other 
field, his self-professed aim is always philosophical. Or, in simpler terms, Whitehead’s 
career does not divide easily into Mathematics (early) and Philosophy (late), though his 
teaching career is so divided. Rather, when writing mathematics, Whitehead understands 
himself to be also a philosopher; and when writing philosophy, he takes himself to be at 
the same time a mathematician. Reading Whitehead in this way makes his stylistic
This dissertation will, at various times, explore the question of philosophical 
method in considerably more detail. These first points hopefully serve to set the stage for 
what is to come. The discussions of philosophical method and historical ethical theory 
(Sidgwick, Hume, Mill, and the Cambridge Moralists William Whewell and T H Green) 
will be done in the service o f arguing more broadly for three theses; (1) that the work of 
Sidgwick and Whitehead combine to dispatch Millian Utilitarianism, Ethical Egoism, and 
Theistic Intuitionism from the field, (2) that their work also makes quite clear the 
problems that a substance metaphysics roughly in the tradition of Aristotle cause for 
Modem approaches to “common-sense” ethical theory, and (3) that Whitehead’s 
philosophical views, while perhaps not as obviously amenable to “common-sense” at 
first, in fact suggest a set o f ethical commitments that themselves support a view of ethics 
that a) can be contrasted with Aristotle’s views, b) can be shown to solve Sidgwick’s 
“Dualism of Practical Reason” dilemma, and c) exemplifies the proper relationship 
between speculative philosophy and common-sense intuitions.
This brings us to the questions that vexed Sidgwick: “Is common-sense morality 
consistent? Does it provide a basis for any particular ethical theory? If so, which one?” 
Thanks in large part to the work of Henry Sidgwick, these three questions were 
inescapable for those who sought to engage in ethical theorizing in the 19^ and early 20^ 
centuries. For Sidgwick, the answers are “No”, “Yes”, and “Both Utilitarianism and 
Ethical Egoism”. The answer to the first question depends on his answers to the second 
and third. Because practical reason can be shown to provide a basis for two contrary
“eccentricities” more accessible.
views, it must ultimately be inconsistent. Sidgwick takes practical reason to provide such 
a basis because he thinks he has shown that both theories are equally reasonable on a 
gciicidl aui vc> o f  cOiiUiioii-iciisc iiuüitîûüs.'' Dccâusc o f  tliis “Dualisn-, o f  Praclicc! 
Reason,” the effort to impose some system on the ensemble o f moral intuitions derived 
from common sense is doomed to failure.
Sidgwick’s argument is introduced into the ongoing debate between the 
Deontological theorists and Consequentialist theorists of the 19"' and early 20"* centuries. 
Similarities abound between the two camps. For example, two standard views of 
Aristotle’s work dominate the period; (1) Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian 
Ethics are works o f “common-sense” ethical theorizing, and (2) Aristotelian “substance” 
metaphysics are acceptable without much comment. As a result, both camps tend to have 
a very similar approach to the data provided by common sense, though their conclusions 
are obviously at odds with one another. Some further elaboration is undoubtedly called 
for here. Generally speaking, it is accepted that the term “common sense” covers a
 ^ To avoid confusion, it should be noted that “common-sense” and “practical reason ” are 
used interchangeably, for the most part. This is in keeping with Sidgwick’s use. This 
oddity will be addressed at length in various places later. Here, however, I will only 
point out that the rough equivalence should indicate that Sidgwick does not mean by 
“common-sense” what one might first expect, nor by “practical reason” what might be 
initially thought. “Common-sense” suffers from a host o f meanings in common use. The 
person, who after driving around town, exits his car and reaches down to touch the 
tailpipe to see if it is hot is said to have displayed a lack o f common sense. Common 
sense is contrasted with formal education, often to suggest that a correlation between the 
two does not exist or is rare. And common sense is used in a finer, more philosophical 
way by Sidgwick to denote two things: (1) that there exists a particular nature common to 
humans by which human beings perceive the world around them ggd (2) that one aspect 
of this nature is the capacity to reason about the presentations of sense experience. 
Common philosophical use of “practical reason” is more similar to (2) than to (1), to be 
sure. However, Sidgwick connects (1) and (2) as aspects of “common-sense” and
multitude of things, including “practical reason”. Indeed, the two phrases are often used 
interchangeably/ “Common-sense” is understood in the following way -  it is that sense 
that is available to all human beings (indeed, that is an inescapable part of being human). 
In other words, it is common in the sense that it is common to all human beings and 
fundamental to what it means to appropriately affix the label “human” to a being. 
“Sense” is similarly broadreaching in scope. It is understood in at least two ways; the 
first as referring to the faculty of sensory experience and the second as referring to the 
faculty o f reason.*
While the moral philosophers of the period do at times differ with Aristotle (or 
their interpretation of Aristotle), they almost universally accept a version of Aristotelian 
“substance”, generally understood as “primary substance” ’ Three aspects of Aristotelian 
interpretation are of importance for this work The first is that the actual world has 
ontological priority to any abstracted “world”. This is to say that the category “tree” is
“practical reason” and then uses these two terms interchangeably, for the most part.
 ^This can quite obviously cause some difficulty in interpretation as “common sense” and 
“practical reason” generally stake out very distinct, and different, areas in philosophy of 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. However, it is important to remember 
that, with some fairly minor exceptions, the major philosophical schools of the day -  the 
Cambridge Moralists, consequentialists like Sidgwick, et al, -  use the two terms 
interchangeably.
* This latter is the reason that the two terms “common sense” and “practical reason” are 
often used synonymously. Whether or not such an understanding of “common sense” is 
truly Aristotelian is an open question. However, it is not completely relevant for this 
project. All that is pertinent is that this sort of view is both the standard use of the term 
“common sense” and that this use is attributed, almost universally, to Aristotle.
’ Again, scholars of ancient philosophy may very well cringe at the often less than critical 
use o f the phrase “primary substance” by the schools o f moral philosophy. There was 
some recognition that Aristotle's work is not univocal on the matter of substance. Similar 
caveats must be lodged relative to the use o f Aristotelian metaphysics by the thinkers of 
this period.
ontologically dependent on particular trees in the actual world from which the abstract 
idea ‘‘tree” is taken. The second aspect is that “substances” are static. The final aspect is 
that one philosophically important question concerns the manner and character o f  change 
of substances, recalling that substance is essentially static.
A final point of commonality between the various competing moral philosophers 
is that each takes his respective theories to form the true systematization o f common 
sense morality. Almost without exception, the resurgent emphasis on the interpretation 
of classical greek philosophy (particularly Aristotle and Plato) is used in the service of 
championing one’s view. Surprisingly, given this resurgence, another trait shared by 
both camps is that Virtue theory was largely ignored.
The work o f Alfred North Whitehead provides a helpful point of departure to 
examine these issues, in no small part because he departs in fundamental ways from these 
IQ***- and early 20“’-century philosophers at each of these three critical junctures; the role 
of common-sense, the method of analysis, and virtue. I will only briefly address these 
here in order to suggest the direction in which this project is going.
It may seem odd to assert that Whitehead found “common-sense” useful in an era 
where this view was almost universally accepted. All o f the major philosophers of the 
period went to some length (some rather extensively so) to establish the relationship 
between their speculative efforts and the experience of common-sense. However, 
Whitehead is nearly unique in what he understands that relation to be. All o f the 
philosophers discussed herein hold that common-sense provides the raw, 
prephilosophical data that their philosophical ruminations seek to interpret and explain.
Great attention is given to how this prephilosophical presentation of the experiential data
is explained and systematized by schemes metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical
However, the finished philosophical product often bears little resemblance to the
prephilosophical data or the questions that arose from them that the philosophical scheme
was supposed to address, make clearer, or solve Given the difficulty of the significant
disjunction between beginning and conclusion, there are two avenues. One might
suppose that the philosophical speculations and systematizations have gone awry; or that
the data themselves were misleading, illusory, or corrupt The task in this latter case is to
render the data more amenable to the conclusions. This is the tack taken by many during
the period, to one degree or another In other words, the abstractions o f philosophical
reasoning are taken to be more informative and more revealing of the world than the
concrete particulars which give rise to them. Whitehead finds such reasoning specious,
coining the informal Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness to deal with precisely this
p r o b l e m . O f  the philosophical outlook that leads to the fallacy, he writes;
[There exists] a false estimate of logical procedure in respect to certainty, 
and in respect to premises. Philosophy has been haunted by the 
unfortunate notion that its method is dogmatically to indicate premises 
which are severally clear, distinct, and certain; and to erect upon those
Whitehead argues that the “chief error in philosophy is overstatement.” (Process and 
Reality. 7) The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness addresses this error. The fallacy is 
committed when one “neglects the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is 
considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought " (7-8). That is, 
when one limits the scope of investigation of an actual entity only to those o f its features 
that fit into abstracted categories (and thus, ignore those features of the actual entity that 
do not fit nicely into those categories). It is also committed when one takes things like 
categories that are in reality abstractions from the actual world and assumes them to be 
concrete features o f the actual world.
premises a deductive system of thought. ... Metaphysical categories are 
not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tentative formulations. ' '
Given this, it is not surprising that Whitehead would take the alternative tack
when confronted with a discoimect between original data and philosophical conclusions.
Simply put, such a discrepancy can, and probably should, be seen as something that is so
much the worse for the philosophical conclusions.’  ^ So, on Whitehead's view, common-
sense is not merely the data of ethical theorizing, it is also a corrective of those theories
Also common to the ethical mainstream of the period was a general acceptance,
often quite naïvely, of a more or less developed view of Aristotelian substance
metaphysics; particularly its subject-predicate form of propositions. However,
Whitehead explicitly rejects such a form because it leaves out, on his view, a great deal of
what actually matters in the actual world; namely the relations between ‘individual
substances’. He writes, “with this metaphysical presupposition [that the subject-predicate
form of a statement conveys a truth which is metaphysically ultimate], the relations
” Whitehead, Process and Reality. (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 8 
This should not be taken as some sort of anti-intellectual slant, nor should Whitehead 
be read as somehow advocating a position that could be characterized by naive readings 
of “common-sense" as the final arbiter of philosophical systems. Rather, Whitehead is 
making the point that “in philosophical discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty 
as to finality of statement is an exhibition o f folly.” Whitehead grasps “how shallow, 
puny, and imperfect are efforts to sound the depths in the nature of things,” (Process and 
Reality, p. xiv.) and thus displays an attitude of humility before the facts of experience 
that he finds lacking in the philosophical circles of his day. For Whitehead, the 
experiences of “common-sense” are corrective of philosophical error, though 
philosophical reflection can at the same time make clearer the implications of those 
experiences. This relationship between the abstractions o f philosophy and the 
concreteness of experience is dynamic, with each shaping the other, however, there 
renmains, at the end of the day, this stubborn facts of the world that philosophical schemes 
ignore at their peril. It should also not be assumed that Whitehead is alone in recognizing 
this dynamic relationship. Rather, in Whitehead we see an attempt to incorporate this
between individual substances constitute metaphysical nuisances; there is no place for 
them.” It is precisely this “place” that Whitehead is trying to emphasize. On 
WTiitehead’s view, the method of analysis that takes static substances as primitive and 
then seeks to explain change or relations between ‘substances’ gets the process exactly 
backwards. This is to say, according to Whitehead, one must take change (or process) as 
primitive.
The final point of departure is essentially a reiteration of the first. For Whitehead, 
the ethical theories that are in competition with his own fail the Fallacy of Misplaced 
Concreteness test, generally for two reasons - the misuse or ignoring of common-sense, 
inappropriate metaphysical commitments, or both. Whitehead advances a view of 
character and character development that takes quite seriously both functions of 
common-sense - its role as prephilosophical data to be analyzed and its role as a check 
against abstractions run amok. Though never formally finalized, his system takes virtue 
to be the central feature of an ethical theory that can interpret, analyze, and systematize 
the intuitions of common-sense and that can withstand the weight o f their scrutiny. At 
the same time, it is a theory that presents itself as a competitor to roughly Aristotelian 
styles o f virtue ethics because the metaphysical commitments on which the theory rests 
are fundamentally different.
These departures of Whitehead’s are also informative with respect to three 
important historical philosophical issues: (1) the development and criticism of ethical 
theory in the 19^ and early 20^ century, particularly with regard to the interpretation of
relationship and the difficulties that arise from it into his larger philosophical view.
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classical greek philosophy, (2) the relationship between metaphysics and ethics in that 
development and critique, and (3) possible solutions to what Sidgwick called the Dualism 
of Practical Reason. For Whitehead, (a) one need not conclude that practical reason is 
inconsistent, much less incoherent,'^ (b) the compartmentalization o f ethics and 
metaphysics will fall victim to the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness, and (c) common- 
sense morality can best be incorporated into a systematized ethical theory only by a 
theory which takes character development and the virtues as central
Whitehead understands his project to follow Aristotle in style but not 
Aristotelianism in substance. He is not unique in this approach; such methodologies were 
commonplace in the late IQ*** and early 20"' century, Henry Sidgwick in his defense of 
Utilitarianism and the Cambridge Moralists (William Whewell, F.D. Maurice, et al) in 
their arguments against Utilitarianism and their defense of a Theistic Intuitionism 
proceed with the view that they are following Aristotle, stylistically, and replacing 
Aristotelianism, substantively, with an ethical theory divined from the common-sense 
rationality o f Victorian England. As a successor to this debate, it is not surprising that a 
great deal o f the Whiteheadian corpus is a response, both directly and indirectly, to the 
work of these noted moralists. Which is why it is somewhat odd that Whitehead is 
thought to have been strictly a metaphysician, philosopher of science, and epistemologist 
with little to say of ethics. Given his critical work on the utilitarianisms o f Mill and 
Sidgwick, the deontology of Kant and Green, and the theological ruminations of the
In fact, this is precisely the wrong sort o f question.
II
Cambridge Moralists, it is fairly safe to assume that Whitehead has a least critical things 
to say. I shall actually advance the stronger claim that he has a developed, positive view.
Chapter 2. The Theorists: Henry Sidgwick, The Cambridge 
Moralists, Alfred North Whitehead
A. Henry Sidgwick
Methodologically, Sidgwick takes his project to be the Victorian equivalent of 
Aristotle’s ethical works. As both J. B. Schneewind and Terence Irwin have pointed out, 
Sidgwick sets out to analyze and systematize the intuitions o f the common-sense morality 
o f Victorian England. Sidgwick takes this effort to provide the same service for the 
Victorians that .Aristotle provided for classical Greece; namely, an analysis and 
systematizing of the common-sense moral intuitions of the day. However, Sidgwick has 
a further end in mind. Sidgwick’s end is to advance and defend a conception of 
Utilitarianism against two traditional rivals, Ethical Egoism and Intuitionism. Ultimately, 
he takes his effort to be a fruitful failure. On the one hand, he dismisses Intuitionism as 
less than viable and provides a positive argument in defense of Utilitarianism. On the 
other hand, he observes that his best argument for Utilitarianism does not eliminate all of 
the competitors. Ethical Egoism remains a “reasonable alternative’’ at the end of the day.
The positive contribution should not be underestimated As John Rawls has 
pointed out, Sidgwick provides perhaps the best defense of Utilitarianism to date; far 
superior to that of John Stuart Mill. I agree with this conclusion. However, I will show 
that Sidgwick’s argument depends at crucial moments on some of Mill’s work. I will 
then show how Sidgwick avoids some of the pitfalls that bedevil Mill. Also crucial to
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Sidgwick’s positive argument is his reliance on Hume’s concept of Sympathy. I show 
how he incorporates Hume’s notion for his own ends. Finally, in this chapter I address 
two criticisms of the Dualism of Practical Reason. The first criticism combines criticisms 
made by Thomas Hill Green and Terence Irwin. The second draws together several 
Whiteheadian criticisms.
B. The Cambridge Moralists (Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William 
Whewell, T. H. Green)
Sidgwick and Whitehead share a common foil - the Cambridge Moralists of the 
IQ**" century. The Moralists present a fairly united front both in their attacks on 
Utilitarianism and in their defense of an Intuitionist alternative Simply put, the Moralists 
conclude that “morality provides the crucial evidence that the best explanation of the 
universe as we experience it is a theistic and probably Christian one This conclusion 
comes at the end of a survey of common-sense morality. After discussing Coleridge’s 
view (which the other two share in one respect or another), I will outline the views of 
William Whewell and Green, who argue against Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism and the 
Dualism o f Practical Reason, respectively. I will then turn to Sidgwick’s criticisms of the 
Cambridge Moralists, especially Coleridge and Whewell Finally, I argue that 
Whitehead’s rejection of the Dualism of Practical Reason is quite similar to the position 
advanced by Green, albeit with some important amendments that save Whitehead’s view 
from the criticism he levels at Sidgwick and the Cambridge Moralists, including Green.
C. Whitehead’s positive view
J. B. Schneewind, “Sidgwick and the Cambridge Moralists”, Essavs on Henrv
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Having touched on Whitehead's negative view in the preceding sections, 1 turn to 
his positive views in Part III. Whitehead takes the work o f the early Modems (“that 
phase o f philosophic thought which began with Descartes and ended with Hume") and 
the “two founders of all Western thought” (Plato and Aristotle) as central to this project. 
Like Sidgwick and the Cambridge Moralists before him, Whitehead takes his project to 
be Aristotelian in style. This similarity includes the recognition of a connection between 
metaphysical and ethical commitments. Ideally, for Whitehead, one's ethical theory will 
grow out of the fundamental notions one holds regarding human nature, the constitution 
of the universe, truth, etc Whatever failures may have plagued Aristotle (and Plato), 
Whitehead thinks that they were right about this point. Certain modem philosophers, 
notably Sidgwick, fail to recognize this foundational commitment and as a result fall into 
error. Thus, we can interpret Whitehead's work (e.g.. Process and Realitvl as an effort to 
expound as clearly as possible the metaphysical assumptions that undergird his own 
ethical v i e w s . F r o m  his vantage point, Whitehead is able to argue that contrary to 
Sidgwick, practical reason is coherent.
Finally, I will show how Whitehead's interpretations of final causes, mathematics, 
“the Good," truth, harmony, beauty, and facts and values contribute to his view that the 
proper conception of ethical theory is a virtue approach. Having shown this, I will tum 
briefly to Whitehead’s Cardinal Virtues; Peace, Fellow-feeling, Tolerance, Beauty, and
Sidgwick. Bart Schultz, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 104.
Clearly he himself holds this view. He writes “one of the motives of a complete 
cosmology [is] to construct a system of ideas which brû%s the aesthetic, moral, and 
rdigious imerests into rdation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in 
natural science.”
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Wisdom. I will conclude the project by examining three potential objections to 
Whitehead's views; objections that seem to strike at the heart of the project rather than 
nibble on the periphery. Ultimately, 1 take these objections to fail, but they are 
nevertheless striking examples o f the ways in which one might critique Whitehead in 
particular and any process ethics in general.
Part II: Sidgwick and the Methods of Ethics
Chapter 1: Henry Sidgwick, part one
A. Introduction
John Rawls claims that Henry Sidgwick provides the best argument for a classical 
Utilitarian system that has been advanced to date. He writes that it is "the clearest and 
most accessible formulation" of classical utilitarianism. At the same time, Sidgwick is 
“more aware than other classical authors of the difiBculties this doctrine 6ces " Unlike Mill, 
he attempts “to deal with [the doctrine’s many difficulties] in a consistent and thorough way 
while never departing from the strict doctrine.” Whatever the case may be regarding 
Sidgwick’s place in the pantheon of utilitarian theorists, Sidgwick himself takes the 
project of his Methods of Ethics ultimately to be a failure. In the first edition, his last 
paragraphs are a self-proclamation of his failure. In subsequent drafts he deleted these 
last lines and qualified his failure more narrowly, but he does not abandon the view that 
ultimately his attempt to establish utilitarianism as the sole view that coherently 
systematizes the intuitions of common-sense morality Ails It fidls because the most 
thorough argument fails to rule out all of utilitarianism’s competitors; and worse, fails to 
show how ethical egoism, as Sidgwick conceives this cat^ory, is any less plausible than
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utilitarianism. However, this failure is merely symptomatic of a more insidious problem. 
Since there are two methods o f ethics that explain and systematize the intuitions of 
common-sense morality equally well, and since they are mutually incompatible, 
Sidgwick concludes that practical reason itself is inconsistent in its moral 
recommendations. In this section, 1 examine Sidgwick's peculiar formulation of the 
Principle of Utility and his defense of utilitarianism.
B. The Project
1. An Overview
One of Sidgwick’s primary goals in the Methods o f Ethics is to
1. Establish Utilitarianism as the only ethical theory that adequately 
systematizes the intuitions of common-sense morality.
Sidgwick goes on to write that his object is "to expound as clearly and fully as my limits 
will allow the different methods of Ethics that 1 find implicit in our common moral 
reasoning; to point out their mutual relations; and where they seem to conflict, to define the 
issue as much as possible.” In other words, the book is “an examination, at once expository 
and critical, of the different methods of obtaining reasoned convictions as to what ought to 
be done which are to be found - either explicit or implicit - in the moral consciousness of 
mankind generally: and which, fitxn time to time, have developed, either singly or in 
combination, by individual thinkers, and worked up into systems now historical”
Sidgwick’s other primary goal is to
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2. Refute the Cambridge Moralists, particularly where theistic assumptions are 
required to complete an ethical theory.
Sidgwick approaches the two primary goals simultaneously because the goals are 
closely interrelated. If Sidgwick were able to accomplish (1) in the way that he proposes, 
(2) would be accomplished along the way. As we shall see, however, accomplishing (2), 
where Sidgwick meets a great deal of success, does not accomplish (1), where he meets 
markedly less.
Sidgwick lumps all of the ethical theorizing that has gone before him (as well as that 
of his contemporaries) into three categories'^, each of which is labeled a “Method of 
Ethics”. The three Methods are Ethical Egoism, Intuitional Morality (also known as 
Dogmatic Intuitional Morality), and Universal Hedonism. As noted above, the Cambridge 
Moralists are fitted into the Intuitional Morality category, along with Kant and Aristotle. 
That such disparate views can belong to the same cat%ory is enough to give one pause, and 
Sidgwick’s inclusion of Aristotle in the Intuitional Morality category has been one area in 
which he has been almost universally criticized
Sidgwick was a classics teacher who turned to philosophy, at least in large part, to 
make up his mind about Christianity and its claims about &ith. In this, he shares a 
common career trajectory (encompassing many of the same questions) with T. H Green, 
one of the more accomplished of the Cambridge Moralists and one of Sidgwick’s 
philosophical opponents.
I should note here that he does not include Psychological Egoism, at least as he 
conceives o f it, in any of the three categories. Rather, he advances an argument against 
those who would hold some version of Psychological Egoism separately (and near the 
beginning of the work). We will deal with his Psychological Egoism argument a bit later.
"  See Bart Schultz, "Introduction” Essays on Henry Sidgwick. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pl3ff. for a very nice discussion o f the criticism that has been 
leveled at Sidgwick for his inclusion of ^ s to t le  in this category.
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The category of Universal Hedonism is somewhat less disparate in its membership. 
Here, Sidgwick includes such thinkers as John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bemham, James Mill, 
and John Austin, to name a few. Sidgwick, whose work is more closely aligned with 
Bentham than with J.S. Mill, includes his own work in this category.
More controversy attends the category of Ethical Egoism. Here Sidgwick includes 
the work of Thomas Hobbes as an example of Ethical Egoism It is this iiKlusion that has 
drawn the most comment, at least in part because Hobbes is often cat%orized as being a 
psychological egoist (by David Hume, for example). Yet Sidgwickly explicitly excludes 
psychological egoism fi-om the category. Psychological Egoism is dismissed almost at the 
outset and not even granted status as a proper Method of Ethics. These issues will be 
addressed in somewhat more length later.
While Sidgwick eliminates Intuitional Morality as a competitor to Universal 
Hedonism and does not eliminate Ethical Egoism, not all of the varieties of Universal 
Hedonism or Ethical Egoism are left standing at the end of the day. For example, Sidgwick 
finds J.S. Mill's work untenable precisely because of Mill’s inclusion of quality as a 
normative criterion. He also finds Bentham’s work lacking because Bentham does not 
always take seriously the many difiBculties that a purely quantitative account of 
Utilitarianism Aces. Similar caveats can be ofiered relative to the varieties of Ethical 
Egoism.
If Sidgwick is to accomplish his two goals - establishing Utilitarianism as the only 
ethical theory that adequately systematizes the intuitions of common-sense morality and 
refuting the Cambridge Moralists - he thinks he must first establish some critical tools. The
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first of these - catteries or Methods - I have briefly mentioned above. Two others are a 
working understanding of “common-sense” and a set of evaluative principles that he calls 
“real self-evident principles.” These latter principles are Equity, Rational Prudence, and 
Rational Benevolence
For Sidgwick, “really self-evident” principles are those which (a) can withstand 
careful reflection, (b) are clear and precise, (c) mutually consistent, and (d) capable of 
eliciting agreement fi’om all competent judges.'^ Each of the last three criteria are also given 
more formal monikers. The process of determining clarity and precision Sidgwick calls 
Intuitive Verification; the process of determining consistency is known as Discursive 
Verification; and the process of agreement is called Social or Ecumenical Verification.
For Sidgwick, Utilitarianism ultimately follows fi’om these self-evidem principles 
along with common-sense morality. Sidgwick viewed classical utilitarianism “as following 
from three principles each self-evident in its own right,” namely, the principles of equity, 
rational prudence, and rational benevolence. From these three principles, “when combined 
with the principle that, as reasonable beings, we are bound to aim at good generally and not 
at any particular part of it,” the principle of utility followed "^
One might express surprise that Sidgwick lays out what amounts to an algorithmic 
process for determining “really self-evident” principles. It seems, at least on the surface, 
that if Principle A must undergo such rigorous testing, then it is not really self-evident at 
all but relies on the evidence marshalled in the course o f the investigation. This is, of 
course, supposing that by “self-evident” one means “have need of no other evidence for 
its validity than itself’. However, it seems that what Sidgwick means to do here is to 
differentiate between those principles which seem to be self-evident given a cursory 
evaluation but are not when evaluated rigorously and those principles which actually are 
self-evident, though perhaps fairly complex and thus not immediately clear as self- 
evidem.
“  Schultz, 18
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Given this, an understanding of the use of "common-sense" in 19^ century ethical 
theory is clearly critical to Sidgwick’s arguments. Sidgwick writes of his objective in the 
Methods that it is "to expound as clearly and fully as my limits will allow the different 
methods of Ethics that I find implicit in our common moral reasoning;, to point out their 
mutual relations; and where they seem to conflict, to define the issue as much as possible."^' 
Thus, a grasp of what he takes to be the content of “common moral reasoning ” is clearly of 
great importance.
Here Schneewind is helpful. He writes,
"the central thought of the Methods o f Ethics is that morality is the embodiment of 
the demands reason makes on practice under the conditions of human life, and that 
the problems of philosophical ethics are the problems of showing how practical 
reason is articulated into these demands.”^^
This emphasis on “practical reason ” is not unique to Sidgwick. While it is true that
Sidgwick thought of himself as following Aristotle in certain respects, it is also true that
such connections were drawn by a great many philosophers of the period. That is to say, a
great many of Sidgwick’s contemporaries also thought of themselves as Aristotelians,
systematizing the prephilosophical intuitions of their day. For his own part, Sidgwick felt
that if Aristotle had given us "the Common-Sense Morality of Greece, reduced to
consistency by careful comparison,”’ then why should we not do the "same for mtr morality
Emphasis mine. One also sees the application of the criteria for testing "real self- 
evidence”” in this passage. The process o f expounding “clearly and fully ” is exemplary of 
the Intuitive Verification process and the discovery o f mutual relations (both positive and 
n^ative) is exemplary of the Discursive Verification process.
”  Schultz, II and J. B. Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. 
229.
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here and now, in the same manner of impartial reflection on current opinion”?^  ^ We will 
investigate the lengths to which Sidgwick goes to make this comparison, including the 
places where the analogy clearly fails to achieve all that Sidgwick hopes for it.
Unfortunately for Sidgwick, he tries to reconcile utilitarianism with its traditional 
opponents, finds ethical egoism to be equally reasonable, and winds up arguing that, 
“because of this, no full reconciliation of the various rational methods for reaching moral 
decisions is possible and therefore that the realm of practical reason is probably 
incoherent His self-professed failure to show that his Utility Doctrine is the ultimate 
ethical organizing principle notwithstanding, his allegiance remained fully in its camp His 
difiSculty is to demonstrate that this allegiance to rational benevolence is itself justified. To 
do so would have the effect of establishing utilitarianism as the only theory in the field. 
This he could not do.
2. Methods o f Ethics 
As we have seen, Sidgwick categorizes ethical theories into three Methods of 
Ethics - Ethical Egoism, Intuitional Morality, and Universal Hedonism. But, how is a 
method different from a principle? For example, when is operating within the scope of 
Universal Hedonism different, in fact, fi'om operating under the Utilitarian Principle 
(however that might be defined by a particular Utilitarian)?
The difScuky here is more a matter of a close relation between two concepts than 
anything detrimental to his project. Sidgwick states that a method is a rational procedure for 
determining vs*at it is right to do On this matter, I follow Schneewind who argues that
ibid, 24.
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a principle asserts that some property which acts may or may not possess is an 
ultimate reason for the rightness of acts A method is a regular practice of using 
some property of acts as the property from whose presence or absence one infers 
that specific acts are or are not r i^ t. Since a principle says nothing about a 
procedure for reaching such conclusions about the rightness of specific acts, and a 
method says nothing about the ultimate reason justifying the use of the property 
through winch such conclusions are reached, each plainly requires the other.^^
Schneewind goes on to argue that
the relationship between a method and a principle ... is a direct, or logical one, the 
property appealed to by the method is not merely evidential or criterial but is the 
right-making property. Thus, if, say, the principle is that right acts are those which 
produce genoal happiness, the metkxl must involve identifying the presence of that 
property, and not merely some indicator or it.“
This is not the only difiSculty for Sidgwick's "methods" On first glance, it may 
seem quite an audacious stretch to suppose that all of the ethical systematizing fi'om the 
ancient greeks to the Victorians can be congregated under three heads. Historically this is 
one of the areas in which Sidgwick has drawn some well-founded criticism.
Sidgwick has been roundly criticized for the enormous scope of his category 
headings. Quite controversial is his inclusion of virtue ethics (or “perfectionist" ethics) 
under the heading Intuitional Morality. Sidgwick recognizes this difficulty because he 
offers a brief justification of h. He argues that what is at issue is moral excellence, 
intuitional Morality, he argues, is “the view of ethics which r%ards as the practically 
ultimate end of moral actions their conformity to certain rules or dictates of Duty 
unconditionally prescribed [%., veracity, promise keeping, justice, etc.]." He then goes on 
to suggest that this view of ethics holds that “we can discern certain general rules with really
Schneewind, 121. 
Schneewind, 95. 
“  ibid
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clear and finally valid intuition”. As Schultz points out, this description would entail that 
Intuitional Morality "would seem mostly to cover the deontological alternatives to 
consequentialism, egoistic or utilitarian”^^ . This is precisely the result that Sidgwick is after. 
If he can show that the connecting principle that makes all of these quite disparate theories 
fit into a single heading is itself flawed, then he can eliminate a large number of Universal 
Hedonism’s supposed competitors in one fell swoop However, confusion is spawned 
here, as Schultz goes on to say, "precisely because of his assimilation of perfectionism, 
surely a teleological theory, to this method.” Which is to say that Kant and Aristotle both 
reside in this category; an uneasy marriage at best. Given the disparity between the 
population of Intuitional Morality, it seems likely that Sidgwick could have included 
Psychological Egoism and Ethical Egoism (which are closer thematically than the 
teleological, non-teleological, and deontological denizens of the Intuitional Morality 
heading) had he thought that Psychological Egoism expressed a coherent ethical principle. 
Given the exclusion of Psychological Egoism fiom membership in any of the cat^ories, 
one is left to conclude that Sidgwick felt that it does not embody a proper ethical principle.
Against Psychological Egoism, Sidgwick invokes the work of David Hume and 
Bishop Butler with little further comment.^^ However, he takes some time to discuss
Schultz, 13.
As all of the Cambridge Moralist M  into this category, it is convenient that with a single 
argument he can dismiss them all, and thus accomplish his second primary goal.
Again from Buer; "the available empirical evidence seems to refute even this 
psychological egôiâin o f merely mbtrvateaiiehavior Many normal people appear quite 
frequently to be concerned not with their own greatest good but with the attainment of 
something the pursuit o f which they know or believe to be to their own detriment.” 198.
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Psychological Hedonism, which he takes to be a special case of Psychological Egoism?" 
This move is not without controversy. If C. D Broad is right, and Psychological Hedonism 
is a species of Psychological Egoism, then the dismissal of Psychological Egoism will, 
necessarily, involve the dismissal of Psychological Hedonism, though the converse is not 
true. However, a slightly different interpretation may serve to make clear why Sidgwick 
takes this tack. In analyzing the group of theories that would fall under the head 
“Psychological Egoism”, Sidgwick seems to find that one brand of Psychological Egoism 
almost seems to express a principle that is similar to the one expressed by his own brand of 
Universal Hedonism and to its surviving competitor. Ethical Egoism. The aim of 
Psychological Hedonism seems to be congruent with that of Ethical Egoism because in both 
cases the doctrine would claim that “h is my duty to aim at the greatest possible amount of 
happiness in my own life, and to treat all other objects as subservient to this end ” '^ 
However, it is odd to claim that it is “my duty” to aim at the greatest happiness for myself if 
it is at the same time psychologically impossible for me to do otherwise. It is this oddity on 
which Sidgwick trades. Sidgwick holds the view that no purely psychological theory
C. D. Broad agrees with this view when he writes that Psychological Hedonism is “a 
particular species” of Psychological Egoism. He goes on to say that “it is not the only 
species; one might quite well be a Psychological Egoist without being a Psychological 
Hedonist.” I think this is consistent with the interpretation of Sidgwick that I am 
advancing. Simply put, Sidgwick dismisses Psychological Egoism almost out of hand 
with the exception that he gives some attention to the species of Psychological Egoism 
known as Psychological Hedonism. However, even in this latter case, he does not 
include the view under one of the headings of methods o f ethics. Further, given the 
failure of Psychological Hedonism to express a coherent ethical principle, which he 
thinks he has shown, this lends greater credibility to my interpretation. This is so because 
even thxs4one possibility from the pantheon of theories that could fall under the heading 
Psychological Egoism Ails to survive muster, and it does so precisely because the 
principle upon which it is founded turns out to be one that Sidgwick thinks incoherent.
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(which he takes Psychological Egoism and Psychological Hedonism to be) can entail any 
purely ethical theory (which he takes all of the theories classed under the method headings 
to be.) At the same time, the history of Psychological Hedonism seems to be akin to that of 
Universal Hedonism. In fact, as both Sidgwick and Broad point out, Mill “professed to 
deduce Universalistic Hedonism from Psychological Hedonism." However, Psychological 
Hedonism foils, in principle, to provide such a support, on Sidgwick’s view. The doctrine of 
Universal Hedonism is that it is the duty of each to aim at the maximum happiness of all, 
and to subordinate everything else to this end. But Psychological Hedonism (like 
Psychological Egoism) denies that any agent can desire anything beyond his or her own 
happiness or development Thus, despite Mill’s belief that the doctrine of Universal 
Hedonism can be derived from or supported by Psychological Hedonism, the two theories 
are logically incompatible, on Sidgwick’s view.
The conclusion that can be drawn here, 1 think, is that Sidgwick is ruling out 
Psychological Egoism (along with its special case of psychological hedonism) on the basis 
that it is incompatible with any purely ethical theory. This is so not because Psychological 
Egoism is a mixed theory, involving psychology and ethics, but because it is not an ethical 
theory at all. Because it builds the ethical commitments on the basis of a psycholo^ that 
could not be otherwise, the illusion of duties, for example, is just that an illusion. As such, 
on Sidgwidc’s view. Psychological Egoism (and its variant. Psychological Hedonism) do 
not express a properly ethical foundation principle because they express no ethical principle 
at all. Thus, we can conclude that (b) is Sidgwick’s view.
Broad, 181.
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3. Aristotle and the Survey of **Commom Sense**
Given the wide scope o f Sidgwick’s categories, it should not be too surprising to 
discover that the concept of “common-sense morality” has some play in it as well. In 
fact. Broad writes o f Sidgwick’s project that he “assays no precise definition of common- 
sense morality, and it is actually dubious that a precise account can be given. He writes 
that the improbability that great precision in definition could be obtained is “a reasonable 
inference from a prime maxim o f common sense in ethics, which is not to demand more 
precision or certainty than the subject is capable of.”^^  Clearly, Broad here harkens back 
to Aristotle and his famous assertion in the Nicomachean Ethics that “Our discussion will 
be adequate if its degree of clarity fits the subject-matter; for we should not seek the same 
degree of exactness in all sorts of arguments alike, any more than in the products of 
different crafts.” ”^*
This connection is not merely coincidental Sidgwick goes to great lengths to 
identify his work within the tradition of ethical theory that he sees Aristotle as perhaps 
the prime example - namely “common-sense” moral philosophy. On several occasions, 
Sidgwick makes clear the influence the ancients have on his own work; for example, he 
writes, “I am fully sensible o f the peculiar interest and value of the ethical thought of 
ancient Greece. Indeed through a large part of the present work the influence of Plato
”  Broad, 77 
”  ibid.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. 1094bl2-14, Irwin, translator, 3.
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and Aristotle on my treatment of this subject has been greater than that of any modem 
writer
Terry Irwin suggests that with this claim Sidgwick “probably has two main points 
in mind; (1) the discussion o f questions in moral psychology in books 1 and 2 of The 
Methods o f Ethics, and (2) the discussion o f the different moral virtues in book 3 .'’^  ^ I 
suspect there is a third point, even more basic than these - Sidgwick seeks to establish his 
bom  fides in the field of common-sense moral theory by drawing an analogy between his 
work and that of Aristotle. That such an attempt is necessary is in part a function of the 
philosophical climate in which Sidgwick wrote Plato and Aristotle seem to function 
like touchstones for IQ*** century ethical theorizing. For example. Mill quotes liberally 
from Aristotle and advances several interpretations o f Aristotelian metaphysics, logic, 
and ethics. Another example is Green, who tends to interpret large sections of Aristotle 
with a sort o f Kantian twist. He does this, in part, to support his own ethical views. 
Thus, Mill and Green both make extensive use of Aristotle; in Mill's case as a foil for his 
own view and in Green's as a supporter o f the view he is advancing.
Sidgwick sees an analogy between Aristotle and the ethical intuitions of ancient 
Greece on the one hand, and himself and the ethical intuitions of Victorian England on 
the other. As Aristotle and his ethical works stand as an investigation of the ethical 
intuitions o f ancient Greece, so Sidgwick and The Methods o f Ethics stand in a similar 
place with respect to Victorian England. He writes, “What he [Aristotle] gave us there
Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics. 375 n.
“  Terence Irwin, “Eminent Victorians and Greek ethics”, Essavs on Henry Sidgwick. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p28S.
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was the Common Sense Morality of Greece, reduced to consistency by careful 
comparison. ... Might 1 not imitate this? .. Indeed ought I not to do this before deciding 
on the question whether I had or had not a system of moral intuitions .” ’^ Of this position, 
Irwin goes on to say that ‘In  a large part of The Methods of Ethics Sidgwick follows 
what he takes to be Aristotle's example, reviewing common sense without trying to 
improve on it.”
I will address the connections between Aristotle and Sidgwick; first discussing
briefly Aristotle’s rejection of demonstration in ethics.
“Moreover, what is fine and what is Just, the topics of inquiry in political 
science, differ and vary so much that they seem to rest on convention only, 
not on nature ... Since these, then, are the sorts of things we argue from 
and about, it will be satisfactory if we can indicate the truth roughly and in 
outline; since [that is to say] we argue from and about what holds good 
usually [but not universally], it will be satisfactory if we can draw 
conclusions o f the same sort. Each of our claims ought to be accepted in 
the same way [as claiming to hold good usually], since the educated 
person seeks exactness in each area to the extent that the nature of the 
subject allows; for apparently it is just as mistaken to demand 
demonstrations from a rhetorician as to accept [merely] persuasive 
arguments from a mathematician.” ’^*
That one ought to restrict the expectation of exactness by the sort of subject matter
investigated seems a fairly obvious principle. However, it can be fraught with peril. One
possible difficulty is a slackening of effort on the part of the investigator. While one
might not properly expect the same level of precision from an ethicist exploring the
vagaries of common-sense moral intuitions that one would expect from a geometer
purporting to show a new proof of the Pythagorean Theorem, at the same time one is
Sidgwick, Methods o f Ethics, xix-xx, his emphasis.
Aristotle, I094bl5-17, \Q^A\)\9-21\,Nicomachean Ethics, 3-4.
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right to expect as much precision as the ethicist can muster. On this point, Sidgwick is 
extremely rigorous and suspects Aristotle of some laxity. On Sidgwick’s view, Aristotle 
“records and articulates” the intuitions o f common sense but he does not truly 
systematize or criticize them. According to Sidgwick, this failure is to be expected given 
Aristotle's nonhedonist conception of the good which is so indefinite that “it cannot be a 
basis for criticism o f common sense.”^^  Sidgwick, on the other hand, takes his work to 
be fundamentally an examination of common-sense to test whether or not it is founded on 
genuine intuitions or whether it rests on empiricial assumptions that may be controversial 
and/or false. Further, Sidgwick is of the opinion that in some cases, common-sense 
simply has nothing to say on certain ethical matters. For all these reasons, as Irwin notes, 
it is Sidgwick’s ultimate view that “the principles implicit in common sense cannot 
embody the intuitions [that are] necessary for any satisfactory first principle in an ethical 
system.” If we accept the Utilitarian principle and conjoin it with the intuitions of 
common-sense morality, we then find that the Utilitarian Principle undergirds those 
intuitions and fills in the gaps that common-sense inevitably leaves
But what exactly is “common-sense” morality? Marcus Singer’s work on 
Sidgwick is helpful here. On Singer’s view, we should read “common-sense morality” as 
expressing or characterizing the morality that we all share. This “common-sense” is 
“prephilosophical, if anything is”. Singer arrives at this conclusion based largely on 
Sidgwick’s claim that the term “common-sense” is to be taken “quite empirically, as we
”  Irwin, 289.
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find it in the common thought expressed in the common language of mankind The 
notion that there exists something that can be called “morality” and that is at the same 
time common to all of humankind is controversial, if anything is / ' I also suspect that 
Sidgwick does not have in mind anything quite as naive as this statement would suggest 
In fact, 1 think Sidgwick is trying to pick out two different things with the concept of 
“common-sense morality” The first is a very simple empirical notion that human beings 
have a nature in common with one another that experiences the world in a particularly 
human way; which is to say, like a human being and not like a cat The second is that 
given a general survey, there will be a certain set of intuitions that embody particular 
rules that make some claim about moral truth.
The first of these things seems to emphasize the common sense part of the 
concept. The second seems to focus on the “morality” pan. Even this analysis of 
“common-sense” seems likely to be controversial, so perhaps more clarification is 
needed, if not to dispel the controversy then at least to make the position as clear as 
possible. Even though Sidgwick is a product of Victorian England with relatively little 
exposure to the world beyond the United Kingdom, he should not be interpreted as 
suggesting that there is in fact a “morality” that is shared by residents of Fiji and denizens 
of Cambridge. It is not the “morality” that is ultimately common, rather it is the 
experience of the world, in the most simple way. That is, human beings experience the
^  Marcus Singer, “Sidgwick and nineteenth-century ethical thought”. Essays on Henry 
Sidgwick. (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1992), 77. The Sidgwick quote is 
from Methods of Ethics. 229.
For example, this is the field in which relativists like to play; developing from the 
empirical hyj^theses of cultural relativism to some sort o f view that ethical norms are.
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world in a way peculiar to our species and thus we can be said to have a “common-sense”
of the world The “morality” part of “common sense morality” seems to draw a
distinction between a morality that is imposed by public opinion, say, on the one hand
and “rules that make claims to moral truth, thought to be warranted by a human
consensus, not merely the traditions and usages of a given community ” In the first
instance, the code imposed by public opinion brings with it an enforcement procedure
dependent upon social sanctions. The sanction of “common-sense morality”, on
Sidgwick’s view, transcends any particular community or social setting, and depends on
the “common-sense” of the world. Here, the warrant is human consensus (which is as
unchanging, presumably, as human nature) not public opinion (which is notoriously
capricious). That Sidgwick has something like this in mind seems fairly clear.
Schneewind summarizes Sidgwick’s claims about common-sense, writing that common-
sense is “the rational and moral manifestation of a common human nature experiencing a
common world Again, the connection to Aristotle here is fairly strong, and without
the criticism of the earlier one. Aristotle claims that
With us, though presumably not at all with the gods, there is such a thing as what 
is natural, but still all is changeable; despite the change there is such a thing as 
what is natural and what is not. What sort of thing that [is changeable and hence] 
admits o f being otherwise is natural, and what sort is not natural, but legal and 
conventional, if both natural and legal are changeable? It is clear in other cases 
also, and the same distinction [between the natural and the unchangeable] will 
apply. ... The things that are just by human [enactment] and not by nature differ
and ought to be, culture-specific.
Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press), 226. Sidgwick discusses his conception o f “common-sense” and the 
connection between common-sense and the morality of common-sense in The Methods 
o f Ethics principally on pages 85,215-6,218-9, 337-361, and 423-457.
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from place to place, since political systems also differ; still, only one system is by
iyt3nature the best everywhere.
As Irwin takes pains to note here that, “human communities can survive under 
many sorts o f laws and conceptions of justice, but it remains true that human nature and 
the human good make one conception of justice the correct one It is this sense of the 
nature of “common-sense” and its relation to ethics that Sidgwick is expressing by his 
notion of “common-sense morality.”
4. The Good
Each of the methods of ethics involves at least one fundamental principle that 
purports to specify what the “good” or the “right” is. Within the history of ethical theory, 
some philosophers, e.g., Kant, have sought to demonstrate a logical relationship between 
the actual world, or the “is”, and the claims about duty, responsibility, and good, or the 
“ought”. Kant’s most famous expression on this matter is the logical principle that 
“ought implies can”; or that to say that someone is obligated to do X implies that the 
actual state of affairs is such that the person can do X. Other philosophers, e.g., hard 
determinists o f various stripes, have thought to divine within metaphysical ruminations 
on freedom and determinism a strict restriction on the “ought” of moral philosophy. That 
is, given that the physical universe is in fact deterministic, it makes no sense to say that 
someone ought to have done other than in fact he did.
Sidgwick, however, places very rigid walls between the branches o f philosophy, 
especially between metaphysics and ethics. He writes, “Morality is unique and
Aristotle, I I34b28-ll35a6.
Terence Irwin, “Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics”, Nicomachean Ethics, 336
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irreducible to any descriptive propositions derived from other disciplines.” ’^ Then, 
echoing David Hume, he goes on to assert that "Morality is m i generis, it is a 
fundamental mistake to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’.’”*^ However, this is clearly not to say 
that one cannot speak at all o f “the good” or “the right”, merely that inferences from the 
realm of metaphysics will be o f little help in grasping the purely ethical notion.
As it turns out, on Sidgwick’s account, “right” and “ought” are the simple and 
basic concepts out of which ethical theory is developed. As such, they are undefined in 
terms of anything more basic. As Schultz writes, “According to Sidgwick, there is an 
absolutely simple, fundamental notion common to such ideas as ‘right’ and ought,’ one 
which ‘is too elementary to admit o f any formal definition.’” ’^ Right’ acts are those 
actions that an agent has the most reason to do Because of this connection to rationality, 
Sidgwick understands right’ acts to be objectively right. Further, for Sidgwick, an action 
is not judged to be right because it possesses some property inherent in it. Rather, a right 
act is right because right acts are rational acts. The rationality that is related to ‘nght’- 
ness here is discussed a bit later in the section “Self-Evident Principles ” There, the 
foundation in objectivity is filled out a bit as well. The connection is this; because 
Sidgwick holds a solely quantitative doctrine of Utilitarianism, goodness and rightness 
both can be quantified, theoretically at least. Beyond that, the Principles o f Equity, 
Rational Prudence, and Rational Benevolence spell out the parameters within which 
actions can be weighed in a measured and reasonable way Further, from our discussion
Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics. 78, 509. 
ibid.
Schultz, 32.
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o f common-sense above, we have that human beings possess a common humanity, 
expressed in part in a common rationality. From the application of these principles, 
Sidgwick can be interpreted as connecting ‘the right' and the good' to the common 
rationality o f our common humanity, which is purely a natural human trait, and thus 
objective.
Sidgwick approaches the working definition for good' in much the same way as 
he approaches the one for right'. Ultimately, Sidgwick maintains that good “is what it is 
reasonable to seek to keep, or aim at getting; and Evil is what it is reasonable to seek to 
get rid of or avoid.'"** Having spelled out the good' for an individual agent, the 
Utilitarian in Sidgwick goes on to express a working definition of the general, or ultimate 
good. He writes that the general or ultimate good “is what one would desire if one's 
desires were in harmony with reason and one took oneself to have an equal concern for 
all existence.'"*^ When Sidgwick claims that the good of the agent is what it is reasonable 
to seek to keep or to aim at getting, the end of that action is, in the final analysis, 
pleasure. He fills out this notion a bit more when he writes that “the [utilitarian] 
statement that ‘Pleasure is the Ultimate Good' will only mean that nothing is ultimately 
desirable except desirable feeling, apprehended as desirable by the sentient individual at 
the time of feeling it.”*®
Having claimed that the right' and the good' are intimately connected to 
rationality, Sidgwick then goes on to show how the two admittedly similar notions differ
^  Sidgwick, The Ethics of Green. Spencer, and Martineau. (New York; The MacMillan 
Company, 1902), 331.
49 Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics. 112
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from each other. He writes that 'Ihe concepts of goodness and rightness then represent 
differentiations of the demands of our own rationality as it applies to our sentient and our 
active powers.” '^ Goodness is connected to our sentient powers; rightness to our active 
powers. The “sentient” individual is the feeling individual and the notion of ‘goodness’ 
is tied to those feelings. So, while goodness is tied to rationality, it is also tied to the 
subjective agent who feels in particular ways about particular things and actions. 
Suppose some agent feels great desire and receives great pleasure from gratuitous cruelty, 
for example There can be no external judgment that he does not indeed possess these 
pleasurable feelings and because of the pleasure they convey, that he finds them 
desirable. One need not conclude, however, that these feelings are good feelings, desired 
though they may be. This is so because these feelings and desires are not congruent with 
human reasonableness or rationality. And this is because the feelings and desires are not 
congruent with the ultimate good, of which the individual good is a species. They are not 
congruent with the ultimate good, because the ultimate good is, by definition, related to a 
concern for all o f existence, including that part on the receiving end of the gratuitous 
cruelty. Thus, because the agent is not acting rationally, on Sidgwick’s view, the 
feelings, while pleasurable, are not good.
In a similar way, the notion of ‘rightness’ serves as a rational check on the active 
powers, or the actions of agents. Consider again the case of the gratuitously cruel agent. 
Supposing that he carries through and expresses his desires, the actions will be 
gratuitously cruel. However, those actions can be publicly decried in a way that the
so ibid., 129.
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private feelings cannot. But, Sidgwick means something other than public outcry 
(supposing of course the public in question is behaving rationally). The rational agent, 
possessed of cruel desires, can and will (in virtue of his rationality) refrain from acting 
upon those desires. This is so because though the feelings may very well be outside the 
control o f the rational agent - one feels what one feels - the actions, on Sidgwick’s view, 
are not. The agent will understand that the gratuitously cruel actions that his heart desires 
are not the actions that he has the most reason to do. And, in acting rationally, he will 
refrain from doing them.
From this discussion, it is clear that the differentiation between good’ and ‘right’ 
leads to a further distinction within the set of moral notions. As Schulz points out, for 
Sidgwick, “sometimes moral notions involve the constraints of reason on the active side 
of human nature, and sometimes they involve constraints of reason on the sentient or 
feeling side of human nature.” However, all o f these moral notions have their origins in 
the common-sense of humanity. The following diagram demonstrates Sidgwick’s 
description of these distinctions.
Rationality
I
Moral Notions
Right Good
I  I
active powers sentient powers
figure 1
SI ibid.
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In light of the three definitions - the ‘right’, the ‘good’ and the general good’, 
Sidgwick wants to show what I call the Rational Beings Principle.
Rational Beings Principle: We are bound to aim at good generally, and not
at any particular part of it.
The success of his entire project hangs on the demonstration of this principle. To 
show this, it might be best to set out the working definitions again.
Right actions: Actions that we have the most reason to do.
The Good: What it is reasonable to seek to keep or aim at getting.
The General Good: What one would desire if one’s desires were in
harmony with reason and one took oneself to have an 
equal concern for all existence.
From these, we can begin to get a handle on Sidgwick’s view. On Sidgwick’s 
account, if a human being is rational, she will seek to keep or aim at getting the ultimate 
good. This is so because ‘the Good’ is what it is reasonable to seek to keep or aim at
getting. To act in contradiction to the dictates of reason is to suggest that the agent is in
fact behaving unreasonably. In addition to seeking the Good, if the agent is rational she 
will also seek the General Good. Thus, the rational agent will aim at the good in general. 
This is because (1) this will more express the equal concern for all existence, rather than 
a particular part o f the good, which could be personal good or even the good o f another, 
and (2) concern for the good of all is necessary for an agent’s desires to be completely in 
harmony with reason.
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s. Verification (Intuitive, Discursive, Social or Ecumenical)
Given the foregoing discussions, it should not be surprising that Sidgwick maintains 
a failibilist conception of ethical knowledge. While certain ethical propositions may be true 
of necessity, it is also clear that he holds that certainty is ultimately beyond human grasp.
In an important later work, the appendbc to “The Criteria of Truth and Error,” 
Sidgwick explains that he rejects the claims of both rationalism and empiricism to put forth 
a simple infallible criterion for determining ultimately valid, foundational knowledge. As 
Schultz writes, “instead, he settles for humbler, fallible, methods of verification - that is, 
methods for excluding error.” These methods, when taken together, reduce the risk of error, 
though they do not eliminate it. The methods are Intuitive Verification, Discursive 
Verification, and Social or Ecumenical Verification. I address each of these in order.
Intuitive Verification essentially involves a careful investigation of a belief to 
determine whether or not the belief is “clear and distinct”. By “clear and distinct”, Sidgwick 
means much the same thing Descartes does; with the following proviso - most beliefs are 
beyond the ability of even the best analysis to be rendered clear and distinct. Most ethical 
beliefs fall victim to this proviso. Intuitive Verification is an approach used to best efikct in 
fields like mathematics, where clarity and distinct-ness are matters of logical demonstrations 
o f necessity. This is not to say that Intuitive Verification is limited to these fields, only that 
it achieves its best results there.
Discursive Verification, on the other hand, is a process of comparing belief with 
one another, especially belief that seem to conflict. The aim is to discover if a system can 
be imposed on the ensemble, thus rendering the two apparently conflicting bdiefs
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compatible. This method of investigation is common to ethical discourse; indeed, the 
entirety of The Methods of Ethics is a lengthy examination of just this type The systems of 
ethical beliefs that comprise the various methods of ethics are painstakingly compared 
alongside one another and, through a process of attempted systematization, some methods 
are eliminated. At the conclusion of the investigation, Sidgwick hopes to have either shown 
that only one method remains at the end of the eliminative process or that each of the 
methods can be reduced, finally, to a single one; his hope is Universal Hedonism, of course.
Sidgwick's conception of Social or Ecumenical Verification (I will refer to it only as 
Social Verification from here on)^  ^ could as easily be called Qualified Experts Verification 
because on his account. Social Verification amounts to the agreement of relevant experts. In 
one sense, this is reminiscent of one of Mill’s criteria for discriminating between higher and 
lower pleasures. Given two possible actions or pleasures, the experience of both would give 
the "expert" a better handle on the relative values of the two and thus insure that the 
"expert" is more likely to choose correctly between them. This heart of Sidgwick’s notion 
of Social Verification is the agreement of the relevant experts, "those qualified to judge”. 
This qualification would seem to be aimed at those who would misread the method as 
somehow entailing that an unsavory character who perpetrated both good and evil actions 
would be more tikdy to be able to judge which of the two is the fine action and which is the 
vicious one.
"  Sidgwick uses both “Social” and “Empirical” separately to identify this method of 
verification and at times uses “Social and Empirical”. It is common practice to use the 
latter term. However, I find it a bit cumbersome and so will use only “Social” to identify 
the method.
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For Sidgwick, each of these methods is to be employed when examining an ethical 
belief. The procedure will not always produce the correct resuh. But, as Schultz notes, for 
Sidgwick,
if we find that an intuitive belief appears clear and certain to ourselves 
contemplating it, that it is in harmony with our other beliefs relating to the same 
subject, and does not conflict with the beliefs of other persons competent to 
judge, we have reduced the risk of error with regard to it as low as it is possible 
to reduce it.”
From this we can conclude that all three methods are important, since none is completely 
free from error
6. Self-Evident principles 
One of the central components of Sidgwick's argument is the notion of “real self- 
evident principles”. What is odd is that Sidgwick then launches into arguments designed 
to demonstrate that the principles of Equity, Rational Prudence, and Rational 
Benevolence are, in fact, self-evident. Indeed, more than a few academic eyebrows have 
been raised by the description of these self-evident principles as “real” self-evident 
principles, as if “real” somehow distinguishes them from “false self-evident principles”. 
But this is precisely one o f the things that Sidgwick means to do with “real”; the other is 
to distinguish them from principles that, while expressing true propositions, are not self- 
evident even though they may appear to be so on cursory examination. At the same time, 
it is a contradiction to claim that a self-evident principle is false; or if true, not self- 
evident.”
”  Schultz, 29
”  Given that the data under investigation are common-sense moral intuitions and not 
Euclidean Geometry, for example, it is perhaps easier to see how such a circumstance
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Sidgwick uses “real self-evident principles” to pick out three features of the
principles under investigation. In the first place, the principle truly has only itself for
evidence. In the second place, he means to distinguish it from those principles that are
either not self-evident or are false. Finally, he seems to want to communicate the fact
that a “real self-evident principle” may not seem self-evident, or even true, at first
examination. He writes,
we are thus enabled to see that a proposition may be self-evident, i.e., may be 
properly cognisable without being viewed in connexion with any other 
propositions; though in order that its truth may be apparent to some particular 
mind, there is still required some rational process connecting it with propositions 
previously accepted by that mind/^
As Schneewind points out, Sidgwick here employs an Aristotelian distinction; the 
naturally prior and the prior for human beings. For Aristotle, certain facts obtain in 
nature of necessity but are only discovered after careful analysis, and then become known 
to humankind. For example, Galileo, after careful investigation, can demonstrate that the 
earth revolves around the sun and not vice versa. This fact is a truth known in nature but 
discovered by a person and then not accepted by the majority for some time. As Galileo 
left upon recanting his “heresy” he uttered the immortal E pur si muove, expressing that 
the truth known in nature was true regardless of the confident counterclaims of his 
inquisitors. With his “real self-evident principles”, Sidgwick suggests this sort of 
phenomena exists within common-sense moral philosophy as well.
might come about. In the moral intuition case, principles are Adlibly drawn from 
common experience, and thus can amount to much less or much more than they appear 
on first glance.
" Sidgwick, “The Establishment o f Ethical First Principles”; Schultz, 16.
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Turning now to the principles that Sidgwick takes to be “really self-evident” ones, 
I will address them in this order: Equity, Rational Prudence, and Rational Benevolence. 
Rawls' reduces Sidgwick's understanding of the Principle of Equity into very simple 
terms. Under the Principle of Equity, two persons should not be treated differently 
merely because they are different persons/^ Sidgwick himself recognizes this Kantian 
echo, writing that he “certainly could will it to be a universal law that men should act in 
such a way as to promote universal happiness Thus, Sidgwick has taken his own 
Principle of Equity, and because of its formal nature, shown that it is compatible with the 
Kantian deontological universalizability principle.
The kinship that Sidgwick s Principle o f Equity has with Kant's 
Universalizability Principle lies mostly in its formality. The Principle of Equity simply 
governs action as a principle o f generalizability would, and says nothing, necessarily, 
about the content o f the action or situations, or the treatment of the individuals covered. 
For example, suppose two philosophy faculty members are hired by a university to teach 
the same number o f courses over essentially the same topics. Consider further that in all 
relevant respects, the two new faculty members are the same All that the Principle of 
Equity maintains is that they should receive the same compensation. It does not maintain 
that they ought to be paid a living wage or even that they should be compensated at all It 
merely holds that whatever is done to one ought to be done to the other and whatever is
Schultz, 25.
Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, xx.; See Marcus Singer (Sidgwick and nineteenth- 
century ethical thought) for a very thorough discussion of Sidgwick’s Kantian 
scholarship. Singer notes that Sidgwick is one of the few British philosophers o f the late 
19^ century to have paid close and careful attention to Kant’s work.
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given to one ought to be given to the other The next two principles bear somewhat more 
content, though they too are highly formalized.
On Schneewind's view, Sidgwick’s Principle of Rational Prudence expresses the 
claim that “mere temporal difference should not matter in considering one’s good” .** 
The Principle of Rational Prudence has to do with the good of the agent making a 
decision between two things that are perceived by the agent as of benefit to him or her. 
The Principle o f Rational Prudence maintains that rationality requires us to forego a 
short-term good that conflicts with a greater or higher later good in favor of the later 
good. Temporality, the long-term or short-term proximity of goods in question, can not 
rationally be a factor in deciding between two goods. Which is not to say that it cannot 
be or a factor or that the later good necessarily trumps the shorter-term one. Consider 
two examples. First is the example o f a student with a test upcoming. Given that it is a 
beautiful warm day and the college is quite close to a sparkling blue lake, the student has 
the option of studying or swimming. The immediate but lesser good is a cooling dip in 
the lake, refreshing and relaxing. The future but far greater term good is directly tied to 
the test results - passing the class, a better transcript, better job prospects, etc The 
nearer-term good is both closer and more certain. However, it is more prudent to study, 
aiming at the much greater good that is admittedly more distant but only a little less 
certain The Principle of Rational Prudence merely acknowledges the common-sense 
intuition that it may in Act be more beneficial to await long-term goods than a nearer-
** Schneewind, 110.
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term one; and that, the rational agent will not select the short-term good simply on the 
basis o f proximity.
For the second example, consider again the student. Suppose that upon 
graduation, she is offered a multi-year contract and signing bonus to play professional 
basketball. She is also offered an assistant coaching position at her hometown junior 
high school. Given effort, commitment, and luck, she could work her way up to head 
high school basketball coach and potentially even coach in college. Or she could make 
tremendous money and play professionally (and perhaps even coach upon retirement). 
Given that this is both more lucrative and more certain, this is obviously the more prudent 
choice.
According to Sidgwick, the Principle of Rational Benevolence “aims at the 
happiness o f other human beings generally, and therefore necessarily takes into 
consideration even remote effects of actions This principle is at the very core of 
Sidgwick’s project. Indeed, even on Sidgwick’s view, unless he is able to not merely 
establish the Principle of Rational Benevolence as “really self-evident” but also justify 
his allegiance to the principle on the basis o f  the data supplied by common-sense moral 
intuitions, the project of establishing Universal Hedonism as the most plausible (or only 
plausible) method of ethics fails.
The Principle of Rational Benevolence is an outward-looking principle, rather 
than an introspective one. In this way, it stands as a complement to the Principle of 
Rational Prudence which, for the most part, looks inward toward the good(s) o f a
Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics. 96.
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particular agent. The Principle of Rational Benevolence maintains that goods are not 
isolated and discrete but rather have consequences beyond the individual agent; 
consequences that can, and inevitably do, affect other goods (and ills) within the social 
structure. As such, this principle is other focused rather than agent-focused.
Both the Principle of Rational Prudence and the Principle of Rational 
Benevolence are related to the Principle of Equity. The Principle of Equity provides that 
two individuals in relevantly similar circumstances ought to be treated in relevantly 
similar ways. The Principle of Rational Prudence requires the agent to maximize her 
own good. The Principle of Rational Benevolence requires the agent to maximize the 
others' good. The Principles of Rational Prudence and Rational Benevolence are thus 
opposites (though they can also be understood as complements).
To illustrate the three principles, let us return to our new philosophy faculty 
example. Under the Principle of Equity, one could be paid a pittance for her labors, as 
long as the other was also paid a pittance. The Principle of Rational Prudence, however, 
would maintain that the first new philosophy faculty, call him Socrates, ought to 
seriously consider (and probably accept) the tenured position at the major university that 
pays philosophers on par with the head football and basketball coaches. It does not tell 
Socrates that he should even let his colleague, call him Isocrates, know about the 
opening.
In a similar way, the Principle of Rational Benevolence would require the 
administration to take into consideration the effects of the decision to beggar their 
philosophy professors; including the effects on student learning and student morale.
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7. The Argument in Outline
The rather extensive foregoing discussion has enumerated the many concepts and 
motivations that Sidgwick brings to bear in the Methods of Ethics. Before turning to the 
work of John Stuart Mill (which is an interlude before returning to the conclusion of 
Sidgwick’s argument) it might be helpful to spell out fairly simply what Sidgwick takes 
his argument structure to be We can represent his argument in the following form.
a There exist three self-evident principles (shown to be self-evident as 
described above). These are (1) Equity, (2) Rational Prudence, and (3) 
Rational Benevolence.
b. The Ultimate Good Principle: The ultimate good is what one would desire 
if one’s desires were in harmony with reason and one took oneself to have 
an equal concern for all existence.
c. Reasonable Beings Principle: We are bound to aim at good generally, and 
not at any particular part of it.
d. Therefore, the Principle of Utility is true.
We will accept, for now, that (d) does indeed follow from (a), (b), and (c). The 
argument for this is fairly straightforward, on Sidgwick’s view, and has already been 
anticipated in much of the foregoing discussion. However, the final product belongs later 
in our discussion. Accepting that the line o f implication holds, provided the premises do, 
reveals some rather glaring difficulties for Sidgwick. Obviously, one difficulty will be in 
establishing that three such “self-evident” principles (Equity, Rational Benevolence, and 
Rational Prudence) exist. Beyond that, however, lies the demonstration of the
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Reasonable Beings Principle. This seems to me to be the most contentious of the 
principles And as it turns out, it is the one that Sidgwick ultimately takes himself to fail 
at showing. It seems that the Ethical Egoist could hold a version of the Reasonable 
Beings Principle, call it RBP* that went something like this; We are bound to aim at the 
particular part of good that is represented by our interests, and only secondarily at good 
generally (if at all). This new principle does not seem incoherent and thus, with some 
amendment to (b) in keeping with this new principle RBP*, the principle at bottom of the 
Ethical Egoism category is supported.
The other thing that Sidgwick must do is eliminate Intuitional Morality from the 
field of competition. His argument against Intuitional Morality and his strategy against 
Ethical Egoism depend in large measure on some of the work of John Stuart Mill, 
particularly some of the work he did as background to his own arguments. As we have 
already seen in brief, Sidgwick mostly rejects the arguments. However, the background 
conditions Mill constructs prove quite helpful for Sidgwick’s own aims. Given this fact, 
1 turn now to a discussion o f John Stuart Mill and his argument for his Utility Doctrine. 
The following section will be instructive in at least two ways: first, as a setting for 
Sidgwick’s own argument (in counterpoint to Mill’s), and second, in providing some 
working principles that Sidgwick will use in his own argument. To provide an 
appropriate setting in which to investigate Sidgwick’s responses to Mill, 1 have provided 
what I take to be the most charitable reading o f Mill’s proof of the principle o f utility that 
I could possibly muster.
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Chapter 2. The Utilitarian Enterprise (John Stuart Mill)
A. Mill's Anti-Platonism
John Stuart Mill was a great admirer of Plato. On Mill’s view, no other
philosopher of antiquity so influenced his own philosophic endeavors as Plato However,
Mill regards all of Plato’s positive moral arguments as wholly unsuccessful. He writes,
all valid arguments in Avour of virtue, presuppose that we already desire virtue, 
or desire some of its ends and objects. ... But no arguments which Plato urges 
have power to make those love or desire virtue, who do not already; nor is this 
ever to be effected through the intellect. “
From this sentiment, it should be clear that from the first and the last clause of the quoted
material that Mill’s objection is not simply directed at Plato, but to any who would
advance any positive argument on behalf of virtue. Irwin points this out when he says,
“He [Mill] finds Plato’s arguments unsuccessful, not simply because Plato overlooked
some good arguments, but because no good argument can be given” ^'
Mill considers himself a Platonist but only in the sense that he adopts Plato’s
“Socratic method”. Here, Mill focuses on the critical element in Platonic philosophy,
almost to the exclusion of all else, especially (for example) the Platonic Theory o f Forms.
On Mill’s view, the Platonic elenchus is perhaps the most powerful tool available to
critical philosophy. He writes.
The Socratic method, o f which the Platonic dialogues are the chief example, is 
unsurpassed as a discipline for correcting the errors, and clearing up the 
confusions incident in the intellectus sibi permissus, the understanding which has 
made up all its bundles of associations under the guidance of popular
^  John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works o f John Stuart Mill, XI: 150 
T H Irwin, “The Classical World”, The Cambridge Companion to Mill. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 444
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phraseology. The close, searching elenchus by which the man of vague 
generalities is constrained either to express his meaning to himself in definite 
terms, or to confess that he does not know what he is talking about; the perpetual 
testing of all general statements by particular instances; the siege in form which is 
laid to the meaning of large abstract terms, by fixing upon some still larger class- 
name which includes that andmore, and dividing down to the thing sought -  
marking out its limits and definition by a series of accurately drawn distinctions 
between it and each o f the cognate objects which are successively parted off from 
it -  all this, as an education for precise thinking, is inestimable/^
However great a tool Mill takes the Platonic elenchus to be, it also seems a two-
edged sword On Mill’s view, the “close, searching elenchus" vanquishes generalities,
tests all general statements by reference to particulars, and lays siege to ‘Ihe meaning of
large abstracted terms.” Here again we encounter Mill’s dismissal of positive Platonic
doctrines, especially those which seem at odds with Mill’s own rigorous empircism. He
writes,
I have felt ever since that the title o f Platonist belongs by far better right to those 
who have been nourished in, and have endeavored to practise Plato’s mode of 
investigation, than to those who are distinguished only by the adoption of certain 
dogmatical conclusions, drawn mostly from the least intelligible of his works, and 
which the character of his mind and writings makes it uncertain whether he 
himself regarded as anything more than poetic Ancies, or philosophic 
conjectures.^
Among these poetic fancies and philosophic conjectures, one finds Plato’s Forms. 
As Irwin has pointed out. Mill follows John Grote in rejecting “any search for an answer 
to the objections that the Parmenides raises to the theory o f Forms, claiming that we
Mill, Autobiography, The Collected Works o f John Stuart Mill, 1:25. I leave the 
question of the possibility that the Platonic elenchus might or might not advance Plato’s 
positive philosophic views, noting only that Mill focuses his attention, and his praise, on 
its critical power.
“  ibid.
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ought not to be surprised that Plato raises objections that he does not answer."^ Here
again, Irwin points out a very telling moment in Mill's own translations o f the Platonic
corpus noting that in the preface Mill "suggests that it is hopeless to attribute definite
positive views to Plato, except on issues of philosophical method
Suffice it to say. Mill clearly sees a need to distance himself from those aspects of
Platonic philosophy that might give aid and comfort to the ontological status o f abstract
ideas From what has been said in the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that, for
Mill, the particular has ontological priority to any general idea that might be drawn from
it This point is o f such importance for Mill to communicate that in the course of his
demonstration of the Principle o f Utility in his Utilitarianism, he takes a moment to
assure the reader that "happiness” o f the individual and the general happiness, though
composites or aggregates, are not abstract ideas, but concrete wholes '^ In his discussion
of Plato, Mill goes so far as to discount the value or use of abstract objects at all,
relegating them to the role of spurious props of religious and philosophical dogma
Ultimately, he concludes that there are two Platos; not in the sense that there were
two ancient philosophers who together penned the Platonic corpus, but in the sense that
one can distinguish two competing views in the works of one man He writes.
There are thus, independently o f minor discrepancies, two complete Platos in 
Plato -  the Sokratist and the Dogmatist -  o f whom the former is by far the more 
valuable to mankind, but the latter has obtained from them much the greater 
honour. And no wonder; for the one was capable o f being a useful prop to many a
64 Irwin, Cambridge Companion to Mill, 447 
ibid., 446.
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man's moral and religious dogmas, while the other could only clear and 
invigorate the human understanding/"^
Thus, we can conclude that Mill, though quite taken with the critical work to be done by 
the “Socratic method”, was almost entirely dismissive of Plato's positive solutions to the 
questions that arose from his use of the elenchus. Hence, judging from Mill's own 
assertions about himself, we can conclude further that there are two accurate, though 
limited, self-descriptions o f Mill's philosophy; on the one hand we have Mill, the critical 
Platonist, and on the other we have Mill, the doctrinal anti-Platonist -  especially as 
regards the theory of Forms or abstract objects.
B. Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible 
John Stuart Mill's “proof’ of the Principle o f Utility is often readily dismissed as 
flawed, perhaps fatally so Even those of Mill's admirers who are convinced that 
something like the Principle of Utility actually captures the “sole criterion” for judging 
conduct seem to believe that Mill's “proof’ in chapter four of Utilitarianism is “famously, 
indeed disastrously, rudimentary " (John Skorupski), or have offered pseudo-justifications 
for it by suggesting that “Mill's Utilitarianism was not written as a scholarly treatise but 
... for a popular audience" (Wendy Donner). Those otherwise convinced that the 
Principle of Utility is the most plausible explanation of moral sentiments and the conduct 
which arises from them (e.g., John Skorupski and Wendy Donner, to name but two) often 
try to prop up the proof from Chapter Four o f Mill's Utilitarianism with interpretations 
that import premises from elsewhere in the Millian corpus.^
® V IF;x I:415
^  Donner, for example, addresses the critique that NfiU abandons true utilitarianism by
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Mill's detractors tend not to be quite so careful in their explication of Mill’s proof 
or in their search for the most plausible reading of it Samuel Taylor Coleridge dismisses 
the proof almost at its outset by simply pointing to what he takes to be a blatant 
equivocation on “desirable”. Certain other of Mill’s critics (and some of his harshest) 
claim that he abandons the utilitarian doctrine altogether with his introduction of quality 
as a summable feature alongside quantity in the utilitarian calculus The later Cambridge 
Moralists join the fray by arguing from theological premises that Utilitarianism must be 
false and as a result fail to appreciate the finer points of Mill’s argument which they take 
as a threat to the theological ends they wish to advance. Here, Sidgwick is again 
important for the care he takes is outlining his own view of utilitarianism; a view that 
differs at significant points from Mill’s but one which utilizes those parts of Mill’s 
argument that Sidgwick finds helpful. For this reason, Sidgwick - supporter and detractor 
- can be seen as one of the most significant reformers of pre-20* century utilitarian 
theory.
In this section, 1 outline the proof Mill offers for the Principle of Utility in chapter 
four o f Utilitarianism. In the course of that explication, 1 indicate where difficulties have
adding quality as a factor in the utility calculus by arguing that quality, like quantity, is an 
empirically discoverable, natural element and thus that while Mill’s calculus is more 
complex than his predecessor Bentham’s, it nevertheless remains an empirical enterprise 
In a similar fashion, Skorupski offers an informative defense of Mill’s warrant for the 
analogies (e.g., visible; seen :: desirable desired) that revolves around his apparent criteria 
for Primitively Normative Dispositions. Briefly, the argument is that the mialogies from 
visible seen and audible. heaid to desirable desired hold because the relationship 
expressed in each pair o f relata satisfies the Primitively Normative Dispositions criteria. 
Sidgwick joins this restoration project, and indeed could plausibly be considered to be the 
one who started it, by explicating with some care those “self-evidem” principles that must 
obtain as antecedents to hfiU’s final conclusion
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been seen to arise and where the argument has been shored up by subsequent utilitarian 
theorists sympathetic to Mill. I will turn to address the difficulties in more depth Finally, 
1 will turn to two final criticisms that 1 find to fatally compromise Mill’s proof even 
taking into account the work of subsequent apologists. Whitehead, for example, calls 
into question two essential arithmetic operations within the calculus and in so doing, calls 
into question the very naturalism that Mill understands to underpin his theory.
Mill begins by claiming that the “questions of ultimate ends do not admit of 
proof " This claim is taken to cover both the first principles of knowledge and the first 
principles o f conduct. Knowledge and conduct, being prima facie different things. Mill 
questions whether the same faculties that human beings naturally possess apply to 
supporting claims of first principles in both. He notes that claims about first principles 
are claims about matters of fact, and as such, the plausibility of those claims can be 
Judged by a direct appeal to those faculties that “judge of fact.” The question then 
becomes, what human faculty addresses the question of conduct? On Mill’s view, it is 
the mind that addresses claims about first principles, whether of knowledge or of 
conduct. Both knowledge and conduct reflect states o f mind. The difference is the 
manner in which appeal is made relative to proof procedure. With matters o f fact, the 
first principle under examination may be subject to direct appeal to faculties o f the mind. 
With “questions of practical ends”, the appeal is always indirect. However, Mill argues 
this is all that is required.
If questions o f first principles of conduct are questions of ends, then they are 
questions about what things are desirable, on Mill’s view. That is to say.
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[I] "Questions about ends are questions about what things are desirable.”
This, then, is the framework into which Mill introduces the thesis to be defended. The 
framework can be illustrated as follows;
Of Knowledge
Direct appeal to 
faculties that judge of 
fact
First Principles
Figure 2
Of Conduct
Indirect appeal to 
faculties that Judge of 
desire
Mill’s thesis is that the Principle of Utility is not only a first principle of conduct but that 
it is the first principle of conduct.
Since first principles of conduct do not admit o f  direct demonstration, the 
Principle of Utility will not admit of direct demonstration. Further, at issue in the 
indirect demonstration of the Principle of Utility is its plausibility .*’
We come now to the thesis:
[Thesis] The utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, and the only thing 
desirable, as an end.
It must be noted at the outset that Mill has two things to demonstrate here, and not 
one. The thesis can be subdivided into Mill’s two conclusions as follows:
*’ This last can be called the Believability Criterion since Mill claims that, given the 
impossibility of direct, deductive demonstration, we must then ask what is required "of
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[Thesis 1] Happiness is desirable as an end, and 
[Thesis 2] Happiness is the only thing desirable as an end 
Mill argues for [Thesis I] before turning to argue for [Thesis 2], One of the 
infamous sections o f Mill's proof greets the reader at the very outset. The proof depends 
on an analogy that goes like this; “The only proof capable o f being given that an object is 
visible is that people actually see it The only proof that a sound is audible is that people 
hear it; ... the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that 
people do actually desire it.” This analogy can be represented as follows:
visible : seen 
audible : heard 
desirable : desired
To avoid confusion, I will separate what I take to be the two premises that Mill 
incorporates into this single passage. For Mill, there are two analogies, though both are 
o f the same type.
[2] (Analogy I ) visible : seen :: desirable : desired, and
[3] (Analogy 2) audible : heard :: desirable : desired
It does not seem prudent to assume that Mill is doing anything other than adding a second 
analogy for emphasis. “Audible” and “visible” clearly seem to refer to the same sort o f 
thing; that is, bodily sensual experience. Further, if this is the case, then Mill has given 
two analogies, either o f which would suffice for his purposes
this doctrine... to make good its claim to be believed.”
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It is also appears that Mill has suggested how one might move from one category 
of First Principles to the other Notice that both visible and audible are instances of sense 
perception, the faculty which judges of matters of fact. Instances of audibility and 
visibility fall under First Principles of Knowledge. So, Mill can be interpreted as 
providing a foundation for his efforts to establish the Principle of Utility as the First 
Principle of Conduct. This relationship can be illustrated as follows;
First Principles
Of Knowledge
Direct appeal to 
faculties that judge of 
fact
audibility, visibility 
analogies
O f Conduct
Indirect appeal to 
faculties tfiat judge of 
desire
fig u res
Of course, it is precisely at this point in the argument that criticism begins in earnest. 
And it is because of this crossover work that the analogies are doing that Coleridge and 
G. E. Moore each advance their criticisms o f Mill’s project. Coleridge’s argument can be 
put rather simply - he argues that the analogy does not hold; at least it does not hold for 
the purpose that Mill needs for it to Coleridge argues that Mill equivocates on 
“desirable”, in one instance meaning “actually desired or capable o f being desired” and in 
another meaning “worthy o f being desired”. This dilemma for Mill is similar to the 
dilemma that Moore identifies. Moore argues that Mill commits a Naturalistic Fallacy 
by positing an analogous relation between natural goods - hearing, sight - and non-natural
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goods - desirability. In both cases. Mill must either show that both are natural goods or 
that no equivocation has occured from audibility and visibility on the one hand to 
desirabilit)' on the other. Here, John Skorupski s work is helpful.
One possible defense of Mill is to argue that his critics, especially Coleridge and 
Moore, misread the analogies. On this sort of view, one might argue that it is clear that 
the connection between desirability and desire is not as close a connection as the one 
between audibility and hearing or visibility and seeing/'" Suppose all that Mill needs for 
the argument to go through is that each of the pairs offered in the analogy satisfy certain 
criteria to enable the proposition expressed to properly be called a Primitively Normative 
Disposition. On Skorupski’s view, one can find in Mill "three criteria of the primitively 
normative”. He writes, “Primitively normative dispositions are those which;
(a) are discovered by careful examination of our consciousness and practice to 
play a normative role in our thinking;
(b) cannot be derived from, and can be reflectively harmonised with, other such 
dispositions; and
(c) are not subversively explicable.”"
If we suppose (I) that Mill is trying to point out the primitively normative character o f 
the dispositions captured by the analogies, (2) that this is all that Mill needs for his
^  Of course, this does not address a further problem with the Millian view. Presumably 
there are countless visible things that will never in fact be seen Here we understand 
“visible” to mean “capable o f  being seen”. If this is the case, then it is simply false that 
the only evidence that something is visible is that people actually see h. My thanks to Dr. 
Kenneth Merrill for his guidance here.
John Skorupski, “Introduction: The fortunes of liberal naturalism”. The Cambridge 
Companion to Mill. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 12-13
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argument to go through, and (3) that the dispositions captured in the analogies actually 
are primitively normative, then we will have succeeded in showing that Mill neither 
equivocates, as Coleridge charges, nor confuses different types of goods, as Moore 
suggests.
Mill follows the analogies with a formal conditional that elaborates further the 
categories of First Principles defined earlier while at the same time advancing the 
argument to its next step Mill writes.
Conditional: If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were 
not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever 
convince any person that it was so.
The perhaps more substantive aspect of this conditional is that to meet Mill's own 
Believability (or plausibility) Criterion, he must satisfy two conditions. They are,
[4] If the end (which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself) were not an end in 
theory nothing could ever convince any person that it was so, and
[5] If the end were not an end in practice nothing could ever convince any person 
that it was so.
These can be rewritten more helpfully as,
[4*] If convinced, then the “end” is an actual end in theory, and
[5‘] If convinced, then the “end" is an actual end in practice.
So, we now we have that if both [4] and [S], or alternatively [4'] and [S'], can be shown, 
then the end “which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself' is an actual end This is 
the approach that Mill takes to the next stage in the demonstration.
58
Mill restates his argument, recalling both the assumption that First Principles do 
not admit o f direct proof and the analogies with which he began by claiming that “no 
reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person 
desires his own happiness.” So, the reason that the Utilitarian Doctrine is supposed to be 
plausible is that each person desires his or her own happiness. This Mill takes to be a 
matter of fact; and if it is a matter of fact then it belongs under the first principle category 
“Of Knowledge”, and “we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all 
which it is possible to require.” For the sake of clarity, let us add as a premise Mill's 
claim that,
[6] Each person desires his or her own happiness.
Mill seems to think that [6] is sufficient to satisfy both [4] and [S]. That each 
person desires his or her own happiness. Mill takes as fact. This “fact " applies both to 
theory and practice. That is to say, each person desires his own happiness in practice and 
each person desires her own happiness in theory. If [6] indeed satisfies both conditionals, 
then Mill takes the following conclusions to follow straightaway;
[7] Happiness is a good,
[8] Each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and
[9] Therefore, the general happiness is a good to the aggregate o f all persons.
Now, it seems clear enough that Mill takes [7] and [8] to follow from [6]. This is so 
because he claims that
No reason can be given ... except that each person desires his own happiness.
This being a fact, we have all the proof it is possible to require that happiness is a
good, that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general
happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons (Emphasis mine)
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The antecedent of the emphasized "this" is linked directly to the reason expressed in [6] 
"Each person desires his or her own happiness" What is not as clear is from which of 
the previous statements [9] is supposed to follow; from [6], [7], and [8] or from [6] alone 
Because [9] concludes the listing that began with [7] and [8], one could be led to think 
that [9] follows directly from [6], However, Mill inserts the "therefore” (emphasized 
above) into this clause, suggesting that [9] follows from [6], [7], and [8] conjointly.
1 take it that the former is the case; [9] follows from [6] directly and that Mill does 
not appeal to the intervening [7] and [8] to argue for [9], This is so because Mill opens 
this section of the demonstration by stating that “No reason can be given why the general 
happiness is desirable, except that each person desires his own happiness.” The second 
clause is [6] and offered as the sole reason to suppose that the general happiness is 
desirable. Thus, it would seem that [9] follows from [6] alone.
Having now waded through this section of the proof we come to Mill's 
intermediate conclusion, namely [10] “Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends 
of conduct and, consequently, one of the criteria of morality.” (Emphasis his) In other 
words, we have satisfied Thesis 1 - "Happiness is desirable as an end" This, however, 
has not satisfied Thesis 2 - "Happiness is the only thing desirable as an end”.
Before turning to  Thesis 2, I will discuss the problem with the notion o f the 
"aggregate of all persons”. There are two troubling aspects of this concern, both 
illustrated by Whitehead. The first has to do with the ontological status o f this 
“aggregate”. The second with the actual summing of happinesses. Simply put, how do 
dissimilar happinesses become additive into one sum of general happiness? And, is the
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“aggregate” something that can “have” a Happiness? Or, in another way, presumably it 
makes sense to speak of the happiness that an Olympic athlete experiences when she 
triumphs in her sport and it makes sense to speak of the happiness that a graduate student 
feels upon the completion of his degree. But, is there a “happiness” that is the sum of 
these two individual happinesses that then the aggregate (in this case two) of persons can 
experience? Further, there is the question about the status of the aggregate made up of 
the two people Is it something that can have a happiness?^^
On Mill’s account, the thing that must be shown if it is to be demonstrated that 
happiness is more than merely a good, but rather is the good, is to show that people never 
desire anything other than happiness. The goal, then, is to show that happiness is the sole 
criterion of morality. We can formalize the condition that Mill takes to be necessary, and 
sufficient for this demonstration. The actual expression of the conditional is that “it [is] 
necessary to show that [people] never desire anything else ” From this we have:
[11] Desire for nothing other than happiness -> happiness is the sole criterion of 
morality.
However, Mill also uses the following formulation at times
[12] Desire for other things -> happiness is not the sole criterion o f morality.
Whitehead argues briefly that the Utility Doctrine ignores the grave problem with 
summing dissimilar happinesses. Indeed, he suggests that such a sum is actually 
impossible and very likely meaningless as a concept. However, even if it be granted that 
such disparate happinesses could be summed up into a general happiness, he argues that 
the supposition that there is an aggregate that could be said to have this general happiness 
requires Mill to violate his own denial of abstract objects, be they Platonic or not. Mill, 
at least, recognizes this potential “aggregate” objection himself. As he turns from 
showing that happiness is g  good to showing that it is good, he briefly addresses the 
concern. However, since this recognition and address happens a bit fUrther into the
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It is this second formulation that Mill sets out to use to demonstrate Thesis 2. While Mill 
is not explicit about [11] and [12] being biconditionals, it seems that they must be in 
order for the demonstration to go through and avoid circularity. For example, if in [11] 
we discover that happiness is not the sole criterion of morality, then by contraposition, we 
discover that there must be a desire for something other than happiness. Since Mill uses
[12] to advance his argument as well, then we have that if we discover that happiness is 
not the sole criterion of morality then there must be a desire for something other than 
happiness; and on account of this, we discover (by [12]) that happiness is not the sole 
criterion of morality. However, if [II] and [12] taken together form a biconditional, then 
it is appropriate for Mill to appeal at one time to the assumption that happiness is not the 
sole criterion of morality (the negation of the consequent o f [ 12]), at other times to appeal 
to the antecedent of [11], and at still others to assume the antecedent of [12] in order to 
force a reductio.
The argument proceeds apace with the assumption that perhaps happiness is not 
the only thing that is desired His example is virtue. Perhaps virtue is desired. If virtue 
is desired, then virtue is an end. To Mill’s credit, he does not assume simply that virtue is 
desired, but that it is "desired disinterestedly, for itself.” In this way, virtue is an actual 
competitor with happiness and if shown to be an end equivalent to happiness, then 
happiness will fail to be the sole criterion o f morality. Mill then makes virtue an even 
stronger competitor. He adds that if one does not love virtue as a thing desirable in itself  ^
then "the mind is not in a right state, ... not in the state most conducive to the general
demonstration o f the second thesis, 1 will deal with it more fully there.
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happiness.” Thus, if one does not love virtue as an end in itself  ^ then one is actually 
foiling to exemplify the Utilitarian Doctrine. However, Mill does not take this strong 
position regarding the status of virtue to indicate a “departure from the happiness 
principle, in the smallest degree.”
Mill quickly introduces a distinction between ends that involves the whole/part 
relation and the means/end relation - those ends that occur as both means to and parts of 
another end and those ends are neither means to nor parts of another end. Virtue, 
according to Mill, is not naturally and originally part o f the end, happiness. Given that it 
now occupies the lofty position as a “desired and cherished” part of happiness, it must 
have been able to become a part, though it did not have this position originally Thus, 
according to Mill, virtue must originally have been associated with happiness as a means. 
This is so because Mill holds that if X  were not originally a means, then it “would be and 
[would] remain indifferent.” This is not the case with virtue. Virtue is now part o f the 
end, so it could never have been indifferent to it. Therefore, it must always have been 
associated with happiness, first as means and now as part. Upon becoming a part of the 
end h is to be expected that virtue should come “to be desired for itself, and that too with 
the utmost intensity.” Thus, the desire for virtue is not a desire for a different thing than 
happiness, but is as much the desire for happiness as is “the desire for health.” In this 
way. Mill takes himself to have eliminated all possible competitors to happiness for the 
title o f sole criterion o f morality. Happiness is a composite end, made up of all those 
things that are properly desired for themselves but which are in foct parts o f  happiness. 
Thus, any desire for one o f those composite parts, e.g., virtue, is a desire for happiness.
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It is at this point that Mill addresses the aggregation concern. However, rather
than address the notion of an “aggregate” as it relates to a group of people, he discusses it
as it concerns the collected parts of the general happiness. Presumably he supposes that
mutatis mutandis, the things he says here will cover the difficulties that attend the
concept when relating it to people. He begins with the following claim;
[13] Happiness is not an abstract idea but a concrete whole
In support of this claim. Mill offers the following statement of his naturalism:
Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources o f happiness, if there 
were not this provision of nature by which things originally indifferent, but 
conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive 
desires, become in themselves sources o f pleasure more valuable than the 
primitive pleasures, both in permanency, in the space of human existence that 
they are capable of covering, and even in intensity 7^
What we have here is in many ways a recapitulation of what we have seen to this point.
Mill's example of virtue is instructive here. We have seen how virtue, though originally
indifferent to happiness, has become a part of it. According to Mill, this happens because
although virtue and happiness were originally and naturally distinct, they were related
or associated with one another in the relationship o f means and ends. Though virtue itself
was and is an end, it was an end conducive to the further end of happiness and is now a
part o f that end This metaphysical structure o f means and ends is a happy provision of
nature, on Mill’s view; else “life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of
happiness.” So, from this we can assume that Mill’s naturalism, though mentioned only
sporadically within the proof o f the principle o f utility, is at the same time a critical
foundation assumption.
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Having reasoned to this point. Mill concludes that from all of the preceding 
considerations, we have arrived at our destination; namely that “there is in reality nothing 
desired except happiness.” Thus, Mill takes it that he has shown not only Thesis 1 - 
“Happiness is desirable as an end,” but also. Thesis 2 - “Happiness is the only thing 
desirable as an end”. He helpfully recapitulates his demonstration in the form of 
conditionals that are satisfied in turn. In the first case, [a] if human nature is constituted 
as to desire nothing which is not either part of happiness or a means of happiness”, then 
we know that these things are the only things desired. From there we have [b] If [a] is the 
case, “happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by 
which to judge of all human conduct.” And finally, [c] it follows from [b] that happiness 
“must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole.” Since Mill 
thinks we have all the proof we can get, and all the proof required in virtue of the fact that 
human beings desire happiness, then [a] follows, and from [a], [b] and then [c].
While at first glance, this may look like only a restatement of the case that Mill 
had made earlier, a subtle addition has been made to it. Earlier we were concerned with 
the “aggregation of people” that culminated the demonstration of Thesis 1. After Mill 
has discussed the provision of nature in his discussion of the composite of aggregates that 
comprises happiness in Thesis 2, we might still be left to wonder how in fact such a 
provision of nature might function in the case of the aggregate of people fi’om Thesis 1. 
However, in this restatement of the proofs Mill makes an important addition that sheds 
light on that question. Just as there was an analogy fi’om audibility to desirability to open
^  Mill, 86.
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the proof, so to an analogy concludes it. The analogy in the latter case is a part/whole 
analogy that can be represented as follows;
Analogy
the parts o f happiness : the whole of happiness 
the individuals experiencing happiness : the aggregate of individuals 
This, then, is the way in which I suspect Mill might answer the earlier potential objection. 
The question remains, however, whether this final analogy holds. Since I find this 
objection to be one of the most problematic for Mill, I will leave it for last. Now, I turn 
to elaborate on those portions of the argument where Mill’s detractors have weighed in 
against him and where Mill's apologists have attempted to shore up his argument The 
obvious place to begin is with the analogies from the outset of the proof.
C. The Analogy Problem
Let us return to that earliest part o f the argument where criticism has historically 
begun in earnest; the opening analogies o f audibility and visibility to desirability; 
Coleridge’s charges of equivocation and Moore’s Naturalistic Fallacy. Hopefully, it has 
become somewhat more obvious why these analogies are so important for Mill’s project. 
Having divided the category of First Principles into two subcategories • Of Knowledge 
and Of Conduct, Mill has to reunite the two to establish that the Greatest Good is an end 
in theory and in practice. Further, by founding his demonstration on the solidly 
empirical matters of fact that are the objects o f  First Principles o f Knowledge, Mill takes 
himself to have introduced a measure of demonstrability into questions o f First Principles 
of Conduct. Or, Mill has answered the question he posed at the outset, “Can an appeal be
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made to the same faculties (as for First Principles of Knowledge) on questions of 
practical ends?” with a “Yes.” If the analogies between audibility/being heard, 
visibility/being seen and desirability/being desired hold, then Mill can argue, for the 
moment at least, that First Principles of Conduct have the same firmly empirical basis as 
First Principles of Knowledge are acknowledged to have/^ Thus, when Coleridge and, in 
a different way Moore, call into question the analogies, they are striking at the heart of 
the Millian project. Should either Coleridge or Moore succeed in their efforts. Mill’s 
project fails.
Coleridge argues that to say that X  is “desirable” is to say something other than
that % is in fact desired by some or even all people; that is, that it is worthy of being
desired. He writes o f Mill’s project,
there is an equivocation in the main word of the definition, viz., desirable, by 
means of which you assume all that ought to be proved. ... For desirable means 
either that which actually I do desire, or that which I know I ought to desire.... You 
preassume, 1 say, that Good is nothing more than a reflex idea of the mind after a 
survey and calculation of agreeable or delightful sensations.
So, Coleridge is pointing out that there seem to be two senses of “desired” that
could be employed here. The first is an empirical claim - % is desirable just means that
See Figure 3.
This may be one o f Mill’s most elegant arguments. Recall that the audibility and 
visibility analogues are subject the First Principles o f Knowledge and as such are Matters 
of Fact admitting of direct demonstration. Recall also that the desirability analogue is 
under the First Principles o f Conduct heading and is so not accessible by direct appeal 
But, if the analogies hold, it follows that desirability is subject to the same certainty o f 
demonstration because it has the same status as audibility and visibility. Though 
desirability (a Matter o f Conduct) is inaccessible of its own, by means of carefully 
selected Matters o f Fact (audibility, visibility), it has the same level of accessibility as 
they.
S T Coleridge, Philosophical Lectures, 152-3
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someone actually desires X, or that X  is capable o f being desired by someone. The 
second, on Coleridge’s view, is a normative claim - %i s  desirable means that X  is worthy 
of being desired by some moral agent On Coleridge’s account, the empirical claim is not 
equivalent to the normative claim and it would have to be for the analogy to hold. Or, put 
in another way, each of the analogies above would need to be recast in the following 
form;
[Coleridge 2’] visible : seen :: desirable (e) : desired (e) :: desirable (n) : desired 
(n), where (e) represents the meaning of “desirable” in the 
empirical claim and (n) represents the meaning of “desirable ” in 
the normative claim 
The adjustment to make [3] into [Coleridge 3’] should be obvious 
[Coleridge 3’] audible : heard :: desirable (e) : desired (e) :: desirable (n) : desired 
(n)
If the analogy held from (e) to (n), then the proof would be able to proceed. 
However, Coleridge argues that it fails because it fails to hold from (e) to (n) and this it 
does because for something to be “desirable (n)” it must be inherently desirable or worthy 
of being desired. In the former case. Mill cannot appeal to desirability inherent in the 
thing desired because this would clearly invalidate the analogy. In the latter, it would 
seem that to argue that X  is desirable because it is desired and that means that X  is worthy 
of being desired serves only to skip the (e) step in the analogy. If one were then to 
answer the question why X  is worthy o f being desired with the statement that X  is desired, 
it would seem that a very neat circle has appeared.
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For Coleridge, Mill must be able to argue for [Coleridge 2’]. This is so because, 
on Coleridge’s view. Mill must be able to bridge the gap between the “empirical” use of 
“desirable” and its normative use. That Mill does not offer such an argument is clear from 
a survey of the Millian corpus. However, the anti-utilitarian Coleridge ultimately argues 
that the argument cannot be made.
On the other hand, if we cast Coleridge’s critique in these terms, we can see how 
Moore’s distinction between types of goods can be seen as closely connected with that 
critique. In fact, it seems that Moore’s critique may be seen as a special case of 
Coleridge’s. However, reminding ourselves of Moore’s distinction between natural 
goods and non-natural goods may be of some help is assessing Mill’s alleged failure. We 
can ignore the distinction “natural” and “non-natural” for the moment and grant simply 
that there are two types o f goods, whatever they may be.^ Let’s call them Good, and 
Good}. This would still appear to cause difficulties for Mill’s analogies. However, if 
those things that could be classed under the heading Good, satisfy the conditions o f being 
Primitively Normative Dispositions and those things classed under the heading Good} 
similarly satisfy the conditions, then one could analogize between them, provided that the 
relationship between relata that one is trying to illuminate is the Act o f being Primitively 
Normative Dispositions. Now, if we reinstate our “natural” and “non-natural" distinction 
from earlier, we are confronted with a type of Good, and Good} situation. Here again.
^  One reason for ignoring the “natural/non-natural” distinction is that nomenclaturally, it 
is not at all clear that Mill means the same thing by “natural ” as Moore. For Mill, it 
seems sufficiem to label “natural” those normative things that are properly Primitively 
Normative Dispositions. Mill would not accept, I suqiect, that the normative 
“desire/desirability” picks out anything other than a natural good, in Moore’s sense.
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recognizing both classes of things as goods, we are left to ask if they reflect Primitively 
Normative Dispositions. If so, the analogy is sound, at least insofar as Moore’s criticism 
is concerned This is why 1 mentioned earlier that we can take Moore’s critique to be a 
special case o f Coleridge’s. For Coleridge, the issue is an equivocation, whether 
natural/non-natural or empirical/normative, or whatever, on the word “desirable”, as it is 
related to “audible ” and “visible ”. This is just to say that Coleridge’s critique seems 
broader; and broad enough to include at least the important part of Moore’s. Thus, if Mill 
can meet Coleridge’s criticism, then it would appear that he has met Moore’s as well.
To show that Mill can meet Coleridge’s critique is also to show that Coleridge 
misreads Mill in one very important way. This is not because Coleridge mistook Mill’s 
use of “desirable” as used only in the “empirical” sense, but because he mistook 
audibility and visibility to be simply empirical matters when in fact they embody a 
normative quality as well. However, the question would seem to be, “Can it be shown 
that both audibility and visibility on the one hand and desirability on the other hand are 
Primitively Normative Dispositions?”
Recall the criteria for a disposition to be Primitively Normative for Mill. Those 
criteria are that Primitively Normative Dispositions
(a) are discovered by careful examination of our consciousness and practice to 
play a normative role in our thinking;
(b) cannot be derived from, and can be reflectively harmonised with, other such 
dispositions; and
(c) are not subversively explicable.
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At this point it is helpful that Mill included two analogies for us to work with. On Mill's 
view, it seems fairly straightforward (if not painfully obvious), that through examination 
of our consciousness and practices we discover that audibility and being heard and 
visibility and being seen play normative roles in thought. In one respect, they pick out 
human faculties that carry the normative value “good". That is, it is with respect to these 
particular abilities that the appellation “good” is affixed. If this is so, then (a) is satisfied 
for both audibility/being heard and visibility/being seen.
Though the two analogues do not form an exhaustive list of sensory perception, 
they do compose a sufficient set of qualities with which to test (b). Clearly, audibility 
and visibility cannot be derived from each other. Further, it seems just as clear that with 
careful reflection (and oftentimes not so careful reflection) that audibility/being heard can 
be harmonised with visibility/being seen and vice versa. Again, this conclusion is 
reached from a survey of common practice and behavior. For example, suppose one 
happened upon a small town on March 17 of some year and decided to tour the 
downtown shops. Upon leaving one of the shops, one notices a large group of men, 
women, and youth, all dressed in green and holding various instruments. Upon hearing 
the music they are playing, seeing the floats upon which they ride, and feeling the impact 
fi-om the cabbages and potatoes that are thrown fi-om the floats, one concludes that one 
has happened upon a St. Patrick’s Day parade. While careful reflection is probably not 
required, the harmonization o f the ability to see and the ability to hear undoubtedly 
harmonize to fiunlitate the conclusion that a St. Patrick’s Day parade is in progress. So, it 
would seem as if (b) is satisfied as well
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Finally, when Skorupsid uses the phrase “subversively explicable”, he seems to 
mean simply that it is very implausible that one should discover some further fact of the 
matter that, o f its own, would explain both audibility and visibility This is just to say 
that audibility and visibility are distinct faculties and instances of seeing indicate brain- 
states that are different from those states indicated by instances of hearing Again, 
audibility and visibility seem to satisfy (c). So, because audibility and visibility both 
satisfy the criteria required to be classed as Primitively Normative Dispositions, it 
becomes more plausible to assume that Mill has not mangled his analogies nearly as 
badly as Coleridge would have us believe In fact, it seems that Mill has everything that 
he needs to meet Coleridge’s critique, and mutatis mutandis, Moore’s as well
D. The Quantity/Quality Problem
One of the more renowned and widely discussed difficulties for Mill, apart from 
the Analogy Problem, is the Quantity/Quality Problem For Mill’s predecessor, Jeremy 
Bentham, and for Bentham’s followers and apologists (including J.S. Mill’s father, James 
Mill), the quantity of a pleasure measured in intensity, duration, and propinquity 
(proximity) was all that could be, or need be, summed in the utilitarian calculus. Not so 
on J S. Mill’s view.
Bentham’s detractors labeled the utilitarian doctrine a “swinish doctrine” as it
could not discriminate between the pleasure of poetry and the pleasure o f pushpin. One
of Mill’s aims is to demonstrate how it is that the utility doctrine can and ought to take
the quality o f pleasures into account when making utility calculations. hfiU writes.
It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the Act, that some 
kinds o f pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be
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absurd that while, in estimating ail other things, quality is considered as well as 
quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity 
alone/
Mill takes the fact that the experience of a great aria is experienced by at least 
some people to be a much higher pleasure than that of a ballpark hotdog (or vice versa) as 
important. Suppose for a moment that one experienced a magnificent performance of one 
of Henry Purcell’s many trumpet voluntaries. Suppose further that one had experienced a 
street vendor hotdog before entering the concert hall. And suppose still further that one 
experienced the former as finer pleasure than the latter. Mill is making the point that the 
experience of one as a higher pleasure than the other is itself an experience that must be 
taken into account in the utility calculus.
On the basis o f this claim, and Mill’s inclusion of quality in his utility calculus, 
some more recent critics have accused Mill of placing “quantity (intensity and duration) 
on one side as a straightforward empirical property and quality on the other side as a 
mysterious, obscure, normative property.”’’ This criticism seems to suggest that Mill has 
in fact abandoned his empiricist foundations. Whether this is the case or not, perhaps 
Mill’s harshest critic on this score is F. H. Bradley. Bradley accuses Mill of abandoning 
utilitarianism altogether with his inclusion o f quality. He writes, “If you are to prefer a 
higher pleasure to a lower without reference to quantity -  then there is an end altogether 
of the principle which puts the measure in the surplus o f pleasure to the whole sentient
Mill, UtilharianisnL 38.
Donner, “Mfll’s Utilitarianism”, Cambridge Companion to NCll. (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 217.
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creation.”*” The crux of this criticism seems to be that because quality and quantity are 
radically different things, they cannot be properly summed; reminiscent o f the 
impossibility of adding apples and oranges. In both of these cases, the criticism seems to 
be that Mill has abandoned his naturalism, in the first instance because "quality” is not a 
“straightforward empirical property”, and in the second because “quality” is an altogether 
different sort of thing than “quantity”
In her paper “Mill’s Utilitarianism”, Wendy Donner takes each of these critiques 
in turn and shows why, on her interpretation of Mill, they fall short o f the mark. 1 find 
Dormer's work on this particular problem quite convincing. She dismisses those “false 
friends” who would argue that for Mill, quality is reducible, in some sense or other, to 
quantity and those who would suggest that quality and quantity, while distinct, are 
nevertheless correlated; that is, as one varies, the other varies in precisely the same sort of 
way. In both these cases. Donner rightly points out that the defender of Mill actually 
supports his critic. In the reductionism case, if it is shown that quality is reducible to 
quantity, then Mill has played false by dwelling so intently on quality as a separate thing 
from quantity. In the latter case where quality and quantity are distinct but vary precisely 
with one another, then quality serves only as an indication of quantity and is actually used 
only when it is more accessible to experience than the quantity to which it is correlated. 
One might imagine that in the course of calculating the utility o f  some particular act or 
another that one has quite a good handle on the quantity o f pleasure to be expected and 
very little grasp on the quality. However, if one can be assured that the two variables are
to F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies. 1876
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precisely correlated, then one need not be concerned that one is adding two wholly 
distinct (and perhaps incommensurable) things. Here again, the advocates of a 
correlationist interpretation of the quality/quantity distinction are in fact arguing that Mill 
uses only quantity as the grist for the utility calculus mill and that the quality of a 
particular pleasure is instrumental in picking out those quantities that might otherwise be 
elusive. This view, too, does not seem to take seriously Mill's own assertion that ‘some 
kinds o f pleasure are more valuable than others" and that pleasures are not to be 
evaluated on quantity alone, but quality as well. The challenge for Millian apologists is 
to show how quality, as a distinctly different thing from quantity, can be added to the 
utilitarian calculus without introducing a mysterious, normative element or abandoning 
the doctrine altogether.
One thing that must be recalled is that Mill holds that pleasures (whether 
measured by “quantity" or “quality") reflect particular mental states. As Dormer points 
out, the things that are valuable for Mill are pleasurable mental states. The good-making 
properties o f these pleasurable mental states are complexes o f sense experience. Mill 
writes.
When many impressions or ideas are operating in the mind together, there 
sometimes takes place a process of a similar kind to chemical combination. When 
impressions have been so often experienced in conjunction, that each o f them 
calls up readily and instantaneously the ideas of the whole group, those ideas 
sometimes melt and coalesce into one another, and appear not several ideas, but 
one.
This “one" is a complex o f those impressions and ideas which are created out o f the basic 
data o f sense experience Donner writes that “many mistaken or misguided objections to
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Mill’s position arise from the failure ... to keep separate the things that are valuable” and 
the properties that are their good-making properties.^'
If the mental life is constructed from first basic sense experiences and then from 
complexes, then it is these basic experiences and complexes o f experiences that are the 
bearers of value. Or, as Donner puts it, “The things that have value are complex mental 
states with pleasure as a component Among those good making things are intensity 
and duration, which together comprise quantity. However, Mill takes quality to be just 
another ordinary (empirical) property that is a component of any pleasurable experience. 
Accordingly, it contributes to the pleasure of that experience as a whole. This can be 
represented as 1 have in the diagram below;
intensity
} quantity 
duration )
> value
)
quality 
figure 4
Thus, for Mill, the utility calculus is admittedly more complex than Bentham’s which 
would include only the upper half o f the diagram. But to assume that Mill’s calculus is 
any less empirical, naturalistic, nor utilitarian than his predecessor’s is wrongheaded. 
Instead, Mill recognizes that quality o f pleasure, if it is the real experience that it 
certainly seems to be, is a component o f  happiness, and as such must be included in the 
calculus if one is to ever hope to accurately calculate either individual or general
*' Donner, 219.
ibid, 261.
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happiness. Further, it is not a mysterious, obscure element, but rather a concrete moment 
of sense experience just as the taste of a hotdog or the hearing of a melody is a moment 
of sense experience. Thus, for Mill, there are two basic good-making characteristics o f
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either abandoned the utility doctrine or empiricism or naturalism or any combination of 
the three simply because he includes quality as a good-making property of pleasurable 
experiences.
E. The Cambridge Moralists* Problem
I will discuss the Cambridge Moralists at considerably more length later. 1 
mention their criticisms of Mill here because they apply both directly to Mill and 
indirectly to Sidgwick. It would be somewhat out of place to discuss Sidgwick's full 
response here since it follows from particular parts o f his argument which have yet to be 
reached. Thus, a discussion of the particular views of the Cambridge Moralists 
(including their criticism of Utilitarianism) and Sidgwick’s dismissal of those critiques 
will follow later. However, for the sake of clarity with regards to Mill’s utilitarianism, I 
will briefly outline their critique and Sidgwick’s response Simply put, the Cambridge 
Moralists think that the utilitarian project Just gets it wrong.
The term “Cambridge Moralist” is attached to a group of 19^ century 
philosophers who were, not surprisingly, faculty members at Cambridge The make-up 
of the group is a subject of some debate Certain philosophers -  F. D. Maurice, Whewell, 
and Grote -  are always included. Green is at times included and at other times not.
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though his views of utilitarianism certainly fit with those of the core group.*^ At times 
Coleridge is included, though he was not a faculty member but rather a quite formidable 
student at Cambridge. Whitehead includes Sidgwick. This latter is clearly a mistake as 
Sidgwick fits neither the philosophical commitments nor theological influences o f the 
group. Whatever the peripheral make-up of the group, a composite of the core 
commitments of this group can be fashioned. Central to that composite is the view that 
the utilitarian doctrine is o f limited use at best and simply wrongheaded at worst.
J. B Schneewind, in a number of his works, has done a remarkable job of 
sketching both a composite of the Cambridge Moralists and showing how the views of 
these philosophers shape much of the debate concerning moral philosophy in the 19*'’ 
century. Crudely put, the Cambridge Moralists were convinced that the utilitarian 
doctrine was, part and parcel, incompatible with Christian doctrine (and on Mill's view, 
dogma). For the Moralists, the fact of common-sense intuitions about morality provides 
the evidence that supports the view that the best explanation for the universe as 
experienced by human beings is theistic Beyond that, the best explanation is most likely 
a Christian explanation. The basis for this view lies in human intuition, which, however 
imperfect it may be, nevertheless seems to enable human beings to grasp moral truths. 
On the Cambridge Moralists’ view, common-sense morality “shows the growth of an 
increasingly clear and penetrating grasp of the morality taught by the best rdigious leaders, 
and consummately by Christ.” However, this ever more clear and penetrating grasp is not
”  Green was an Oxford man and Coleridge was a student who predated the Cambridge 
Moralists mentioned above. However, Green’s sympathies clearly lie with his 
Cambridge counterparts and Coleridge was a tremendous influence on the philosophical
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deducible from “Avoridly considerations”; that is to say, from empirical observation and 
generalization. That Mill, and Bentham before him, advance a view that is dependent 
wholly on empirical observ ation and generalization is an example of defending a “one-sided 
and partial view of morality”.*^
The views of the Moralists and the Utilitarians are so incompatible about the nature 
of common-sense and common-sense morality that it would seem there is little way to judge 
between them. If the Moralists are right about utilitarianism, it seems that it would be very 
difficult to establish that without b^ging important questions. Similarly, the utilitarian 
wishing to rebut the Moralists is faced with a similar dilemma Mill’s requisite 
“plausibility” argument -  namely that the utilitarian doctrine is plausible, and more plausible 
than its competitors -  seems foced with quite a hurdle given the apparent 
incommensurability of the two positions. Sidgwick, however, does a very nice Job of 
rendering the basic assumptions of the Moralists as at best suspect and at worst implausible. 
This he does by bringing into question the very intuitions upon which the Moralists 
conclusions rest
Sidgwick acknowledges that intuitions play an incalculably valuable role in 
morality; indeed, intuitions are required for any sort of reasoning or knowledge at all, not 
just moral reasoning and/or knowledge. However, Sidgwick denies that the proper 
inference from the possession of moral intuitions and necessity of intuitions for moral 
reasoning is that human beings possess a divine nature. Since intuitions are required for any 
knowledge whatever, the Moralists must be willing to say that intuitkms regarding
bent at Cambridge long after his departure.
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mathematics or logic or natural science are also indications of the divinity of human nature; 
moral intuitions would have no special status. However, the Moralists maintain that moral 
intuitions are revelatory of the divine, perhaps not to the exclusion of intuitions connected to 
“matter o f fiict knowledge," but at least superior to them. On Sidgwick’s view, this position 
is not justified; and thus, the inference to a theistic, and probably Christian, best explanation 
of the world is at least suspect.
F. The Whiteheadian Problem
Whitehead rarely mentions Mill. Indeed, Mill shows up only once in Process and 
Reality, and then only in the context of an example of the inadequacy of language in 
general and propositions in particular to fully express events in the world. However, on 
those rare occasions when Whitehead does turn his attention to the utilitarian scheme 
Mill advances (primarily in Adventures of Ideas), the result is a very telling indictment of 
the Millian project.
As is not at all unusual with Whitehead, we first need to clarify some of his 
terminology and the distinctions in the actual world that these dififerent terms are thought 
to refer. With regard to the Millian argument, the distinction is between “things that 
occur”, “things that recur”, and “things that endure”. Some examples are surely needed 
to make these distinctions clear. Something is said to be an example of an “endurance” 
when it is a “true and real thing that endures” '^ By “true and real thing”, Whitehead 
simply means something in the actual world as opposed to an abstract idea. One of 
Whitehead’s examples o f endurance is a piece o f rock.
** Schneewind, 107.
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An example o f an “occurrence'’ is a “true and real thing that occurs”. Again, by 
“true and real”, Whitehead is locating the instance of an occurrence in the actual world 
and asserting that it is ontologically distinct from any abstraction from the actual world. 
Here, an example is any happening, any event that takes place; e.g., the falling of a rock. 
These happenings, or actual occasions, have ontological priority for Whitehead. We will 
return to a more elaborate discussion of actual occasions later. For the purpose of 
addressing his criticism of Mill, however, it is sufficient to note the difference between 
the three sorts of things without worrying about the devilish details.
Finally, Whitehead uses the phrase “things that recur” to pick out abstract objects. 
His example, in keeping with the rock theme, is the shape of the rock. For Whitehead, 
the abstract object in this case is very much like an Aristotelian form -  that is, the form of 
a chair, for example, is to be found in the chair, not floating about in Plato’s heaven. 
Further, abstract objects are ontologically dependent on the true and real things that 
endure and the true and real things that occur. Later, we will discuss Whitehead’s view 
of abstract objects (or more properly “eternal objects”) and the ontological relationship 
between actual occasions and eternal objects; the former has priority over the latter. 
Here, we need only keep in mind that abstract objects are ontologically secondary to and 
dependent on things that occur. One o f Whitehead’s arguments is that Mill does not keep 
this distinction straight.
Before turning to this argument that depends on the distinction between things 
that endure, things that occur, and abstract objects, we ought first examine a telling
“  Whitehead, Adventures o f Ideas. 164.
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critique that Whitehead does not make but suggests. Whitehead grants, for the sake of
argument, that a utilitarian calculus is possible. That is to say, that one might actually be
able to add the pleasures of different people together to amass a sum of pleasures that
could be labeled “the general happiness”. That Whitehead grants this possibility should
not be taken as an endorsement of it. Indeed, Whitehead is quite skeptical that one might
be able to accomplish such a task. One recent Millian apologist has picked up on this
concern and notes that Mill’s project is indeed endangered by it. Skorupski writes.
Utilitarianism ... is an abstract ethical thesis about what has intrinsic ethical 
value. Mill did not think hard enough about its content. He did think hard about 
the claim that happiness is the only thing that has ethical value, and he said wise 
things about it. ... But about the distributive content of the utilitarian thesis he 
hardly thought at all. ... 1 am thinking about the content of the thesis itself; about 
how it proposes to measure overall ethical value, or general good, as a function of 
the good of individuals.^
Skorupski may in fact be overly generous. It seems hardly plausible that individual
happinesses are additive at all. If we assume for the moment that the things that are
pleasurable are indeed mental states, then we are left to wonder how it is that one might
add the pleasurable mental state of John Stuart Mill to the pleasurable mental state of the
Queen o f England and come up with a sum. These happinesses seem very highly
individualized; as individualized as the people who have them. It does not seem that Mill
has developed this side o f the doctrine well enough; indeed, the additive problem (or the
problem o f distributive content) may very well prove insurmountable for utilitarian
theorists, including Mill. Indeed, fi-om Whitehead’s remarks at the outset o f his critique
“  Skorupsid, 20
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of utilitarianism, he suggests that the problem of distributive content is in fact potentially 
fatal to the utilitarian project.
However, for the sake of argument, Whitehead grants that individual happinesses 
are additive. An instance o f an individual happiness, say the pleasure of eating a ballpark 
hotdog, is an occurrence of happiness. That is to say, the pleasure o f eating the hotdog is 
something that happens in the real world and as such is an actual occasion Further, the 
pleasure o f attending the opera is also an occurrence of happiness. However, the most 
that can be said is that the pleasure of one occurrence is the pleasure o f that occurrence. 
It is not transferable to another occurrence, and the pleasure of eating the hotdog and the 
pleasure o f attending the opera are occurrences which are tied to their happenings, and to 
their happenings alone.
Now, suppose that these pleasures are additive in the way that would be required 
for Mill's utilitarianism to work. The question is whether the general happiness that is 
the sum o f these pleasures is also an occurrence. This is the question of importance to 
Mill’s project because happiness does not seem to be an occurrence at all, but rather a 
recurrence. Note that in this paragraph and in the one preceding, 1 use “pleasure” to pick 
out the particular instance and “happiness” to pick out the additive sum. This is simply 
for the sake of clarity to signify that the sum and the parts are distinct things. On 
Whitehead’s view, “happiness” is a recurrent. That is to say, happiness is an abstract 
object that recurs each time a particular occurrence of pleasure occurs. Further, the 
“general happiness” of which MUl speaks must also be a recurrent, and thus an abstract 
object, despite Mill’s protests to the contrary. This is so for the following reason.
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If we grant that individual occurrences of pleasure are additive into what Mill 
calls "the general happiness”, then there must be some actual occurrence whose pleasure 
this “general happiness” is. However, there is no thing in the actual world that possesses 
or experiences the “general happiness”. For example, suppose we could place a 
mathematical value on the eating of a hotdog by person A and another value on the 
attendance of an opera by person B. Supposing these values to be additive, the sum of 
the value must be possessed by something on Mill’s account. This something, 
presumably, is the “aggregate of all persons”, in this example, two. But (person A + 
person B) seems quite a meaningless expression. The only way to make sense of this 
summing and possessing, on Whitehead’s view, is to include within the principle itself 
that the “aggregate of all persons ” is an “occurrence with the happiness of this additive 
sum ” However, such a move is itself doomed at the outset because to posit that the 
“aggregate” is itself an occurrence is to suppose that there is some thing in the actual 
world that is that “aggregate”. On Whitehead’s view, that way lies the very positive 
doctrines of Plato from which Mill has so consistently tried to distance himself.
In summary, Whitehead argues that Mill either Ails to recognize the difference 
between an actual occasion of pleasure and the “general happiness ” which is not an 
occasion of pleasure but rather a recurrent (that is, an abstract object -  despite Mill’s 
protestations to the contrary) or that Mill fails to recognize that the “general happiness” 
does not attach to any actual occasion whose pleasure the “general happiness” would be. 
This is, o f course, after Whitehead has granted that highly individualized instances of 
pleasure might plausibly be summed together to make the additive sum that is the
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“general happiness” . However, like Whitehead, I do not find such a sum that plausible to 
begin with, nor do I find it plausible that this “general happiness” could then be thought 
to be a instance of pleasure for any thing in the actual world If Whitehead is right about 
the distributive content problem or the conflation and confusion of occurrent things and 
recurrent things (and 1 take him to be right about both), then Mill’s argument in support 
of the principle of utility fails.
Chapter 3. Henry Sidgwick, Part Two: The Dualism of Practical 
Reason
Despite their differences Sidgwick picks out at least three strands of thought from 
Mill: (I) The Principle o f Plausibility, (2) Primitive Notions, and (3) an explication of the 
utility doctrine that includes quality as a normative criterion distinct from quantity, a 
position that Sidgwick rejects. Recall fi’om the first stages o f the discussion of Mill's 
argument that the Principle of Plausibility amounts to a method of judging between two 
competing views. This sort of method is useful in ethical theory because of the difficulty 
of giving deductive demonstrations concerning most ethical matters. Mill relies on the 
Plausibility criterion, claiming that, given the impossibility of direct, deductive 
demonstration, we must ask what is required “of this doctrine ... to make good its claim to 
be believed.” So, the Principle of Plausibility may be expressed as follows:
Principle o f Plausibility: Given two competing theories, the theory that is, on 
balance, more plausible is the one that ought to be provisionally accepted '^
^  I suggest that the acceptance ought to be provisional (an amendment o f Mill’s view) 
simply because of the fluidity of evidence. For example, suppose Theory A is taken to 
be, on balance, more plausible than Theory B. If in the future a considerable body of 
evidence should be uncovered that tips the balance in fiivor o f  Theory B, then the euiier
8S
A corollary to the Principle of Plausibility is Mill’s Believability Criterion.
Believability Criterion: The most that one can require of an ethical theory is 
an argument that it is worthy of rational belief. This is also the least that 
ought to be required.
The difference between the two principles is fairly obvious and quite simple. In the first
case, one is comparing two theories that each lay claim to be true. The aim here is to
discriminate between the two theories. The second case is a requirement leveled at an
individual theory; namely that Theory A, for example, must be able to be shown to be
rationally believable. Suppose Theory A cited the phases of the moon and the tracks of
the stars through the zodiac as explanatory principles for human behavior. Suppose also
that Theory B made claims about human motivations and desires to explain the same
behavior. Neither theory is without difficulty. Yet one. Theory B, is much more
believable. So, Theory B might very well be found to be preferred to Theory A, but that
ought not be the end of the argument Some sort of argument about why a rational person
ought to believe Theory B to be the case is also necessary. Sidgwick adopts these
principles, utilizing the Principle of Plausibility to eliminate Intuitionism and utilizing the
Believability Criterion as the standard for his argument for Universal Hedonism.
Another inheritance fi'om Mill is the set o f Primitive Notions.
Primitively normative dispositions are those which are discovered by careful 
examination o f our consciousness and practice to play a normative role in our 
thinking; cannot be derived from, and can be reflectively harmonised with, other 
such dispositions; and are not subversively explicable "*
acceptance of Theory A should be reassessed. 
“  Skorupski, 12-13.
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While Sidgwick uses the Principle of Plausibility to argue against Intuitionism, he uses 
two different arguments to actually subvert the view. One depends almost entirely on 
something very similar to Mill’s set of Primitively Normative Dispositions
Finally, Sidgwick takes Mill’s explication of the Utility Doctrine as one way to 
deal with the difficulties that attend Bentham’s first formulation of the view. One of 
Mill’s amendments to Benthamite Utilitarianism is the Quality Criterion. Sidgwick 
rejects this amendment, though this would seem to leave Sidgwick to face some of the 
difficulties that the Quality Criterion sought to address. As Rawls has pointed out, 
Sidgwick takes great pains to address each of the objections with which a Quantity 
Utilitarian Doctrine is met Against the backdrop of Millian Utilitarianism, Sidgwick can 
advance his own view in much the same way we will see Whitehead’s Virtue view 
advanced against the backdrop of its closest theoretical kin, the Virtue ethics o f Aristotle. 
1 turn now to Sidgwick’s arguments comparing the three methods of ethics.
A. Comparison of Universal Hedonism, Ethical Egoism, 
Intuitionism
1. Argument against Intuitionism
On Sidgwick’s view, Intuitionism makes the following claim about common-
sense;
Intuitionism: Common-sense claims to be able to see by inspection that 
certain types o f action are necessarily right (or wrong) without regard to the 
goodness or badness of their consequences^
Broad, 216.
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Sidgwick has two arguments to level against the Intuitionist view. I first examine the 
notion Primitively Normative Dispositions and then move to Sidgwick’s own original 
argument.
As we have already seen with Mill, there is a formal inference that is used with 
the Primitively Normative Dispositions to make claims about an ethical theory. It is 
formalized as follows;
Theory Verification Inference: If an ethical view is coherent, then it will be 
founded on dispositions that are primitively normative.
On Sidgwick’s view, with only the quickest examination of our consciousness, it is quite 
clear that certain dispositions play normative roles in our moral thinking. For example, 
the famous “Lying is wrong ” may be taken to be necessarily true in virtue of what it 
means to lie. Thus, principles like “Lying is wrong’’ that are intuitively grasped as clear 
and distinct meet the first criterion required to be considered true primitively normative 
disposition/' The difBculty lies in the investigation relative to the second requirement 
It seem fine to say that “Lying is wrong” is irreducible. ”  Sidgwick does not take it to 
harmonize with other dispositions that also meet the first requirement For example, the 
disposition “Be kind to your neighbor” seems to play a normative role in human society. 
Yet, the “Lying is wrong” disposition is not always compatible with the “Be kind to your
^  See section C. Analogy Problem for the earlier discussion of Primitively Normative 
Dispositions.
This does not entail the coherence of the ethical view that includes “Lying is wrong” 
because the Inference is not a biconditional.
”  The only way in which it might be thought to be reducible is as the negation of the 
“Truth telUng is always right” claim However, for the moment consider it to be 
irreducible.
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neighbor” disposition; at least it is not clearly compatible. This example suggests an 
entire class of dispositions that meet the first criterion but are at the same time 
incompatible with one another. The problem is that there is no way to simply appeal to 
intuitions to settle the matter. Settling disputes between dispositions looks as if it 
requires a principle by which the disputes are settled; a principle that, as suggested here, 
cannot be wholly intuitive. Thus, Intuitionism seems to falter on this point. The 
founding dispositions of Intuitionism fail to be primitively normative and thus the view 
fails to be coherent.
For all that this would seem to get Sidgwick everything he needs to dismiss 
Intuitionism, it is not the argument he spends the most time developing The argument 
against Intuitionism that he takes to be his finest, while similar to the Primitively 
Normative Dispositions argument, is finally different in some important ways. Recall 
again the Intuitionist claim with which we began this section;
Intuitionism: Common-sense claims to be able to see by inspection that 
certain types of action are necessarily right (or wrong) without regard to the 
goodness or badness o f their consequences.
One example of the clearly deontological slant in his conception of this category is his 
use of the Kantian example o f  lying and truth telling. Simply put, Kant asserts that 
telling a lie is wrong and inherently so, rather than because of the consequences that 
might follow from it On Kant’s view, one can presumably examine the proposition "In
Note here that I have not addressed Kant’s infamous article “On an alleged right to lie 
fi’om altruism”. In this article, Kant makes an argument that almost every scholar since 
has recognized as a departure from his own ethical views as advanced in the Groundwork
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thus and so a predicament, I should tell a lie” and see that it is necessarily w r o n g . T h u s  
by inspecting the proposition itself, a rational agent can tell that the action expressed is a 
bad one, even if the consequences to the agent, the situation, and the general good of 
humankind would be uniformly better than truth telling. Or in another way, certain 
characteristics of the action itself are sufficient to make the action right or wrong 
independent of the consequences. Other actions, truth telling, for example, are 
immediately right. This is what leads Sidgwick to sometimes label the category 
“Dogmatic Intuitionism”; a moniker that he uses interchangeably, for the most part, with 
Intuitionism when addressing his comments to this particular method of ethics.
However problematic Intuitionism may sound on its face, it is as clear now as it 
was to Sidgwick that a survey of “common-sense” will reveal precisely these sorts of
and the Metaphysics o f Morals. Kant here argues that his own view that lying is always 
wrong can be supported by an examination of the consequences lying will have, both on 
society and on the character of the liar. However, if lying is wrong, on Kant's view from 
the Groundwork., it is so because the moral law has a universal character that bears a 
certain sort of necessity. That is, to say that one “ought” to do X means that X bears a 
particular formal logical relationship to the perfect will. If the perfect will would will X 
to be the case given the particular circumstances, then the imperfect agent who has 
authored the moral law within herself ought, on the basis o f that self-authorship of the 
moral law, to will X to be the case. The consequences of X are irrelevant, as X has a 
particular ontological status as inherently good. This is not the view Kant defends or 
depends upon in the “Alleged Right”; he advances a consequentialist argument to support 
his view that one ought not lie. For the purposes of this project, however, we will focus 
only on those passages where Kant’s work seems to be internally consistent and 
expressive of his deontological views; views 1 take to express his true considered 
philosophical commitments 
I use “necessarily” here to pick out a particular kind of ontological necessity that Kant 
feels that the moral law expresses. Kant ’s deontic logic uses the operators o f “ought ” and 
“can ” to express, in the arena of moral claims, a similar logical relationship within the 
metaphysical or mathematical arena captured by the operators “necessary” and 
“p r o ^ le  ” For a very helpful discussion o f deontic logics, see Georg von Wright, 
Deontic Lope.
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principles (e.g., not lying, being kind, etc.) to be present in the ethical discussions of 
people. Beyond this, a simple survey also reveals that principles of this sort are 
immediately and intuitively grasped by those who hold them For example, suppose a 
child has uprooted his aunt's petunias. When asked about the petunias he lies to avert 
blame. His subterfuge is uncovered and when the child is told that lying about the 
petunias was wrong, he responds with the question, “Why?”. He is often met with the 
response, “Lying is wrong.” But this response ought not be thought of as a response to 
the particular instance, necessarily. Suppose the parent is asked further whether it is ever 
okay to lie. The response then is likely to be “No,” and the reason given that “Lying is 
wrong.” Sidgwick maintains that on the survey of common sense, the respondents seem 
to hold that the “Lying is wrong” proposition is true not because of social ills that might 
attend its falsity but rather it possesses what is taken to be intuitive clarity. Lying is 
simply wrong, and that settles the matter.
For the Dogmatic Intuitionist, the set o f “real self-evident” principles will be quite 
large, encompassing “Lying is wrong”, “Truth telling is right”, and a host o f other 
principles that resonate with the sort o f intuitive clarity that these principles seem to 
possess. The diSBculty facing this method is immediately obvious; this sort of 
Intuitionism holds only in the most simple o f cases. It does not seem to hold very long 
even in the case of lying. Consider again the child who asks if lying is ever okay. While 
one likely response is “no”, another is “well, sometimes, maybe” followed with a 
prephilosophical discussion about how all lies are not necessarily created equal. Here, 
one might imagine lies told to preserve another’s feelings or, in extreme cases, to
91
preserve another’s life. But, if this is even plausibly the case, then the “Lying is wrong” 
intuition is in for some modifications. This is Sidgwick’s complaint against the 
Intuitionist method of ethics.
Critique: The principles thought to be self-evident on the Intuitionist model 
turn out not to be.
Sidgwick’s critique seems to consist in three parts. If any of the three parts of the 
critique is successful, then the critique is successful. It appears that in the case of 
Dogmatic Intuitionism all three are successful.
The first focuses on the breadth of the set of principles that this method is liable to 
produce. It seems fairly obvious that this critique is supported by more than the specific 
case o f lying versus truth telling. As suggested above, the Intuitionist method could 
potentially harbor a vast host of seemingly self-evident principles of varying 
complexities. Perhaps the “Lying is wrong” principle is removed in favor o f what could 
be a multitude of principles expressed in the following form, “Lying is wrong, except 
when X is the case”. The competitors for X are clearly legion, some o f which will likely 
seem more clear and distinct than others. However, the more conditions that are added, 
the less clear and distinct the principles seem to become. Thus, this case would seem to 
fail to meet Sidgwick’s Intuitive Verification requirement for self-evident principles. 
Beyond this, the case also suggests that there seems to be little hope of consensus among 
the relevant experts; hence the method Ails at Social Verification as well. In fact, on 
further reflection it seems that the only times that the Intuitionist method meets the 
criteria o f clarity and distinctness and o f general consensus are in unambiguous simple
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cases that deal mostly with vague generalities/^ Consider the following example. One 
morning after prayer, a young novitiate (a “monk-in-training”) approached Abba 
Alonious (an elderly monk renowned for wisdom) and put forward the proposition that 
“Lying is always wrong” (actually, he said “Lying is always sin”). ^  Abba Alonius then 
asked what the young monk would do in the following situation. A person has come 
running into his cell and hidden behind a barrel o f pickles. Soldiers from the town come 
to the cell and tell the youngster that a prisoner has escaped and they are looking for him 
for the purpose of his execution. Abba Alonius asks the youngster what he ought to say 
in response to the question from the soldiers concerning whether or not he had seen the 
escapee. If “Lying is always wrong” is clear and distinct, then the answer should be 
equally so. However, Abba Alonius held that the proper response was to lie to the 
soldiers and that the young monk should meditate on the question further.
From the examples, we can see that while the principle “Lying is wrong” 
appeared to be clear and precise, it is not so. Beyond its ultimate failure at the tests 
Intuitive and Social Verification, it would seem that this scenario causes a potential 
failure in Discursive Verification as well. The more “self-evident” principles there are, 
the more likely it is that two of these principles will conflict in irreconcilable ways; for 
example, “Lying is wrong” and “Be kind to one’s neighbor”. So Sidgwick’s first line o f 
critique is that Intuitionism fails to yield principles that are truly self-evident.
One example might be the case o f gratuitous cruelty. It would seem that the 
proposition “Acts of gratuitous cruelty are always wrong” meets the demands o f clarity 
and precision and would receive a Avorable review from the relevant experts.
^  Benedicta Ward, translator. Savings o f the Desert Fathers. (London; Mowbray 
PubUshers, 1975), 35.
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The second focus of the critique is a recognition that human beings are emotional 
creatures, often motivated to action (or to assent to principles) not through reasoned 
consideration of the details but through oratory or circumstance. Sidgwick notes that 
human beings often confuse strong impulses with “genuine intellectual insight” In so 
doing, we are apt to label a principle self-evident when it is in fact far from it History is 
rife with examples of "principle” from the Crusades to the Salem Witch Trials to the 
McCarthy hearings; all done in the name of principles taken to be clear and distinct. 
However, a moment's reflection demonstrates that the principles held so dear in the heat 
of passion are impossible to defend in the cold light o f reason
The third part of the critique is focused more on the deontological “rules” that 
arise out o f the principles. On Sidgwick s view, these “rules” often rest on custom and 
habit and because of this have gained the appearance of “moral axioms” when in fact 
they are not. C. D. Broad uses the Victorian example of the gentleman who seems to 
know intuitively what the “dictates of politeness or honor hold or forbid.” However, 
Sidgwick is rightly concerned about the “intuitiveness” of this knowledge It seems that 
the intuitions here arise not as self-evident principles, but rather have been cultivated by 
the society in which this gentleman exists. There is a lack of “internal rational 
justification” of these principles. That is to say, the dictates of honor, for example, have 
been the subject of a number of rather pointed debates, often involving blades o f one sort 
or another. This is not the sort o f Social Verification of self-evident principles that 
Sidgwick has in mind. Again, these sorts o f principles do not seem to meet the criteria 
of Intuitive, Discursive, or Social Verification, and accordingly are not to be seen as
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really self-evident principles. Or, as Broad puts it, "careful examination of the ‘alleged 
axioms’ of common-sense intuitionism fail to answer [Sidgwick’s] conditions ”
It is not only in the complicated cases (e.g., lying) that the problems arise, but 
even in simple ones. For example, there exists a general proscription against murder. 
But almost immediately the question arises concerning the content of "murder”. Suppose 
it to be defined as “unjustified killing”. Then the question arises about the standard of 
justice being used to determine which killings are justified and which are unjustified. 
Thus, situations seem to play havoc with the interpretation of the principles and, it seems 
unlikely that the principle will meet the requirements o f self-evidence. Into this dilemma, 
"common-sense either suggests no principle of reconciliation, or one so complex and 
qualified as to be no longer self-evident” ^^  For this reason, Sidgwick argues that 
Intuitionism is forced to incorporate a teleological principle, o f one sort or another. Thus, 
the method is not ultimately complete on its own, but must depend on some foundational 
principle from outside its scope in order for its own intuitional principles to be made 
consistent. Sidgwick thinks the best candidate for this outside principle is the Utility 
Doctrine.
2. Argument for Universal Hedonism (Utilitarianism)
On Sidgwick’s view, it is not enough to have shown that the Intuitionist method 
fails to be complete. Nor is it enough to suggest that one principle that would fill in the 
gaps is the Utility Doctrine. Instead, he understands that he must make an argument in
’’ Broad, 217.
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favor of his own view and that this argument must meet the criteria expressed in the 
Principle of Plausibility and the Believabiiity Criterion
First he tries to show that Intuitional morality is '^unconsciously" utilitarian He 
does not do this, it seems, to show that the Intuitional method is flawed (he thinks this has 
already been established). Instead, showing that Intuitional morality is “unconsciously” 
utilitarian will provide support for Universal Hedonism. This is so because if the 
foundational principle of Universal Hedonism can be shown to complete the Intuitional 
model, then this will provide some support for its own plausibility.
The second thing Sidgwick wants to show is that Universal Hedonism meets the 
“really self-evident” criteria along with the verification requirements. From these, 
Sidgwick argues that Universal Hedonism straightforwardly follows.
The first argument is in the form of a hypothesis confirmation. Sidgwick begins 
with the following hypothesis about the “Moral Sense”, which can be understood to refer 
to the moral intuitions of common-sense that we have been investigating all along.
Hvpothesis: The Moral Sense is ‘unconsciously utilitarian’.
To support this hypothesis, Sidgwick first considers whence the Moral Sense 
arises. On his view, the Moral Sense is derived from sympathy. Here, he explicitly 
depends on the work o f Hume. 1 will briefly digress to examine Hume’s derivation of the 
Moral Sense from sympathy.
a. Hume on Sympathy 
On Hume’s view, all human perception is of two kinds - impressions and ideas. 
Impressions, which have primacy over ideas, are, on the whole, more imense, more vivid.
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and more forceful than ideas. This is quite elementary Humean material, and while it is a 
distinction that is important to keep in mind, I will not elaborate further on these basic 
issues. Instead, I will focus on the issue of Sympathy and the Moral Sense. Sympathy is 
an element of human nature and, as such, is part of the mechanism underlying human 
experience. Perhaps this accounts for its quite interesting effects. Hume writes, “no 
quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than 
that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their 
inclinations and sentiments. Sympathy is thus responsible for some of our strong 
impressions.
Hume then goes on to argue that the Moral Sense arises from this human capacity.
He famously claims in the Treatise that morality is more properly felt than judged of.^^
The upshot of this claim is that the elements o f the Moral Sense begin with a sense
impression, not with an idea (say, of Justice or Courage, etc.). That impression is then
combined with the natural human capacity for sympathy, which transmutes the
correspondent idea into an impression, say, of duty to alleviate need. Hume writes.
When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects 
... which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an 
impression, and acquires such a degree o f force and vivacity, as to become the 
very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original impression.'^
The actual mechanism of admixing sense impressions with human sympathy to
ultimately produce the features o f the moral sense is rather straightforward, on Hume’s
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. P H. Nidditch, e d , (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 1978), 316.
” ibid., 470.
‘“ ibid., 317.
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account. To begin with, we always have an impression of ourselves and this impression 
is "intimately present with us.” So, take for example a case where we hear of someone 
on his way to the dentist for a lengthy root canal, and we see the effects of the passion 
that grips the victim. Hume says that “when I see the effects o f passion in the voice and 
gesture o f any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, 
and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion 
itself” '"' Thus, when met with the person on his way to the root canal, the cringe we 
experience is an instance of the phenomena of the idea of a passion in another converting 
itself into a passion within us. The mechanism of this communication is sympathy. 
Sympathy “enlivens the idea” of another’s sentiment or passion to the point that it has the 
intensity of an impression within us. So, though the experience of the dentist drill is not 
one that we personally experience on this occasion, we vicariously experience the dread 
of the other, at least in part because our imagination holds before us the idea of the drill, 
the chair, the nitrous-oxide, and we ourselves in the chair.
Another important thing to notice is that Hume makes the scope of this idea quite 
large. It is not only upon meeting a family member or friend with the impending visit to 
the dentist’s chair that human sympathy activates within the human breast. Hume states 
that this capacity is activated when we see the effect of passion in the voice and gesture 
of any person. Hume’s view of the process by which this scope develops is also rather 
simple. From the fact that we always have an impression of ourselves, Hume moves to 
the claim that the mind passes from the idea of oneself to that of another person or of
101 ibid , 576.
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another object. In the case o f the dentist’s patient, the sympathy arises in the agent who
then shudders with the dread experienced by the patient. Perhaps this is on account o f
having experienced the dentist drill firsthand However, this is really not relevant What
is relevant is the experience of the shudder of dread and that we are connected to other
human beings beyond our immediate social relationships and familial connections.
However, those familial connections and social relationships play a very
important role in the extension of sympathy to those beyond our immediate social
groupings. Hume notes that there is, generally speaking, a close connection between
parents and children; a more distant, but still intense connection between children and
more distant relations (e.g., uncles, aunts, etc.); and a still more distant connection to
friends of relations. Similarly, there is a quite strong connection between close friends; a
more distant connection between casual fiiends; and a still more distant connection
between mere acquaintances. Hume writes,
whoever is united to us by any connexion is always sure o f a share of our love, 
proportion'd to the connexion, without enquiring into his other qualities. Thus the 
relation of blood produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in the love of 
parents for their children, and a lesser degree of the same affection, as the relation 
lessens Nor has consanguinity alone this effect, but any other relation without 
exemption We love our country-men, our neighbours, those of the same trade, 
profession, and even name with ourselves. Every one o f these relations is 
esteemed some tie, and gives a title to a share of our affection.
The connection, immediately and forcefully felt in the case of close relations and friends
and more fiuntly experienced in the case of distant relations and acquaintances, is the
experience of sympathy As Nidditch writes of Hume’s view, in practice "the mind
103 ibid , 352
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extends to others beyond close kin” in ever widening concentric circles until the whole of 
humanity is included.
To be sure, the more distant the relation or acquaintance (or enemy or stranger, 
for that matter), the more difficult it is for the agent to feel sympathy for the plight of that 
individual. But here reason steps in to extend our feelings. For example, suppose that 
one finds Courage admirable in a fiiend. On Hume’s account, the recognition of the 
virtue in a fiiend reasonably requires the same recognition of the character trait in an 
enemy. That is not to say that this is an easy matter at all. Hume recognizes that the 
passions are an unreasonable lot, not easily corrected or reined in by cool and calculated 
judgment, and surely not directly influenced by reason. It may be very well to say that 
one ought find the courage of an enemy as praiseworthy as the courage in a fiiend, but it 
is an entirely different thing to actually fed this. However, reason can indirectly shape 
and mold the feelings, though some will always be recalcitrant. That indirect influence is 
of the form already suggested - showing that one who feels in one way toward a 
particular subject ought, in all consistency, to feel towards other subjects in relevantly 
similar situations.
That widening of scope arises fi*om the gradual application of experience within 
the ever-wider concentric circles o f experience - fiunily, fiiends, acquaintances, and then 
by imagination and the use of reason, strangers, and even enemies. The actual 
mechanism by which this widening o f scope occurs is the experience of sympathy in all 
its intensity in the closer proximity relationships; an experience that is extended by 
imagination in ever broader ways. The idea of connection that arises fi*om this exercise is
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itself mixed with sympathy and this generates yet another impression - though one that is 
likely weaker as the distance of the subject from the agent is greater.
The connection bom of Sympathy is all that there is to bind humanity to itself. As 
L. A. Selby-Bigge writes of Hume’s view, “we have no extensive concern for society 
except by sympathy.” '"  ^ But, for Hume, it is sufficient.
Sidgwick also uses this conception of virtue and so I will briefly discuss it here. 
According to Hume, virtues are those qualities of character that prove beneficial and 
receive approval on a general survey. Natural Virtues (e.g.. Benevolence, Gratitude, 
etc ) elicit feelings o f approval on every occasion they are observed. On the other hand. 
Artificial Virtues (e.g.. Justice, Promise-keeping, etc.) are approved at times and not at 
others. They elicit approval on the basis of their benefits to society and societal order. 
The impression of sympathy will cause people to approve of qualities that are beneficial 
to the possessors, just as they approve those qualities that are beneficial to themselves. 
On Hume’s view, these qualities are called virtues. Or as Broad writes o f Hume, “virtues 
are felicific qualities of character.”
Thus, we have seen how the natural human capacity of Sympathy through direct 
and indirect associations of impressions and ideas gives rise to the recognition of virtue in 
oneself and in others. Sidgwick appropriates Hume’s view with little emendation Thus, 
we have working definitions o f virtue and Sympathy that Sidgwick appropriates for the 
most part;
Sympathy: The natural human capacity fi’om which the moral sense is derived.
103 Selby-Bigge, Analytical Index, Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. (New York:
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Virtues: Felicific qualities of character.
b. Sidgwick's Self-Evident Principles 
Given this conception of virtues as felicific qualities of character, Sidgwick thinks 
he can then show that there exists a complicated coincidence between the morality of 
common-sense (or the Moral Sense) and Utilitarianism In the negative prong of his 
argument, Sidgwick must address claims that Intuitionism actually covers a broader range 
of moral intuitions than Utilitarianism. If this is the case, there are particular conflicts 
that are better addressed from the Intuitionist method. Thus, the criticism is that 
Utilitarianism is too spare a notion to supplant Intuitionism, whatever difficulties 
Intuitionism might have. There are two conflicts that receive particular attention in 
Sidgwick's negative argument. The first conflict involves the empirical observation that 
some actions that arise from a virtuous state of character may fail to promote utility. At 
the same time, there exists within common-sense a moral intuition to praise worthy 
characters. For example, suppose a person with a courageous character strides into a 
situation for which courage is called but the actual result of the immediate courageous act 
is to prolong a conflict that will be more harmful than if it ended quickly. It seems right 
to suppose that we would still want to call the act a courageous one, especially since ex 
hypothesi it arises from a courageous character. Yet the immediate consequences and the 
longer-range consequences turn out to be negative. Sidgwick recognizes that actions in 
the actual world often present these sorts of difficulties for a Utilitarian view. After all, if
Clarenden Press, 1985), 739.
Recall that the negative prong of the argument is an effort to show that Utilitarianism 
is a plausible alternative to Intuitionism.
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one is a strict Utilitarian, ought one not condemn the courageous act (and perhaps the 
person) on the basis of the negative consequences that obtain on account of that act, and 
the character from which it arose? Sidgwick answers this difficulty with the following 
claim;
(a) Dispositions may be admired as generally felicific even when special acts 
resulting from these dispositions are infelicific.
In addition to handling the apparent critique of the negative consequences o f a 
virtuous act, this view also accounts for the dogmatic intuition that certain acts are right 
regardless of consequence. For example, some Intuitionists have held that it is always 
right and universally morally obligatory to tell the truth (or at least not to lie), regardless 
of the consequences. The intuition is that some actions (e.g., truthtelling) and character 
(e.g.. Honesty) are inherently right and there is nothing more to be said about the matter. 
On Sidgwick’s view, this expression of the intuition is partly right. On Sidgwick’s view, 
this intuition can be explained apart from supposing that the character (or action) is 
inherently good. A Utilitarian can explain this apparent conflict by arguing that certain 
sorts of character generally produce actions the results of which are usually felicific. 
Those sorts of character can be admired and fostered because o f this general felicity apart 
from the occasional instances of infelicity.
On the other hand, Sidgwick goes on to write that,
(b) An act a Utilitarian must condemn as likely to do more harm than good may 
yet show a disposition or tendency that will on the whole produce more good 
than harm.
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On the face of it, this would seem to argue against the interpretation of Sidgwick's view 
that I have advanced for (a). This is so because given the occurrence of an action that 
brings about ill consequences, even if it arises from a virtuous character, would require 
condemnation. This problem would seem to be aggravated by the following Sidgwickian 
addition;
(c) Only the useful is praiseworthy.
Thus, from (b) we have that any action that brings about harmful consequences, even if it 
arises from a virtuous character, must be condemned and from (c) we have that which is 
useful should be praised. One could argue that praise for a virtuous character would 
seem to be jeopardized by (b) and (c) and their consequences. And this would seem to 
stand in stark contrast to the intuition to praise worthy characters and to affix the label 
“good" to people and not just to actions.
Two issues ought to be addressed here The first is that even on this less than 
charitable reading of Sidgwick’s view, the case for Intuitionism is not given aid. 
Sidgwick contends that (b) is “eminently the case with scrupulously conscientious acts." 
For example, the common-sense of the day elevated conscientiousness (understood as 
“carefulness in conforming to accepted moral rules”) to the level of a virtue. To express 
a truly good character was to be a conscientious person (along with other attributes). But 
Sidgwick goes on to point out that “unenlightened conscientiousness has impelled men to 
Anatical cruelty, mistaken asceticism*"’, and other infelicific conduct.” However, he also 
recognizes that “no Intuitionist would maintain that carefulness in conforming to
103 Here Sidgwick is referring to the same phenomena that Hume excoriates as “monkish
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accepted moral rules has not, on the whole, a tendency to promote happiness. ... [In the 
negative or infelicific cases] we speak of ‘over-scrupulousness' or ‘fanaticism’ 
Thus, in response to the claim that the real-world examples of the courageous act that 
results in harm or the conscientious character that results in infelicity bear no real 
criticism against Utilitarianism that they do not also bear against Intuitionism as well.
The second issue is more important. While the first simply results in the 
observation that neither Intuitionism nor Utilitarianism is harmed more than the other by 
the criticism posed by the real-world examples, the second goes to why it is that 
Utilitarianism is not harmed at all. Sidgwick writes, in keeping with (a), (b), and (c) 
above, that “it may be observed that when we perceive the effects o f a disposition 
generally felicific to be in any particular case adverse to happiness, we often apply to it, 
as so operating, some term of condemnation.” However, this does not entail that actions 
are worthy of praise in proportion as they are immediately useful. The Utilitarian, on 
Sidgwick’s view, must not consider only the usefulness of the action or character, but the 
usefulness of the praise. If, for example, by praising an action we would encourage 
dispositions that are generally infelicific, but that happened to be useful occasionally or 
even just in the particular case, then we ought not offer that praise; or if we do, offer it 
only with great qualification. And in those cases when the character is generally felicific 
but the special action that arises from the character is not, then the condemnation ought to 
be apportioned to the action only with great qualification. This is so because in the
virtue
106 Sidgwick, 428.
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greater picture, the character will produce more benefit than harm and undue criticism 
might very well damage the character, thus producing more harm than benefit.
Consider the following example. The experience of resentment and the act of 
resenting a particular action done to one by another may very well be in harmony with 
the Utility view that Sidgwick advances. As P J. Strawson has pointed out, the 
experience of resentment (and other reactive attitudes) may very well be necessary for the 
existence of society and human interaction as we know it.‘°’ However necessary 
resentment may be to society, it is quite in harmony with Utilitarianism, on Sidgwick’s 
view, that it should not be recognized as a virtue by common-sense. This is because, in 
the particular instances o f the experience, resentment may produce more benefit than 
harm, indeed, the experience of particular instances of resentment may even be 
necessary for the existence of society. However, if every action, or even a great number 
of actions, are done from feelings of resentment, the character of those actions is likely to 
produce more harm than good. So, it is* in keeping with Sidgwick’s view that the 
experience of resentment is to be recognized as of benefit to society and yet not to be 
praised.
Note that by “undue criticism” 1 do not mean to suggest that no criticism be 
forthcoming. This would seem directly in contradiction to (b). But the criticism must 
likewise be useful [by (c)] on a Utilitarian view and so to the extent that it is useful, 
should be offered; to the extent to which it is harmful, or at least less helpful than some 
other course of action, this circumstance is sufficient reason to lessen the intensity o f the 
criticism.
We should note a course Sidgwick does not take. He could simply dismiss the 
difficulty by arguing that any action that produces ill consequences could not have arisen 
from a virtuous character. This would simply beg the question against the Intuitionist.
For Strawson’s complete treatment o f this issue, see his “Freedom and Resentment” in 
“Freedom and Resentment” and Other Essavs. Methuen, London, 1974.
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Having addressed the character/act distinction criticism of his view, Sidgwick 
goes on to address the notion of Benevolence. The moral intuitions of common-sense 
have been taken to suppose that Benevolence largely comprises the demands of 
distribution of kindness He notes that while the Intuitionists would claim that it is the 
Good for one’s fellow creatures that is at stake and the Utilitarian would claim that it is 
Happiness, we should not assume that the two views do not converge simply because of 
this distinction.
On Sidgwick’s view, the investigation of this apparent difficulty must begin with 
a survey of common-sense; in this case, the common-sense views concerning how people 
actually interact with one another, particularly as these interactions express the 
distribution of kindness throughout society. Common-sense morality regards this as the 
“love my neighbor as myself’ principle. The criticism amounts to this. Suppose we 
admire someone as virtuous who gives up her own happiness for the happiness o f others 
and that the exchange is not even; that is, the one who sacrifices experiences greater harm 
than the benefit received by the one for whom the sacrifice is made. It would seem that 
the Utilitarian must regard this self-sacrificial action as likely beyond the pale of 
admiration and virtue because the utilities simply do not work out. Sidgwick goes on to 
make the case even harder by asking the reader to suppose that in this surrender of 
happiness for another the total happiness is diminished. Clearly, it would seem that the 
Utilitarian observer must hold that the character is not virtuous or that the admiration is 
misplaced. Yet a quite common common-sense moral intuition is that the person is to be 
admired and regarded as virtuous.
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About this case, Sidgwick has a number of less than helpful things to say before 
finally addressing the Utilitarian justification. In the first place, Sidgwick argues that it is 
doubtful that such a character is actually admired. That is, it is doubtful that in the case 
where such a disproportion between sacrifice and gain is as clear and striking as he has 
portrayed it that a spectator would actually admire the sacrificial iamb. This seems to 
straightforwardly beg the question.
His second approach is to suggest that the spectator gets it wrong when observing 
such a scene. For example, the spectator may not be able to tell "whether happiness is 
lost on the whole” and may not be able to judge whether future consequences will merit 
the apparently unequal exchange in the present This, also, seems a question-begging 
response.
However, his third approach does seem to address the critique. Suppose, he 
argues, that there is a loss in this case and that the loss is as bad as above (that is, the 
sacrifice actually diminishes happiness on the whole). "Our admiration of self-sacrifice 
will [still] admit of a certain Utilitarian justification.” This is so because the self- 
sacrificial action flows from a particular sort of disposition, one which is generally 
felicific, even though this particular instance o f self-sacrifice is not. So, while the 
Utilitarian might very well be required to condemn the particular action, she would not 
have to question the admiration or the character of the self-sacrificing person. This is so 
because, on Sidgwick’s view, “such conduct shows a disposition far above the average in
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its general tendency to promote happiness, and it is perhaps this disposition that we 
admire rather than the particular act
For Sidgwick, at issue here is the distribution of kindness - that is to say, in what 
ways and to whom ought our kindness be extended. Or, in another way, when is the 
volition toward doing good for others to be commended and when, if ever, is it to be 
condemned. He notes that Utilitarianism and common-sense may very well agree that all 
right actions are conducive to someone’s happiness, either that of the agent or that of 
whoever receives the benefit. In this way, they are in agreement as to the beneficence of 
actions. The issue is the distribution of that beneficence, since it seems as if this is where 
the two views will diverge. On Sidgwick’s view, the distribution of kindness in 
accordance with normal promptings of family affections, fnendships, gratitude, and pity 
have a firm utilitarian base, if  he is able to demonstrate this claim, then he will have 
shown that insofar as there exists a divergence regarding the distribution o f beneficence 
between Imuitionism and Utilitarianism then that divergence is so much the worse for 
Intuitionism.
Sidgwick notes that common-sense outlines a set of rules which govern the 
distribution of beneficence. The dictates of common-sense are that the agent give her 
immediate relations greater consideration than strangers. This set of closer relations 
includes “consanguinity, friendship, previous kindnesses, and special needs”. This is not 
a difficulty for Utilitarians as some (e.g., J. Grote) have supposed. This is so because 
Sidgwick claims that these close relations tend to be the locus of our most intense
110 Sidgwick, 432.
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emotional experiences. He writes, "the most intense and highly valued of our pleasures 
are derived from such affections”. This emotion, he notes, is highly pleasurable. So, the 
acts of beneficence between close relations are likely to be more productive of benefit for 
the recipient. Beyond this, actions which flow from a disposition filled with affection for 
one’s fellows are more likely to be received without objection and with reciprocity than 
those that flow from a disposition that is clearly egoistic. Beyond this, it is likely to 
strengthen the connection between giver and receiver and thus increase the later 
emotional exchanges between them. If, however, the same act of beneficence is 
performed for someone unknown to the giver, the act is as likely to arouse suspicion of 
motive as it is to arouse gratitude or to inspire an “echo” of the kindness. These 
phenomena are clearly known to common-sense. Thus, it would seem that the Utilitarian 
response to the phenomenon of self-sacrifice functionally reproduces the distribution 
rules for beneficence that common-sense moral intuitions suggest. Thus, there is no 
functional divergence between common-sense and Utilitarianism. For this reason, one 
can plausibly assume that the best explanation (at least between Utilitarianism and 
Intuitionism) for the distribution rules is a Utilitarian one, at least ‘unconsciously’, 
because Utilitarianism more aptly fits the data of common-sense.
In summary, the character/act distinction seems to provide more support for the 
view that common-sense is unconsciously utilitarian’ than that it is Intuitionist. In the 
course of this discussion, we have seen that the coincidence between the demands of the 
Utility Doctrine and the demands of common-sense is explained and the praise and blame
111 ibid., 433.
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accorded particular actions that are beneficial and harmful demonstrate a coincidence, 
though not strictly one-to-one relationship, with the expected application of the Utility 
Doctrine. Further, the attribution of felicity to dispositions even when a particular act 
issuing from that disposition is infelicific is not ruled out by Sidgwick’s view; in fact, 
Sidgwick’s Utility Doctrine seems to demand just that sort of attribution. This is 
consistent with what one might expect common-sense moral intuitions to demand
So it has been shown that Universal Hedonism provides a basic principle that 
Intuitionism can be understood to rely on for its own completeness. This reliance is 
clearly not of a conscious sort So, it appears that Sidgwick has produced at least some 
confirmation of the hypothesis that “The Moral Sense is ‘unconsciously utilitarian ” 
Sidgwick has argued for the confirmation of the hypothesis that common-sense moral 
intuitions are unconsciously utilitarian’. He has done this by showing the 
incompleteness of Intuitionism and by showing that the gaps can be overcome with the 
Utility Doctrine; namely that as rational beings we aim at the good in general as opposed 
to any particular part of it. Sidgwick must now show that the Utility Principle is a “clear 
and certain” moral principle. Further, he must show this to be the case within the fairly 
strict parameters he has set forth: really self-evident and verifiable. I will approach his 
arguments for self-evidence first before turning to his verifiability claims.
Sidgwick’s pattern o f argument is to advance three principles that he takes to be 
self-evident and to show that they are so by applying the verifiability criteria to each of 
them in turn. Then he takes the three principles, conjoined with the Utility Doctrine, and 
investigates whether this set o f principles is still “really self-evident.” The method for
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determining self-evidence in the case of the set of principles is the same as for 
determining self-evidence in the case of a single principle; the philosopher must examine 
the set by applying the verifiability criteria to see if the set will survive such an 
investigation.
The argument for self-evidence begins with a statement of the quandary facing the
Intuitionist who fails to recognize the ‘unconsciously utilitarian’ basis for his view The
dilemma of the Intuitionist, on Sidgwick's view, is that there is no way to steer a middle
course between a sort of absolutism and dogmatism on the one hand, and relativism on
the other He writes, that on the one hand, we have a “strong instinct of Common Sense
that points to the existence of such principles, and the deliberate convictions of the long
line of moralists who have enunciated them.” Here, we encounter again the intuitions
that certain actions are right, and unquestionably so, in virtue of the character of the
action itself. That is, we know, for example, that truth telling is right without needing to
examine the consequences. The difficulty lies on the other hand. He notes
the more we extend our knowledge of man and his environment, the more we 
realise the vast variety o f human natures and circumstances that have existed in 
different ages and countries, the less disposed we are to believe that there is any 
definite code of absolute rules, applicable to all human beings without 
exception
The solution to this dilemma, at least for Dogmatic Intuitionism, has been to 
assert the “strong instinct”, albeit with greater and greater abstraction. This presents a 
new set o f problems, though perhaps we can see it as a maturing of the dilemma. As 
Sidgwick states.
112 ibid , 379.
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there are certain absolute practical principles, the truth of which, when they are 
explicitly stated, is manifest; but they are of too abstract a nature, and too 
universal in their scope, to enable us to ascertain by immediate application of 
them what we ought to do in any particular case; particular duties have still to be 
determined by some other method
In a sense, all but the final clause are a statement of the more mature dilemma - in an
effort to address the experience of a much wider world than Victorian England (or even
Northern and Western Europe), the "absolute principles” become more and more abstract
in order to include the "vast variety” of human experience The final clause recasts the
quote because it reveals Sidgwick’s own view. In the first place, Sidgwick continues to
hold that there is a common human nature that experiences a common world Second,
this is compatible with that fact that the experience is highly varied. And third, this new
breadth of experiential data serves to further suggest the inadequacy o f an Intuitionism
bom of experience in Victorian England.
Sidgwick then argues that there exists a middle way between the Scylla and
Charybdis that form the intuitionist dilemma There exist three principles that certainly
seem “absolute”, though at first glance appear too universal and too abstract to do much
work. However, if these principles are then conjoined with the Utility Doctrine, they will
together form a method that can determine particular duties and actions in the particular
case as well as in the abstract. The first of these is the Principle of Equity.
The Principle o f Equity certainly seems self-evident. The principle can be stated
in a number of ways, some more useful than others. For example, it can be stated
positively or negatively. That is, the Principle of Equity can be formulated as a command
ibid., 379.
113
to do such and such an action or it can be formulated as a prohibition of action. It can be 
formulated in such a way as to emphasize those occasions when one treats two 
individuals differently. Sidgwick supposes that this formulation will be something of the 
form "if a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not right (or wrong) for some 
one else, it must be on the ground of some difference between the two cases, other than 
the fact that I and he are different persons." On this view, obviously, simply being two 
different people does not allow for different treatment; for a difference to matter in 
judging rightness or wrongness o f action that difference must be morally relevant
He notes that yet another formulation could involve actions that are done to 
(rather than by) individuals. For example, given two relevantly similar professors in 
relevantly similar disciplines with relevantly similar working environments, the 
administration should compensate them similarly (that is, the administration to do to 
them things that are relevantly similar). Here, Sidgwick notes the common formulation 
of this equity or fairness principle is normally as the Golden Rule -  “Do to others as you 
would have them do to you.” He also recognizes that this is not the best formulation. For 
example, consider person A who wants person B to participate with him in some vicious 
action and is more than willing to reciprocate. This would meet the rather imprecise 
formulation of the equity principle as expressed by the Golden Rule. There are other 
difficulties with this positive formulation of the principle. For example, consider A and 
B again. Given differences in circumstance, it may very well be the case that it would be 
wrong o f A to treat B in a particular manner, but it would be right o f B to treat A in that 
way. For example, suppose a coach gives instruction to one of her players in the midst of
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a soccer match. The coach and the player are different in relevant ways, and hence it
would not be right for the player to instruct the coach. The Golden Rule formulation of
the Equity Principle does not really address this sort of case. This is because the player
(following the Golden Rule) ought to do that which she would want done to her. Hence,
if she would want instruction, she ought to give it. The coach is, mutatis mutandis, in a
similar position Thus, the Golden Rule formulation is not clear and precise in the way
that Sidgwick thinks principles must be. Ultimately, this is not a difficulty for the
Principle of Equity, though it does point out that the principle must be stated negatively
to insure clarity and precision. He thinks that any positive formulation will succumb to
the same sorts of difficulties that plague the Golden Rule formulation. With this in mind,
Sidgwick states the Principle in the negative;
Principle o f Equitv: It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it 
would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different 
individuals, and without there being any difference between the natures or 
circumstances o f the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for 
difference of treatment.
However difiBcult this formulation may be in terms of practical application, 
Sidgwick takes it to capture the intuition behind such moral commands as the Golden 
Rule. It simply restricts the sorts of actions in which one might engage. It is the practical 
importance of this maxim o f prohibition that common-sense “has amply recognised”.
While one might suggest that the Golden Rule is not actually this naïve and that it 
implicitly takes into account the difference in circumstances, Sidgwick will argue that 
this may indeed so, but nevertheless it does not explicitly take this into account, 
ibid , 380.
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And Sidgwick adds that the truth of the maxim (negatively stated), “so far as it goes, 
appears to me self-evident
What should be noted here is that Sidgwick has addressed all of the criteria for 
“real self-evidence”, though he has combined some in places In the first case, the 
Principle of Equity certainly appears clear and distinct. Admittedly, the negative 
formulation is somewhat less clear at first glance, but it is clearly more distinct than are 
many o f the positive formulations, which might seem much more clear."’ One further 
benefit o f the abstract, negative formulation is that it is more likely to harmonize with 
other principles that may also be shown to pass the clear and distinct test Because 
common-sense has amply recognised this maxim (albeit in a number of forms that must 
be refined into this negative formulation) and because a long line of moralists have 
judged it to be true, the Equity Principle is taken by Sidgwick to have passed the test of 
Social Verification Since the Equity Principle passes each of the Verification criteria, it 
is taken to be the first of that set o f principles that lies between absolutism on the one 
hand and relativism on the other
The second o f the principles that Sidgwick takes to be really self-evident is the 
Principle of Rational Prudence. Like the Principle o f Equity, there is some difficulty in 
precisely how this principle should be formulated. For example, on might suppose that 
the formulation be something like “one ought to aim at one’s own good”. The difficulty
"S b id
117 Recall, from the discussion of the Intuitive Verification criterion that the goal is to 
discover those principles that are actually clear and distinct as opposed to those that 
merely appear to be. Sidgwick takes this n a t iv e  formulation to meet the clear and 
distinct criteria of Intuitive Verification while other positive formulations, e.g., the
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here, as Sidgwick points out, is that this formulation runs the very real risk o f being 
tautological. For example, suppose we define the “good” as “that at which one ought to 
aim" Thus, we are left with the principle actually being “one ought to aim at that which 
one ought to aim." While this is clearly true, it is also quite clearly less than helpful. So, 
Sidgwick claims that the proper formulation of the principle is as follows;
Principle of Rational Prudence: One ought to aim at one’s good, on the 
whole."*
The addition of this latter clause at least removes the tautology complaint. As I 
mentioned in the general discussion of self-evident principles above, Sidgwick takes this 
clause to focus on the temporality of goods. That is, the agent who employs the Principle 
o f Rational Prudence will have his entire life in mind when making decisions about his 
good. Thus, it is not surprising that Sidgwick alternatively refers to the following 
formulation of the principle from time to time:
Principle of Rational Prudence (alternative form): Hereafter as such is to be 
regarded neithw less nor more than Now."’
Sidgwick takes this Principle to accomplish at least two things. The first is to 
rebut a rather naïve criticism of Bentham. Given that certainty of a pleasure is part of
Golden Rule, ultimately do not.
"* ibid, 381.
" ’ ibid., 124 note 1. Here, Sidgwick is addressing Bentham’s method o f calculating 
pleasures. Bentham’s four quanta are Intensity, Duration, Proximity, and Certainty. 
Sidgwick argues that it is “reasonable to disregard” proximity as a fiictor, except where it 
is related to Certainty. He writes that “My feelings a year hence should be just as 
important to me as my feelings next minute, if only I could make an equally sure forecast 
o f them. ... This equal and impartial concern for all parts o f one’s conscious life is 
perhaps the most prominent elemem in the common notion of the rational - as opposed to
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Bentham’s Hedonic Calculus (and Sidgwick’s for that matter), it was asserted (again by 
Grote) that a consequence of the view is that given two pleasures, one certain and close 
and of little intensity and the other less certain, more distant and of greater intensity, the 
Utilitarian is compelled to choose the former. Sidgwick argues, however, that in the first 
place, certainty need not trump proximity and in the second, nearness need not trump 
distance. The criticism, on Sidgwick’s view, essentially reflects a misunderstanding of 
Bentham’s project; and a potential misunderstanding of his own that Sidgwick hopes to 
forestall.
The second thing Sidgwick seems to accomplish in making these claims is to 
point out that the Hedonic Calculus, either Bentham’s or his own, is a much more fluid 
and variable sort o f thing than is often portrayed. The importance of this demonstration 
of variability is rather obvious. Grote’s nuve criticism suggests a deeper problem that 
Utilitarians may face. If it is true that the Hedonic Calculus produces a rigid method of 
judging pleasures and a method that diverges from common-sense in important ways, 
then Sidgwick’s project is seriously compromised. Suppose that a Utilitarian is 
committed to give significant priority to closeness of pleasure over intensity on the basis 
of small levels o f difference in certainty; for example to choose Pleasure A that is close, 
less intense and slightly more certain rather than Pleasure B, which is distant, more 
intense and slightly less certain. It is clear that such a commitment will cause the 
Utilitarian to make decisions that are considerably at odds with the common moral sense. 
Recall the example o f the student with the choice o f studying for a test or going to the
the merely impulsive - pursuit o f pleasure.”
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lake. Recall also that it is a beautiful, warm day and the college is quite close to a 
sparkling, blue lake The present good is a cooling dip in the lake, refreshing and 
relaxing. The longer-term good is directly tied to the test results - passing the class, a 
better transcript, better job prospects, etc The nearer-term good is both closer and more 
certain. Clearly, Grote’s "utilitarian" would be compelled to choose the dip in the lake. 
A more charitable view that still held certainty to be the more important factor in 
judgment might still result in this Grotian conclusion. Common-sense, on the other hand, 
would hold that the student ought study, even though the results of studying may very 
well be considerably less certain. Sidgwick answers this difficulty with the Principle of 
Rational Prudence expanded beyond tautological simplicity
It remains an open issue whether this principle is really self-evident. In the first 
place, it certainly seems clear and distinct Admittedly, it is not as immediately clear as 
its tautological cousin (the principle without the “on the whole" clause). However, the 
addition does not really affect the clarity or precision of the principle. Sidgwick writes 
that this additional clause “affirms that the mere difference of priority and posteriority in 
time is not a reasonable ground for having more regard" for one pleasure against another. 
Given the convergence this amended principle has with the intuitions of common-sense, 
Sidgwick regards it as meeting the requirement o f Intuitive Verification.
The question o f whether or not the Principle of Rational Prudence can be 
harmonized with the Principle of Equity is a question of Discursive Verification. At first 
glance, the principles do not seem to have any conflicting consequences. In fiict, the 
Principle of Equity would seem to be quite congruent with the added “on the whole"
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clause. This is so because this clause makes clear that one ought address one’s own 
future selves with the same regard that one has for one's immediate self. However, the 
Principle o f Equity does not imply that one ought regard those future selves with exactly 
the same concern as one’s immediate self. This is so because the future self and the 
current self are, potentially, in relevantly different circumstances. If some future self and 
my current self are in relevantly different circumstances, then according to the Principle 
of Equity, I am justified in treating them differently. According to the Principle of 
Rational Prudence, I am justified in treating those future opportunities more favorably 
than my current opportunity - that is, I may forsake a current good for the sake of a later 
one. At the same time, the Principle of Rational Prudence does not demand that I must 
treat that future opportunity with more regard than a current one. So, it seems clear that 
while the Principle of Rational Prudence and the Principle of Equity would each have 
something to say about how I treat current and future opportunities, they do not produce 
conflicting commitments. Beyond this, in those instances when they cover different areas 
of judgment, those instances do not conflict. By this I mean that when the Principle of 
Equity says that I am justified in treating my distantly future self differently than my only 
slightly future one, it does not encroach on the purview of the Principle of Rational 
Prudence. Likewise, the Principle of Rational Prudence, while suggesting in one case 
that 1 ought to favor the distantly fiiture self over the immediately future one, or vice 
versa, does not contradict the Principle of Equity in those instances Thus, the two 
principles jointly meet the criterion of Discursive Verification.
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I have already dealt fairly extensively with the question of Social Verification of 
the Principle of Rational Prudence in discussing the potential concerns that Sidgwick 
means to address with his formulation of the Principle. As shown, Sidgwick’s 
formulation of the Principle of Rational Prudence brings the Utilitarian judgments in line 
with those expected by the relevant experts of common-sense Thus, the principle meets 
the criterion of Social Verification. Since the Principle of Rational Prudence meets each 
of the three verification criteria, it can be regarded as “really self-evident .”
The third abstract principle that Sidgwick takes to be really self-evident is the 
Principle of Rational Benevolence. The principle is deduced from evidence provided by 
two rational intuitions. In the foregoing discussion, the good “on the whole” referred to 
an individual’s overall good, Sidgwick now extends the concept of the good “on the 
whole ” to all of humankind. By examination of this “universal good”, we soon discover 
that if we consider any two of its constituent parts, we find that no part is of more 
importance than the other. In the case of the exploration of the Principle of Rational 
Prudence, we considered two instances and their respective goods within a single human 
life. In the case of this investigation, we again consider two instances and the goods 
respective to them. However, there is one immediate difiBculty with this analogy. In the 
former case, the two goods under examination dififered in that they were temporally 
distinct - that is, one was earlier than the other, necessarily. In this case, two goods may 
be simultaneous. For example. Person A may experience Good Y and Person B may 
experience Good Z at the same time, wdiile Person A, in the former case, experienced 
Good V at time Ti and Good X at time Tj, where the two times are differem.
121
To address this difficulty, Sidgwick amends the investigation in the following 
way. Given any two individuals, neither should be considered of more importance than 
the other unless there are morally relevant differences between them. Sidgwick has some 
method for weighing simultaneous goods; a method which will take into account all of 
the variability in the case o f the “universal whole" that we have already seen to be at 
work in the case of the individual “whole". So, the first rational intuition used to deduce 
the Principle o f Rational Benevolence is this part/whole analogy concerning goods that 
Sidgwick extends to an analogy from individuals to the universe.
Even taking into account this method urged by Sidgwick, one difficulty that arises 
fairly quickly is the problem of perspective. While it may be possible (albeit with 
difficulty) to judge between two goods (a present one and a future one) for an individual, 
it is significantly more problematic to judge between two goods for separate individuals. 
This difficulty is exacerbated if one of the individuals involved is also doing the judging. 
Sidgwick proposes a theoretical solution to the difficulty, amending the principle further 
to stipulate that the good of one individual is of no more importance than the good of 
another from the point o f view o f the Universe.
Clearly, this solves the partiality problem. Unfortunately, it adds the very 
practical difficulty that no individual possesses the “point of view o f the Universe”. 
However, Sidgwick is not immediately concerned with applicability in special cases at 
this point. Rather, he is concerned with the deduction of a formal, abstract principle that 
will meet the verification criteria. He takes this principle to do so. With all of the 
amendments he has added, the principle is rendered as the following:
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Principle o f Rational Benevolence: As a rational being, I am bound to aim at good 
generally, not merely at a particular part of it.‘^ “
In a flourish reminiscent of Hume, Sidgwick states that this principle 'lis 
evident”. The argument for its self-evidence is only a little more instructive. First of all, 
the principle has been deduced from other principles already shown to be self-evident. 
This deduction, however, should not be thought of as a demonstration or as a derivation. 
The Principle of Rational Benevolence is clearly different in scope from the Principles of 
Equity and Rational Prudence, though it is also quite clearly connected to them. If it 
were the product o f an inference from these already established principles, it would 
obviously be an ampliative inference However, that content can be explained by the 
amendments already discussed; and these amendments each represent direct intuitions, on 
Sidgwick's view. Thus, the principle is itself a clear and distinct intuition, even if it must 
be discovered to be so after an examination of each of the pieces of the principles. 
Hence, the principle meets the first criterion. Intuitive Verification.
As we have also seen in the deduction of the principle it is consistent with the 
other two, at least insofar as those principles have aided in the deduction process. The 
only remaining potential trouble-spots are the additions. Rotating the point of view fi-om 
that o f an individual person to that of the Universe does not cause any apparent 
inconsistencies. The Principle o f Equity can be interpreted to express just this sort of 
universal scope just as easily as it can be seen to cover the scope an entire individual life, 
so nothing in the Principle o f Rational Benevolence seems to be inconsistent with the
130 ibid., 382.
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demands of Equity. Similarly, the place at which Rational Prudence differs immediately 
from Benevolence is the arena of temporality. The Principle of Rational Benevolence 
certainly does not seem to conflict with the commitment that pleasures of some future 
moment can be rationally preferred to pleasures of a more immediate present, whether the 
agent of those pleasures is a single individual or a group of individuals. So, the principles 
are interconnected in some very important ways and in those areas where they differ in 
scope, those differences are not contradictory. Thus, the Principle of Rational 
Benevolence meets the second criterion. Discursive Verification.
By approaching the argument in this way, Sidgwick has already settled the 
question of whether the set o f principles taken as a whole meet the first two criteria. The 
satisfaction is fairly straightforward because it is exactly the same argument used to show 
that Rational Benevolence and Rational Prudence satisfied the Discursive Verification 
criterion. In showing that Prudence met the demands of Discursive Verification, it was 
shown that Equity and Prudence were consistent In showing that Benevolence met the 
demands of Discursive Verification, h was shown that Benevolence was consistent with 
both Prudence and Equity By transitivity, then, each of the principles has been shown to 
be consistent with the others
Whether the set is Intuitively Verifiable is a bit more obscure; but all that is 
necessary has already been done. For Sidgwick, if one discovers three different clear and 
distinct propositions, then the conjunction of those propositions will also be clear and 
distinct. Thus, in showing that each of the principles is clear and distinct severally, it 
follows from this view o f the conjunction of self-evident principles that the set will be
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clear and distinct as well. Hence, the set of principles satisfies the first criterion. All that 
is left is to show that Rational Benevolence satisfies the criterion of Social Verification 
and that the ensemble of principles satisfies this criterion as well.
With respect to Rational Benevolence, Sidgwick offers a brief caveat. It may be 
the case that all the relevant experts will not agree that Rational Benevolence holds. 
However, Sidgwick writes that “it may be fairly urged ... that practically each man ... 
ought chiefly to concern himself with promoting the good of a limited number of human 
beings, and generally in proportion to the closeness of their connexion with him.” *^ ' In 
support of this assertion, Sidgwick urges the reader to consider the ‘“plain man’ in a 
modem civilised society" Consider also that this ‘plain man’ is asked the hypothetical 
question “whether it would be morally right for him to seek his own happiness on any 
occasion if it involved a certain sacrifice of the greater happiness of some other human 
being - without any counterbalancing gain to any one else ” In this hypothetical situation, 
Sidgwick thinks it is clear (and clear to all the relevant judges) that the plain man’ would 
answer negatively and would do so without h e s i t a t i o n . O n  my view, this is an open 
question and it is not at all clear to me that the answer Sidgwick urges is actually the 
answer that would be forthcoming (and ultimately, it is an open question even to
ibid.
ibid One difficulty attends this example. It may be that it is too abstract to be of 
much use. As Dr. Merrill has suggested to me, we would want to know more about the 
details. Suppose, for instance, that the person to be harmed had made himself vulnerable 
through foolish or evil decisions. It would seem that the “plain man ” might very well 
answer differently in these circumstances. However, to alleviate this problem, let us 
stipulate that the harmed person is in fact innocent o f both foolhardiness and evil and 
comes to harm purely on the basis o f the greater happiness of the one benefited. In this 
case, it seems more clear than the “plain man” would answer as Sidgwick suggests.
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Sidgwick’s mind). However, to be fair, it is important to note how the question is 
actually presented. The question is not whether one ought to sacrifice oneself and one’s 
happiness for the happiness of another, but rather whether it would be right for a person 
to seek one’s own happiness at the expense o f another; and beyond that, at greater 
expense to that other than the benefit one would personally receive. If the question were 
of the self-sacrifice form, it is more likely that the answer would be one that Sidgwick 
would find unhelpful for his cause. However, asking the question in the way that he does 
actually brings the Principle of Equity to play in the deliberation; namely, is it fair to 
demand sacrifice of others for one’s own happiness. In this case, especially in the 
abstract, the answer is likely to be “no”, and a fairly widespread “no” at that Thus, 
Sidgwick takes Rational Benevolence to satisfy the third criterion. Social Verification.
The question then is whether the ensemble satisfies Social Verification. Again, 
Sidgwick can employ the part/whole argument. That is, if two propositions are severally 
verified and have been shown to be consistent with one another, then they are jointly 
verified. Both of the antecedent conditions have been met in the foregoing discussion. 
Each o f the three propositions has been jointly verified (except possibly the last, on my 
view) and each has been shown to be consistent with one another and each has been 
shown to be clear and distinct. Thus, they are jointly verified as well.
c. The Self-Evident Principles plus the Utility Doctrine
Having shown that the set of principles (Equity, Prudence, and Benevolence) are 
“really self-evident”, Sidgwick needs now to show that the conjunction o f these
1 2 6
principles plus the Utility Doctrine is consistent. Note that he need not show that the
Principle of Utility is self-evident. Recall Sidgwick’s statement at the outset;
there are certain absolute practical principles, the truth o f which, when they are 
explicitly stated, is manifest; but they are o f too abstract a nature, and too 
universal in their scope, to enable us to ascertain by immediate application of 
them what we ought to do in any particular case; particular duties have still to be 
determined by some other method.
The foregoing discussion has been a demonstration of the first part of this claim -
showing that there exist certain absolute practical principles. It has also been seen that
these principles are abstract to varying degrees, though in almost all cases too abstract to
“enable us to ascertain” what ought be done in any particular case. Overcoming this
difficulty is left to a method and a properly basic principle. This principle, on Sidgwick’s
view, is the Principle of Utility.
Sidgwick attempts to show that the Principle of Utility follows from the
conjunction of the three self-evident principles along with a proposition about the aims of
rationality. Recall the structure of Sidgwick’s argument outlined earlier.
e. There exist three self-evident principles These are (1) Equity, (2) 
Rational Prudence, and (3) Rational Benevolence.
f. The Ultimate Good Principle: The ultimate good is what one would desire 
if one’s desires were in harmony with reason and one took oneself to have 
an equal concern for all existence.
g Reasonable Beings Principle: We are bound to aim at good generally, and 
not at any particular part of it.
123 ibid., 379.
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h. Therefore, the Principle of Utility follows from (e), (f), and (g).
1) The Ultimate Good Principle
As we saw quite early in this project (in “The Good” section of this chapter), 
Sidgwick supposes a distinction between Right and Good that reflects a distinction within 
rationality; namely, a person’s active powers (related to Right) and her sentient powers 
(related to Good) I will restate that distinction briefly here. Goodness serves as a 
rational check on the sentient powers of an agent; rightness as a rational check on the 
active powers.
Whatever the distinction may entail, it is also clear that the two powers are 
intimately related (as they are both powers of human rationality) and. thus, that good and 
right are related as well. Sidgwick notes that in common parlance, this connection is 
fairly difficult to grasp with any sort of certainty. The Ultimate Good for human beings 
is related to right action. However, the Good is “frequently conceived as supernatural 
and so beyond the range of independent ethical speculation Clearly, Sidgwick is not 
content with such a view.
On Sidgwick’s view, “the practical determination of Right Conduct depends on 
the determination of Ultimate Good ” This emphasis on “practical determination” will 
necessarily eliminate recourses to the supernatural or epicycle-like invocations of the 
Deity to preserve otherwise inconsistent moral demands. The determination of the
Here Sidgwick has in mind at least the work o f the Cambridge Moralists. Their 
conception of the Good for humankind involves obedience to duty (and those duties 
conceived very theocentrically). As I suggested at the outset of the project, Sidgwick has 
two goals, one of which is a rebuttal (and perhaps refutation) of the Cambridge Moralists 
and their ethics o f religious commitment. Since 1 will explore that connection in more
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Ultimate Good depends on an elimination of possible alternatives -  (I) Virtue and (2) 
Subjective Rightness of Will. The remaining alternative, on Sidgwick’s view, is 
happiness (or, as he often puts it, desirable consciousness or pleasure).
2) Against Virtue
On Sidgwick’s view, to suppose that virtue comprises the General or Ultimate 
Good will inevitably lead us into a vicious circle in fairly short order. By "virtue ”, 
Sidgwick means "conformity to such prescriptions and prohibitions as make up the main 
part o f the morality of Common Sense.” '^ * If Virtue is the Ultimate Good, and virtue is 
right actions as specified by prescriptions and prohibitions o f common sense, and right 
conduct depends on the Ultimate Good, then right conduct depends on right conduct. 
Thus, Virtue is eliminated as a possible formulation of the Ultimate Good.
3) Against Subjective Rightness of Will
depth in the next section of this chapter, I will not dwell on it further here.
Obviously, this is a potentially controversial definition. For example, one alternative 
definition has very little to do with the prescriptions and prohibitions of Common Sense 
but rather involves states o f character and the like. However, these sorts o f conceptions 
of virtue have already been dismissed as part o f the Intuitionist method, so the 
understanding of Virtue here must be limited to those possible understandings that have 
not been dismissed. So, the criticism that Sidgwick’s argument here does not rule out 
ethics o f character of an Aristotelian sort, for example, are misguided because Sidgwick 
does not mean, with this argument, to address those sorts o f virtue at all. Sidgwick does 
propose a brief argument against admitting the character conception of Virtue as the 
Ultimate Good. On Sidgwick’s view, a disposition or character "can only be defined as a 
tendency to act or feel in a certain way under certain circumstances.” However, the 
tendency does not seem to be valuable, o f itself. Rather, it is valuable because o f the acts 
and feelings it tends to produce. Hence, the circle is upon us again.
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Taking “rightness o f will” as the Ultimate Good is no better. The very notion of 
subjective rightness or goodness implies an objective standard that the concept does not 
provide. His argument goes something like this.
(1)In deliberating with a view to immediate action, the agent cannot 
distinguish between doing what is objectively right, and realizing the 
agent's own subjective conception of rightness
For Sidgwick, this premise is supported by the view that “whatever action any of us 
judges to be right for himself he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in 
similar circumstances This was employed in the argument showing the Equity was a 
really self-evident principle and it is an assertion that he takes to be true o f Common 
Sense moral thought. Here, however, there is a slightly different slant to the claim. What 
Sidgwick seems to be saying is that in the moment of decision faced by an agent, she will 
take what she thinks to be the right thing to do (“the agent’s own subjective conception of 
rightness”) and implicitly judge that it is what it would be right to do for any agent 
similarly situated (“what is objectively right”). If this is the case, then Sidgwick is right 
that in the Ace of a decision about an immediate action, the agent is likely to confuse 
subjective valuations about rightness of action with the objective ones. This seems even 
more likely to be Sidgwick’s view given his next assertion;
(2) No rule can be recognized as more authoritative than the rule of doing 
what she judges to be right.
136 Sidgwick, 379.
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Supposing that the agent is rational and deliberative, the subjective rule of “do what you 
judge to be right” will have authoritative priority for the agent to some external rule of 
“do what someone outside oneself judges to be right”. Here, Sidgwick's view is quite 
similar to Kant’s concerning the authority of moral rules; namely that the truly 
autonomous agent is herself the author of the moral law for herself and that this self­
authored moral law is authoritative in a way that outside, heteronomous rules are not 
However, the contusion between subjective evaluations of rightness and objective ones is 
doubly troublesome, on Sidgwick’s view, because;
(3) We are continually forced to make the distinction in (I) as regards the 
actions o f others and to judge that conduct may be objectively wrong 
though subjectively right.
Since access to motive and intent is clearly privileged, outside observers of action 
have no direct evidentiary grounds for judging actions to be right or wrong other than the 
consequences of those actions. Thus, our ground for judging the actions of others to be 
right or wrong very rarely takes the form of a questioning of motive; at least not in the 
first glance at a situation. Instead, Sidgwick argues that
This is not to say that Sidgwick thinks that estimation o f motive or intent plays no part 
in judging the rightness or wrongness o f action. However, Sidgwick does think that 
access to those motives is quite privileged and the only external access will ultimately be 
based on observation o f past actions o f the agent whose actions are being evaluated. 
Thus, even when suppositions about intent are used to militate judgments of wrongness, 
for example, those suppositions will themselves be the product o f observation of 
consequences of action.
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(4) Conduct is judged to be objectively wrong because it tends to cause pain 
and loss of happiness to others (apart from any effect on the subjective 
rightness of their volitions -  which are beyond our grasp).
It is true that observers may moderate their judgments of wrongness on the basis 
of some estimation of motive or intent on the part o f the acting agent However, to be 
rational those moderating impulses must have some basis in past observation Further, 
those past observations, as well as the current ones, will be observations of consequences; 
specifically whether pain or pleasure has been the result of an action Thus, whatever 
else may be involved in judgments, it seems clear that at least (4) is the case as well All 
of which leads Sidgwick to an example that he thinks points to the difficulty of this 
particular conception for the Ultimate Good.
(5) We commonly recognise the mischief and danger of fimaticism; - meaning 
by a fanatic a man who resolutely and unswervingly carries out his own 
conception of rightness, when it is a plainly mistaken concept.
Here as we have seen, Sidgwick emphasizes the well-recognized difficulty with judging 
of subjective motives in others. Thus, the difficulty has been seen to exist for outside 
observers of action [(3), (4), and (5)] and for the agent himself [(1), (2), and (5)]. Beyond 
these difficulties, Sidgwick suggests that if we conceive the Ultimate Good as Subjective 
Rightness o f Will (and rule out the use of consequences in the evaluation o f rightness 
either for ourselves or others) then we will also be left with the following paradox.
132
Paradox: There is no ultimate end except right-seeking itself and no effects of 
right volition can be good except the subjective rightness of future 
volitions.
This is to say that the agent is incapable of using the effects o f volitions as evidence that 
the volitions are themselves right. All that is available to the agent are future volitions 
and the feeling of their subjective rightness, though the rightness of those volitions admits 
of no confirmation beyond other future volitions, and so forth. The “plain man” of 
Sidgwick’s Victorian common-sense will find this a “palpable and violent paradox”
4) The Principle of Ultimate Good 
Having ruled out Virtue and Subjective Will as candidates for the Ultimate Good, 
Sidgwick argues that the Ultimate Good is a good consciousness (or a desirable 
consciousness, or the sentient [feeling] life, or pleasure). He writes, “this seems in 
harmony with Common Sense” Because this view is in harmony with common-sense, 
and he has shown that the other two options fail to meet this criterion, the Ultimate Good 
is to be understood as desirable consciousness. However, this is not taken to eliminate 
virtue or subjective will as elements o f the Ulitmate Good. His argument from analogy 
goes something like the following:
( 1 ) The virtues and subjective will are valued as means to ulterior good.
(2) Nutrition, physical action, and sleep are all valued as indispensable 
elements of the maintenance o f animal life
138 Sidgwick, 396.
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(3) The virtues and subjective motives are to the psychical life as nutrition, 
etc., are to physical life.
(4) Therefore, the virtues and subjective motives are valued as indispensable 
elements of desirable consciousness.
However, even if this view is “in harmony with Common Sense”, it does not 
address the question of whether it is in harmony with his arguments elsewhere in the 
Methods about the Good; arguments we investigated in the section of this chapter entitled 
“The Good.” There, we arrived at a conception of the General Good by first 
demonstrating the distinction between the sentient and active powers of rationality, next 
coming to a conception o f the Good (“what it is reasonable to seek to keep or aim at 
getting”), and finally expanding that concept to the notion of the General Good.
This principle does not specify what the Ultimate Good is, rather it picks out the 
conditions that the Ultimate Good must satisfy. Similarly, to specify that the Good is 
“what it is reasonable to seek to keep or to aim at getting” likewise sets the conditions for 
any competitors for the office of “the Good". Sidgwick thinks he has shown that 
desirability satisfies these conditions in ways that Virtue and Subjective Will do not (and 
cannot). For example, while virtue and subjective motive are goods - that is to say, they 
are reasonable to seek to keep or aim at getting - they are not the Ultimate Good because 
they are elements of it [from (4) above]. Beyond this, having demonstrated the 
inaccessibility of subjective will, and for that matter, the content of another’s character, 
the thing to be desired if one’s desires were in harmony with reason, etc , is the products
129 ibid.
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or effects of that will or those states of character. That is to say, we actually desire the 
positive consequences and abhor the negative ones So, on Sidgwick's view, it is more in 
keeping with the facts of experience that we should want for ourselves (and for others) 
desirable consciousness (or pleasure) which is the supposed effect of these other goods 
On Sidgwick’s view, to desire pleasure is perfectly reasonable, given the foregoing 
discussion. Thus, his utility doctrine meets the criteria set forth in the principle o f the 
Ultimate Good.
5) The Rational Beings Principle
The last piece of the Sidgwickian puzzle is the Rational Beings Principle. On 
Sidgwick’s account, if a human being is rational, she will seek to keep or aim at getting 
the ultimate good This is sc because ‘the Good’ is what it is reasonable to seek to keep 
or aim at getting. To act in contradiction to the dictates of reason is to suggest that the 
agent is in fact behaving unreasonably, which would militate against labeling the agent, 
at the outset, as rational. In addition to seeking the Good, the agent, if rational, will also 
seek the General Good. Recall that the ultimate good is, “what one would desire if one’s 
desires were in harmony with reason and one took oneself to have an equal concern for 
all existence.” Thus, the rational agent will aim at the good in general. This is because 
(1) this will more likely preserve the equal concern for all existence, rather than a 
particular part of the good, which could be personal good or even the good of another, 
and (2) for the rational agent’s desires to be completely in harmony with reason will 
entail that the agent will have a concern for the good of all.
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6) The Principle of Utility
Sidgwick's conclusion is that the Utility Doctrine follows from the conjunction of 
the three self-evident principles (Equity, Rational Prudence, Rational Benevolence), the 
Ultimate Good Principle, and the Reasonable Beings Principle. From the Rational 
Beings principle we have that a rational agent will aim at the General Good. Thus, the 
rational agent will aim at those desires that are in harmony with reason and express equal 
concern for all existence (from the Ultimate Good Principle). Similarly, the rational 
agent will aim at desirable consciousness or pleasure because this is the desire that 
harmonizes with reason and expresses that equal concern This aim will be directed 
beyond the agent herself (application o f the Rational Benevolence and Equity Principles) 
but will include the good of the agent as well (application of the Rational Prudence and 
Equity Principles).'^”
3. Ethical Egoism
Within common-sense there is a moral intuition toward self-preservation and even 
self-love. Sidgwick recognizes this intuition and incorporates it extensively into his own 
view. However, incorporation is not the full extent to which these intuitions to self-love 
can be extended. Rather, they form the basis for the third method o f ethics Sidgwick 
addresses, namely Ethical Egoism (also referred to by Sidgwick as Egoistic Hedonism).
The fundamental difference between Universal Hedonism and Ethical Egoism is 
captured nicely in differing propositions that the two would afRrm The Universal
The Utility calculus itself is another matter entirely, though it too is a product o f the 
applications o f these principles to actual cases.
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Hedonist will affirm that “If a state of consciousness having a certain quality (e.g., 
pleasantness) would, for that reason, be intrinsically good, then its occurrence m any 
minJ IS a titting object ot desire to any mnui. The Egoist, however, wouid affirm ihe 
following proposition, “If a state o f consciousness having a certain quality (e.g., 
pleasantness) would, for that reason, be intrinsically good, then its occurrence in any 
mind is a fitting object o f desire to that mind and to that mind
As Broad points out, if stated in this way the position is not susceptible to claims 
of internal inconsistency or arbitrariness. For example, the Egoist does not make any 
affirmation about his own Ego that he is not prepared to allow to be the case for any other 
Ego. Or, in another way, suppose that Fred is an Ethical Egoist. Suppose further that 
some object of desire, say a caramel apple, is likely to induce a consciousness o f pleasure 
in Fred. At the same time, another caramel apple would induce a similar consciousness 
of pleasure in Jane. Fred, the Ethical Egoist, is entirely prepared to say “Good for Jane”. 
That is, it is nice that such a desirable consciousness is present in Jane in the presence of 
the caramel apple. However, that such a desirable consciousness is present in Jane does 
not lay any obligation on him (and that such a desirable consciousness is present in him 
does not lay any obligation on her).
The reason Fred is able to hold this position is that he holds two distinct 
propositions to be true. As a hedonist, he holds that “all equally pleasant states o f mind 
are equally good things.” This is true without regard to whose state o f  mind is in 
question. However, he also holds that “each agent is only properly concerned with a
Broad, 243.
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particularly restricted class o f these equally good things, namely those that are the states 
of the agent’s mind.” As such, the agent (Fred, in this case) will have a duty to do only 
those things that are a part ot that class specified oy the secona proposition. Cieariy, the 
same will be true if the agent in question is Jane. If Ethical Egoism is stated in this way I 
can see no inconsistency nor arbitrariness in the view.
The difficulty in being unable to dismiss Ethical Egoism is that at the end of the 
day, Sidgwick is left with two mutually inconsistent ethical methods, each of which 
makes claim to foundation in the moral sense. This introduction has suggested the 
dilemma. However, the presence of an apparently competitive principle is not itself 
sufficient to generate the Dualism of Practical Reason. Sidgwick takes some care to 
show that, unfortunately for his project. Ethical Egoism cannot be dismissed nearly as 
easily as Intuitionism (and perhaps cannot be rejected at all).
Given that such intuitions to self-love exist, Sidgwick applies the same criteria to 
the principles deduced from such intuitions that he applied when examining the 
foundational principles o f Utilitarianism and Intuitionism. I will address the verification 
criteria in reverse order, beginning with Social before turning to Discursive and Intuitive. 
Prior to this discussion o f Verification, I will outline the Ethical Egoist Argument that 
Sidgwick takes to be his primary foil.
a. The Ethical Egoist Argument 
The argument that Sidgwick takes to be the best expression of the Ethical Egoist’s 
position is quite simple (and in many ways simpler than the argument for Universal 
Hedonism) Generally, commentators on Sidgwick suppose that the argument involves
138
first a rejection of the Ultimate Good Principle and the addition of two new principles 
that replace the Principles of Rational Benevolence and Equity. Since, as we have 
already seen, the Ultimate Good Fnnciple aepends on tne Principles of Equity, 
Benevolence, and Prudence, it is sufficient to show that the Principles of Benevolence 
and Equity (or just the former) are amended to show that the Ultimate Good Principle no 
longer holds, at least not in its Utilitarian form. One principle that can remain unchanged 
is the Principle of Rational Prudence.
I introduced one of the altered principles in the Introductory part of this project; it 
is an amended form of the Reasonable (or Rational) Beings Principle. Recall, that for 
Sidgwick the Reasonable Beings Principle amounts to the following;
Reasonable Beings Principle: We are bound to aim at good generally, and not 
at any particular part of it.
The amended principle could be stated as follows:
Reasonable Beings Principle We are bound to aim at the particular part of 
good that is represented by our interests, and only secondarily at good 
generally (if at all)
The second new principle we can call the Principle of Self-Interest Sidgwick 
casts this principle in the language of the utility calculus. The Egoist is one who “when 
two or more courses of action are open to him ... chooses the one which he thinks will 
yield him the greatest surplus of pleasure over pain"
Principle of Self-Interest: Given two courses of action, an agent ought choose 
the greater surplus o f pleasure over pain for himself.
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This choice is based on an assessment o f the two courses o f action and that 
assessment is o f the amounts o f pleasure (or pain) each of the courses will bring. This 
principle replaces the Principle of Rational Benevolence from the Universal Hedonism 
argument. If the Principles o f Equity and Rational Prudence are maintained intact and we 
further maintain the understanding of the Good as that which is reasonable to aim at 
getting or seek to keep and that this end is pleasure or desirable consciousness, then on 
Sidgwick’s view, the Maximum Pleasure Principle follows;
Maximum Pleasure Principle: One ought maximize one’s own pleasure or 
happiness.
Sidgwick notes that each of these new principles is part of the moral sense, just as 
the earlier principles that he used in support o f Universal Hedonism were. If this is the 
case, then Ethical Egoism follows properly from the moral common-sense. Further, if 
each of the new principles survives the verification process, then Ethical Egoism will 
have the same status as Universal Hedonism
Before turning to the verification portion o f  the discussion, I will propose an 
alternative interpretation of the Ethical Egoist argument; one to which Sidgwick seems to 
allude at times but does not develop
It does not seem at all clear to me that the Ethical Egoist must accept the Principle 
of Equity. Recall that the Principle o f Equity is:
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Principle of Equity: It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it 
would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different 
individuals, and without there being any difference between the natures or 
circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for 
difference of treatment
It seems that the Ethical Egoist could simply deny this principle outright, because he
could consistently suppose that it is right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would
be wrong for B to treat A Consider the following example. Ann is an Ethical Egoist
As an Egoist, she might very well hold that it is right for her to expect preferential
treatment from the waitstaff at a restaurant because this would provide the greater surplus
of pleasure over pain for herself. She also might hold this view even if in receiving
preferential treatment, one of the consequences was that Alfred was forced to wait an
inordinate amount of time for service. Thus, his pleasure was actually lessened. Clearly
this circumstance violates the Principle of Equity, but it seems that an Ethical Egoist
might hold that Ann acted rightly (or at least did not act wrongly) in the scenario.
We can make sense of this sort of result by altering the argument. If one denies
the Principle of Equity, one can still advance the argument in favor of Ethical Egoism.
However, an alteration will need to be made to the Principle of Self-Interest to make the
argument work. I call the amended Principle o f Self-Interest, the Principle of
Enlightened Self-Interest.
Principle o f Enlightened Self-Interest: An agent ought to abide by a Principle 
of Equity only insofar as the principle tends to promote the agent’s own 
good.
ibid., 380.
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The reason 1 have formulated the principle in this way is that the Principle of 
Equity (as formulated in the negative by Sidgwick) carries with it a level of moral 
necessity that cannot be preserved in the Principle of Enlightened Self-Interest. 
However, if we use one of the positive formulations of the Principle of Equity available 
to us, we can overcome this concern. For example, suppose we appropriate one of 
Sidgwick’s intermediate positive formulations - “if a kind o f conduct that is right (or 
wrong) for me is not right (or wrong) for some one else, it must be on the ground of some 
difference between the two cases, other than the fact that I and he are different persons" 
We can amend it as follows;
Principle of Equity*: If a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not 
right (or wrong) for some one else, it must be on the ground of some 
difference between the two cases.
By eliminating the final clause in Sidgwick’s formulation, we can now preserve 
the argument. The Ethical Egoist can maintain that Ann acted rightly (or at least, not 
wrongly) in receiving preferential treatment because it was she who received it and she 
differs from Alfred in that she is not Alfred. Further, an Egoist might be able to criticize 
Ann’s actions as well For example, if in receiving preferential treatment on this 
occasion, she has made an intractable enemy o f Alfred, who will do her ill turns for years 
to come, then the Egoist can claim that the action was actually in violation of the 
Principle o f Enlightened Self-Interest This is simply to say, sometimes it is in the 
agent’s interest to surrender a bit of pleasure now for the sake o f greater pleasure later (or 
significantly less pain later). And at times, this surrender in the present will look very
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much like an instance of adhering to the Principle of Equity when in reality it is 
adherence to the Principle of Enlightened Self-Interest. Seen in this way. Enlightened 
Self-Interest replaces Benevolence just as Self-Interest does However, it also replaces 
Equity. Just as in the earlier case (that is, Sidgwick’s argument), the Maximum Pleasure 
Principle follows. The conjunction of the Maximum Pleasure Principle with the foregoing 
principles comprise the core of Ethical Egoism.
Once again, these new principles seem to be straightforwardly lifted from the 
moral common-sense, so that requirement is satisfied. In both cases, it is clear that 
Ethical Egoism amounts to an affirmation of Rational Prudence to the exclusion of 
Rational Benevolence (and in my amended version, to the exclusion of Equity, as well). 
All that remains is to show that Sidgwick’s argument for Ethical Egoism and my 
amended argument, call it Sidgwick*, survive the verification process.
b. Intuitive and Social Verification of Ethical Egoism
Instead of treating each of these separately. I will address them together. The 
Fundamental Principle of Ethical Egoism or Maximum Pleasure Principle is widely 
accepted in one form or another across a broad spectrum of philosophical traditions. 
Sidgwick himself notes this when he lists a diverse selection of thinkers who have, to one 
degree or another, endorsed the principle; Jeremy Bentham, Bishop Butler, and Samuel 
Clarke, among others. Citing Bentham’s work, Sidgwick writes that even though 
Bentham advances the Utility doctrine, he also claims that “that each individual should 
aim at his own greatest happiness ’’"^
•”  Sidgwick, 119.
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Bishop Butler, whose arguments against Egoism find supporters in both Hume
and Sidgwick, also holds that an individual has some vested interest in his own
happiness. In Sermon XI, Butler writes,
our ideas o f happiness and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most 
important to us...that, though virtue and moral rectitude does indeed consist in 
affection to and pursuit of what is right and good and such; yet, when we sit down 
in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit till we 
are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it
Here, in one of the staunchest opponents to the position that Sidgwick describes as the
Ethical Egoist view, we have a straightforward assertion that justification for virtue and
moral rectitude is, at least partly, the happiness that is to be gained from virtue and moral
rectitude. Butler goes further, making the stronger claim that without being convinced of
the happiness to be gained in virtue, we cannot justify that virtue to ourselves. We note
that he does not make the weaker claim that virtue can be partially justified in the absence
o f this happiness. Rather, he seems to make the stronger one that virtue cannot be
justified in the absence of this happiness. However, whether he is making the weaker or
the stronger claim is irrelevant to this discussion. In either case, weaker or stronger,
justification for virtue depends, to one degree or another, on the Pleasure Principle.
This position is echoed by Clarke, who writes that “Virtue truly deserves to be
chosen for its own sake and Vice to be avoided" However, he goes on to write that it is
“not truly reasonable that men by adhering to Virtue should part with their lives, if
thereby they eternally deprived themselves of all possibility o f receiving any advantage
Joseph Butler, “Sermon XT’, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel and A 
Dissertation Upon the Nature of Virtue. (London: G. Bell, 1953), 96.
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from that adherence So, even in this case, some benefit must accrue to the agent in 
the practice of virtue for that practice to be “truly reasonable” . Thus, Clarke, too, holds 
that, to one degree or another, the principle of aiming at one’s own good is involved in a 
proper notion of virtue.
This wide-ranging, albeit brief, survey of the philosophical terrain serves two 
functions in Sidgwick’s exposition of the Ethical Egoism method of ethics. In the first 
place, it serves to show that the principles involved satisfy the requirements of Social 
Verification. Though Sidgwick does not take notice of the fact, this satisfaction may be 
even more true for Ethical Egoism than for Universal Hedonism. Universal Hedonism 
met with widespread disdain as an ethical theory. While it is true that Ethical Egoism 
shares this fate, it is also true that even on Sidgwick’s own view, the fundamental 
principle of Ethical Egoism is far more widely shared than that of Universal Hedonism. 
Philosophers from Bentham to Butler to Clarke (as well as most of the Cambridge 
Moralists) hold that some form of the fundamental principle of Ethical Egoism is the 
case. Very little else in the way of further argument is necessary to show this to be true. 
On the other hand, Sidgwick was compelled to work quite hard to show that Universal 
Hedonism satisfied the requirements of Social Verification.'^
The second function of this exposition is to show that the fundamental principle 
of Ethical Egoism satisfies the requirements of Intuitive Verification. What is important
Samuel Clarke, Bovie Lectures. (London; Knapton, 1725), 87.
There is a potential criticism of Sidgwick’s account at this point. It seems clear 
enough that Butler and Clarke and a host o f others could very well accept that personal 
happiness and/or self-interest are of significant moral relevance without accepting the 
Principles of Self-Interest.
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to note here is the lack of further argumentation by Bentham, Butler, or Clarke, for 
example, as concerns the principle. Each of the thinkers simply accepts that something 
like the principle of self-interest is the case, to one degree or another. It is accepted 
straightaway by each as intuitively given. The challenge, at least for Butler and Clarke, is 
to then show how the principle fits into a wider theory that serves to limit the scope of the 
principle. The principle is not open to question; rather its further function in a full ethical 
view is at issue. Thus, on a survey of the common moral sense, Sidgwick thinks that it is 
clear that Ethical Egoism satisfies the requirements of Intuitive Verification,
c. Discursive Verification of Ethical Egoism 
This leaves only Discursive Verification. At issue here, though, is whether or 
not, in the specific case of Ethical Egoism, the Maximum Pleasure Principle can be 
harmonized with the other principles (Self-Interest, etc ) First, I will examine whether or 
not an Ethical Egoist must accept Sidgwick's Rational Prudence, which states that "One 
ought to aim at one’s good, on the whole.” In showing that the Ethical Egoist need not 
accept Rational Prudence, we will see that the Ethical Egoist can also reasonably deny 
Rational Benevolence while at the same time holding the principles that conjunctively 
support the Egoist position. The first investigation will utilize Sidgwick’s argument in 
which it he supposes that the Ethical Egoist will hold the Principle of Equity in addition 
to Self-Interest, Maximum Pleasure, etc Second, 1 will examine whether or not an 
Ethical Egoist must accept the Principle of Equity. In showing that he need not, 1 will 
show that the Ethical Egoist can reasonably reject Equity (and along with it Rational 
Prudence and Rational Benevolence) while at the same time holding the principles that
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conjunctively support the Egoist position This second investigation utilizes my own 
Ethical Egoist argument adapted from allusions Sidgwick makes but does not develop 
The result o f these two investigations will be to show that the principles of Ethical 
Egoism are independent in the relevant ways that the principles of Universal Hedonism 
have already been shown to be A secondary result is that neither Ethical Egoism nor 
Universal Hedonism is reducible to the other. These results will entail that they (the 
principles of Ethical Egoism) can be held together without inconsistency This further 
entails that they satisfy the requirement of Discursive Verification. The conclusion, then, 
will be that since the principles of Ethical Egoism satisfy all three verification criteria, 
Etfiical Egoism has the same status as Universal Hedonism. Since this is the case, the 
Ethical Egoist can consistently hold that
Ethical Egoist Conclusion #1: It is not the duty of the Egoist to aim at the 
General Good, and
Ethical Egoist Conclusion #2: It is his duty to aim only at his own good states 
of mind.
Since these are contradictories of the conclusions concerning “ought” and “right” 
reached by the Universal Hedonism argument, then we are left with the Dualism of 
Practical Reason; namely that the two surviving ethical methods entail contradictory 
conclusions. Since both are developed step by step from the data of the common moral 
sense, we can conclude, with Sidgwick, that the data o f common moral sense is dualistic. 
If this is the case, then the common moral sense is inconsistent, and potentially 
incoherent.
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The Maximum Pleasure Principle is the base intuition that is expressed in 
Rational Prudence, but it surfaces at other times as well. However, Sidgwick recognizes 
that the Ethical Egoist can accept Rational Prudence and little else of the Utilitarian 
method. Beyond this, Sidgwick recognizes that the Ethical Egoist need not accept even 
his formulation of the Principle.
For example, suppose that we accept that a person is made up of a successive 
series o f conscious moments and that one ought consider the entirety, as far as one can, 
when deliberating immediate action This is the picture o f the self that Sidgwick uses to 
explain why the Principles of Equity, Rational Prudence, and Rational Benevolence hold. 
If we suppose that a person is a serially ordered set o f conscious moments and that the 
agent should consider the entirety of this set (or at least the elements of it that comprise 
the present and the future) when deliberating action, then we have essentially a complete 
acceptance of the Principle of Rational Prudence. However, Sidgwick then uses this 
principle, along with the principle o f Equity, to suggest an analogy between the series of 
consciousnesses that comprise an individual and the group of individuals that comprise 
the population. The Ethical Egoist can reject the claim that such an analogy holds in 
anything like the way that Sidgwick needs it to. For example, there is the phenomenon of 
simultaneity in the group of individuals that will not be present in the serially order set of 
conscious moments. Note that the Principle o f Rational Prudence addresses primarily the 
concerns of an individual agent who faces a choice about two potential goods - one in the 
near term and another later - that are mutually incompatible. That is, choosing one 
eliminates the possibility o f choosing the other. Sidgwick holds that the agent ought to
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consider each of his conscious moments to be more or less equal. Thus, it is rational to 
forego an immediate pleasure, or even suffer an immediate pain, in order to experience a 
later pleasure of greater magnitude, intensity, fecundity, or duration. He then analogizes 
from the serially ordered set o f conscious moments to the aggregate of all people over 
which the General Good ranges.
The Ethical Egoist can simply deny that the analogy holds. It is quite different to 
suppose that an agent should choose a later pleasure over an immediate one for himself 
and to suppose that an agent should choose a pleasure for someone else over a 
contemporaneous pleasure for himself. This is just to point out that in the aggregate of 
all people, there are many conscious moments at any given time while in the single agent 
there is but one. And it is conceivable to imagine that, in the case of the aggregate, many 
people could experience no moments of desirable consciousness (nor the promise of 
future ones) while the General Good is preserved. This situation would clearly violate 
the pleasure principle on the Egoist account. The only way to overcome a circumstance 
of this sort is for each agent to pursue her own pleasure first (and perhaps foremost). 
This is a straightforward denial of the Principle of Rational Benevolence. However it 
involves a denial of the Principle of Rational Prudence as well.
Consider this further example -  the Ethical Egoist need not accept Rational 
Prudence at all. The principle suggests that when Certainty is relatively negligible that 
future possibilities with great intensity can reasonably be chosen over near-term 
possibilities with lesser intensity. However, the principle also emails that future 
possibilities can be reasonably chosen over near-term ones even when the certainty
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differential is fairly great; that is, if the near-term experience is much more certain than 
the more distant term one. It is reasonable to choose the future experience even though it 
is less certain, if it is of sufficiently great intensity to make the cost/benefit calculus work 
out. The Ethical Egoist can reject this implication, even if he accepts the reasonability of 
choosing future experiences over near-term ones if the certainty level is negligible. The 
rejection of this conclusion entails a rejection of the Principle itself.
However, it should be noted that at no time have the Principles of Self-Interest, 
Maximum Pleasure, or the altered Reasonable Beings Principle been brought into 
question. Neither has the Principle o f Equity. During the course of this discussion, in 
fact, those principles have been used in concert to deny Rational Benevolence and 
Rational Prudence. This suggests that the principles harmonize in the way Sidgwick 
requires for satisfaction of the Discursive Verification criterion.
I have already alluded to the fact that the Ethical Egoist may deny Equity as well 
This is so, at least in part, on the ground of a differential in certainty. Equity requires that 
an agent treat any two people in similar circumstances in similar ways. This is the 
requirement even if both of the people are the agent herself. This is a special case of 
applying Equity that demonstrates how closely connected it can be to Rational Prudence. 
According to Equity, an agent should treat her current self and her future selves in 
relevantly similar ways. However, as we have just seen above, an Ethical Egoist can 
reasonably hold that the nearer, less intense, and more certain pleasures are to be chosen 
over the more distant, more intense, and less certain ones. “A bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush.”
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If, however, Sidgwick means something even more general by the Principle of 
Equity; say that from an objective perspective, the egoist must maintain that the good of 
any particular individual not himself is equal to the good of any other individual not 
himself, then the egoist could reply that it is not this sort o f Principle that he rejects. As 
Broad writes:
He could admit that ‘the good of any one individual is of no more importance, 
from the point o f view of the Universe, than the equal good of another.’ He 
would merely remark that, after all, he is not the Universe, and therefore it is not 
obvious that he ought to take the Universe’s point o f view
Thus, the Ethical Egoist can reject Rational Prudence and Rational Benevolence 
in favor of a Principle of Self-Interest and replace Equity with Equity* and still maintain 
a system of consistent principles, each of which is “really self-evident” in just the ways 
Sidgwick argues that his own principles are. Similarly, the Ethical Egoist can reject all 
three of Sidgwick’s core principles (Equity, Rational Prudence, and Rational 
Benevolence) in favor of Equity* and the Enlightened Self-Interest. This new set of 
principles is again internally consistent and “really self-evident” In either case, the 
Ethical Egoist Conclusions #s 1 and 2 above have been shown to follow.
B. A summary of the Dualism of Practical Reason 
The process o f argument that leads to the Dualism of Practical Reason can be 
represented quite simply, now that we have seen the intricacies of the arguments for the 
competing theories On Sidgwick’s view, both the Universal Hedonist and the Ethical 
Egoist will agree to the following claim:
SI : A person’s good is her self-satisftction.
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S2; Self-satisfaction consists in maximizing pleasure for the agent, or (to 
avoid begging any questions) in the realization of pleasure by the agent 
I have reframed the first two premises of the argument in this way because they 
seem to capture claims to which both the Universal Hedonist and the Ethical Egoist will 
a g r e e . I  have also put it in this way because it helps to crystallize the concern that is 
raised by the Dualism of Practical Reason. This is so because from S 1 and S2 both of the 
following claims receive equal support (or lack thereof):
S3: The agent has a duty toward the general good 
S3* The agent has no duty toward the general good 
Obviously S3 is Sidgwick's view of Universal Hedonism while S3* is his 
approximation of Ethical Egoism. It is also clear that S3 and S3* are incompatible 
claims. Yet, as we have seen, both seem to be supported by the moral common-sense 
Thus, Sidgwick, at the end of the day, holds that the moral common-sense is inconsistent.
C. Objections (Sidgwick’s and Others)
1. Georg von Gizycki
One way out of the Dualism of Practical Reason may be to get a clearer 
understanding of what is properly to be considered a "method" of ethics. Perhaps, one 
would discover, in the course of such an investigation, that Ethical Egoism is itself not a
Broad, 245
I have also reframed the issue in this way because it will allow the reader to see the 
connection between Sidgwick's arguments that conclude in the Dualism of Practical 
Reason and Green’s argument that the difficulty can be overcome. In the Cambridge 
Moralist subsection on T. H Green, 1 will return to this formulation o f the argument. 
This is also why the premises and conclusions are labeled with an “s". This will help to
1S2
method of ethics. Clearly, this cannot happen in the same way that Psychological Egoism
was eliminated, or presumably Sidgwick would have done so However, this does not
rule out the possibility that Ethical Egoism might fail to be a method of ethics for some
other reason. This is precisely the solution that Gizycki argues Sidgwick should have
taken. On Gizycki's view, Sidgwick can simply argue that Ethical Egoism is not a
method of ethics, at all
The crux of Gizycki’s argument is that if the principle on which %oism rests is not a
moral principle, then there can be no contradiction between egoism and morality, no matter
how widely their dictates may diverge. However, Sidgwick himself considers just this
sort of move. Consider the following statement;
It may be doubted whether this [Ethical Egoism] ought to be included among 
received methods of Ethics', since there are strong grounds for holding that a 
system of morality, satisfactory to the moral consciousness o f mankind in general, 
cannot be constructed on the basis of simple Egoism.'**'
On Gizycki's account, to call a theory an “ethical” theory is just to say that it is a 
theory that involves a concern for the good of all human beings. That is, Gizycki suggests 
the following definition for an “ethical theory":
Ethical Theor^r Definition: A theory of conduct, X, is properly called a moral 
theory only if X  involves a concern for the good of everyone alike.
differentiate them from Green’s premises that will be labeled with a “g".
All that I mean to imply here is that Sidgwick has already treated Psychological 
Egoism in considerable depth. Given his care as a philosopher, his obvious desire to 
have Universal Hedonism take the day, and that he revised the Methods of Ethics no 
fewer than seven times, it would be plausible to assume that i t  on his view. Ethical 
Egoism suffered the same defects as Psychological Egoism that he would exploit those 
defects to their fullest potential.
Schneewind, 116-7.
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Further, Gizycki gives a dififerent definition for theories of conduct commonly 
called “prudential” or “egoist”.
Egoist Theory Définition. /\ theory of conduct. A’ is called an egoist or 
prudential theory if it involves only concern for the agent.
On this view Ethical Egoism fails to satisfy the Ethical Theory Definition. If it is 
not an ethical theory, then it is not a Method of Ethics Since the Dualism of Practical 
Reason depends on the acceptance of both Universal Hedonism and Ethical Egoism to be 
proper Methods of Ethics, if one o f the two is shown to not be a method of ethics, the 
Dualism is thwarted. On Gizycki’s view. Ethical Egoism fails and thus, the Dualism of 
Practical Reason is overcome.
We might suppose that Sidgwick has something like this possibility in mind given 
his foregoing statement about the doubt that seems to attend including Ethical Egoism as 
a 'method of Ethics'. Schneewind interprets this passage as an indication that Sidgwick is 
very hesitant about suggesting that Egoism systematizes “the plain man's moral 
convictions”. Further, Sidgwick might also agree with Gizycki’s definitions. But, such a 
move apparently seems to Sidgwick to be nomenclaiural sleight of hand that does not 
actually solve the Dualism of Practical Reason and actually exacerbates the situation 
because h obscures the problem.
In addition, we can also suspect that Sidgwick does not agree with the definitions. 
This is so because on Sidgwick’s view the authority of morality is dependent entirely on the 
rationality it expresses. It is this rationality that he thinks both Universal Hedonism and
M l Sidgwick, 119.
154
Ethical Egoism express. Thus, since they express rationality in ethically rdevant ways, they 
are equally methods of ethics or equally not methods of ethics. Thus, the inclusion of one 
will force the inclusion of the other Since Universal Hedonism is included, so too is 
Egoism.
2. Sidgwick and the Ignobility of Ethical Egoism
The foregoing discussion should not be taken to suggest that Sidgwick finally 
believes that Ethical Egoism is the right ethical theory or that it is the equal of Universal 
Hedonism. Instead, as I have maintained throughout, Sidgwick remains a Utilitarian. He 
is simply not able to dismiss Ethical Egoism. Indeed, he laments that the Dualism of 
Practical Reason remains intractable, because in practice he thinks “the offence which 
Egoism in the abstract gives to our sympathetic and social nature adds force to the recoil 
from it caused by the perception of its occasional practical conflict with common notions 
of duty " So, Sidgwick’s disdain for Ethical Egoism ought not to be thought to wane 
simply because the method cannot be dismissed. However, the refutation of Ethical 
Egoism is a different matter entirely from whether or not it is a noble or ignoble view. 
On this score, Sidgwick takes it to be ignoble, both to common-sense and to more 
abstract theorizing. However, ignobility (or the impression of ignobility) is little 
argument against a view. To Sidgwick’s credit, he recognizes this fact and does not 
allow his sense of revulsion (or the revulsion that he takes to be the reaction of the “plain 
man ” to Ethical Egoism) to count against the logical force o f the view. However, 
perhaps he should allow the ignobility of the view to affect his judgment about it. Or at
142 ibid, 199.
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least explore the sentiment that inspires the judgment under which Ethical Egoism 
suffers.
3. C. D. Broad's Evaluation
This seems to be exactly what Broad’s does Broad suggests that Egoism, as 
conceived by Sidgwick, inspires the revulsion on the part of common-sense at least in 
part because it is false. He writes, ’Ihe doctrine that 1 ought not to desire to any degree as 
an end the occurrence of good states of mind in anyone but myself, seems plainly 
false ” Lest this seem purely an expression of dogmatism, Broad goes on to write that 
"it does seem to me conceivable that I ought to desire more strongly the occurrence of a 
good state o f mind in myself than the occurrence of an equally good state of mind in 
anyone else.” The virtue of this amendment is that it recognizes that it may be the case 
that human beings will be quite self-interested. But this does not help the Ethical Egoist. 
Although this proposition has a certain degree of plausibility, it does not seem self- 
evident at all. On the other hand, it does seem self-evident to Broad that "I ought to 
desire to some degree its [a good state of mind] occurrence anywhere.” The conjunction 
o f these propositions that preserves Broad’s intuition would seem to be that, it seems self- 
evident that one ought to desire that good states of mind occur in the world (from the 
latter proposition [both A and B below]) and that it is conceivable that I should desire at 
least some of those good states o f mind to occur in me [A], perhaps more strongly than I 
should desire them to occur in the world and occur always elsewhere [B].
143 Broad, 245.
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Good states of 
mind occur in the 
world AND good 
states of mind 
occur in me
Good states of 
mind occur in the 
world AND good 
states of mind do 
not occur in me
A B
Two things strike me about Broad’s suggestion. The first is that the first 
proposition is more self-evident to me than perhaps he takes it to be. For the most part, I 
suspect that agents, given a choice, would prefer that they experience good states of mind 
rather than for those good states of mind to occur elsewhere, all other things being equal. 
So, if the Principle of Equality is “really self-evident”, then it would seem that this simple 
desire to experience the good states o f mind that occur in the world is also. What is left 
out of this proposition is that the agent would desire that good states of mind occur in her 
instead of elsewhere, even supposing that those good states of mind would be more 
fhiitful elsewhere. This is the commitment that the Sidgwickian Ethical Egoist is going 
to maintain. That is, even if the good states o f mind elsewhere in the world might bring 
about more good states o f mind than if those good states occur to the agent, the agent will 
still prefer that she experience them. However, the proposition that Broad suggests is 
plausible is the weaker “desire more strongly that they occur to me, all things being 
equal” than this stronger principle. The former of these seems much more self-evident 
(in a Sidgwickian way) to me than it does, apparently to Broad.
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The second thing that strikes me about Broad's suggestion is that Sidgwick would 
refuse the “hidden sentiment”. That is to say, suppose that there is a sentiment hidden in 
the revulsion of common-sense expressed toward Ethical Egoism. Further, suppose that 
sentiment is the intuition that Ethical Egoism is false. Sidgwick, in fairness, would likely 
say that such an intuition exists in the moral sense about Universal Hedonism as well. 
Utilitarianism evoked vitriol as well. If, on the basis o f the revulsion of common-sense. 
Ethical Egoism is thought to evoke an intuition of falsity, then since Utilitarianism also 
evokes revulsion, the hidden intuition in its case is likely to be similar. We need to avoid 
overstating the issue, however. If Mill and Sidgwick are right about the adverse reaction 
against Utilitarianism, that reaction is at least in part because the view is largely 
misunderstood. But it can also be attributed, in part, to the “hidden intuition " Thus, 
while Ethical Egoism is met with revulsion on the basis of a deep intuition. Universal 
Hedonism is rejected on the basis of a deep intuition and a misunderstanding. The point 
is that if the misunderstanding is removed, the deep intuition might be dissolved 
Broad seems to think this is not the case, and I tend to agree with him. The Cambridge 
Moralists, particularly Whewell and Green, seem to have a very clear grasp of the 
Universal Hedonist view. In addition, they both seem to retain the deep intuition opposed 
to the view. So, while revulsion may doom Ethical Egoism and not Utilitarianism, at the 
same time, the deep intuition o f revulsion seems to at least cast doubt on Universal 
Hedonism. Thus, the two theories will vary in similar ways with respect to these deep
This dissolution could be as follows. In overcoming the misunderstanding, it is 
discovered that the intuition was directed at the misunderstood view rather than the 
clarified view. If the intuition was directed at the misunderstood view, then the
1S8
intuitions (though one may be the subject of greater revulsion than the other). Thus, to 
eliminate one on the basis of revulsion does not help to solve the Dualism of Practical 
Reason, instead, it muddies the waters further as common-sense is now seen to support 
no moral theory rather than supporting two incompatible theories This latter eventuality 
seems a much worse position than having to deal with the Dualism of Practical Reason, 
so Broad’s cure may indeed be worse than the disease
D. Conclusion
Thus, Sidgwick believes he has shown that Ethical Egoism satisfies the same 
criteria that Universal Hedonism does Given that the Plausibility Principle is dependent 
on those criteria, Sidgwick is left with the conclusion that Ethical Egoism is as plausible 
as Universal Hedonism. Thus, the two are equally supported from the moral intuitions of 
common-sense. In the course of the discussion, it should have become obvious that each 
of the methods developed some of the same intuitions from the moral sense, but that each 
also exploited different ones. Because the differences conclude in the intractable 
Dualism of Practical Reason, Sidgwick concludes that common-sense morality is 
inconsistent.
Chapter 4. The Cambridge Moralist Conclusion
The Cambridge Moralists provide Sidgwick with perhaps his primary foil. For 
this reason it is important to take a bit of time to investigate those views against which 
Sidgwick argues and in opposition to which he sees his own positive views. First, I will 
outline what is commonly taken to be the fnunework of the Cantabridgian arguments
elimination of that view undercuts the intuition as well
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about the moral sense. Here, the work of Schneewind is again significant. However, his 
sketch of the Cantabridgian view needs further elaboration. This elaboration is the 
second issue I will approach; first by examining the work of Coleridge, whose work 
receives significant treatment by the other Cambridge Moralists and then by examining 
the work of two of the Cambridge Moralists who make significant contributions to the 
fiamework. Finally, I will propose what 1 take to be Sidgwick's critique of the 
Cambridge Moralists (again depending partially on the work of Schneewind and partially 
on a development of my own interpretation of the Cantabridgian position).
Schneewind summarizes the Cantabridgian view as follows. The conclusion to 
which the Moralists argue is;
Cambridge Moralist Conclusion: The best explanation of the universe as it is 
experienced by human beings is a theistic, and probably Christian, one 
To argue for this conclusion, we must begin with the data. Within these facts of 
experience, we encounter what are commonly taken to be moral truths. Those moral 
truths are grasped imperfectly, to be sure, but are obtained nevertheless. Further, these 
moral truths are grasped only by intuition and could not be obtained from other 
knowledge. One of the moral truths that is obtained by intuition is that human beings are 
free agents. Schneewind here notes that the Cantabridgians take a straightforward 
Kantian line and argue that we know that we are fi’ee because we have moral obligations 
and duties which is possible only if we are free (“ought implies can") Finally, these
Schneewind, 107.
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intuitions “testify to our unique status in the universe and to our having contact with a 
divine being.”
Or, in outlined form;
(I) Human beings can grasp &cts about the world by intuition
(Q) Those Acts include moral Acts (or moral truths)
(m) Among those moral Acts is that human beings have moral obligations 
and duties
(TV) "Ought implies can”, and so human beings are free agents
(V) Being free is distinctively human {supplied}
(VI) Our intuitions show the human connection to a divine being
(Vn) Therefore, the best explanation of the universe as it is experienced by
human beings is a theistic, and probably Christian, one.
A. Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Arguments against Utilitarianism 
and in favor of the Cambridge Moralist Conclusion
Coleridge is the first o f the Cambridge Moralists to provide a full account of how
the conclusion about the best explanation of the universe is to be attained. He supposes
that there are three first principles that can be divined from the moral common-sense,
which in turn is rooted in common human experience. The first o f these is that:
A  Human beings have a conscience and that conscience is the root o f all
consciousness.
Coleridge takes it as a given that generally speaking human beings have experienced both 
the pangs and the pleasures o f conscience. The pangs of conscience arise when we 
"know” what we ought to do and do not do it. The pleasures o f conscience arise when
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we “know” what is right, that we ought not violate the dictates of conscience, and do 
what is right This common experience is captured in Coleridge’s next principle;
B. The dictates o f conscience are the origin of moral terms like “right” and 
“ought”.
Finally, Coleridge holds that conscience is not dependent on outside factors; as for 
instance, whether an action will bring about a greater portion of pleasure or pain. That is 
to say, conscience is not consequentialist. It is primitive and directly intuitive. Thus, we 
have Coleridge’s third principle:
C. Conscience is intuitive.
Coleridge draws two implications from (A)-(C). These are:
D. Only the religious person - who presumably admits the intuitive abilities of 
conscience - can use moral terms in their proper sense, and
E. The dictates of conscience are opposed to hedonism, utilitarianism, and 
generally all forms o f consequentialism.'"**
The importance of these implications is not found in themselves as much as in the 
further conclusion that they serve to support. As mentioned in the prologue to this 
section, the Cantabridgians were quite concerned to demonstrate the existence of a 
connection between the ordinary moral intuitions o f common-sense and the 
Cantabridgian theological commitments. The Cambridge Moralists go further than 
arguing for a connection, however. Beginning with Coleridge, they argue that “Morality 
provides the cfudal evidence fbr the view that the best explanation of the universe as we
146 S. T. Coleridge, “Confessions o f an Inquiring Spirit”, Aids to Reflection. (London,
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experience it is a theistic, and very probably a Christian, one " I will outline Coleridge’s 
position with a minimum of exegetical commentary before turning to demonstrate (1) 
how he argues for his conclusion (E), and (2) how his conclusion and its supporting 
argumentation serve to advance his broader theological conclusion.
The broad conclusion, as I have called it, depends in part on establishing that 
human beings have a place within the universe from which to recognize that the best 
explanation for the universe is a theistic one. Not surprisingly, this place is somewhat 
privileged relative to the rest of the experiencing subjects in the world, e.g.. dogs, cats, 
mules, etc Coleridge accepts an Aristotelian essentialist notion that human beings have a 
particular quality that distinguishes them from all other life (that is, something that makes 
a human a human and not a chimpanzee); and further, that this distinguishing capacity is 
rationality. Thus, one would not expect a horse to recognize that the best explanation for 
the universe is a Christian one; but one could expect that a human being, behaving 
rationally, would arrive at precisely this conclusion.
Coleridge begins with a claim that can be construed as a simple recognition of the 
scope of the data to be considered.
a. The data of moral experience form a substantial part o f the evidence to which 
we must appeal to test hypotheses about the universe and the place of human 
beings in it.
Simply put, Coleridge takes the existence of moral experience as a given of human 
existence. Beyond this, moral experience comprises a considerable portion of the
1913), 296. Schneewind, 108.
163
experiences that humans have. The second of these points is less controversial than the 
first. For example, one might easily suppose that moral experiences (like resentment, 
say) make up a considerable proportion of the experiences that human beings have, 
without supposing that there is no further interpretive explanation for them, say, for 
example, the habituation of those attitudes that tend to promote happiness, either 
positively (as in the production of pleasure) or negatively (in their likelihood to reduce 
pain). Whatever the source of moral experience, Coleridge claims that the instances of 
moral experience are themselves data; and further, are data that human beings can (and 
must) use to test hypotheses about the universe.
Coleridge’s next claim follows from (C) above. On Coleridge’s (and Sidgwick’s) 
view, those things that are self-evident are directly intuited. This is not to say that all 
intuitions, moral or otherwise, are self-evident. Rather, the line of inference is 
unidirectional; that is, if some moral judgment is self-evident, then it is directly intuited. 
However, if a moral judgment is directly intuited, then there is no further account to be 
given of its origin. That is, it will be irreducible to any further fact. Thus, for Coleridge;
b. There are unique, irreducible moral judgments.
It is not clear to me that (b) can be rejected Whether it can or cannot, it seems 
fairly clear that Sidgwick cannot reject it. For example: suppose that there are no unique, 
irreducible moral judgments. In other words, suppose ~b. On this supposition, we have 
tliat no moral judgment is directly intuited. Further, from this, we would have that no
For example, the moral judgment that “It is always wrong to inflict gratuitous pain on 
a sentient creature” certainly seems unique and irreducible. My thanks to Dr. Merrill for 
the example.
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moral judgment is self-evident. However, this latter proposition would cause problems 
for Sidgwick because he holds that some moral judgments are self-evident. Thus, while 
it may be that (b) could be rejected by some moral theorist yet unknown, it is clear that 
Sidgwick cannot suppose its contradiction.
At this point, it might be helpful to provide a bit of religious background for this 
argument. On Coleridge’s view, human beings have some hypotheses about the universe 
and the place of human beings in it. Further, human beings are not so privileged as to 
have direct and objective access to the data that might verify or falsify those hypotheses. 
This is simply to say that human beings have neither the perspective nor the mind of God. 
However, on Coleridge’s view, humans do have some basis from which to test 
hypotheses. What is at issue for him is whether or not the hypotheses are divinely 
inspired. For example, because human beings have neither the perspective nor the mind 
of the infinite, hypotheses about the infinite must originate somewhere other than within 
the finite minds and perspective of human beings '■** Yet human beings have the 
hypotheses. So, the issue is whether those hypotheses about the universe are truly 
inspired by God, or not. For Coleridge the moral judgments of common-sense moral 
intuition are hypotheses about the universe. For example, the judgment that lying is 
always wrong is simply a statement given by God about the character of the universe that 
arises within the conscience of individual human beings
This brings the conversation to the first of two commitments that I have called 
Religious Points Coleridge employs these in the course o f his argument primarily as
148 Here, Coleridge simply appropriates some of the reasoning of St. Thomas rather
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illustrations that serve to illuminate his claims. However, as one might suspect from the 
“given by God” clause relative to moral judgments, the claims are not inconsequential to 
the argument. The first Religious Point is;
Religious Point #1: The hypotheses are given first in revelation and then 
confirmed through testing; showing them either to be truly inspired (that is, 
of God) or not.
This Religious Point was obviously used in the foregoing discussion of the irreducibility 
o f moral judgments. However, the point does not play a particularly important role in the 
argument. Here, it serves merely as illustration. Coleridge seems to simply be making a 
claim about the “from whence” of the judgments noted by (b). It seems to be Coleridge's 
view that after the argument has reached its denouement. Religious Point #1 will be 
confirmed. Thus, since he has offered it before the argument has reached its conclusion, 
we are led, on my view, to suppose that it serves as a touchstone to remind the reader of 
the destination. Any other interpretation, it seems, would have the unfortunate result of 
supposing that Coleridge falls victim to a rather immediate and obvious circle.
Having reminded the reader of the destination, Coleridge sets out to investigate 
the “place” or status o f human beings in the universe. Thus, he puts forward three 
successive conclusions [ c - d  below]
c. Confirmation o f our place in the universe is partly provided by (b)
d. Those judgments suggest that the human place is that of possessors o f  powers 
of intuition (by which God is known - from the religious point) and free will 
(which is one o f the unique, irreducible moral judgments; that is, the judgment 
that human beings have free will.
directly.
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e. Confirmation of place is partly provided by content of dictates of conscience 
(ex. Commands to act against certain desires, stressing inner worth [intent, 
motives, etc ] of agents as opposed to the values o f consequences 
Te dictates of conscience take into account the motives of the agent performing one act or 
another. That is, it is supposed within the common Moral Sense that intentions and 
motives matter on questions of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness (both by outside 
observers of actions and by the acting agent herself) Only the acting agent is privy to the 
dictates of her conscience, but the expcrieoce of conscience is, on Coleridge's view, 
common to all p e o p l e . H a v i n g  each experienced the dictates of conscience, however 
privately, people tend to suppose that others experience conscience as well
Those dictates (e.g., that lying is wrong and that one ought not lie) are presented 
to the agent as directions to action and as feelings of guilt or self-praise afier the action;
It is important to note that (e) follows from (a), (b), and Implications D and E above 
(which in turn followed from A, B, and C). That is,
(a) The data of moral experience form a substantial part of the evidence to which we 
must appeal to test hypotheses about the universe and the place of human beings
in it.
(b) There are unique, irreducible moral judgments.
(D) Only the religious person -  who presumably admits the intuitive abilities of 
conscience -  can us moral terms in their proper sense.
(E) The dictates o f conscience are opposed to hedonism, utilitarianism, and generally 
all forms o f consequentialism.
Therefore,
(e) Confirmation o f place is partly provided by content o f dictates of conscience (ex. 
Commands to act against certain desires, stressing inner worth [intent, motives, 
etc ] o f agents as opposed to the values of consequences).
Coleridge does take the time, albeit briefly, to exempt what would commonly be 
called sociopathic personalities fi^ om the “all people"
This is not to say that all people experience conscience in the same way. That is 
beyond verification and represents a stronger view than Coleridge seems to need.
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guilt if the directives of conscience are violated (say, the agent lies) or self-praise when 
they are upheld. This is, on Coleridge’s view, a generally universal human experience. 
From this common experience, the moral sense tells us that the motives and intentions of 
an agent are morally relevant to assessing praise and blame The Universal Hedonist, 
say, cannot simply dismiss this supposition as flawed common sense because for 
Sidgwick, at any rate, the data of the common moral sense have temporary priority to 
moral judgment.
Since the intuitions of moral common-sense are the data from which the 
arguments are launched, they stand as facts to theories; that is, as the things to be 
explained rather than questioned. If a theory is incompatible with the facts, so much the 
worse for the theory. Thus, the Universal Hedonist cannot simply dismiss intentions and 
motives in favor o f consequentialist constructions. Rather, she must show how those 
intuitions and motives are not basic but the result of those consequentialist commitments 
themselves. This, as we have seen, is one of the things that Sidgwick has done in his own 
dismissal of Intuitionism. We now return to Coleridge’s argument from that brief 
digression into method.
An intuitionist like Coleridge will hold that there simply are the intentions and 
motives, that they are understood by common-sense to be morally relevant in assigning 
praise and blame, and that they are a given of human experience; that is, they are 
stubborn facts, irreducible to further Acts. Thus, we have that the dictates o f conscience 
take into account the motives and intentions behind an action and that the intuitions that 
motives and intentions are morally significant are irreducible.
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The ability to form both the intentions to act and to take into account the motives 
o f another when assessing praise and blame are, on Coleridge's view, peculiar to the 
human animal, and I call these intentions and the intuitions about them the Moral 
Intuitions. These capacities separate human beings from the other forms of life in the 
world If this is so, then the content of these intentions and intuitions toward intentions 
will also be unique to human beings. For Coleridge, this is a straightforward implication 
shown as follows;
( I ) To be human is to have moral intuitions and vice versa.
Or, alternatively,
(1) X is human if and only if X has moral intuitions.
This, however, represents only part of Coleridge’s view on this point. To complete it, we 
need the following statement about moral intuitions.
(2) Moral Intuitions supply content peculiar to Moral Intuitions; where 
“peculiar” here means that the content can be supplied only by Moral 
Intuitions and by no other form of Intuitions.
Or, alternatively,
(2) X is a Moral Intuition if and only if the content of X is the content of a 
Moral Intuition.
Moral Intuitions will of necessity give rise to truths about human beings. That is, 
suppose X is a moral intuition and that the content of X is that “lying is wrong”. In this 
case, the Act that one has the feeling that “lying is wrong” means that the individual 
experiencing the feeling is experiencing a moral intuition and further that the individual
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experiencing the moral intuition is a human being. Further, if a person is a human being, 
then that person will have certain moral intuitions And those moral intuitions will 
supply information about the world that can be gleaned only from moral intuitions Thus, 
certain intuitions, namely the Moral Intuitions, will, of necessity, reveal truths about the 
nature of human beings.
One of those truths revealed, on Coleridge’s view, is contained as an implication 
of the intuition that praise and blame can be meaningfully assigned. The line of 
implication for this argument is straightforwardly Kantian in flavor. If praise and blame 
can be reasonably assigned for actions of agents, then the agents must have moral 
responsibility for the actions that they commit or omit. But, if agents possess moral 
responsibility for action, then they must have moral freedom to choose to act or to not 
act. But moral freedom entails that there exists actual freedom Thus, human beings are 
free agents and this is known intuitively.
So, we now have that the presence of Moral Intuitions is distinctively human and 
that the intuition of freedom is distinctively human. That is, both of these designate the 
unique “place” within the universe occupied by human beings.
Thus, the “place” of human beings involves the possession of (1) the powers of 
intuition [or (d) above] and (2) the content o f conscience. This latter stresses the 
intentions and the motives of the agent. That is, conscience confirms or denies the 
rightness or wrongness of an action internally to the agent, and independently o f the 
consequences of the action itself. But these moral judgments of “right” or “ought” 
involve the assigning of moral responsibility to the agent which in turn requires the
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assigning of freedom to the agent. Thus part o f the content of conscience is the 
entailment that human beings possess freedom of will. The powers of intuition and free 
will define human place in the universe because they are distinctively human
However, even if all o f this be accepted, one still need not conclude that the best 
explanation of the universe is theistic, much less Christian This conclusion follows from 
the conjunction of the foregoing principles along with a second Religious Point.
Religious Point #2 The dictates of conscience confirm the teachings of the
Bible (particularly the teachings of Christ).
The expression of this Religious Point is quite important. One notes that the
Religious Point is itself founded on an intuition - namely the dictates of conscience - in
precisely the same way in which the principle concerning freedom is. Coleridge goes on
to express the intuition at the bottom of this Religious Point by writing that.
There is more that fittds me than I have experienced in all other books put 
together...the words o f the Bible find me at greater depths of my being; and ... 
whatever finds me brings with it an irresistible evidence of its having proceeded 
from the Holy Spirit.
This direct confirmation of the principle expressed in Religious Point #2 shows, 
for Coleridge, that the point is founded on self>evident intuition beyond which there is no 
further fact of the matter. Religious Point #2 is an expression of a moral intuition in the 
same way that the freedom principle is. Thus, it is not question-begging on Coleridge’s 
part to introduce it at this stage of the argument. And if this Religious Point #2 bears the 
same status as the freedom principle does, then h is distinctively human in the same way. 
Further, since it has this same status, it too must express a Moral Intuition [from (I) and
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(2) above] that in turn expresses a unique and irreducible Moral Judgment [from (b) 
above] Since Religious Point #2 expresses a unique and irreducible Moral Judgment, it 
is itself unique and irreducible Thus, Coleridge concludes about moral experience or 
moral common-sense that;
f. Moral experiences (the Moral Sense, Common-sense morality) generally (I) 
shows these features (c, d, and e) and (2) shows that morality of common- 
sense is explicable in terms of a religious outlook, to the extent that it is 
explicable at all.
And if (f) holds, then there is at least support for the Coleridgian (and 
Cantabridgian) conclusion about the best explanation of the universe. This is so because 
the best explanation for the moral sense is completely explicable only in terms of a 
religious outlook.
There are many reasons to suppose that this argument fails. For one thing, 
accepting it at each point does not accomplish everything that Coleridge wants. At most, 
it shows that the best explanation for the data of the moral common-sense is a theistic 
explanation. It does not show the stronger claim that the best explanation for the 
universe is a theistic one. For example, it is conceivable that the best explanation for the 
set of moral intuitions is theistic, but that the best explanation for other intuitions minus is 
rigidly mechanistic. The argument simply does not supply the justification for the 
stronger claim
However, Coleridge’s weaker claim is quite enough to make the argument 
problematic for Sidgwick. It seems that there are only three avenues open to someone
is: Coleridge, 296.
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sympathetic to Sidgwick, given the way I have interpreted the argument’s structure. That 
is, there are three avenues that do not immediately beg the question against Coleridge’s 
Religious Points by simply denying them outright at the outset The first is to argue 
against the possession of intuition as a marker of human “place” in the universe. The 
second is to argue against the actual existence of free will. The third is to suppose that 
while there exists direct intuition of moral judgments, that these moral judgments do not 
support the conclusion Coleridge draws.
Sidgwick himself cannot take the first avenue because it is a view he himself 
holds, at least in part. That is, Sidgwick seems to hold that moral intuitions are peculiarly 
human. While he clearly does suppose that the Religious Points follow fi-om those 
intuitions or that the intuitions say anything special about human place relative to the 
divine, he does take moral intuitions to be uniquely human and to say something about 
human “place ” relative to the rest of the world. The second avenue is likewise 
unavailable to Sidgwick because of his strict compartmentalization of metaphysical 
investigations on the one hand and ethical inquiry on the other. For good or ilL, he 
excludes questions about freedom and determinism from his ethical theorizing. Whether 
this is an appropriate sort of distinction is not relevant here because all that it is necessary 
to show is that the avenue is not actually open to Sidgwick. So, without the first or 
second avenues available, he must attack the Cambridge Moralist argument as expressed 
by Coleridge along the third avenue I will come to this at the end of this section. Before 
that it is important to investigate how this basic form of the Cantabridgian argument
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receives further treatment by later Cambridge Moralists. For this, I have chosen two of 
the more notable Moralists; namely Whewell and Green.
B. William Wheweirs Amended Coleridgian View 
As already noted, one of the key concerns o f the Cambridge Moralists is 
providing an argument against Utilitarianism, first against Bentham and then Mill. The 
former case was often the easier, as Bentham clearly sets himself up for parody with 
some of his more outrageous statements about the comparability of certain pleasures - 
poetry and pushpin, for example. Sidgwick, as we have seen, is in Bentham’s camp 
rather than Mill's; though Sidgwick has by all accounts the more considered and 
measured view. The genius o f Whewell is, in part, that his critique of Bentham applies to 
Mill and to Sidgwick
Against the Utility Doctrine, Whewell argues that, in the first place, the intuition 
at bottom is perfectly reconcilable with his own intuitionist leanings (and those of the 
other Cambridge Moralists), but that in the second, the principle cannot do all that its 
advocates suppose. The inference drawn is that Utilitarianism is an incomplete view of 
morality; thus, while it apprehends the truth to some degree, it finally falls short o f being 
a full ethical theory.
Whewell’s negative argument is rather straightforward. Simply put, Bentham in 
particular (and the Utilitarians in general) get it backwards - happiness depends on 
morality, not the converse. To demonstrate his view, Whewell begins with a question;
Question: "Why should a person be truthful?"
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tfis answer is crafted to anticipate what he expects would be a Utilitarian
response. Presumably, the Utilitarian answer would be that, on balance, the utility
calculus works out in such a way that greater good attends truth telling If pressed, he
supposes that the Utilitarian would ultimately give the following response;
Supposed Utilitarian Answer: Because acts of veracity, even if they do not 
produce immediate gratification to him and his friends in other ways at least 
produce pleasure in this way; - that they procure him his own approval and that of 
all good men.
It is important to note that Whewell has not supposed a strawy utilitarian 
response. He has taken care to note that the agent need not receive any external benefit at 
all from his act of truth telling. Indeed, no pleasure at all is alleged to accrue to the agent, 
save one - he would be pleased by his own approval to have told the truth (and perhaps to 
have told the truth in order to advance the greater good). The answer still assumes a bit 
too much, on my view. For example, the act o f truth telling (and advancing the greater 
good) may very well “procure [the agent’s] own approval”, but 1 see no reason to assume 
that it will procure “that of all good men.” Indeed, it may be the case that the particular 
act of truth telling will procure nothing but the scorn of “all good men”. For example, 
due to a mistake, “all good men” observing the act of truth telling might think it is instead 
an act of lying, and thus condemn it However, even in such a case, if the act o f truth 
telling would result in greater happiness for the aggregate o f people, then the agent ought 
to tell the truth. In such a case, the final clause of the answer Whewell puts in the mouth 
o f his utilitarian agent fiuls. An amended answer might be something like the following:
Amended Utilitarian Answer: Because acts of veracity, even if they do not 
produce immediate gratification to him and his fiiends in other ways at
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least produce pleasure in this way; - that they procure him his own 
approval.
Far from compromising Whewell’s argument, however, 1 suspect that this 
amended answer strengthens his point This is because it makes quite clear that any 
pleasure the agent may experience as a result of the truth telling is entirely from the self­
approval that attends it Since 1 take the amended answer to be the stronger of the two 
positions, I will outline Whewell's argument in light of this stronger position. It should 
be clear that the argument is consistent with either the weaker or stronger version.
On Whewell’s view, the Answer is “intelligible and significant”, but Bentham 
(and utilitarians of Bentham s ilk) cannot merely advance this answer without further 
analysis o f the action itself. That analysis would reveal that the act is approved (by the 
agent or by the agent and a few good men) because it is thought to be the right or virtuous 
thing to do. By 'Ihe right” or “virtuous” thing to do, 1 do not mean to imply that 
“rightness ” is in anyway independent o f whatever utility calculations might support it. 
The reason for the agent’s belief that truth telling, in the particular instance, is the “right” 
thing to do may very well be that he has done precisely the most stringent sort o f 
utilitarian calculations possible. Thus, the act is thought to be virtuous or right precisely 
because h gives pleasure So, Whewell’s first point is that;
Required Benthamite Analysis: if an act is approved because it is thought 
virtuous, it is thought to be virtuous because it gives pleasure.
William Whewell, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England and 
Additional Lectures on the History o f Moral Philosophy. Thoemmes Antiquarian Books, 
Ltd , Bristol (original printing: Cambridge University Press, 1852 and 1862), p216
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It is at this point that it becomes apparent that Sidgwick is also susceptible to this 
argument. Like Bentham, Sidgwick holds that acts thought to be virtuous are assigned 
this lofty title precisely because they are the source o f pleasure As we have already seen, 
Sidgwick argues that certain states of character are more likely to be productive of 
pleasure, both individual good and the General Good. These states o f character are called 
virtues on account of the consequences that they usually produce. Thus, whatever 
Whewell’s criticism of Bentham is on this point, it will be similarly applicable to 
Sidgwick.
The crucial point in Whewell's critique lies in the reason for the agent 
experiencing his own approval. The agent receives the pleasure o f his own approval in 
his moment of truth telling because it is thought to be virtuous. That is to say, the agent 
thinks that his action is virtuous and receives the pleasure of self-approval on the basis of 
that. So, we now have the crux of Whewell’s critique;
Whewell’s Analysis: an act gives pleasure precisely because it is thought [by 
the agent] to be virtuous.
So, on the one hand we have the Benthamite Analysis - that an act is approved 
because it is thought to be virtuous and thought to be virtuous because it gives pleasure - 
and on the other hand we have the Whewell Analysis o f the Utilitarian position - that an 
act gives pleasure because it is thought (by the agent, at least) to be virtuous. As 
Whewell writes, this is a “palpable” circle
ibid., 216.
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On Whewell’s view, the universe of ethical theories can be divided into two 
classes, rather than a Sidgwickian three. On the one hand, there will be those theories 
that succumb to this palpable circle, and on the other, there will be those who do not 
The former group are all tokens of Dependent morality; the latter. Independent. Note that 
this is not to say that all of the moral theories that fall into the Independent morality 
category will be equally good theories. It is simply to designate those theories that will 
survive the circle test as he has specified it. Within this Independent morality category, 
any number o f theories may fail for one reason or another. However, if a moral theory is 
to triumph as the ultimate expression of common-sense morality, it must be of the 
Independent type as opposed to the Dependent.
On Whewell’s account, all of the theories o f the Dependent Morality type will 
“assert it to be the law of human action to aim at some external object ... to be the true 
end of human action” This way of putting the claim is a bit obscure, though given his 
examples, its meaning is clear enough. The examples that Whewell lists as tokens of the 
Dependent Morality type include “those which in ancient or modem times have asserted 
Pleasure, or Utility, or the Greatest Happiness for the Greatest Number”.'*’ So we can 
now recognize what the principle that dififerentiates Dependent Morality from 
Independent Morality is supposed to involve. For clarity’s sake, it is important to note 
that Whewell takes the relevant “law of human action” to involve “the true end of human 
action”; and then to note that the thrust o f the law is that this end is an external object of 
some sort at which human beings will aim. Or, perhaps we can put it a different way;
Whewell, ix.
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Human nature is such that human beings will aim at external objects as an expression of 
the deepest human fulfillment or the truest end of human action. The paradigm examples 
of this sort of morality will be those that Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick (whatever their 
own differences) advocate.
An interesting aspect o f this view is that according to Whewell, this characteristic 
of Dependent Morality is compatible with his own Independent Morality view. This is in 
quite a limited way but it is instructive nevertheless. It is reconcilable, to a point, with his 
own view because it does capture at least one intuition - pleasure is a good It is just a 
secondary, and not a primary, good.
Independent Morality, on the other hand, will include those theories that \vould 
regulate human action by an internal principle or relation, as Conscience, or a Moral 
Faculty, or Duty, or Rectitude, or the Superiority of Reason to Desire”. Two important 
examples o f this type o f Morality are Coleridge’s “conscience” view and Kant’s 
deontological view. 1 have discussed Coleridge’s view in outline earlier and will discuss 
Green’s adaptation of Coleridge to Kant (and vice versa) in the next section. Here I want 
only to spell out the conditions an Independent Morality must satisfy, on Whewell’s 
account, if it is to be succeed where Dependent Morality foils. Whewell identifies three 
characteristic commitments that ethical views of the Independent Morality type must 
hold, namely that;
1. Reason has a natural and rightful authority over desire and affection
2. There is a difference of kind in our principles o f action, and
3. Our obligation is to do “what is right at whatever cost o f pain and loss ”
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I will address these in sequence.
I . Reason has a natural and rightHil authority over desire and affection
“Rightful authority” must be defined before it can be shown that “rightful 
authority” has priority over desire.
The following maxim is taken as “proceeding from the general voice” of 
humankind - we must do what is right regardless of cost. This is to say, certain actions 
are right and this rightness is sufficient reason for doing those actions. The rightness of 
an action, on Whewell’s view, outweighs any other considerations - pleasure/pain 
calculus, cost/beneGt analysis, or any other consequentialist scheme of judging of action. 
He demonstrates his view with a rhetorical flourish; “It is painful: but it is right; therefore 
we must do it. It is a loss: but it is right; therefore we must do it. It is unkind: but it is 
right; therefore we must do it.” Each of these propositions, he takes to be self-evident. 
He claims “That a thing is right, is a supreme reason for doing it.” This is apparently so 
because of the moral weight that “right” is thought to carry. “Right”, and “right” alone, 
is thought by Whewell to imply “supreme, unconquerable reason”. Given this impressive 
weight, “right” is connected intimately to “ought”. “Should” and “ought” are dependent 
upon “right”. If some action X is right, then we ought to do X, simply because it is the 
right thing to do. There is no appeal to any other feature of the action than its rightness. 
Clearly if this is the sort o f thing to which “rightness” refers, then we have already 
entered the moral realm as soon as we have invoked “rightness”. This is not so of desire 
or feeling.
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We may very well feel that an action is undesirable or we may have no feelings at 
all or we may feel that we do not want to do X because it will surely bring us pain or ruin. 
All these considerations are secondary, and as such, not “supreme reasons” for doing X 
or not doing it. This being the case, reason (by which we come to grasp “right” and 
“ought”) has priority over feeling, by which we know desire
The connection between “right” and reason is even closer than this might suggest. 
On this analysis, it looks like one can separate the two; examining first one and then the 
other. Not so, on Whewell’s account. For Whewell, “the supreme reason of human 
actions and the moral nature of them cannot be separated.” The result is a view that 
human reason, functioning properly and without undue influence by the passions, will 
inevitably render true judgments about the “right” things to do. He writes that ‘Ihe two 
[human reason and “rightness” o f actions] come into our thoughts together, and are in our 
conceptions identical.” 'T h i s  brings us to the second claim:
2. There is a difference o f kind in our principles o f action 
This claim follows fairly quickly from the foregoing discussion. If “rightness” 
and reason are bound up together in the way that Whewell suggests, then it is obvious 
that principles of action that have their basis in this “rightness” will be different in kind 
from those principles of action that have their basis in something other than “rightness”. 
For example, principles like the Principle of Utility, which has its basis in pleasures and 
pains (and likely human psychology) is at least at one remove from those principles 
founded on ’Tightness” o f action.
ibid, xi.
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3. Our obligation is to do "what is right at whatever cost of pain and loss.”
This principle follows directly from the Whewellian conception of “rightness” 
Given that the supreme example of human reason is inseparably connected with 
“rightness” and that obligation is defined in terms of the “rightness” of an action, (3) 
follows. Suppose we assume that (3) is not the case. The only way that (3) could be 
false [given that (1) and (2) are true] is if (a) we are not obligated to do what is right, or 
(b) we are not obligated to do what is right provided the cost is higher than the benefit to 
be gained in the action. To begin, (a) will clearly not hold because obligation is defined 
in terms of “rightness”. That is to say, if we are obligated to do X, it is precisely (and 
only) because X is right. If X is right, then we are obligated to do X. Similarly, (b) 
cannot be the case because of the connection of obligation and “rightness”. However, (b) 
also fails because doing the cost/benefit analysis of an action is irrelevant. Any principle 
that arose from such an analysis would necessarily be of a different (and inferior) kind to 
the direct principle of “ought” that arises from the inherent “rightness” and the act. Since 
neither (a) nor (b) holds, (3) cannot be false. Therefore, (3) must be the case [provided, 
of course, the acceptance of ( 1 ) and (2)]
C. T. H. Green and the Dualism of Practical Reason 
T. H. Green, though not always recognized as one of the Cambridge Moralists by 
many, is a highly underrated philosopher rightly counted among their number In the 
majority of the literature that makes reference to this group in the middle and late 19^
I should note that as an Oxford scholar, he very likely would not have appreciated the 
moniker “Cambridge” moralist. Schneewind suggests that Green be included in their 
number because o f the affinities in philosophical outlook. 1 have followed this here.
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century, it is understood that the group consisted of Maurice, Grote, and Whewell. This 
is because the three had more in common than philosophical commitments; they each 
served as Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy - beginning with Whewell, then 
Grote, and finally Maurice. Almost immediately Coleridge became included as a 
Cambridge Moralist; in 1854 James Martineau began to include Coleridge whenever he 
wrote of the Cambridge Moralists. Along with Whewell, Grote, Maurice, and Coleridge, 
Schneewind suggests the inclusion of Green. I agree. I think Green is rightly considered 
one of the Cambridge Moralists for two reason. First, Coleridge was not recognized as a 
Cambridge Moralist initially because he was not a colleague, but a student. Further, he 
was a student long before the others were professors (he died two years before Green was 
bom). However, his influence on the group is without dispute and because of his explicit 
inclusion by Martineau and his successors, I have followed their lead. Like Coleridge, 
Green was not recognized initially as one of the group, though he also interacted with 
them and contributed greatly to their body of theistic moral apologia. Further, he was a 
professional colleague, although a quite late contemporary, in a way Coleridge was not. 
Additionally, the label "Cambridge Moralist" is not strictly contemporaneous with the 
activities o f those commonly numbered among the group. It is applied later by James 
Martineau, who wrote that “no one talks of a Cambridge Theology’ [but] there is such a 
thing, nevertheless.” He goes on to name Maurice, Grote, and Whewell as the ones who 
advanced a "theology, perfectly distinct and characteristic of the age".’’’ Sidgwick,
although 1 recognize the potential criticism from Green himself.
'** James Martineau, “Personal Influences on Our Presem Theology,” Essavs. Reviews, 
and Addresses. (London; Oxford Press, 1890, vol. I ), 224.
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Whitehead, and other late 19*- and early 20*-century commentators have broadened the
use of the term to designate a particular school of thought more than a set group of
philosophers.'^^ For this reason also. Green belongs in their company.
Moving on to Green’s contribution to this discussion, it is interesting to note that
he supposes that the Dualism of Practical Reason is a pseudo-problem. In Green's view,
the dualism of practical reason
“is a conclusion which, once clearly faced, every inquirer would gladly escape, as 
repugnant both to the philosophic craving for unity, ûid to that ideal of sWeness 
of heart’ which we have been accustomed to associate with the highest virtue
Green thinks the escape is possible because he argues, in a sense, that one need not
believe that there exists the sort of intractable divide between what he labels “duty” (which
represents the demands of Universal Hedonism) and “interest” (which represents the
constraints of Ethical Egoism).
It should be noted here that Green does not think that solving the Dualism of
Practical Reason will, in any way, give aid and comfort to Utilitarianism. He, like Whewell
before him, is an Intuitionist in the line of Coleridge. While Green is an Intuitionist, he is
the most closely connected of the Cambridge Moralists to the work of Immanuel Kant.
Whitehead even numbers Sidgwick among the group. He uses “Cambridge Moralist ” 
to designate the philosophical conclusions that mark the work of Whewell, et al, not so 
much to designate the method that they had in common. Further, Sidgwick succeeded 
Maurice as Knightbridge Professor o f Moral Philosophy, and so has this in common with 
the others as well. However, only the commonality in method is philosophically relevant, 
and so I think that my interpretation of Whitehead’s appellation “Cambridge Moralist” 
accentuates that similarity rather than simply an order of professorial succession. 
Further, speaking philosophically, only on this interpretation does it make sense to 
number Sidgwick among the Moralists
T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. A. C. Bradley (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 1883), 221.
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Thus it should not be surprising that his own version of the Coleridgian argument from 
earlier takes on an even greater deontological bent Because of this, the concept of “duty’' 
plays a central role. However, if the Dualism of Practical Reason holds, then it holds 
whether the duty is conceived in a Utilitarian way or in a Deonotological way. This is so 
because “duty” is, on Green’s view, other-directed. That is, “duty” involves obligation 
toward others. For the Universal Hedonist, that duty is established in terms of the General 
Good; for the Kantians like Green, that duty is established in terms of the moral law. 
However, that “duty” involves obligation toward others holds in either account To rescue 
his own view. Green advances an argument that he thinks will satisfy a Utilitarian as well.
On Green’s view, the key to solving the problem of the Dualism o f Practical 
Reason lies in a correct conception of a person’s “good” He turns to Greek ethics, 
particularly Aristotle, to develop what he takes to be the proper conception of a person’s 
“good”. In this. Green bears striking similarity to Sidgwick, though their differences are 
substantive. Recall that Sidgwick, too, looked to ancient Greece for a notion of the 
common-sense and a comparison model for his own method of ethical investigation. 
However, that is as far as Sidgwick goes. Sidgwick, perhaps influenced by Darwin and 
surely so by Herbert Spencer, maintains a view of human evolutionary development that 
includes ethical theory and the moral common-sense from which ethical theory properly 
arises. On Sidgwick’s view, just as surely as the technological advances o f Victorian 
England have surpassed those of their ancient Greek counterparts, so too has the moral 
common-sense surpassed that of the ancient Greeks. In short, the Greek culture has been 
superseded by the Victorian one; a view quite common in the period and notably
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advanced by Spencer, among others.'^' This English chauvinism colors Sidgwick's 
appropriation of Aristotelian concepts. Green, on the other hand, takes an opposing view. 
On Green’s view, the work of Aristotle (and Plato, to a lesser degree) is particularly 
relevant for addressing the Dualism of Practical Reason, for example. Green holds that in 
reading Aristotle, one discovers that the virtues ultimately require “an expression of a 
will to be good, which has no object but its own fulfillment.” '^  ^ Supposing Aristotle to 
find a person’s good in this sort of will. Green takes it that he is in agreement with 
Aristotle in supposing that duty (the expression of the will to be good) and self-interest 
are ultimately compatible.
Recall from an earlier discussion the argument summary that gives rise to the 
Dualism of Practical Reason.
SI: A person’s good is her self-satisfaction.
S2: Self-satisfaction consists in maximizing pleasure for the agent, or (to 
avoid begging any questions) in the realization of pleasure by the agent.
161 And a view not particularly uncommon in the late 20"' century either. One recent 
paper which makes a similar argument (except it is the late 20"* century United States 
playing the role of Victorian England) is Marie Schmidt’s, “The Idea of Human Nature 
and Mid-Twentieth Century Political Theory”.
Here it seems that Green is putting a slightly Kantian slant on the Aristotelian notion 
of the highest good as something that is desired for its own sake and not desired for the 
sake o f anything further. (Nicomachean Ethics 1094al7-18) The reason I use the phrase 
“Kantian slant” is two-fold. First, Green is perhaps the best Kant scholar among the 
Cambridge Moralists, to the extent that he has been called ‘little more than a parrot” by 
later commentators. Indeed, C. D. Broad labels Green as “a thoroughly second-rate 
thinker” (Broad, 144). While this is extreme, on my view (and Irwin’s), it does capture a 
kernel o f truth - namely that the reading of Kant had a considerable influence on Green’s 
own ethical views. This leads to the second of the “two-fold” reasons. It seems unlikely 
that Aristotle has a Kantian conception o f the will operative in his own view. Green, 
however, seems to read Aristotle, at least in part, through a Kantian interpretive lens
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S3 and S3* are both compatible with SI and S2.
S3; The agent has a duty toward the general good 
S3*: The agent has no duty toward the general good 
But, S3 expresses the moral commitment of the Universal Hedonist and S3* expresses 
the commitment of the Ethical Egoist. Since S3* and S3 cannot be true together, yet are 
equally supported from the common moral sense, the Dualism of Practical Reason 
results.
S2 is an expansion of the definition of “good”. The individual (a composite 
entity) and the individual good are analogous to the general populace (also a composite) 
and the general good. However, Green argues that a proper expansion of that notion will 
solve the Dualism of Practical Reason (or more accurately, show that no problem existed 
in the first place). Green recasts the argument as follows:
G1 : An agent has a duty toward the general good.
G2: Self-satisfaction consists in the full realization o f a rational agent’s 
capacities.
G3: The full realization of one person’s capacities requires him to will the 
good of other people for their own sake.
From G1, G2, and G3 we have
G4: Ethical Egoism, as Sidgwick conceives it, is defeated.
163 Irwin, 280.
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Obviously Green has to argue for 02  and 03 to show that 0 4  follows. To do this, he 
turns to the ancient Greeks Green argues that the Greek moralists found the tnie principle 
o f morality;
Once for all they conceived and expressed the conception of a free or pure morality, 
as resting on what we may venture to call a disinterested interest in the good; o f the 
several virtues as so many applications of that interest to the main relations of social 
life; of the good itself not as anything external to the capacities virtuously exercised 
in its pursuit, but as their full realization.'^
Green is intrigued, not only by the view that virtue involves this “disinterested
interest” '^ *, but by the Aristotelian restrictions on the virtues. For example, courage is
displayed when fighting a naval battle, say, but not when one struggles only against the
sea. Generosity, for another example, is displayed only in the giving of material to
others, but not, say, in giving time or support. Green takes the presence of society to be
a necessary condition for the acquisition of virtue. This is because people must be
present for an agent to habituate the virtues and, ultimately, to develop the steady state of
character that marks acquisition of the virtues. The restrictions that Aristotle places on
the virtues are instructive here. Irwin writes that “Aristotle's restrictions reflect his views
about what promotes the common good, and each virtue is a state of character that expresses
the agent's identification of his own good with the common good " '^
Green and Sidgwick differ substantively on another point that Green sees as
advancing the view that the good of the agent and the common good are connected. For
Green, Prolegomena. 253.
By “disinterested interest”, Green seems to be designating the same thing Aristotle 
picks out by the good that is desired for its own sake and not for the sake o f anything
further.
166 Irwin, 292.
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Aristotle, it is quite clear that virtue and the fine (koAx>v) are at least related concepts. 
However, Sidgwick and Green differ greatly on the implications to be drawn from 
Aristotle's discussions of virtue and the fine or the good On Green's view, the 
connection suggests that Aristotle is right, for the most part, about the character of moral 
intuitions about intention and motive However, more important for this discussion. 
Green takes Aristotle’s conceptual connection between virtue and the fine to suggest that 
Aristotle is basically right about the connection between the good of any particular agent 
and the good of others That is, in Aristotle's connection between virtue and the fine. 
Green sees the support for his move from G2 (self-satisfaction consists in the full 
realization of a rational agent’s capacities) to G3 (full realization o f one person's 
capacities requires him to will the good of other people for their own sake).
Sidgwick, on the other hand, takes Aristotle’s connection between virtue and 
fineness to imply an opposing conclusion. On Sidgwick s view, the fact that Aristotle 
references the fine when writing o f virtue is evidence that he does not distinguish those 
judgments that are strictly moral judgments from those that are purely aesthetic. Unlike 
his view that Victorian culture (with its attendant moral common-sense) supersedes 
ancient Greek culture, we ought not suppose that this conclusion is the result of some 
Spencerian Victorian chauvinism. Instead, this is further evidence of Sidgwick’s 
overarching principle o f separation of disciplines within philosophy. As we noted in the 
section on Sidgwick’s method, he strictly compartmentalizes ethical investigations fi*om 
those inquiries that are commonly grouped under the headings o f metaphysics, 
epistemology, anthropology, etc Aesthetics is no exception. Again, Sidgwick brackets
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out aesthetic judgments from bearing upon strictly ethical investigations. Judgments of 
beauty have no direct bearing on judgments of “right” or “wrong”, “good” or “evil”, and 
the like Only those judgments that arise from moral intuitions are data for ethical 
inquiry. This rigid compartmentalization, perhaps tinged with the chauvinism mentioned 
previously, makes it somewhat clearer that Sidgwick would suppose that Aristotle had 
fallen into error by assuming that judgments of fineness (or beauty) might have some role 
to play in ethical theorizing.
I think Sidgwick errs in assuming a rigid compartmentalization of the intuitions 
and judgments that arise from common-sense. It seems clear that there is at least some 
permeability of the dividing wall between areas of discourse in philosophy. Whether or 
not Sidgwick gets Aristotle right, it seems fairly clear that the Cambridge Moralists are 
right to suppose that there is a connection between moral responsibility (which surely 
arises from moral intuitions) and questions concerning freedom and determinism (which 
Sidgwick himself notes are not moral questions, per se, but metaphysical ones). Here the 
common philosophical view (Kant, et al) that the two are connected seems to me to be 
the more apt one.
Sidgwick misinterprets Aristotle As Irwin points out, “it is tnie that the Greek 
tenn that Aristotle uses, k o X o v , is often appropriately translated as ‘beautiful.’ But there 
are good reasons for denying that aesthetic beauty is what he primarily intends when he 
mentions the kalon in connection with the virtues.”'^ ^
ibid., 295.
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As Irwin notes, this is consistent with Green’s conclusion. Green does not 
substantiate his argument beyond its simple assertion. Fortunately, however, Irwin 
develops an argument from various Aristotelian sources that does support the conclusion. 
I have reproduced it here with some editing for space.
1. What is fine is both intrinsically good and praiseworthy .
2. Actions that are praiseworthy must be voluntary'^^ and actions 
displaying great virtue especially deserve praise
3. Actions display great virtue insofar as they especially benefit others ' '
4. Hence, concern for the fine is contrasted with narrow and exclusive 
concern for one’s own i n t e r e s t a n d  when everyone concentrates on 
fine action, we can expect that to promote the common good
Thus, Irwin argues that Green has some support for his assertion that Aristotle holds 
that the good of the individual is tied to the good of the community in which the individual 
lives. Another result of this argument is that it becomes clear that Sidgwick gets Aristotle 
wrong. The k o A o v  is not merely an aesthetic notion. It is connected with moral value. 
Since it captures a moral intuition and moral judgment, it is a proper datum for ethical 
investigation. So, even if Sidgwick maintains a rigid barrier between ethical inquiry and 
other philosophical inquiries, the barrier does not prevent consideration of the fine in ethical
Eudemian Ethics I248bI7-2S; cf. Nicomachean Ethics I101b31-2, lISSa28*31, and 
Rhetoric 1366a33>6)
Nicomachean EtMcs 1109b31; £iidbminn Ethics 1223a9-15)
Rhetoric 1367b28
Rhetoric I366b3>4; Nicomachean Ethics II20aII,  lI21a27-30, lI23a31-2; Eudemian 
Ethics \23\elA
Rhetoric I3S8b38, 1389a32-S, I389b3S;McomacAearr£Mfcs I104b31,1169a6
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investigation. This is because the fine is either connected with moral value (in which case it 
also must encompass some moral intuition of its own) or it expresses a moral intuition of its 
own. In either case. Green is right in his interpretation of Aristotelian ethical commitments 
and Sidgwick is not.
Beyond this interpretive point we can see now that Green has some justification for 
G3 ("The lull realization of one person's capacities requires him to will the good of other 
people for their own sake”). If the good of the agent is necessarily connected to the 
common good in such a way that for the promotion of the good of the agent, the agent 
must also at least take the common good into consideration, then G2 ("Self-satisfaction 
consists in the full realization of a rational agent’s capacities”) holds. Further, if G2 
holds in this way, G3 is a straightforward consequence. And from GI, G2, and G3, G4 
follows. Thus, it is at least plausible to suppose that the Dualism of Practical Reason 
need not equally indict a deontological view like Green’s and a utilitarian view like 
Sidgwick’s. Indeed, we have reason to suppose that the Dualism of Practical Reason is a 
pseudo-problem because Green’s argument stays within the strict parameters that 
Sidgwick establishes for ethical theory. Beyond this, it draws from moral intuitions of 
common-sense a notion of duty that includes, necessarily, the concern for the agent’s 
own well-being. Thus, Green (with some 20^-century help from Irwin) has shown a way 
to solve the supposedly intractable Dualism of Practical Reason.
Nicomachean Ethics 1169a6-l 1
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However, Green has other problems that may defeat his view. Chief among these 
is his allegiance to the Coleridgian argument explicated above It is at this juncture that 
Sidgwick’s argument against the Intuitionists as a group bears against Green as well
D. Sidgwick and the Cambridge Moralists: On Intuitions as 
indications of Humanity's Connection to the Divine
Sidgwick’s secondary' argument against the Cambridge Moralists is quite simple.
He argues that there is no reason to suppose that moral intuitions suggest anything special
about the human place in the universe, much less some unique connection to the divine.
On Sidgwick’s view, one encounters intuitions about a great many things and belonging
to a great many fields o f inquiry. Not all intuitions are moral ones. Since this is the case,
it should not be surprising to discover that there are also judgments arising from these
non-moral intuitions that are themselves “really self-evident” . If they are “really self-
evident” they will satisfy the demands of Intuitive Verification. However, merely
satisfying Intuitive Verification is not sufficient for attaining the label “really self-
evident.” Sidgwick writes:
One may say generally that as the intuitive verification cannot be made entirely 
trustworthy, it requires to be supplemented by a discursive verification - which 
consists generally in ascertaining the harmony between the proposition regarded as 
intuitively certain and other propositions belonging to the same department of fact, 
and of which the Baconian verification [by survey of particulars] is the most 
important, but by no means the only species.
That is, intuition is simply a requirement for any sort of knowledge or reasoning at all. For
example, the judgment that the Euclidean Paralld Postulate is not derivable fiom the other
nine Euclidean Elements and thus is independent of them arises first fiom intuitions about
Sidgwick, 82.
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lines, planes, and etc. These base intuitions are severally clear and distinct, and thus they 
fulfill the requirement of Intuitive Verification. Upon investigation, the Parallel Postulate is 
discovered to have the same status as the other nine Elements and thus is also clear and 
distinct (though not immediately or obviously so). The point is that even these judgments 
about geometric first principles require intuitions. If this is the case then the mere fact that 
we have moral intuitions is not a special mark of our divine nature. Since intuitions are 
required for matter-of-fact knowledge, for mathematics, for logic, and for science as well as 
for morality, we have little reason to suppose that moral intuitions convey any further 
information about the human "place" in the universe than the intuitions about the first 
principles of geometry. Of course, this argument works against the Cambridge Moralists 
because they assume this special property of moral intuitions; that they and only they are 
intuitions that provide insight into the human connection with the divine. However, it 
appears to me that the argument works even if the Cantabridgian position is presented more 
broadly.
It is not generally supposed that human intuition in geometry is some indication of 
human connection to the divine. However, suppose that the Cambridge Moralists accepted 
the obvious implication of Sidgwick’s argument against them - namely that either all 
intuitions that are “really self-evident” testify to a human connection to the divine or that 
none of them do. These seem to be the only alternatives available after showing that all 
intuitions have the same status. Clearly the Cambridge Moralists will not take the latter 
option since it would result in the collapse of their foundational Coleridgian argument. 
Thus, they must swallow the former. However, it proves to be a bitter pill. Given that they
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assume at the outset that no non-moral intuitions have this divine feature, conceding that 
they do (after the Sidgwicldan argument) appears to be oc/ hoc. Beyond this, if it should be 
accepted at the outset that all intuitions have this sort of divine property, this acceptance 
itself constitutes a judgment that will fail the verification process. This is so because it will 
not receive assent fi-om the relevant experts. Geometers, for instance, do not suppose that 
the intuitions at bottom of the proof of the Pythagorean Theorem carry with them some 
proof of a connection between humanity and the divine. Hence, since the latter option fails 
the test for Social Verifiability, it fiuls to be "really self-evident’'. So, both of the Cambridge 
Moralist alternatives prove unpalatable.
The result of the foregoing argument is that intuition is required for any sort of 
knowledge. Thus, to suppose that it should thus be required for moral insight is not strange 
nor does h do anything special to support a theistic view Moral insight is thus no more a 
mark of a divine nature than a particularly penetratii% grasp of Euclidean geometry.
E. Whitehead and the Dualism of Practical Reason, Part One
We have reason to think that Whitehead has a view similar to Green’s, rooted in 
his own peculiar interpretation of Aristotle. Whitehead is often the subject of the same 
sort o f accusation that Sidgwick levels against Aristotle - namely that he holds a purely 
aesthetic conception of the good, that he does not distinguish between the strictly moral 
and the purely aesthetic. However, that he holds something like the view that Irwin 
attributes to both Green and Aristotle can be shown in two parts. The simple portion of 
this argument is the direct textual evidence that Whitehead denies the existence o f the 
Dualism of Practical Reason. The second, and less simple, portion has to do with the
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ways in which Whitehead treats the concept of the k o X o v .  I will show that if Whitehead 
falls victim to the charge of holding a solely aesthetic conception of the good, so too do 
Aristotle and Plato. However, since neither of these do, neither then does Whitehead ' '
In a rather lengthy statement that encompasses clues to Whitehead's conception of 
the proper philosophic method as well as the connection between individual and corporate 
good, he writes that
Philosophy is the self-correction by consciousness of its own initial excess of 
subjectivity. Each actual occasion contributes to the circumstances o f its origin 
additional formative elements deepening its own peculiar individuality. 
Consciousness is only the last and greatest of such elements by which the 
selective character of the individual obscures the external totality from which it 
originates and which it embodies. An actual individual, of such higher grade, has 
truck with the totality of things by reason of its sheer actuality; but it has attained 
its individual depth of being by a selective emphasis limited to its own purposes. 
The task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by the selection. It 
replaces in rational experience what has been submerged in the higher sensitive 
experience and has been sunk yet deeper by the initial operations of consciousness 
itself. The selectiveness of individual experience is moral so far as it conforms to 
the balance of importance disclosed in the rational vision; and conversely the 
conversion of the intellectual insight into an emotional force corrects the sensitive 
experience in the direction of morality. The correction is in proportion to the 
rationality of the insight.
Morality o f outlook is inseparably conjoined with generality of outlook. 
The antithesis between the general good and the individual interest can be 
abolished only when the individual is such that its interest is the general good, 
thus exemplifying the loss o f the minor intensities in order to find them again with 
finer composition in the wider sweep of interest .
Since this portion of the argument has direct ramifications for Whitehead’s positive view, 
I reserve the fiill argument for the appropriate section of Chapter Three. Here, though, I will 
suggest that it is at least plausible to assume that Whitehead sides with Green on this point 
purely on the basis of textual evidence in which Whitehead treats the Dualism of Practical 
Reason explicitly.
Whitehead, Process and Reality. 15.
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Here, it is clear that Whitehead is echoing the argument that we have already seen 
advanced by Green (and substantiated by Irwin). On Whitehead’s view the individual 
interest and the general good are linked o f necessity Philosophy, according to 
Whitehead, is the method by which this connection is divined. Initially, human beings 
are completely self-interested. This is both a theoretical point as well as a coldly 
practical one. For instance, anyone who has encountered a small child knows how self- 
interested the child is. With time, the child discovers that she is not the only creature in 
the universe. That discovery begins to lead to an understanding of connectedness to a 
wider world; a world that she can influence and one that influences her. As the agent 
gathers insight into the world of which she is a part, the correction made to the initial 
excess of subjectivity (or self-interest, in this case) is proportional to the rationality o f the 
insight, on Whitehead’s view. One of the functions of reason is to correct excessive self- 
interest in agents. This it does by demonstrating that the individual interest and the 
general good are inherently connected.
Thus, we can suppose, based on the foregoing textual evidence, that Whitehead 
holds something like Green’s view. I take it that Whitehead does indeed hold something 
that is almost identical with Green’s view, though I will argue that unlike Green, 
Whitehead provides his own support for the view. This second phase of the argument is 
contained in the following chapter, in the section entitled “Mathematics and the Good ”
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Part III. Whitehead s Theory of Virtue
Chapter 1. Background
Considerable attention has rightly been given to Whitehead's metaphysical schemes. 
A not inconsiderable amount of attention has also attended his epistemological schemes. 
Relatively scant attention has greeted his ethics. All too little notice has been taken of the 
moral component of Whitehead’s w o r k . T h i s  is a grave over s igh t .Sure ly  part of the 
reason for this oversight lies in the Act that Whitehead is one of the truly brilliant logicians 
and systematic metaphysicians of the late 19  ^and early 2 (f centuries. No less than W V O 
Quine remarks that Whitehead is one of the foremost “pioneers in the field” of modem 
l o g i c . A n d  fi’om AH Johnson; “Whitehead’s pre-eminence in logic, the philosophy of 
science, and metaphysics has tended to distract attention fi’om his genuine achievements in 
other fields.” '*® Whitehead himself, at the outset of Process and Realitv. states that “one of
As Paul Arthur Schilpp set out to write his essay “Whitehead’s Moral Philosophy” for 
the Whitehead volume of the Library of Living Philosophers, he was advised by a colleague 
who was himself “an ardent disciple of Whitehead” that “I suggest you take as a model for 
your essay on ‘Whitehead’s Moral Philosophy’ a well-known treatise on the Snakes of 
Irdand ” Schilpp, “Whitehead’s Moral Philosophy”, The Philosophy of Alfred North 
Whitehead. 593, nl31.
It is also quite strange. To ignore the ethical intuitions and commitments that color each 
of his works is akin to studying only Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics while paying no 
attention to the rest of the corpus There is a rather pronounced kinship between the works of 
Aristotle and Whitehead that Whitehead himself notes on several occasions. This could 
come as a surprise to many with only cursory background in Whitehead’s work since he has 
such a self-proclaimed a£fectk>n for Plato. However, in Adventures of Idew Whitehead 
accords Aristotle similar status, especially in his discussion of the Hellenic epoch contrasted 
with the Hdlenistic and Scholastic epotAs Indeed, the careful reader of Whitehead soon 
comes to see that Whitehead is decidedly more aristoteiian than platonic.
W V O Quine, “Whitehead and the Rise of Modem Logic”, The Philosophy of Alfred 
Nnrth Whitfhfld P*ul Arthur Schilpp, ed., (New York: Tudor Publishing, 1951), 127.
A. H. Johnson, “Whitehead’s Philosophy o f Civilization”, Whitehead and the Modem
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the motives of a complete cosmology [is] to construct a system of ideas which brings the 
aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which 
have their origin in natural science.”'*'
Johnson is one o f the few first-generation Whitehead scholars to recognize that 
Whitehead's three most important books (Process and Reality. Science and the Modem 
World, and Adventures o f Ideas) are concerned with the topics of civilization and the 
development of individual character required for civilization to rise and flourish. Whitehead 
writes, "The book [Adventures of Ideas] is in fact a study of the concept of civilization, and 
an endeavor to understand how it is that civilized beings arise.”' F o r  Whitehead, 
civilization is dependent on civilized beings. Without the latter, the former does not arise. 
This section addresses what it means to be civilized. For Whitehead, a civilized character is 
a morally good character and vice versa. Because this is definitional, I will not dwell on it 
other than to point out that, given the equivalence, the question of being civilized just is the 
question of having good character. Since character and its development are questions of 
virtue and vice, I will examine Whitehead’s view of the constitution of virtue and show how 
agents acquire virtue. However, because of the dose connection between Whitehead’s 
ethical views and his other philosophical speculations, a number o f foundational historical, 
metaphysical, and epistemological points need to be made first.
A. Summary of the Negative Views
World. A. Cornelius Benjamin, ed , (Boston; Beacon Press, 1950), 42.
'"  Whitehead, Process and Realitv. xii. (emphasis added)
Whitehead, Adventures o f Ideas. (New York: MacMUIan Publishing, 1933), 7.
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An important preliminary consideration is locating Whitehead’s thoughts on ethics
in the spectrum of ethical theories. This can be done rather briefly. James Gray a i^es
unconvincingly that Whitehead is a Utilitarian.'^^ John Hick simply assumes that it is
obvious that Whitehead is a Utilitarian."'^ Richard Davis takes a more limited approach,
stating that Whitehead’s ethics can be interpreted as resembling utilitarianism.'** Davis
defends this claim partly by making the historical point that Whitehead’s views of morality
bear some resemblance to Sidgwick’s. But we have seen, Whitehead explicitly rqects
utilitarianism as a tenable view.
On the other hand, Whitehead has a great many positive things to say about both
duty'** and the development of character. What is important to note here is that he takes the
former to be dependent on the latter. He writes
the Actor in human life provocative of noble discontent is the gradual emergence 
into prominence of a sense of criticism, founded upon appreciations of beauty, and 
of intellectual distinction and of duty. The moral element is derivative from the 
other Actors in experience. For otherwise there is no content for duty to operate 
upon. There can be no morality in a vacuum.'*’
At first reading, it might appear that Whitehead makes “duty” primitive 188
'*^  James S. Gray, Process Ethics. (New York; University Press of America, 1984). An 
interesting sidenote. Gray is one of the many philosophers who have made the claim, in 
print, that "Whitehead never wrote an ethics ” Gray, however, is the only one to many 
this claim with the stronger claim that “Whitehead never wrote a theology ” I find both 
of these to be false. Only my claim that the first is false is contentious within Process 
scholarship.
John Hick, Philosophy of Religion. 4* ed, (New Jersey: Prenticc-Hall, 1990), 131.
'** Richard S. Davis, “Whitehead’s Moral Philosophy”, Process Studies. (Summer 1973), 
75-90.
'** In this, Whitehead’s view bears some resemblance to another 19^ century Cambridge 
moralist, T. H. Green.
'*  ^Whitehead, Adventures o f  Ideas. 18.
'*' While it is ultimately clear that Whitehead does not think duty is primitive, the less
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However, this is not so Rather, for Whitehead, experience or “common-sense” is
foundational. Experience is taken as primitive. In this way, Whitehead resembles
Sidgwick. Common-sense, of which the Moral Sense is a part, refers to a common
humanity experiencing a common world. The moral element (along with the sense of
criticism and appreciations of beauty) arises from experience through direct intuitions. Then
intellectual distinctions can be made and duty has content upon which to work. That
Whitehead has this sort of progression in mind becomes clearer when he claims that “all
knowledge is derived from, and verified by, direct intuitive observation.”**’ Thus, there is
an ebb and flow relationship between duty and direct moral intuitions. Duty and intellectual
distinctions arise from intuitions, and those distinctions and conceptions of duty are then
confirmed (or not) by further intuitions. Or, as Whitehead says in another place.
Civilization did not start with a social contract determining modes of behavior. Its 
earliest effort was the slow introduction of ideas explanatory of modes of behavior 
and of inrushes o f emotion which already dominated their lives. Undoubtedly ideas 
modified practice. But in the main practice precedes thought.
than careful reader might suppose that the phrase “founded upon appreciations of beauty 
... and o f duty” suggests that duty is somehow basic. I argue that this would be a 
mistaken reading of the passage.
'*’ ibid.
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 114. For a very nice discussion of Whitehead’s 
rejection of contractarian models of ethical theory, see, among others George Allen, “No 
Common Goods without Common Natures”, Society for the Study of Process 
Philosophies, 1998 Conference. The point here is not to investigate Whitehead’s 
arguments against contractarianism, as these form a particularly small subset of the 
ethical arguments more generally. Rather, it is simply to suggest that should one’s 
interpretation of Whitehead’s ethical commitments conclude by placing his thought 
within Utilitarian, Deontological, or Contractarian models, then that interpretation has the 
further onus of harmonizing Whitehead’s clearly negative arguments against these views.
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As we have already seen, Whitehead’s reception of utilitarian schemes (both Millian 
and Sidgwicldan) and deontological schemes (particularly the Cambridge Moralist variety) 
tends to be rather negative.
B. Background
In this section 1 run the very real risk of presenting an argument that might seem to 
be a welter of proof-texts. However, the point is to demonstrate that not only does 
Whitehead’s system have ethical implications, but that the system from which those 
implications arise is intended to be seen as inherently ethical That is, Whitehead’s concern 
with human conduct and character development provides the motivation for his more 
popularly debated work. The implication of this claim is that without the ethical dimension 
of Whitehead's work, the work itself loses meaning because it loses the end for which the 
work is done.
It is part of the received opinion concerning the Whiteheadian corpus that Process 
and Reality is a work in systematic metaphysics and epistemology along with a critique of 
many of the systems of Whitehead’s modem predecessors (Kant, Hume, Locke, et al); that 
Symbolism: Its Meaning and Eflfect is a work exploring a particular aspect of Whitehead's 
doctrine of truth along with criticisms of preceding truth doctrines; that The Function of 
Reason is concerned with the human Acuity of Reason; and so on. What this received 
opinion omits, however, is the starting consistency in Whitehead's assertions concerning the 
‘Why?” of his philosophical investigations. It may come as a surprise to those philosophers 
who uncritically accept the "Whitehead never wrote an ethics” dogma, but Whitehead
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daims without exception that his woric is directed to the understanding of human experience
and, within that, human conduct
In some of Whitehead's work, the emphasis on ethical concerns is straightforwardly
apparent. For example, in Symbolism, the third and final chapter of the book is dedicated to
“Uses of Symbolism.” At the outset of this chapter, Whitehead turns his attention to the
inextricable link between human civilization and symbolism. And while “humanity can be
overwhelmed by its symbolic accessories,” symbolism and criticism of received symbols are
necessary elements in the "promotion of a wholesome dvilization The segue into this
final chapter is found in the conclusion of the preceding one;
In this chapter, and in the former chapter, the general characterization of symbolism 
has been discussed. It plays a dominant part in the way in which all higher 
organisms conduct their lives. It is the cause of progress, and the cause of error. 
The higher animals have gained a faculty of great power, by means of which they 
can define with some accuracy those distant features in the immediate world by 
which their future lives are to be determined. ... It is the purpose of the next chapter 
to illustrate this doctrine by an analysis of the part played by this habit of symbolism 
in promoting the cohesion, the progress, and the dissolution of human societies.
In a quite straightforward fashion, Whitehead has specified the reason for the 
exploration of symbolism. In the first place, it is to clarify and critically evaluate the general 
character of symbols. Secondly, it is an investigation of the conduct of life, its progress, its 
fiwlings, and its prospects for satisfaction in the future. Third, and finally, it is an 
explanation of the function of symbolism within society, specifically the ways in which it 
functions to bind individuals to one another in society, to educate the members of society, 
and to shape the character both o f the individuals who are the constituent parts of the society
191 Symbolism: Its Meaning and Eflfect. (New York: Putnam-Capricom Books, 1959), 60-61
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and the character of the society itself. In each of these, it is apparent that the living of 
human life is the overriding concern that motivates the work.
Another example in support of my thesis is Adventures of Ideas, where some of 
Whitehead's most explicit ethical formulations are located. This book has been likened to 
Plato's Republic because of its place and function within the Whiteheadian corpus. On 
Davis’ view, just as Plato set out to describe the construction of the ideal state and the states 
of character of its citizens in the Republic, so Whitehead set out to examine human 
civilization in Adventures of IdeasT^ Although this is grossly oversimplified, as Davis 
himself notes, the similarities between the two works and their placement in the respective 
bodies of work are striking. The similarities become even clearer when the Republic is 
interpreted as something other than a work of political philosophy and is seen more strictly 
as an exploration into the development of character which focuses on the acquisition of 
virtue. For example, beginning with a question concerning the nature of justice, Plato turns 
his attention to the development of the ideal state on the view that in finding justice tfiere it 
can then be found in the individual. In that development, considerable attention is given 
(notably in Book VI) to the education and training of the citizens and rulers of the state with 
the express intent of developing in them the proper characters that will make the ideal state 
possible. The focus is always directed ultimately at finding the virtue justice in the 
individual. In a similar way, Whitehead is striving to identify and clarify those things by 
virtue of which a society is called civilized. He states at the outset that civilization, in 
whatever epoch, is driven by two agencies • brute necessity and “articulated beliefs issuing
192 ibid., 59.
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from aspirations and issuing into aspirations.” '^ '* From there, Whitehead sets out to discuss 
the three types of character which partake in the “highest ideal of satisfaction possible.” 
Central to the advance of civilization, at least within this epoch, are the images of 
graciousness, kindness, freedom, and mercy inherited from the “interim ethics” of the 
founders of Christianity.Whitehead then goes on to advance his theory of civilization but 
it is the character of the individual as she progresses from acting on instinct, to acting with 
intelligence, to developing an abiding wisdom that assesses and criticizes both instinct and 
intelligence with which he is ultimately concerned. It is this concern with the development 
of character that marks the deepest connection with the Socrates of the Republic. The 
political theory is but a secondary similarity.
The one seeming departure from this concern with human conduct and character 
development is his magnum opus. Process and Reality. A critic of my view could rightly 
poim out that Whitehead does not set out human conduct as the target of his investigations at 
the b^inning of the work. Rather, it is labeled a systematic examination of “speculative 
philosophy.”'^  Similar to Spinoza’s geometric method, Whitehead’s work also proceeds to 
set out definitions, categories, logical connections and required relations in an effort to 
overcome many of the difiScuhies of “nineteenth-century philosophy [which] excludes itself 
from relevance to the ordinary stubborn Acts of daily life.” Simply put. Process and Reality 
certainly seems to be a work in metaphysics and not ethics.
Davis, 79
Whitehead, Adventures o f Ideas. (New York: MacMillan, 1933), 12-13.
Of these, Whitehead writes, “So long as the Galilean images are but the dreams of an 
unrealized world, so long must they spread the infixtion of an uneasy spirit.” Adventures of 
jdfiRS,24-S)
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So does Spinoza's Ethics. That is, until one sees what is done with the definitions, 
categories and the rest Only then does it become apparent that Spinoza is concerned with 
what is commonly labeled “ethics”. The same is true for Whitehead.
In the pre&ce, Whitehead makes only a brief statement of the final destination of 
this work. “The fifth part is concerned with the final interpretation of the ultimate way in 
which the cosmological problem is to be conceived. It answers the question, “What does it 
all come to?”'^  ^ Sure enough, in part five the discussion turns to questions of evil, the 
character of God, greatness in action, and the “various contrasted qualities of temperament, 
which control the formation of the mentalities of different epochs.”*'^ * This final section of 
Process and Realitv can be overlooked by those concerned with only the metaphysics. 
Robert Mesle in his Process Theologv argues that the fifth section can be read completely 
independently of the first four. He argues further that one need not read or try to understand 
the Final Interpretation to grasp Whitehead's meaning in the preceding chapters. This seems 
odd. It is perhaps understandable because the final section of Process and Realitv explores 
questions not explicitly mentioned in the preceding sections. However, 1 am at a loss to 
grasp how one might understand that final section without making extensive use of the 
definitions, cat^ories, presuppositions, and the argumentation of the earlier sections, 
further, whether or not the two sections of the text are separable, it seems clear fiom the text 
that Whitehead did not see them as such. Thus, while one might advance a process model 
that did not have the two pieces as part and parcel of each other, that model would not be a
Whitehead, Process and Reality, 3.
'^ibid.,xiii. 
ibid., 338.
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Whiteheadian modd. For Whhehead, it seems that the connection between the fairly 
fundamental questions about character - of God, of individuals, and of the world - is the 
point of the investigations in Process and Realitv.
C. Whitehead and the Greeks
1. TheKaA,ov
It is important to bear in mind the role that Whitehead assigns to his interpretation of
classical Greek philosophy. Here, too, is a deceptive similarity to Sidgwick. Sidgwick,
relyir% on his interpretations of Plato and Aristotle, advances a view that the "Good" is the
ultimate qualification in moral theory. For Sidgwick, however, this qualification is afiBxed
to things based on some sort of utilitarian analysis That is, to call something “Good" is to
say something about the benefits to the general good (understood in a utilitarian way) that
the thing provides. Whitehead also sees 'Good” as the “ultimate qualification” but not as
something to be afiBxed to a thing based on utilitarian calculations. Rather Good" is
ascribed to something based on its excellence. For example, a good toaster is called “good”
because it toasts bread excellently Whitehead recognizes that this strategy is not without
problems, noting that the question of ascribing the qualification ‘Good” to something on the
basis o f that thing’s particular “excdlence” raises some thorny problems both for the Greeks
and their successors. He writes
This notion of excellence, partly attained and partly missed, raises another problem 
which greatly exercised Greek thought at the time of Plato. The problem can take 
many special forms. In what does beauty consist, for example, the beauty of a
I am inddrted to Hugh Benson for this example. While he and I recognize that using a 
toaster to talk about virtue is problematic (since a toaster is an artifact), it is a nice 
example o f  ways in which “good” might be affixed to  something.
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musical melody, the beauty of a statue, or of a building such as the Parthenon? 
Also, there is that other form of beauty, which is rightness of conduct Probably, in 
this naïve shape, the question has no answer, since ‘The Good’ is an ultimate 
qualification not to be analysed in terms of any things more final than itself But an 
analogous question can be asked, to which Greek thought was unanimous as to its 
answer. To what sort of things does the concept [the Good] apply, and in particular 
what sort of conditions are requisite for its evocation? The Greek answer to this 
latter pair of questions was that beauty belonged to composite things, and that the 
composition is beautifiil when the many components have obtained in some sense 
their proper proportions This was the Gredc doctrine of Harmony, in respect to 
which neither Plato nor Aristotle ever wavers.^”"
This notion of Harmony plays a central role in Whitehead’s account of virtue As 
such, we will return to it later First, it would be of help to discuss Whitehead’s view of 
his kinship with the ancients, particularly with regards to the topics of final causes, 
mathematics. Harmony, Beauty, and the “end” of a human being Each of these is 
intimately connected with Whitehead’s notion of the Good’.
2. Final Causes
The Nicomachean Ethics may be the most read part of the Aristotelian corpus, so it 
might seem strange to say that a likeness exists between the works of Aristotle and 
Whitehead. While Aristotle's work is clearly a work in ethics, the point that Whitehead 
never wrote an ethics has been belabored in scholarly circles. So at the outset, it appears a 
daunting task to compare the work of the two favorably. However, the comparisons are 
quite strong.
Careful examination of the Nicomachean Dhics reveals that Aristotle relies on other 
of his writings to complete the arguments. That arguments in the Nicomacheatt Ethics are 
compressed is relatively uncontroversial. The example Irwin cites is Aristotle’s
Whitehead, Adventures o f Ideas. 152.
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criticism of the Platonic Theory of Forms. At 1096a 12-1097a 12, Aristotle raises no 
fewer than eleven objections to the Theory, on Irwin’s view.^“  These objections are, for 
the most part, claims made with little supporting argument. Fortunately, he has much 
stronger support for these objections. Unfortunately for those who want to read the Ethics 
separately from the rest of the corpus, that support is not found in the Ethics.
This lack of support is particularly striking with respect to Aristotle’s “objections to 
the Form as separated.” ®^’ For Plato, the form of a thing is separable from the ordinary 
things that participate in the form. Irwin’s example is helpful. He writes, “In the Platonic 
view the Form of the Just is perfectly just and is separable from sensible just things ”'"^ 
These claims as simple statements of Aristotle’s view that Plato is wrong-headed about the 
doctrine come perilously close to question-begging if taken in isolation from the rest of the 
Aristotelian corpus. However, by reading the Nicomachean Ethics as part of a broader 
philosophical project, one then has available Aristotle’s arguments at Metapt^sics 987a32fl^ 
I078b9-I079a4, and 1086a24-bl3 for support of the conclusions Aristotle draws.^°*
Irwin, “Introduction ” to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, xxi 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b25ff.
203 Irwin, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 10. Note that when referring to Irwin’s 
headings in his translation of the Nicomachecm Ethics, I have elected to use the page on 
which the heading is found.
’“^ ibid.. Notes, 303. This view is extended to cover the other Forms as well. For a 
further example of the problem Irwin (and Aristotle) have in mind here, see Constance 
Meinwald’s “Good-bye to the Third Man” in Kraut’s The Cambridge Companion to 
Plato. 365-397.
At Metaphysics 987a32ff, Aristotle expands on his assertion that “One might be 
puzzled about what [the believers in Ideas] really mean in speaking of The So-and-So 
Itself since Man Itself and man have one and the same account o f man; for in so far as 
each is man, they will not differ at all. Nicomachean Ethics, 1096a34ff. Aristotle’s 
disagreement with Plato about the Form doctrine is perhaps clearest with respect to their 
views on numbers and the One. For Plato, numbere are derived from the Form of the
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The point of this discussion is to demonstrate briefly that without a working 
understanding of the Aristotelian material (metaphysics, epistemology, anthropology, etc )
“Great and Small" and are distinct or separable from ordinary objects or sensible things. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes as an objection to Plato’s view that “the 
Pythagoreans seemingly have a more plausible view” (1096b5). However, this view is 
expanded helpfully tA Metaphysics 987b20-988al9,
Accordingly the material principle is the “Great and Small,” and the essence or formal 
principle is the One, since the numbers are derived from the “Great and Small” by 
participation in the One. In treating the One as a substance instead of a predicate of 
some other entity, his teaching resembles that of the Pythagoreans, and also agrees 
with it in stating that the numbers are the causes of Being in everything else; but it is 
peculiar to him to posit a duality instead of the single Unlimited, and to make the 
Unlimited consist of the “Great and Small.” He is also peculiar in regarding the 
numbers as distinct from sensible things, whereas they hold that things themselves are 
numbers, nor do they posit an intermediate class of mathematical objects. His 
distinction of the One and the numbers from ordinary things (in which he differed 
from the Pythagoreans) and his introduction of the Forms were due to his investigation 
of logic (the earlier thinkers were strangers to Dialectic) , his conception of the other 
principle as a duality to the belief that numbers other than primes can be readily 
generated from it, as from a matrix. The fact, however, is just the reverse, and the 
theory is illogical; for whereas the Platonists derive multiplicity from matter although 
their Form generates only once, it is obvious that only one table can be made from one 
piece of timber, and yet he who imposes the form upon it, although he is but one, can 
make many tables. Such too is the relation of male to female: the female is 
impregnated in one coition, but one male can impregnate many females. And these 
relations are analogues o f the principles referred to. This, then, is Plato's verdict upon 
the question which we are investigating. From this account it is clear that he only 
employed two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the 
cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the Forms He 
also tells us what the material substrate is of which the Forms are predicated in the 
case o f sensible things, and the One in that of the Forms—that it is this the duality, the 
"Great and Small." Further, he assigned to these two elements respectively the 
causation of good and o f evil; a problem which, as we have said,4 had also been 
considered by some o f the earlier philosophers, e.g. Empedocles and Anaxagoras. 
(Hugh Tredennick, translator, Aristotle in 23 Volumes. Harvard University Press, 
1933)
This is but a single illustration of the use of material outside the Nicomachean Ethics to 
support claims Aristotle makes within it, but it should be suflGcient evidence that the 
Ethics is dependent, to a certain degree, on this outside help. Clearly, without the 
passages from the Metaphysics, the claim in the Nicomachean Ethics is completely 
without support.
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developed in other works, one is hard pressed to make complete use of the arguments in the 
Ethics. Just as one needs to read the broader Aristotelian corpus to grasp all the subtleties of 
the Ethics, so one needs to pay special attention to Whitehead's ethical concerns and 
commitments to grasp the subtleties of his metaphysics. 1 will offer only a brief example 
here, though fuller examples follow in the next sections. In Adventures of Ideas. Whitehead 
develops a controversial theory of truth. On his view, "Truth" has many gradations, from 
stronger to weaker forms. The strongest gradation is connected with direct intuitions, the 
weakest is symbolism, including the symbolism of langu%e and prepositional statements. 
The Theory of Truth is developed in support of his notion of Harmony. Harmony is at the 
pinnacle of his conception of the virtues. He goes on in Part Three of Adventures of Ideas 
to develop the notions of phraseology, prehension, individuality, knowledge, sense 
perception, perceptive function, objects, creativity, perception, non-sensuous perception, 
energy flux, mind and nature, personality, space and time, body, and dualism to the end of 
making clear his understanding of civilization and the character development of the 
individual human beings.^°^ But the understandings of the essence of civilization are
That Whitehead has character development in mind will be demonstrated later. It will 
suffice here to point out that Whitehead describes the essence of civilization, its growth and 
decay, in terms of human character and with an eye to the proper sort of character 
development that will promote the growth of civilization. Note especially the following 
description of modem nations, "In modem states, there is a complex problem. There are 
many types of character. Freedom means that within each type the requisite coordination 
should be possible without the destruction of the general ends of the whole community.... In 
this way individuality gains the effisctiveness which issues from coordination and freedom 
obtains power necessary for its perfrsction.” (Adventures of Ideas. Part 1, Chapter 4, Section 
Vm). Or from his description of the human soul, "All three types of character partake in the 
highest ideal of satisfiution possible fi)r actual realization, and in this sense can be termed 
that beauty which provides the frnal contentment Gjt the Eros of the universe.” (Part 1, 
Chapter 2)
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presented both prior (in Part I) and posterior (in Part IV) to these discussions, providing the 
framework into which each of these metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological 
concepts is placed. Thus, without taking careful note o f the work Whitehead intends for 
these metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological components to do, one runs the very 
real risk of failing to fully understand the components themselves. And he intends the 
components to make clear the nature o f civilization and the essence of human character 
development.
My view is this: just as Aristotle's non-ethical works serve to provide support for 
his ethical views, so Whitehead's ethical commitments provide a context within which he 
advances his so-called "non-ethical" views. It is somewhat easier to divide the one from 
the other with Aristotle since he seems to do so himself. In Whitehead's case, it is 
considerably more difficult as the two are interwoven.^®’ Another important similarity 
is their reliance on “Final Causes" to make the arguments for their ethical commitments.
Aristotle's Final Cause doctrine is one of his more controversial doctrines. It raises 
more troubling questions more quickly than any of the other three “causes" - efficient, 
formal, or material. This is in part because of a lack of clarity regarding “cause"; 
particularly as it relates to the Final Cause. For example, is the Final Cause a reason, an 
explanation, or some indication of design by an outside agent?'®* Yet there is little
In the final section of Process and Reality. Whitehead again makes reference to the work 
of Aristotle, noting that Aristotdian commitments have colored a great deal of thought about 
the character of God and the world. The placement of the comment along with the overall 
structure of Process and Rgality should again remind us of the comparison of the two
Tanwecr Akram argues that on account of this latter possible interpretation, Aristotle 
ought not be interpreted as having applied the Final Cause doctrine to anything other than
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disagreement that the notion plays a critical role in the development of the doctrine of 
Natural Teleology. Whitehead's Final Cause doctrine is somewhat less controversial.^”’ For 
Whitehead Final Causes express intentions of living entities. For example, when asked why 
the New Orleans Saints would sign three quarterbacks, their presumed response would be 
"To win the Super Bowl." However misguided the action (the signing of the three mediocre 
quarterbacks), the intention that motivated the action is the Final Cause of that action. 
Should, by some miraculous happening, the Saints win the Super Bowl, management would 
point to the earlier action and attribute the performance of the action to the desire to win.^*“
artifacts and certainly not to human beings or to the cosmos. {The New Nation, Spring 
1988) This is a wrongheaded position, on my view, because if Final Causes designate 
functions, as it seems that they do, then it seems quite clear that Aristotle attributes Final 
Causes to human beings. More informative is Thomas of Aquinas’ use of the 
Aristotelian doctrine of Final Causes to “prove" the existence of God as the agent of the 
order in the world. Thomas’ “fifth way ” of proof runs in this way.
We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and 
this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to 
obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, 
but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless 
it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow 
is directed by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural 
things are directed to their end; and this being we call God. (St. Thomas of Aquinas, 
Whether God Exists?, Anton Pegis, translator, in his chapter Five Ways to Prove the 
Existence o f God, Classical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophv of 
Religion. John Hick, editor, (Indianapolis: Prentice Hall, 1990), 42.
This is for two reasons. (1) there are fewer combatants and (2) Whitehead is clearer 
about what he means by Final Cause.
This discussion has some rather direct implications for attributing an ethical scheme to 
Whitehead Indeed, if the discussion were to end at this stage, the case would have been 
made that his system has some ethical import. Fortunately, Whitehead's discussion does 
not end at this stage. In The Function of Reason. Whitehead makes several more 
assertions that could easily have been included in the discussion above. However, it is 
one o f the places in which his concept o f Final Cause is best developed. Thus, the 
treatmern of it in this section.
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For Whitehead, the function of reason is “to promote the art of life.”^" The art of life is then
characterized as first, “to be alive, secondly to be alive in a satisfitctory way, and thirdly to
acquire an increase in satisfaction.” '^  ^ That is, to live, to live well, and to live better.*'^ On
Whitehead's view, this commitment is, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to the thesis,
“Reason is a factor in experience which directs and criticizes the urge towards the
attainment of an end realized in imagination but not in fact.”^ ''* Which is to say, reason is
that factor which directs one toward an end that one desires and has not yet attained.
However, to attain such a “good life” requires that individuals develop their characters in
such ways as to make civilized existence possible
The Function of Reason is not the only place where these commitments are made
In Adventures of Ideas for example, Whitehead states that “Life can only be understood as
an aim at that perfection the conditions of its environment allow.” "^* In his criticism of
much of modem scholarship and science, he writes that they
reproduce the same limitations as dominated the bygone Hellenistic epoch and the 
bygone Scholastic epoch. They canalize thought and observation within 
predetermined limits, based upon inadequate metaphysical assumptions 
dogmatically assumed. The modem assumptions differ from the older 
assumptions, not wholly for the better. They exclude from rationalistic thought 
more of the final values of existence.^'^
Simply put, it is the character of civilization and the individuals that comprise civilized
societies that Whitehead seeks to understand and explain. From Symbolism, which
Whitehead, Function o f Reason. 4.
ibid., 8.
ibid
ibid., 9.
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 87. 
ibid, 122.
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precedes Process and Realitv. to The Function of Reason, which is contemporaneous with h, 
to Adventures of Ideas which follows it, Whitehead consistently spells out the Final Cause 
of his philosophical ruminations. It is, first, to live, to live well, and to live better, and 
second, to systematize those requirements which explain experience and make the character 
of the “to live, to live well, and to live better" accessible. In short, his is a profoundly ethical 
endeavor, and one that seeks to correct modem errors by mining the classical past.
3. Harmony, Beauty, and Freedom
It is perhaps odd to lump these three concepts together into a single discussion. 
However, Whitehead's scheme presents these as intimately interrelated in such a way that 
it seems best to address them together rather than severally In the notion of Harmony, 
Whitehead thinks the Greeks hit upon a solution to the problem of relating the Good to 
virtues, or excellences. “Excellences” are excellent in virtue of the Harmony they 
express. Now whether Plato or Aristotle ever held this sort of view in the way Whitehead 
characterizes it is an open issue. Of philosophical interest here is Whitehead's 
conception of Harmony and its relation to Beauty and Freedom. Harmony characterizes 
the condition of any complex system in which the components are in proper proportion 
and where in the development o f that system, the proper proportional relationship 
between the components is preserved. Whitehead's view is something like this. Since
With such an aflSnhy for Aristotle and Plato, it should come as no surprise that 
Whitehead has his own catalogue of virtues, the acquisition of which serve the development 
of individual and societal character. It is a difikrcnt catalogue to be sure, but it is a dififerent 
metaphysics which serves as the underpinning and a diflferent epistemology which serves as 
the method of coming to know them. Whitehead's catalogue includes Tolerance, Peace, 
Persuasimt, Wisdom, and Harmony. These are developed most explicitly in Adventures of 
Ideas, though they appear in each ofthe other works mentioned.
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Harmony has two foci - ( 1 ) the proper proportion of the components within a system and 
(2) the maintenance of proper proportion of the components during the development of it 
- both of these criteria must be met for Harmony to obtain.^'*
One example Whitehead uses to illustrate this notion is the discovery by Archytas 
that there is a direct mathematical relationship between the length of a string in a musical 
instrument and the note it produces By varying the length of the string, in half or in 
quarter for example, one will vary the tones by octaves or double octaves, respectively 
Obviously the addition of more strings of varying lengths to the instrument will create a 
progressively more complex instrument in much the way that a twelve-string guitar is 
more complex than its six-string cousin Throughout the addition of complexity, the 
strict mathematical relations between length of string and tone remain. Should strings be 
out of tune, for example, disharmony will result This disharmony is due to the failure to 
maintain the proper proportions.
Were we to shift our focus from musical instruments to architecture or painting, 
we would discover again that preservation of proportion in dimension underlies beauty. 
Whitehead holds that all qualitative elements in the world depend on mathematical 
relations Turning to a human being, we are again met with a complex system. For 
virtue to be expressed by that system. Harmony must be a true description of it.
Beyond this, one of the aspects that Harmony shares with Beauty is the absence of 
"painfU clash” between the elements within a complex system This is perhaps because 
Beauty is one o f the Cardinal Virtues and because the “end” of a human being is to 
develop a virtuous character.
Significantly, this means that for Whitehead, Picasso’s Guernica is not a beautiful or 
harmonious painting. But this seems to be precisely the sort o f result we would want (or 
at least that Picasso wanted). Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 153, see also,
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Whitehead also recognized that one problem with “excellences” is that they may 
be partly attained and partly missed. Take, for example, the toaster oven of our earlier 
discussion It will be considered an excellent toaster if it possesses the excellence proper 
to it; that is, if it toasts bread well. But it seems clear that there are many states in which 
a toaster could be. It may toast almost perfectly, but blacken the edges a bit too much. 
Or it may bum the bread to a cinder. Or it may do something in between. This sort of 
situation may be difficult to explain if there is only The Excellent’ and ‘The Not 
Excellent’; that is, if virtue were an all-or-nothing proposition. For Whitehead, it is not. 
Things can be more or less excellent. In an analogous way, character can be more or less 
excellent. Further, if it is Harmony that determines excellence, then one can account for 
the gradations in the excellence of things in a very straightforward way.
Another example may help to clarify the view. The Academy of St. Martin-in- 
the-Fields, under the conduction of Sir Neville Marriner, may perform Brahms’ First 
Symphony magnificently, missing but a single note during the performance. It seems 
counterintuitive not to call this an excellent performance, indeed a virtuoso performance. 
The Podunk High School Marching Band may play the same piece and butcher it, though 
it may still be recognizable as Brahms’ First. In both cases, excellence is only partly 
attained. Yet Whitehead’s view can still pronounce the Academy’s performance virtuous 
and Podunk’s less so because excellence is determined by Harmony.
“Mathematics and the Good’
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Harmony
Beauty Truth
Freedom
On Whitehead's view. Harmony is related to both Beauty and Truth The 
discussion of the relationship between Harmony and Truth is explored in greater detail in 
the section on Whitehead's Theory of Truth. The relationship between Beauty and Truth 
is explored further in the section on Beauty Suffice it to say that while there is some 
overlap. Truth and Beauty are different, that Truth is a more narrow concept than Beauty, 
and that both are defined in terms of the Harmony expressed The point of the graphic 
here is to illustrate how each expresses an excellence that is related to Harmony. In the 
case of the Academy and Podunk, one's performance is clearly more beautiful than the 
other The analysis is made on the basis of the Harmony expressed.
A curious feature of Whitehead's scheme is the inclusion of the notion of 
Freedom. Freedom is intimately related to Harmony (though not necessarily to Beauty or 
Truth). Freedom, as Whitehead uses the term relative to Harmony, is the contrary of 
Slavery. He writes that 'freedom  is the presupposition o f political theorists now ... 
Freedom and Equality constitute an inevitable presupposition for modem political 
thought.”**®
**® Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 15. For more on this connection, see the “Relation 
between Metaphysics and Ethics” section below. Clearly, Whitehead is not referring to 
metaphysical freedom, (though the view has implications for the metaphysical question
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He notes that in 20“’-century discussions of Freedom, “we are apt to confine 
ourselves to freedom of thought, freedom of the press, freedom for religious opinions.”^ '^ 
If this is the limit of the discussion of Freedom, then the notion can be conceived in 
purely negative terms. Freedom described in this way is a “freedom from" something. 
Freedom of the press is actually the freedom from  censorship by authorities of one sort or 
another; freedom for religious opinions is actually the freedom from  the enforcement of 
church or state belief systems on the governed As Whitehead puts it. Freedom thus
of freedom and determinism). Instead, he is considering the general common-sense 
intuitions of the general population of his day and contrasting it with the ancients. Plato, 
Cicero, Pericles, and Aristotle all occupy a world in which the general common-sense 
intuitions of the general population were at odds with what Whitehead takes to be the 
modem view. They lived in a time when the presupposition of theorists and common 
folks alike was slavery and inequality. Freedom, in the sense o f absence of servitude, is 
considered by Whitehead to be inviolable for an ethical theory This is because it is one 
of the presuppositions o f common-sense. It is also because he sees Freedom as a 
necessary component of any system that could promote Harmony.
To the extent that Whitehead is a progressivist, it is on this point. I use 
“progressivist” to denote that he thinks it is an indication that human society has 
progressed from the time o f the ancients to the time of the modems, at least on the issue 
of Freedom/Slavery. Too often, those o f this period who suggest that society has 
“progressed” are immediately labeled as some sort of “Spencerian Social Darwinist.” 
This is not the case where Whitehead is concerned. I go to some lengths in the “Potential 
Problems” section at the conclusion of this chapter to show this result. He often uses the 
phrase “the discovery o f freedom” (Adventures of Ideas. 62, 84) to suggest that prior to 
the more modem era, slavery was simply assumed to be the norm. There is certainly 
some support for this view. Aristotle, for example, seems to hold that some people are 
slaves by nature and so not fit for true virtue. Whitehead gives the Methodist movement 
o f the 18"* century tremendous credit for its advocacy of abolition. However, it is also of 
some importance to note that in so doing, the movement went counter to the accepted 
teachings o f 1700 years o f Christian history, dating to the apostle Paul. Indeed, even in 
the culture o f the 1800s, the notion that slavery was an acceptable institution was quite 
prevalem. Whitehead takes it to be a sign of the progression o f civilization that Freedom 
rather than Slavery is the fundamental presupposition of society.
Whitehead, Adventures o f Ideas. 84
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conceived involves only “the antagonisms of our fellow men This sort of “freedom” 
is a species o f Freedom, to be sure, but it is not to be confused with Freedom. Freedom 
of action is the true conception of Freedom on Whitehead’s view. He means the Freedom 
to become; to become something that one is not yet and to open to oneself and to one’s 
community possibilities that were not there before. It is the Freedom to create.
His example is that o f Prometheus, the frre-giver Prometheus, he notes, “did not 
bring mankind freedom of the press”. But the taming of Are opens up to humanity vistas 
of possibilities that did not exist prior to its taming This aspect is not completely 
captured in the negative construction as I have proposed it. Rather, it seems to capture 
something o f Freedom fo r  rather than freedom from ^^^ It stretches beyond the notion of 
an absence of coercion because the subject o f the freedom is fairly broad - including 
press, thought, and religion to be sure, but including more than that.
Whitehead then gives us an idea of the importance of Freedom to humanity (and 
by extension the importance of the notion of Freedom to his own ethical speculations). 
He writes, “Freedom of action is a primary human need.”^^** If virtue entails a level of 
Harmony in the individual, then virtue requires the existence of this sort of Freedom; a 
Freedom to create oneself. Thus, this fairly broad notion o f Freedom is a necessary 
condition for virtue.
Perhaps another example would be helpful. Suppose that one founded a genteel 
society built on the backs of slaves (for example, the romanticized view of the Old South
ibid
Note that this is the contrast in Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Tw o Concepts o f Liberty" 
Whitehead, Adventures o f Ideas. 153.
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in the antebellum United States). Such a system is predicated on the systematic and often 
brutal suppression o f a large portion of the population. The clash between the oppressor 
and oppressed characterizes a relationship to which Harmony cannot in any way be 
ascribed. Even if the system appears harmonious from the point of view of an outside 
observer, such an appearance would be misleading. The reasons for this should be clear. 
Such a system (indeed, any system that involves slavery), necessarily cannot be 
harmonious because it violates both criteria of Harmony, the criteria of Beauty, and also 
stands in direct opposition to Freedom. The opposition of Slavery to Freedom can be 
seen simply in Slavery's destruction (or at least severe limitation) of the possibility for 
creativity. For the enslaved, the Freedom to self-create is curtailed or eliminated 
altogether. Thus, virtue is arbitrarily denied to an entire class of human beings.^^* Thus, 
if Harmony entails virtue and virtue entails Freedom, the negation of Freedom will 
necessarily result in the negation ofHarmony
Obviously Slavery stands in opposition to Freedom even where Freedom is conceived 
negatively, as a freedom from oppression or subjugation. However, as suggested earlier, 
these negative conceptions do not necessarily carry with them the intuition of Freedom as 
freedom to create and to self-create.
Common-sensically, it seems rather straightforward to suppose that to acquire virtue 
one must possess not merely the moral freedom to pursue virtue but the actual political 
freedom to do so as well. More than simply an appeal to the presumption of the day, it 
seems likely that Whitehead is right on the necessity o f Freedom point. This is so for the 
following reason. Harmony in the general society is dependent on Harmony in the 
particulars. Without Harmony at the level of actuid entities, then groupings of actual 
entities will not display the trait. Now, I should note that this claim does not commit 
Whitehead to the Fallacy of Composition. This is because the general society has a 
dependence relative to component parts. Disharmony in an actual entity is transmitted to 
each other actual entity. This is because, as Whitehead has pointed out, every actual 
entity is intimately related to every other one in the society. Thus, dishvmony in one 
will resonate throughout the group. Thus, without harmony in the particular actual 
entities, there will not be Harmony in the society. And since the institution of Slavery
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D. Guiding Metaphysical, Epistemological, and Ethical Principles
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guiding metaphysical and epistemological principles that inform Whitehead's speculative 
philosophical method: “coherence”, “logic”, “adequacy” and “applicability”. I will then 
turn to some of the more peculiar concepts that populate Whitehead’s “philosophy of 
organism”. Among these are “actual entities”, “eternal objects”, “prehensions”, 
“coherence”, etc.^^’ The reason for this rather lengthy discussion of metaphysical, 
epistemological, and historical topics in the context of ethics is that Whitehead certainly 
takes each of these to be interconnected. I will take up this “interconnectedness” later in 
this section. First, the principles.
On Whitehead’s view, it is reasonable to demand that any philosophical effort 
satisfy four framework criteria: coherence, logical consistency, applicability, and 
adequacy. Whitehead equates the attempt to formulate a “Speculative Philosophy” with 
“the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of 
which every element of our experience can be interpreted.” *^* Some two paragraphs 
later, he restates this position in more common-sensical way. He asserts that, given his 
formulation, it should be noted that philosophy has both a rational AND an empirical 
side. Coherence and logical consistency comprise the rational side, while applicability
surely makes its slaves experience disharmony, then so too will the society which 
includes such an institution So, once again. Freedom is required for Harmony and for 
virtue
Since we have already discussed Whitehead’s grounding of his philosophy in his 
interpretations o f classical greek philosophy, I will point out the ways in which the 
concepts are taken to supersede, supplement, of replace those o f his predecessors.
*”  Whitehead, Process and Reality. 3.
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and adequacy comprise the empirical.
Speculative Philosophy
Rational
coherent logical
Empirical
applicable adequate
While the branching diagram may be sufficiently clear to demonstrate 
Whitehead’s web of framework concepts, I prefer another example. 1 label this example 
the Whiteheadian Quadrilateral to illustrate that each of the four criteria is at work in 
each moment of philosophical investigation, properly done.
Coherence
Rational Side
Logical Consistency
Whitehead Quadrilateral
Applicability
Empirical Side
Adequacy
1. The Whitehead Quadrilateral
a. Coherence and Logical Consistency
Whitehead introduces the framework criteria in reverse order of his treatment of 
them. The second pair o f conditions for the success of any philosophical construction “is 
unflinching pursuit of the two rationalistic ideals, coherence and logical perfection ’’^ ^^
U 9 ibid., 6.
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Though his treatment of these notions begins with applicability and adequacy, I treat 
them in the order of his initial outline
Coherence and logical consistency are quite straightforward notions that bring 
with them little deviation from the generally accepted understandings o f the terms. He 
writes that "logical perfection does not ... require any detailed explanation.” However, 
as one pole of the Rationalistic side of the Whiteheadian quadrilateral it bears some 
discussion. Mathematics forms a nice example of the sort of consistency (and 
interconnectedness) that Whitehead is trying to suggest exists in any proper philosophical 
investigation. He writes, “The history of mathematics exhibits the generalization of 
special notions observed in particular instances. In any branch of mathematics, the 
notions presuppose each other. Philosophical speculations, properly done, will 
exhibit the same sort of presupposition and interdependence.
It is not at all surprising that the other pole of this Rational side of the 
quadrilateral is coherence. Logical inconsistency, for the most part, is trivial on 
Whitehead’s view. Given the immediately foregoing discussion, this charge of 
“triviality” is clearly not an attempt to say that a philosophical system that exhibits 
logical inconsistency can be somehow absolved o f responsibility for those 
inconsistencies. Nor is Whitehead trying to exclude logical consistency as a proper 
demand that must be satisfied by philosophers in their ruminations. Rather, Whitehead 
seems intent on emphasizing the interconnectedness o f philosophical concepts in any 
Rational speculative scheme. He writes, “the fundamental ideas, in terms of which the
ibid
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scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless.”^ '^ 
Just as “logical” has “its ordinary meaning”, so “coherence” seems to have the standard 
philosophical meaning That is, the fundamental ideas form a tapestry of interrelated and 
interdependent concepts. Taken in isolation, the threads lose much of their relevance; 
taken together, they form a coherent whole.^’^
b. Applicable and Adequate
Before moving to applicability and adequacy, I need first to set out what 
Whitehead means by an “interpretation”. He defines an “interpretation” as the notion 
“that everything o f which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, 
shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme. Here, he 
assumes that interim philosophical investigations have yielded some abstract concepts 
that have begun to coalesce into a general philosophical view. He uses these 
qualifications to show that one need not have arrived at a fully systematized view before 
one can examine the applicability of the view.
Interpretations are presented before the mind as a combination of a particular 
experience - say, seeing the color red - and an evaluation of the analysis of that color 
within the general philosophical scheme. For example, a Newtonian scheme will analyze 
the experience of perceiving the color red in a way very different from a Scholastic
231 ibid, p. 3.
At least, this is the idea. Whitehead holds an even stronger view than that the 
fundamental notions are in fact inseparable and indefinable in abstraction from the others. 
Ideally, the notions will not even exhibit the appearance of independence. He writes, I t  
is the ideal of speculative philosophy that its fundamental notions shall not seem capable 
of abstraction from each other ”. Process and Reality, p. 3, emphasis added, 
ibid
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scheme. While the Schoolmen suggest that the color is actually in the world, independent 
o f the perceiver, a Newtonian philosopher might interpret the experience of the color red 
as a particular instance of external stimuli that causes the mind to perceive a color within 
the mind. That is, red is in the eye of the beholder, not existing independently in the 
world. In both systems, however, there is an interpretation of the experienced event, and 
that interpretation is not outside of the boundaries allowed by the general scheme; that is, 
it is an instance of the scheme.
Whitehead then defines ‘applicable' to mean that some items of experience are 
interpretable within the logical and coherent set of beliefs. That is, given a set of items of 
experience, at least one must be interpretable within the philosophical scheme. Perfect 
applicability (or adequacy) is understood to mean that no items are incapable of 
interpretation. However, no philosophical scheme attains perfect applicability Thus, to 
the extent that a system of beliefs does not provide an interpretation for a particular 
experience, that theory cannot claim absolute adequacy. On this view absolute certainty 
is not a criterion for justification of the philosophical view.^^^ Applicability is. He writes 
that “the first requisite is to proceed by the method o f generalization so that certainly 
there is some application; and the test o f some success is application beyond the 
immediate origin The point here is a simple one. A philosophical investigation
One great benefit o f this sort of view is that it recognizes the ongoing development of 
and fluidity in a system of beliefs about the world that is attempting to correspond as 
accurately as possible to the world. Another related benefit of this view is that it 
recognizes, and perhaps requires, a place for mathematics (including probability theory), 
scientific inquiry (including scientific inference), and maybe the social sciences as weU, 
from which these sciences can both inform and refine schemes o f belief.
Whitehead, Process and Reality. 5.
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begins with particular data presented by experience. Some of the data are selected for 
further analysis and some are de-selected. From the selected data, general notions are 
developed. Those general notions are thought to be properly applicable if they can then 
be applied to the de-selected data. Thus, the charge of “inapplicability” is not just a claim 
that the general scheme leaves out elements o f experience, but that after having 
developed abstract notions, those notions do not apply to the excluded elements.
Applicability relates to the particular de-selected elements o f experience as they 
are subjected to analysis in light of the general principles of the philosophical scheme 
Adequacy relates to the scope of those elements. A theory satisfies applicability if it 
includes some elements beyond those from which the theory itself was developed. 
Adequacy is a harder test. A theory is perfectly adequate if and only if it applies to all 
data, the initially included, initially excluded, and initially unthought of. However, since 
perfect adequacy is beyond the bounds of possibility, on Whitehead’s view, we adopt a 
different stance toward philosophical schemes and the data presented by the actual world 
- that of varying adequacy. A theory is said to be more or less adequate based on the 
scope of the experience it includes and for which it provides an interpretation,
c. Conclusion
These four criteria are relatively uncontroversial. One might even go so far as to 
wonder at their explicit inclusion within this project because they certainly seem to be 
widely accepted philosophical background conditions. It seems that the vast majority of 
philosophers, when advancing arguments for their own positive views, are in essence 
arguing that their view is internally consistent, coherent, adequate in explanatory power,
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and applicable. Further, in raising criticisms of other views, philosophers appeal directly 
to arguments that purport to show inconsistency, incoherence, inadequacy, and/or 
uselessness, individually or in some combination, in the competing view Far fewer is 
the number of philosophers who explicitly and intentionally set out the criteria at the 
outset of their work; pointing out to the reader that these criteria must be satisfied. While 
it may be argued that these framework criteria form simply the background for any 
philosophical argument, it is also true that they are applied unevenly. Of this 
phenomenon, Whitehead writes, “If we consider philosophical controversies, we shall 
find that disputants tend to require coherence [and the other criteria as well] from their 
adversaries, and to grant dispensations to themselves Whitehead is concerned to 
make it as clear as possible to the reader that these conditions apply universally to any 
speculative efforts in philosophy, his own included.
2. The Method and Aim of Philosophy
The ‘philosophy o f organism’, Whitehead’s term for what has become popularly 
known as process philosophy, begins from an examination of the whole or the one before 
examining its constituent parts. The individual, whether a rock or a human being, is an 
organism, composed of actual entities, prehending either positively or negatively the 
many o f the universe. Although much of his discussion concerns constituent parts (actual 
entities, prehension relations, etc.), Whitehead approaches the discussion beginning with 
the supeiject or the individual as a whole. Only then can the constituent parts be
Whitehead, Process and Reality. 6.
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examined, and then only in the context of the whole.^^^
Whitehead rightly believes this approach to be somewhat different from that of 
traditional metaphysics. Generally, the approach has been to analyze the constituent parts 
of the subject under investigation. Whether that subject be a rock or a person or any 
entity in between, the metaphysical concentration has been on the things that make it up. 
From the speculative schemes of the pre-Socratic cosmologists like Thales and 
Democritus to more modem philosophers like Leibniz, discussion has focused on the 
“building blocks”, however those blocks are conceived (e.g. water, atoms, monads). One 
shortcoming of these approaches is that analysis of constituent parts can never provide 
access to the complete picture. No matter how many pieces are examined independently, 
the dynamic of the whole eludes grasp. Or, let us examine a more readily grasped if 
more highly fanciful example. Humpty Dumpty, it is said, once sat on a wall. Humpty 
Dumpty had a great fall. When all the kings' horses and all the kings' men arrived on the 
scene, they were faced with a scattered Humpty Dumpty, reduced to constituent parts by 
his untimely tumble. No matter how intently the pieces are examined, ultimately Humpty 
Dumpty remains in pieces. One of the most common renderings o f the nursery rhyme 
pictures the protagonist as a giant egg. Now, imagining for a moment a giant egg 
shattered on the ground before us. We can say easily enough that it is an egg and we can 
identify the shape it most likely had before the accident. However, our powers of 
analysis cannot help us to reassemble the egg into its precise pre-tumble state. 
Whitehead seems to be suggesting that the state o f  most philosophical investigations
ibid., 23.
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begins in precisely the position of all the kings’ horses and men, with one pernicious
additional fact - these investigations do not know how the pieces are supposed to ht back
together. The impossibility o f constructing an adequate explanatory metaphysic is in part
a function of the analysis o f constituent parts without proper attention to relations
between them and relations o f part to whole
I do not mean to suggest that Whitehead’s own method of investigation
overcomes all of the problems that attend the formulation of an adequate explanatory
metaphysic As he himself writes, ‘There remains the final reflection, how shallow,
puny, and imperfect are efforts to sound the depths in the nature of things In
philosophical discussion, the merest hint o f dogmatic certainty as to finality o f statement
is an exhibition of folly.” ’^* Whitehead’s humility is not an exhibition of false modesty.
He knows that his philosophical views are not the final word on all matters o f philosophy.
However, this in no way militates against the contribution. And one of the most telling
contributions Whitehead makes is in the suggestion that the traditional method of
philosophical analysis simply obscures certain aspects of nature that his own method
illuminates. Nor ought one to read Whitehead’s criticism of centuries of metaphysical,
epistemological, and ethical discussions as indicating a superficial reading of the texts on
his part As Charles Hartshome writes about Whitehead’s metaphysics in particular and
his philosophical method in general;
On all these issues and many others, Whitehead is more aware than his 
predecessors o f the alternatives that may (with greater or less coherence and 
consistency) be held. If he asserts that events and experiences are the ultimate 
subjects o f predication, it is not because it has never occurred to him to regard
Whitehead. Process and Reality, xiv.
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"things" and “persons" in this light; but because he believes he sees that two 
thousand years of persistent effort to achieve rational coherence by this method 
have failed and were bound to fail
It is not at all difficult to discern the ultimate target of this criticism; namely the 
philosopher who preceded Whitehead by some two thousand years - Aristotle. As we 
have already seen in a foregoing section (“Final Causes"), Whitehead juxtaposes his own 
notions of ethical concepts with Aristotle's, departing in some rather important ways. 
Those points of departure can ultimately be traced to his departure from Aristotle at the 
fundamental level of ontology and philosophical method. From the difference in method 
(analysis on the one hand and organism on the other), to the concept of proper subject of 
predication (things versus events), to the view of virtue, we can trace a parallel 
development of concepts within the work of both philosophers.
If one analyzes the approach at a level deeper than a simple comparison of the 
philosophical views, it becomes clear that Whitehead takes his conception of the proper 
aim of a method of philosophy to be the same as Aristotle’s. Whitehead writes, “The true 
method of philosophical construction is to frame a scheme o f ideas, the best that one can, 
and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme 
There are at least two important implications of this brief assertion. First, whatever the 
differences between Whitehead and Aristotele, it seems that Whitehead takes their views 
of the aim of philosophy to be the same. This is so because Whitehead accepts, for the 
most part, the 19*-century analysis of common-sense, although he rejects the associated
Charles Hartshome, “Whitehead’s Metaphysics", Whitehead and the Modem World. 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), 27.
Whitehead, Process and Reality, xiv.
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philosophical scheme. Part of that analysis is the quite common-sensical notion that 
philosophy is concerned with interpretation of experiences had by a common humanity 
experiencing a common world. Given this approach to common-sense (an approach that 
Aristotle was universally thought to have shared), it is safe to suppose that Whitehead is 
justified in holding the first implication 1 have drawn from his assertion.
The second important implication to be drawn from Whitehead's assertion about 
the tru e  method of philosophical construction" is that Whitehead is a fallibilist. It is rare 
that the clause “the best that one can” is included in a statement of purpose without the 
recognition that one might get it wrong. Further, this simple little clause should remind 
the reader of Whitehead's stronger claim; namely that “In philosophical discussion, the 
merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition o f folly 
Whitehead resorts to a vivid example to clarify further what he takes to be the method of 
philosophy; a clarification that preserves this fallibilist commitment. He writes, “The 
true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of 
particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air o f imaginative generalization; and 
it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation.” '^*^  What 
is striking about this passage is that it so succinctly captures the tenor o f Whitehead’s 
philosophy. Philosophy is a living discipline that is alive in the interplay between 
experience, on the one hand, and abstract reasoning and interpretation of that experience, 
on the other; between empiricism and rationalism. In short, philosophy itself is a process.
ibid
34: ibid, 4.
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It will be productive to explore this fallibilist commitment a little further. Wliile 
it is not unusual for an ethicist to advance his positive view with some caution as to 
Ünality of statement”, it is somewhat less common for a metaphysician to do the same 
Two notable examples come to mind; Aristotle and Descartes. Aristotle makes the quite 
famous assertion in the Nicomachean Ethics that one ought not expect more precision 
from a field of study than that field admits of. Ethics does not allow of the same 
precision as mathematics. Aristotle makes no such claims in the Categories or the 
Metaphysics, the Physics, or De Anima. Neither does such an exception apply, 
apparently, to investigations o f logical syllogisms and the like. Thus, a level of certainty 
seems to exist (or be thought to) in these metaphysical investigations in a way that it does 
not in the ethical ones. Similarly, the Cartesian metaphysics seems to admit of little 
imprecision. Despite the method of doubt exemplified in the Dream Hypothesis and Evil 
Demon Hypothesis of the First Meditation, the Cartesian metaphysics is ultimately 
founded on clarity and distinctness which provide sure foundations for his arguments for 
the existence of God {Third and Fifth Meditations), the distinction o f the Mind and the 
Body (explicitly in the Second and Sixth Meditations) and for the establishment of the 
Primitive Notions of Mind, Body and the Substantial Union of the Mind and the Body. 
Further support for the view that Descartes holds that philosophical investigations can 
exemplify startling precision is his reliance on the example o f mathematics as a 
paradigm. In his Letter o f Dedication that precedes the Meditations, he goes so far as to
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claim that ^he arguments I use here do, in my opinion, equal or even surpass those of 
geometry in certitude and obviousness
Clearly, Whitehead parts company with both Aristotle and Descartes. He writes, 
“Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tentative 
formulations of the ultimate generalities.”^^ The disagreement with Descartes is 
particularly striking because o f the significant role that mathematics plays in Whitehead’s 
own philosophical development and positive views. However, Whitehead claims that 
“Philosophy has been misled by the example o f mathematics; and even in mathematics 
the statement of the ultimate logical principles is beset with difficulties, as yet 
insuperable.” '^*’ This difficulty is of particular relevance as it relates to philosophical 
method. On this point, Whitehead claims that 'the  primary method of mathematics is 
deduction; the primary method of philosophy is descriptive generalization Clearly, 
the former of these two claims is true. The second is what differentiates Whitehead from 
Descartes
This position coincides nicely with his description of the general project. The 
philosophy of organism, as we have already seen, is concerned not merely with 
component parts but with relations between those parts; relations which are intrinsic to 
the larger organism and without which the investigation of both the parts and the whole is 
fatally limited Given Whitehead’s fundamental claim that process and not stasis is the
Rene Descartes, Letter o f Dedication, Meditations on First Philosophy. Donald Cress, 
ed., (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 3"* edition, 1993), 3.
^  Whitehead, Process and Reality. 8.
ibid 
'"^ibid., 10.
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Hindamental characteristic of the universe, it is obvious that one must be able to 
differentiate between a method of inquiry that works from static first principles in a 
deductive fashion (mathematics) and a method of inquiry that is rooted in first 
experiencing the world as a series o f processes and generalizing from particulars to 
categories of particulars and from categories of particulars to categories of components 
and relations (philosophy). This latter inquiry will be rife with ampliative inferences, 
inferences that tend to provoke suspicion. Given Whitehead’s conception of philosophic 
method, then, his recognition of the ultimate fallibility of the endeavor is not surprising.
For Sidgwick, the moral intuitions of common-sense play a singular role in his 
philosophical investigations. One begins with the intuitions of moral sense and examines 
them to discover those that are “really self-evident”. Upon arriving at the “really self- 
evident” principles, one then constructs a philosophical method that incorporates them. 
The principles that turn out to be “really self-evident” are those that have satisfied the 
Verification Criteria, one of which is the Social Verification criterion However, at the 
end of the day, Sidgwick is left with two methods of ethics that both satisfy all of his 
criteria. He does not allow a further appeal to the moral intuitions of common-sense to 
decide between them. Nor does he allow an evaluation of the conclusions of Ethical 
Egoism on the basis o f further intuitions. The conclusions are deductively reached from 
first principles that have been shown to be “clear and distinct” . Here, Sidgwick is much 
more similar to Aristotle and Descartes than to Whitehead.
However, suppose that one began with a set of intuitions and from that set arrived 
at a series o f conclusions that seemed to contradict some o f the original set. It would
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seem an intuition o f common-sense to infer from the contradiction a difficulty in the 
conclusions and the reasoning that gave rise to them. Sidgwick concludes that common- 
sense is intractably divided upon itself
Whitehead supposes at the outset that the direct intuitions of common-sense are 
both the starting point of philosophical investigations and the evaluator of those 
investigations. '^*^ Arriving at conclusions at variance with direct intuitions o f common- 
sense is problematic for the investigations as the intuitions are simply given. This 
methodological structure is in keeping with Whitehead’s airplane example Recall the 
example;
The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the 
ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative 
generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by 
rational interpretation.*"**
That “renewed observation” is both the wellspring of further data for future flights and
also the checking procedure that keeps the generalizations grounded. The connection this
bears to Whitehead's rejection of Social Verification becomes clearer at this point for two
reasons. The first concerns the methods with which Sidgwick is left at the conclusion of
his investigations. For example. Broad, among others, argues that Ethical Egoism does
not commend itself to the intuitions o f the moral sense directly. Further, he agrees with
Sidgwick that Ethical Egoism is an ignoble doctrine that is met with little agreement in
the minds and hearts o f reasonable people. This would seem to suggest that the
This is an application of the Quadrilateral. Recall that philosophical schemes are 
required to meet the criterion of adequacy. Adequacy is measured in part by evaluation 
on the basis of the intuitions of common-sense
ibid., 4.
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principles of Ethical Egoism do not ultimately satisfy Social Verification. Whitehead 
seems to be claiming, however, that even the Social Verification criterion is to be 
doubted on the basis of a further appeal to common-sense. Given the progression (and 
perhaps the “evolution”) o f knowledge it is reasonable, even common-sensical, to hold 
that the views of the “relevant experts” may very well be wrong. Social Verification 
involves an appeal to authority without a strict evaluation of the authority itself to 
determine whether or not it is worthy of the authority it is accorded. Thus, Social 
Verification seems to fail the “renewed observation” suggested by the airplane example 
and suggested by common-sense itself "^*’
Having examined Whitehead's method at some length, I turn now to the aims of 
philosophy as Whitehead sees them. Arthur Murphy has helpfully pointed out that 
among Whitehead’s aims is the attempt to defend a position opposed to tum-of-the- 
century “analysts” and “positivists”.*’® The arguments against Auguste Comte and his 
successors are of some historical interest, but of little contemporary importance. 
Accordingly, I will address only the “anti-analyst” position. Whitehead states explicitly 
that the task he has set for himself in Process and Reality is to repudiate some “myths and
It should be noted that if it is true that Social Verification can be safely excluded as a 
criterion for “real self-evidence” (or at least held as a much weaker test than Sidgwick 
allows it to be), then the discussion of the Dualism of Practical Reason is for the most 
part over. If Social Verification is denied, it might seem that Ethical Egoism still 
survives as it satisfies the other criteria. However, given that Whitehead’s method 
reasonably includes the intuitions of common-sense both at the outset and the end of an 
investigation, the intuitions o f the masses (and the experts) still militate against its claim 
to “real self-evidence”. This is not Whitehead’s line of argument here, but it seems like 
one that is available to him given the admittedly underdeveloped comment under 
examination
Arthur Murphy, “Whitehead and the Method of Speculative Philosophy”, Thg
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fallacious procedures” that are accepted by 19‘*‘-century philosophers without question, 
for the most part. Among these are “the trust in language as an adequate expression of 
propositions [and] the subject-predicate form of expression.”^ '^ As I have already noted 
in the methodology subsection of this section on Aim and Method, Whitehead's approach 
is not that of analyzing the component parts of an organism in isolation from the other 
components or the relations between them In this vein, Whitehead writes that the “study 
of philosophy is a voyage towards the larger generalities.” *^^  For Whitehead, this means 
in part that one of the most important aims of philosophy is to bring to mind those 
elements that are most often excluded from philosophical analysis - namely relations and 
the change or dynamism in the world. These are commonly obscured in Aristotelian and 
Cartesian substance-metaphysics, to the detriment of their speculative schemes.
Whitehead thinks those who restrict philosophical investigations to an analysis of 
component parts of a given organism or who suppose that the proper way to understand 
the world is to first grasp the atomic elements and then construct upward are going about 
the philosophical process precisely backwards. This is because this method of 
philosophy runs counter to the experience human beings have when presented with the 
world. Our most basic experience of the world is the experience of organisms and 
relations, not static components. Thus, one o f the aims o f philosophy is to make sense of 
the component parts o f the organism m light o f  their relation to the organism taken as a
Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead Schiipp, ed , 353. 
‘ Whitehead, Process and Reality, xiii. 
ibid., 10.
238
whole and through the lens of change rather than stasis. He writes “The elucidation of 
meaning involved in the phrase ‘all things flow’ is one chief task of metaphysics.
Continuing the discussion of this aim of philosophy, WTiitehead writes that “the 
task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by the selection,” i .e , by the 
perceptions from which general conclusions about the world are drawn. In another place, 
he writes, “The philosophic attitude is a resolute attempt to enlarge the understanding of 
the scope of application of every notion which enters into our current thought.” *^'* The 
elements of the world that are most commonly de-selected are relations and dynamism. 
The point is a shift in view of the world. Rather than assume a static, fractured reality, 
Whitehead suggests that the fundamental metaphysical assumption must be the 
assumption of a dynamic, organic reality, the components of which cannot be adequately 
understood without a grasp of the whole. Hence, another aim of philosophy is the 
instigation of thought to ever broader scope rather than ever narrower scope.
So, two of Whitehead’s aims are the broadening of scope relative to the items 
taken as data for philosophical investigation and a change in the perspective of the 
investigation itself. But these aims are in the service of a further aim. The practice of 
“speculative philosophy ” fell into disfavor during the early part of the twentieth century, 
and Whitehead is clearly trying to recover the art and defend it as a proper line of 
philosophical inquiry. Another of the attitudes repudiated in Process and Reality is “the 
distrust of speculative philosophy” And Whitehead understands Speculative
ibid , 208
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Philosophy to be ‘Ihe endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general 
ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.” *^^  On this 
point, Whitehead takes himself to be of a mind with Aristotle and Descartes, though he 
clearly disagrees with their conclusions and methods
However, these three aims are in the service of a final aim, one with particularly 
meaningful implications for those interested in Whiteheadian ethical views. He writes 
that “it must be one of the motives o f a complete cosmology to construct a system of 
ideas which brings the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those 
concepts of the world which have their origin in natural science.”**’ The aim, then, can 
be stated as the attempt to describe what sort of things must be true about the world given 
our moral intuitions. Put another way, the aim is to answer the question, “What sort of 
world must it be given that moral principle X is true?” That this is the proper question 
will become clear after the discussion of Whitehead’s Theory of Truth Suffice it to say 
here that Whitehead takes the highest level of relation between the actual world and its 
appearance in perception to be that o f direct intuition. Given that some moral intuitions 
are themselves direct intuitions, the goal must be to infer from the truth of those intuitions 
to a structure of the world in which those intuitions can be true
In summary, Whitehead’s aims of philosophy can be seen as stepwise 
progressions. He is first concerned with broadening scope and changing perspective. 
Then, given these aims, his next goal is to defend the practice of speculative philosophy.
'*  ^ibid, 3 
ibid., xii.
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And he engages in speculative philosophy as a necessary tool to discern the structure of 
the world given that certain intuitions, including moral intuitions, hold.
3. Actual Entities, Eternal Objects, Prehensions, Societies, and the 
Self
One of the easiest mistakes in approaching Whitehead's philosophy of organism 
is to lose oneself in the minutiae of the definitions and categories and principles which he 
develops in the first section of his most influential and systematic work. Process and 
Reality. In his speculative enterprise, Whitehead attempts to provide as much detail as 
possible. He adapts a wealth of common, if perhaps underused terms (e.g. “prehension”, 
“concrescence”), gleaning from them new importance of a particularly philosophical sort, 
and adapts more familiar ones (e.g. “actuality”, “entity”). This makes it easy to get lost. 
Paradoxically, without close attention to the details of those definitions and categories 
and principles it is difficult to see the relationships upon which Whitehead's entire 
philosophical construct is based. As I develop these conceptions I will strive to show 
their interrelatedness and I will include examples to provide as much clarity as possible
Among Whitehead's less complex concepts is that of ‘actuality', which he uses in 
much the same way Aristotle did “ 'Actuality' means nothing more than (the) ultimate 
entry into the concrete, in abstraction from which there is mere nonentity.” ’^* Thus, 
actuality' can be seen as contrasted with potentiality' For Whitehead, the concept 
universe denotes an infinitude of entities, o f which there are two fundamental types, 
eternal objects and actual entities which will be discussed a bit later. He makes a further
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logical distinction between the ‘universe disjunctively’ and the ‘universe conjunctively’. 
The ‘universe disjunctively’ is all of the entities discrete from one another The ‘universe 
disjunctively’ can be represented logically as the set of all entities such that each is 
independent of each; that is, a set in which no element is causally related to any other and 
of which every possible contemporary entity is a member By contrast, the ‘universe 
conjunctively’ refers to the real unity of those actual entities The distinction Whitehead 
makes here is between the unified supeiject - an actual occasion - and the several entities 
which comprise it and which can be analyzed separately He writes, “An actual occasion 
is a novel entity diverse from any entity in the ‘many’ which it unifies” ^^  ^ The ‘universe 
disjunctively’ emphasizes the diverse many’ while the universe conjunctively’ picks out 
the entity itself This distinction carries more than mere difference in emphasis, however. 
The ‘universe conjunctively’ is a novel entity. That is, it is a new entity, different from 
each of several entities that comprise it. Further, this novel entity is not identical to the 
sum of those entities or any combination of subsets o f those entities This is simply to 
say that the universe conjunctively’ is not reducible to the universe disjunctively’. 
Within the universe conjunctively’ we find all o f the complex entities that are 
constituted by being related to simpler elements within the universe while remaining 
independent of others. For example, a rock is constituted of certain entities, a plant is 
constituted o f others, and a dog is constituted o f still others
Whitehead goes to great lengths to explain how the universe disjunctively’ gives 
rise to discrete conjunctions of entities. ""^Omcrescence^ is the name for the process in
Whitehead, Process and Reality. 21.
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which the universe of many things acquires an individual unity in a determinate 
relegation of each item of the ‘many’ to its subordination in the constitution of the novel 
‘one’.”^^ More simply, concrescence’ means becoming concrete, or a coming together 
of the many discrete entities that comprise the new complex one It is the actual joining 
of simple and complex entities to form more complex entities. “An instance of 
concrescence is termed an actual entity’”^"'
The concept of * becoming' applies only to actual entities that are one of the eight 
types of existence that constitute the universe disjunctively and the universe 
conjunctively. In the ""becoming of an actual entity, the potential unity of many entities 
in disjunctive diversity acquires the real unity of the one actual entity The actual entity 
is the real concrescence of many potentials ‘Becoming’ refers to the “transformation 
of incoherence into coherence. That is, at each instant the discrete entities which 
comprise a thing come together and in doing so they provide a coherent unity which is 
possessed by none of the discrete entities alone. This is perhaps clearer in analogy. A 
molecule of salt is comprised of two atoms. Sodium and Chlorine In turn, these are 
comprised of electrons, neutrons and chemical bonds along with many other subatomic 
particles. But none of the constituent parts can be identified with the whole. Looking 
only at an electron, without knowing the context of relationships within which it exists, 
one cannot even tell if it belongs to the Chlorine atom or the Sodium atom. Thus, one
ibid
ibid.
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surely cannot extrapolate to a total picture of the atom containing the electron, much less 
the molecule containing the atom, simply from the examination of the extracted electron 
In the moment of the coming together o f all the constituents, the molecule of salt 
possesses a coherent unity that cannot be attributed to any of its constituent parts
Whitehead's conception also differs radically from a conception of stasis' or 
‘static unity' because the discrete entities which comprise the complex entity over time 
do not remain f i x e d I n  each successive concrescence some heretofore unincorporated 
entities are conjoined while some incorporated entities are excluded This understanding 
grasps the Heraclitean intuition about the changing river. From moment to moment the 
river becomes a new thing, a novel entity. It is no longer the same river even from the 
moment the big toe enters it until the heel enters. With each successive moment, each 
successive concrescence, the river has become a new river, while retaining its coherent 
unity.
For Whitehead, there are two fundamental types of entity, actual entities and 
eternal objects. All simple and complex entities within the world are merely expressions 
of these two fundamental types of entity functioning together in the actual world. There 
is but one way to describe etemat objects-, as potentiality for ingression into the 
becoming of actual entities. Eternal objects are pure potential, and ingression' is the 
mode by which the potentiality of the eternal object is realized in a particular actual
^  Here, Whitehead stakes out the Heraclitean position against the rival Parmenidean 
construction. It seems to be the case that a metaphysical scheme based upon a static view 
of the world ignores the intuition of movement and flux within the world. Whitehead 
totally rejects the perspective of Parmenides and ail those who have followed who have 
posited shnilar static understandings of the world.
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entity. As such, the eternal object contributes definiteness to that actual entity Here 
Whitehead echoes Plato For Whitehead, the Platonic world of Forms constitutes 
something like the eternal objects. There is one veiy important difference, however. On 
Whitehead’s account, actual entities have ontological priority with respect to eternal 
objects.*^' Eternal objects, in contrast to actual entities, are not in process themselves but 
are incorporated into the actual entities of the temporal world. It is in the discussion of 
the types of entities, then, that the distinction between actuality and potentiality becomes 
more clear As Cobb and Griffin have argued, “Anything which is not a process is an 
abstraction from process, not a full-fledged a c t u a l i t y E t e r n a l  objects are the prime 
examples of those abstractions.
An actual entity and concrescence are defined in terms of one another. An actual
This is one place where the careful reader can recognize that Whitehead has a greater 
affinity for Aristotle than Plato. Simply put, actual entities are more real than eternal 
objects because actual entities are actual as opposed to potential. The similarity with 
Plato is Whitehead’s assertion that, “any entity whose conceptual recognition does not 
involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the actual world is called 
an eternal obiect.” Process and Realitv. 44. Forms are rejected as ultimate, however, 
because they are not agents. That is, they do not do anything. In a related matter, 
Whitehead argues that there is no such thing as “vacuous actuality”; one case of which 
would be an eternal object with no referent to an actual entity in the actual world. Thus, 
for Whitehead, there are no Empty Forms.
^  Whitehead divides Eternal Objects into two classes; objective and subjective. By 
“subjective”, Whitehead means forms of feeling. For example, “an emotion, or an 
intensity, or an adversion, or an aversion, or a pleasure, or a pain.” (Process and Reality. 
291 ) Whitehead goes on to write, “A, may be that component o f A s constitution through 
which A is objectified for B Thus when B feels A,, it feels ‘A with thca feeling.’” 
Suppose there are two actual entities, A and B. B prehends A in a particular way, fixing 
upon or feeling A, which is a component of A. So, in one sense. A, is a private element 
for B - B feels A by prehending its component A, - and as such exemplifies a subjective 
eternal object. However, A, is also an example of an objective eternal object. This is so 
because it is a part of A that serves as a lure for feeling for subjects like B. It does not 
itself prehend or grasp some component o f B; instead it is grasped by B.
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entity is the unity that is ascribed to a particular instance of concrescence.^** The 
concrescence is simply the “real internal constitution" of the actual occasion in 
q u e s t i o n . T h e  Heraclitean river at any instant is a nexus of actual entities, or actual 
occasions, and as such it is a particular instantiation of the coming together or 
concrescence of the discrete entities (drops of water, dissolved molecules of salt, etc.) 
that constitute it at that moment. These constitutive discrete entities are themselves 
complexes of still other entities and so on. The fundamental entity is an actual entity or 
occasion, beyond which no further explanation is possible This is simply to say, in the 
analysis of an organism, one will discover that it is a composite (though complexity 
varies). These actual entities can be analyzed further, revealing that each is a composite 
of prehensions, phases, eternal objects, etc.*^° However, qua actual thing, there is nothing 
more basic than the simplest actual entities by which those entities can be explained. 
Simply put, no further analysis is possible. Whitehead says two very compelling things 
about these actual entities that are quite revealing about his speculative philosophy in 
general. First, he claims that the “ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism About the 
final, simple actual entities which he takes to be these ultimate atoms, he writes, the 
“Category of the Ultimate [of which actual entities are a part] replaces Aristotle’s 
category o f ‘primary substance’
Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology. 14.
Whitehead also uses the terms actual entity’ and ‘actual occasion’ interchangeably for 
the most part
Whitehead, Process and Realitv. 212.
Recall, these components of actual entities are not themselves actual, 
ibid., 35.
m ibid., 31.
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Actual entities can be simple or complex. For Whitehead, hm- an actual entity
becomes constitutes what that actual entity is That is. as the actual entities are conjoined
from moment to moment, the simple actual entities form more and more complex ones
until the drops of experience form Heraclitus' river, which is itself a society of actual
entities. When one conducts an analysis of a complex society, it is this coming together
or concrescence of constituent actual entities that one discovers.
A key concept in Whitehead’s scheme is that of a “society”. “Society” refers to a
group o f actual entities. However, it does not refer to simply any group, but rather a very
particular sort. Any group of actual entities is a “nexus”, where “nexus” has its common
meaning. A society is a particular sort of nexus of actual entities; it is a nexus with
social order Whitehead writes,
A nexus enjoys “social order” where (i) there is a common element of form 
illustrated by the definiteness of each of its included actual entities, and (ii) this 
common element of form arises in each member of the nexus by reason of the 
conditions imposed upon it by its prehensions of some other members o f the 
nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose that condition of reproduction by reason 
of their inclusion of positive feelings of that common form. Such a nexus is 
called a “society,” and the common form is the “defining characteristic” o f the 
society. The notion of “defining characteristic” is allied to the Aristotelian notion 
of “substantial form”.
Whitehead’s view may be more accessible by way of examples that emphasize the 
different aspects of this society. Consider a set of atomic particles. A hydrogen atom is 
comprised of tremendous numbers of subatomic particles, but we will limit this 
discussion to three -  the proton, neutron, and electron. When in proper relation these 
three subatomic particles comprise an atom of hydrogen. The relationships between the 
three particles are o f considerable importance. If the three particles are outside o f the
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magnetic fields generated by each, then there is no atom of hydrogen. Only when the 
neutron and proton are part of a nucleus around which the electron revolves can we 
properly call the three particles an atom of hydrogen. The three particles are analogous to 
actual entities and the atom of hydrogen to a society.
Consider a second example, if we have two atoms of hydrogen and a single atom 
of oxygen, we do not have water, necessarily. The three atoms could be separated from 
each other such that they cannot bind together to form a molecule o f water. When the 
three atoms are brought together, a molecule of water is formed. However, it is more 
complicated that this. When the three atoms form a molecule of water, it is impossible to 
say which electron belongs to which atom. In fact, the three atoms share the electrons 
equally, for the most part, and the electrons orbit the three nuclei in a pattern referred to 
as an electron cloud. The three atoms are analogous to actual entities and the molecule of 
water to a society.
These examples suggest how societies satisfy Whitehead’s criteria. In the first 
place, there is a common element o f form. To say that the subatomic particles of the first 
example and the atoms of the second are definite is to say that they are actual and not 
theoretical. The same is true for actual entities. Further, a society is determined, in one 
sense, by the elements that comprise it. That is, it is constituted by these elements and no 
others. Thus, those constitutive elements share a common form. In the second place, the 
form of the society is established by the constituent members of the nexus. That is, a 
proton, neutron, and electron prehend one another in particular, determined ways. The 
electron cannot fulfill the role o f the proton and vice versa. The characteristics of the
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several subatomic particles and the relations between them are the conditions from which 
the form of the society arises. In the third place, the elements of the atom impose a 
structure on the atom’s successor in time. That is, without intervention by some other 
society (another atom, say), the atom of hydrogen will reproduce itself in the next 
moment as an atom of hydrogen. In other words, the atom of hydrogen will not, in the 
next moment, become a covey of quail .
Whitehead concludes his set of criteria by writing of the set that “the common 
form is the ‘defining characteristic’ of the society The notion of defining characteristic’ 
is allied to the Aristotelian notion of ‘substantial form So, the “common form ” is an 
analogue of Aristotle’s “Formal Cause ” Consider the following example. Suppose we
It should be evident from this discussion that Whitehead’s notion of personal identity 
is rather similar to that of Derek Parfit. On Whitehead’s view, a person, for example, is a 
serially order society o f actual entities. That is, the actual entities that comprise Harold in 
one moment perish and give rise to the actual entities that comprise Harold in the next. 
There is no strict identity over time, whether that time be a second or a lifetime What 
determines personal identity over time is the positive prehensions of the actual entities 
that comprise the person. When the actual entities that comprise Harold perish, they 
become objective data for prehension by the actual entities that comprise Harold in the 
next moment. When those perish, they provide the data for prehension by the actual 
entities that comprise Harold at the next moment, and so on. Here is another way to look 
at this view. Harold, the person over time, is comprised of several harolds -  each harold 
conceived of as a person-slice or person-stage. For more on theories of person-slices and 
person-stages, see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons. Oxford 1986; Bernard Williams, 
“The Self and the Future,” Philosophical Review 79 (1970) and reprinted in Personal 
Identitv. John Perry, University of California, 1975. On Whitehead’s view, harold(l) is a 
society of actual entities that perishes and harold(2) is the successor of harold(l) with the 
actual entities that comprised harold(l) as the objects of prehension by the actual entities 
of harold(2) The person, Harold, is a serially ordered set o f harolds. Whitehead writes, 
“An animal body is a society involving a vast number of occasions, spatially and 
temporally co-ordinated. ... Each living body is a society. ...” Adventures of Ideas. 256f. 
For further discussion o f this notion, see Chapter XUl “The Grouping of Occasions” in 
Adventures of Ideas.
Whitehead, Process and Realitv, 34.
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have a dog. Bandit. Bandit is a particular dog and no other, and as such is a primary 
substance on Aristotle’s view and an ordinary object comprised of actual entities on 
Whitehead’s. As a primary substance. Bandit has a particular substantial form; namely 
Dog. That substantial form is metaphysically dependent on the primary substance As an 
ordinary object. Bandit is actually a series of societies, 'spatially and temporally co­
ordinated” That is. Bandit is a series of bandit-stages or bandit-slices. Each of those 
individual stages is a particular society in the life of Bandit and is comprised of actual 
entities. The actual entities and their prehensions in any particular society give rise to the 
order of that society (or, in this case, bandit-slice). The actual entities have ontological 
priority here and the society is roughly equivalent to the substantial form; namely Dog. 
However, just as Dog does not pick out any particular dog for Aristotle, neither does Dog 
pick out any particular dog for Whitehead. Further, “Bandit” picks out only a serially 
ordered set of societies, and no particular constitutive actual entity.
Whitehead argues that analysis of actual entities finally depends on analysis of 
prehensions. T h e  concept of a “prehension ” is one of Whitehead’s most important 
metaphysical tools. It is certainly one of his most fundamental, and fundamentally 
misunderstood. Much of the misunderstanding can be traced to the concept's 
complexity.^’® In this section, I will outline the formal concept of “prehension ” before
ibid., 23.
Unfortunately, some can also be attributed to Whitehead's use of the term which can 
be misleading. This is not to say that Whitehead uses the term inconsistently. Instead, 
sometimes he refers to the entirety of the tripartite relationship between subject, object, 
and feeling between them as a prehension relation and at others he labels the subject a 
“prehending subject”, the object a “prehended object”, and so on Care must be taken to 
remember that the tripartite relationship is presupposed when he uses the shorter forms.
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turning to two uses that begin to show the ways that the formal prehension relation is 
provided content.
Whitehead uses the word “prehension” to capture the dynamic tripartite 
relationship between a given subject and the object the subject experiences. The 
prehension consists in three parts - the experiencing subject, the datum experienced, and 
the manner of the experience (which Whitehead calls the “subjective form”). Consider 
the following analogy; Wile E. Coyote, an Acme anvil, and the anvil falling upon his 
head. Wile E. Coyote is the experiencing subject and the Acme anvil is datum to be 
experienced The manner of the experience, or the “how experienced”, is fairly complex 
and expresses a particular sort of character or feel. Even with this fanciful example, the 
“how experienced” part of the relation is too complex for simple or immediate 
explication However, a few aspects of the “how experienced” can be illustrated and that 
should suffice for our purposes of coming to have a feel for this particular concept In the 
Wile E. Coyote and the Acme anvil example. Wile E. experiences dread, the awful 
knowledge of impending doom, the certainty that the experience of the datum of this 
prehension is going to leave a mark. Beyond the emotional tenor of the experience, there 
is the physical counterpoint - in this case, pain. These are but a few of the aspects that go 
to comprise the character o f the experience. Many others could be imagined. However, 
it should be noticed that 1 have not mentioned the emotional or physical feelings that 
might be experienced by the anvil. This is not because I, or Whitehead, assume that the 
anvil does not have experiences. Rather, there are two interconnected reasons. The first 
is that the “how experienced” of the prehension is the “how experienced” for the
2S1
subject. Accordingly, the emotional and/or physical feelings of the anvil (the “how” for 
the anvil), should any exist, do not enter into the formal structure of this prehension 
(unless they enter in an attenuated form, e.g., the subject. Wile E. Coyote, in his 
experience of the anvil, imagines how the anvil might be feeling at the moment.) The 
second is connected to the first. As an object of the prehension, the anvil exists in the 
causal past of Wile E. and so is not properly a subject of this prehension relation, because 
it has ceased to be a subject at all. Also, I have not mentioned the Roadrunner who 
certainly had a role to play in this little saga. This is because the only reason Wile E. 
Coyote is experiencing the anvil in this way is that he had plans to use it on the 
Roadrunner and was outwitted again. However, this is again at least two removes from 
the “how experienced” felt by the Coyote and would only enter into the experience as 
regret on the part of Wile E. that yet another plan has gone awry In short, then, a 
prehension has three parts - the subject who experiences, the datum that is experienced, 
and the manner in which the subject experiences the datum.
Whitehead, and his disciples, apologists, and detractors, ofien use the following 
shorthand to express the prehension of the earlier example: “Wile E. Coyote prehended 
the anvil.” They will say also that the Coyote is the “prehending subject” and the anvil 
the “prehended object”. This is a cause of much of the misunderstanding o f the concept 
“Prehension” covers the entirety o f the relationship in all its splendor. However, if one 
selects the actual entity that is to be the subject, one is picking a particular prehension 
relation. For example, when we selected Wile E Coyote to be the subject, we 
immediately selected that prehension where Wile E. is the subject and the anvil, the
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object. The tenor of the “how experienced” was also selected because it is the “how 
experienced” for the subject. Had we chosen the anvil as the subject and Wile E Coyote 
as the object (a perfectly reasonable possibility on WTiitehead’s view), we would have 
selected a different prehension. So, in the example used to demonstrate the formal 
character of a prehension, along with rudimentary content supplied by actually filling in 
the relata of the relation, there are actually two particular prehensions. The formal 
character is simply (a) subject, (b) object, and (c) “how experienced”. The two individual 
and independent prehensions car be analyzed as follows: (Prehending Subject) Wile E 
Coyote, (Prehended Object) the anvil, and (Positive Prehension) “how experienced” for 
Wile E. Coyote and (Prehending Subject) anvil, (Prehended Object) the Coyote, and 
(Positive Prehension) “how experienced” for the anvil. Thus, it is of some importance to 
use care when discussing the concept of a “prehension”
Another reason for the difficulty with the concept of a “prehension” is that 
Whitehead uses the much more commonplace word “feeling” interchangeably with one 
sort of prehension - positive prehensions. It is helpful to remember that when Whitehead 
uses the term “feeling” he is almost never restricting himself to the more ordinary use of 
the word to refer to emotions (anger, love, etc.) or sense impressions (pain, pleasure, etc ) 
These are included in his use, to be sure, but “feeling” is not restricted to these. Rather, 
Whitehead follows Friedrich Schleiermacher, to name one, in using “feeling” to express a 
much wider range of experience than simply emotional or physical Included in that
There is an important distinction between Schleiermacher and Whitehead on this 
topic. For Schleiermacher, feelings are almost always conscious, though they need not 
always be. For example, one can have a feel for a subject and this feel not be represented
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range of expression is the notion of “feeling” captured in the following sentence; “That 
chef certainly has a feel for the kitchen.” Or, another example: an excellent mechanic is 
said to have a feel for automotive maintenance or an artist may be said to have a feel for 
conveying the angst of life. In both cases, each could be said to have a strong emotional 
attachment to their subjects, but that attachment is not necessary to have a feel for the 
subject. To sum up, Whitehead uses “prehension” and “feeling” interchangeably for the 
most part and “prehension” formally refers to the entire dynamic of a relationship 
between an experiencing subject, and object experienced, and the manner in which the 
subject experiences the object.
Whitehead divides prehensions into three classes - physical, conceptual, and 
prepositional. I will deal with the former two in this section and the latter in the section 
on Whitehead’s Theory of Truth that follows. I should begin by noting that the 
experiencing subject in any prehension relation is always an actual entity. This is just to 
say that neither eternal objects nor propositions can be experiencing subjects. Indeed, the 
only part of the fonnal structure that either eternal objects or propositions can occupy is 
as a datum of experience or the object experienced. Similarly, actual entities can also 
occupy this part of the formal structure. When an actual entity is the datum of 
experience, Whitehead terms the prehension relation that results a “physical prehension” .
by an occurrent belief. However, his primary example of a feeling is the feeling of 
absolute dependence upon God, a most definitely conscious experience. Indeed, 
conscious awareness is a necessary condition of the feeling of absolute dependence. For 
a more elaborate treatment o f this, see Gene Tucker’s Canon. Theology, and Old 
Testament Interpretation. Fortress Press and Keith Clements’ Friedrich Schleiermacher: 
Pioneer of Modem Theology. Fortress Press, 1997. For Whitehead, feelings need not be 
conscious, and most often are not.
254
One example of a fairly simply physical prehension is that of the smelling of a particular
odor. In Whitehead’s example, one is encouraged to imagine oneself in a green
woodland in spring. Perhaps one then catches a whiff of some noxious odor or another
(e.g., that famous cartoon skunk, Pepe Le Peu). At that moment, the
intellect fastens on [the] smell as a datum ... Our developed consciousness fastens 
on the sensum as datum; our basic animal experience entertains it as a type of 
subjective feeling. The experience starts as that smelly feeling, and is developed 
by mentality into the feeling of that smell
The experience of the smelly feeling is one that is not captured completely by any
elaborate retelling of the event, and the experience of a skunk is rarely dismissed lightly
It has affective power on the one who experiences the skunk firsthand. .\nd if one has
truly encountered a skunk, then it is clear that th a t smelly feeling” is accompanied by
activation of tastebuds, watering of eyes, churning of stomach; and as such is
significantly more than “just a smell”
In a not completely dissimilar way, the “how experienced” aspect of a prehension
where the subject and object are both actual entities may be characterized as love, for
exampl e . Pr esumabl y ,  as Romeo stood beneath the balcony gazing up at Juliet's
Whitehead, Adventures o f Ideas. 245.
Some clarification is needed here. On Whitehead’s view, the prehended object is not 
an actual entity fo r the prehending subject. That is, the prehended object is dead fo r  the 
prehending subject because it is in the past o f  the prehending subject; albeit perhaps in 
the very recent past -  say a half second or so. Romeo (the subject) prehends the Juliet of 
his past. As he stands at the windowsill, it is not the Juliet contemporaneous with him 
who utters “Wherefore art thou” but the Juliet of his immediate past Thus, that past 
Juliet (dead in the sense of being completely objectified) is incorporated into the subject 
Romeo or is actualized in the subject Romeo As Whitehead writes, the process of 
actualization is the “appropriation of the dead by the living.” (Process and Realitv. xiii.) 
This is not to say that Juliet, herself, is merely object. For Juliet qua prehending subject, 
Romeo is an object o f her immediate past and is incorporated into her self-actualization
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window, he did not imagine it to be the East and Juliet the Sun. However, it was a 
physical (and in this case, quite emotional) prehension. Again, that emotion need not be 
reciprocated, any more than the anvil need reciprocate the feeling of impending doom 
experienced by Wile E. Coyote. Juliet need not love Romeo for him to experience the 
emotion. So, in every case where one actual entity experiences another, the relationship 
is termed a “physical prehension” . As a result of this definition of a “physical 
prehension”, the commonplace uses of feeling (e.g., emotional or sensual) are grouped 
into the same category of prehension relation. This grouping, too, can cause the reader of 
Whitehead to misunderstand his use of “prehension” and “feeling”
A “conceptual prehension” is different. It is generally less complex than a 
physical prehension. This is the case for a number of reasons, the most fundamental of 
which is that the “object experienced” is an eternal object and not an actual entity. As a 
result, the experiencing subject has an experience that has somewhat less intensity than 
with a physical prehension. Whitehead describes the conceptual feeling this way; “From 
each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum 
is the eternal object determinant o f the definiteness o f the actual entity ... physically 
felt.” "^° Consider the following illustration. Suppose one encounters a basketball. 
Holding the ball, one experiences a physical feeling - that of holding a basketball. From 
the physical experience, a conceptual experience is derived. An idea of “ball” arises from 
the experience o f the ball. The eternal object is something like the concept “ball” .
as a datum.
Whitehead, Process and Reality. 26.
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Since a conceptual prehension has an eternal object as the “object experienced" 
relatunu it should be fairly obvious why the “how experienced” is somewhat more diffuse 
than in the case of the physical prehension In the physical prehension, the object relatum 
is an actual entity and as such is a fully determined particular In the conceptual 
prehension, the object relatum is an eternal object that may apply more or less to a wide 
range of particulars than can properly be picked out by the concept One of Whitehead's 
own examples is the color Red. He writes, “an eternal object evades any selection among 
actualities You cannot know what is red by merely thinking of redness You can only 
And red things by adventuring amid physical experiences in this actual world.”^*' His 
point here is that epistemologically, conceptual prehensions depend upon antecedent 
physical prehensions and that from physical prehensions arise concepts, especially those 
concepts that pick out characteristics shared by several actual entities, e.g., the color red. 
Those generalized concepts, or eternal objects, then can themselves be experienced by the 
experiencing subject in a prehension. This happens, for example, when I think about 
redness. From such a thought alone, I would not know what, if anything, in the world 
was red. The concept follows from and arises from the physical prehension, not vice 
versa. In this conceptual prehension (me thinking about the color red), the object 
experienced is at least one remove from this actual world. As such, it lacks some of the 
definiteness that characterizes actual entities; or in Humean terms, is apt to lack the force 
and vivacity of the experience of a physical prehension. Note too, that having come to 
have a concept of redness, 1 can now imaginatively attach that concept to others. For
Whitehead, Process and Realitv. 256. Emphasis his.
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example, 1 can imaginatively adjoin red and elephant; or white, tall, suit-coated, rabbit, 
and gold-watch with a chain to imagine the “dreadfully late” rabbit of Alice in 
Wonderland. Should I at some point in the future have occasion to experience such a 
beast as an actual entity, so much the better for my imaginative powers. But, even in 
such a case, the prehension relation will be different from the one where 1 experienced 
concepts and joined them together imaginatively. If I experienced an actual rabbit, it 
would be a physical prehension and significantly more definite than even Lewis Carroll's 
most experienced imagination could posit. Such is the difference between a physical 
prehension and a conceptual prehension in Whitehead's scheme.
Before moving on, it might be helpful to discuss briefly the concept of an 
individual' In common philosophical parlance, a person or an individual is understood 
to be an entity which endures through time. Obviously this is not an uncontroversial 
notion. It is certainly not Whitehead's conception of an individual. In Whitehead's view, 
an individual is a momentary experience or concrescence. That is, if one were to be able 
to take a snapshot of the river or a human being at a single instant in time, the snapshot 
would depict an individual. This is crude and somewhat artificial. The snapshot conveys 
a stasis, not a process, and so is inaccurate in a fairly fundamental way. However, it does 
serve to distinguish the Whiteheadian view from some of the more popular notions of an 
individual. From this, it is then easy to se that the referent o f the traditional concept o f an 
‘individual' as a being that exists through time comes to be understood in the 
Whiteheadian sense as a society of individuals.^^^ Or as Cobb and Griffin put it.
2S3 A couple o f notable thinkers have views that bear a family resemblance to
258
“personal human existence is serially ordered society of such” individuals.^*  ^ Put another 
way, for Whitehead, individual existence is defined in the particular moment and what is 
traditionally defined as an individual is a connected, linear series of these moments
4. ^Mathematics and the Good": Whitehead and the Dualism of 
Practical Reason, Part Two 
It will be recalled from a foregoing discussion [“Whitehead and the Dualism of 
Practical Reason - Part One”] that I suggested that Whitehead and Green have a similar 
position regarding the Good. Their position has the benefit of rendering the Dualism of 
Practical Reason impotent Green does not defend his view so much as simply assert it 
It was left to Irwin to show why Green’s view can be defended on the Aristotelian 
grounds that Green simply assumes support his view. Whitehead, happily, does not wait 
for later philosophers to demonstrate that his conception of the Good can be defended; he 
does it himself. However, unlike Green (with help from Irwin), Whitehead does not look 
to Aristotle for support. Rather, he uses the work of Plato to launch his own defense of 
his conception of the Good. In this section of the project, I turn my attention to 
Whitehead’s paper, “Mathematics and the Good,” to show two things. (1) that Whitehead 
argues for a conception of the Good that involves, necessarily, concern for others, (2) as a 
result of (1), Whitehead, like Green, defangs the Dualism o f Practical Reason.
Whitehead’s view here Quine, for example, holds that physical objects have temporal 
parts (or stages) and are, accordingly, like events in an important way. Similarly, Derek 
Parfit views the “self’ insofar as such a thing exists, to be a connected scries o f events. 
Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology. 15.
259
The gist of the paper is that there exists an analogous relationship between the 
study of mathematics (and its object) and the study of the Good (and its object) That 
analog) can be framed as follows, with the particular discipline o f Geometry representing 
the various disciplines of mathematics:
Analogy 1
Geometry Triangles and Spatial Theory
Philosophy (Ethics) The Good
The reason for the double object as one of the relata in the Analogy I illustrates a further 
Whiteheadian point. At first glance, the analogy looks likely to fail because this double 
object in the first pair of relata seems to differ, at least in number, from its counterpart in 
the second pair However, as we shall see, Whitehead supposes that the object of study 
in the second pair of relata is also a double object. Though he is not explicit that the 
analogy itself can be framed as follows, 1 think it is his view So, we have a new 
analogy. Or, more properly, we have a new expression of Analogy 1 in which the 
relatum designated by “the Good" is expanded into its constituent parts. Thus, we have 
Analogy 2.
Analogy 2
Geometry Triangles and Spatial Theory
Philosophy (Ethics) Individual Good and the
General Good
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It is important to note that Whitehead is arguing for this analogy rather than 
assuming the analogous relationship to show something further. Thus. Whitehead does 
not beg the question against Sidgwick on this point If Whitehead is capable of showing 
that the analogy holds and if his argument also satisfies the Plausibility and Believability 
principles that Sidgwick establishes as benchmarks, then we will be able to conclude that 
the Dualism of Practical Reason is overcome.
Whitehead casts the argument in the context of a discussion of historical 
philosophical and scientific developments. In a number of places within the dialogues. 
Plato makes connections between a conception of the Good and Mathematics. For 
example, in the Meno we encounter the connection between mathematics and the 
Good.^^^ In an argument whose conclusions are hotly debated by scholars of ancient 
philosophy, there is one point of consensus; namely that the use of geometry to guide the 
slaveboy to “recollect” what he did not know at the outset of the elenchus is of central 
importance as a tool, analogous to the process by which one might come to “recollect” 
the virtues Plato also makes the connection quite famously in the Republic where he 
outlines the course of study of those who will be the philosopher-rulers of the city To 
attain the lofty station of philosopher and possess wisdom they must first study 
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and harmony. The connection comes up again in the 
discussion of the Divided Line. Notoriously, Plato leaves the reader to puzzle out what 
precisely the objects of the penultimate section of the example are supposed to be."^
And in the Meno we encounter the connection in much the same way that Whitehead 
himself uses it.
Among others, see Julia Annas' Introduction to Plato’s Republic for a nice discussion
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Aristotle claims that the object o f this section of the Line are “mathematicals”; though it 
is not completely clear what these are supposed to be. At any rate, mathematics and 
virtue are intimately connected on Plato's view. Whitehead claims that Plato is exactly 
right in this regard, though later philosophers have not always been quick to pick up the 
importance of the connection.
Whitehead illustrates this connection by examining the way in which a child 
learns geometry. After mastering some arithmetic (addition, subtraction, multiplication, 
division, simple fractions, decimal notation, and so on), the child is introduced to 
geometry. In due course she encounters a right-triangle and her instructor provides a 
proof of the Pythagorean Theorem. One way of demonstrating the truth of the 
Pythagorean Theorem is to draw a right-triangle and then from each of the sides, 
construct a square that has dimensions defined by the side of the triangle from which it 
originates. The figure below illustrates this:
of the Line and this “omission”. Also, J. T. Bedo-Addo, “A Theory of Mental 
Development: Plato's Republic V-VTT’, Platon 28 (1976), “Mathematics, Dialectic, and 
the Good in the Republic VI-VIF’, Platon 30 (1978), and “Dianoia and the Images o f
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However, before the demonstration is given and the squares are added to the 
figure, the child can easily note that the triangle itself forms a definite pattern. But this 
pattern of lines and angles “does not disclose its various intricacies to immediate 
consciousness" This is quite clearly the case. Further, Whitehead is right in claiming 
that 'Ihe child knew what his teacher was talking about, namely, the right-angled triangle 
quite evidently suggested on the board by the thick chalk lines. And yet the child did not 
know the infinitude of properties which were implicitly involved.” What the child 
perceives are lines, angles, points, etc However, none of these particular notions has any 
meaning “apart from the reference to all-enveloping space” Again, this is 
uncontroversial.
What is controversial, however, is the conclusion that Whitehead then draws 
about the practice of philosophy, especially as it relates to analysis. While one does not 
see all of the intricacies of the figure when it is first presented, one can rather quickly 
begin to analyze its individual parts. One can manipulate the line segments (a, b, and c), 
lining them beside each other to note the difference in length One can isolate particular 
angles and examine their differences. However, the analysis of the individual parts is not 
an analysis of the triangle itself. The right-triangle exemplifies a particular set of 
relationships that each of the points, lines, and angles bears to each other. Abstracting 
from any particular one of these to a general statement about the triangle is an exhibition 
of folly. And a discussion of the triangle apart from the spatial system to which it refers
Forms in P]axo’s Republic VI-VIT’, Platon 3 \ (1979).
Whitehead, “Mathematics and the Good”, The Philosophy o f Alfred North Whitehead. 
Library of Living Philosophers Collection, Paul Arthur Schilpp, e d , (New York; Tudor
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is likewise problematic. Whitehead calls it "meaningless" While this may be a bit 
extreme, it surely has merit. This is because the Pythagorean Theorem with its reference 
to Euclidean Space is a "glorious mistake” if one supposes that it can be universalized 
across all geometries.** The Pythagorean Theorem refers to a particular understanding 
o f spatial dimensions. Riemannian Geometry refers to a different one; Lobachevskian 
Geometry still another. And the background spatial theory is inseparable, in principle, 
from the data under study in the discipline. The particulars are inseparable from the 
generalities to which they refer
In hindsight, mathematicians recognize the progression. Whitehead calls this the 
“Now we know” reaction. Now we know that the Pythagorean Theorem, for example, is 
not truly independent of background conditions.^** If one is working in non-Euclidean 
space, the Theorem is likely false. However, in the time of Plato (or for that matter, 
Descartes, Hume and Kant), the Theorem (and Euclidean Geometry more generally) was 
taken to be absolute Of this sort of attitude, Whitehead writes "The notion of the 
complete self-sufhciency of any item of finite knowledge is the fundamental error of
Publishing Company, 1951), 668.
Whitehead labels it a glorious mistake because Euclidean Geometry provides a very 
simple and largely practical way of examining the world and making scientific 
predictions based on rather elementary calculations. However, as science advanced in the 
latter part of the 18* and 19^ centuries, the error contained in the simplicity begins to 
cause difficulties for the advance of science. Whitehead writes that “Luckily the 
mathematicians - at least some o f them - had got ahead of the sober thoughts of sensible 
men of science, and had invented all sorts o f fantastic variations from orthodox 
geometry.” These inventions were critical to the continued advance of scientific 
discovery.
In fret, it is likely meaningless.
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dogmatism. Every such item derives its truth and its very meaning from its unanalyzed 
relevance to the background which is the unbounded universe "
Here, then, we can see the beginning of Whitehead’s strategy He goes on to
write
not even the simplest notion of arithmetic escapes this inescapable condition for 
existence. Every scrap of our knowledge derives its meaning from the fact that 
we are factors in the universe, and are dependent on the universe for every detail 
of our experience.**®
If not even the simplest notion of arithmetic is immune to essential relatedness, why 
ought one suppose that a human being, considerably more complex, is immune"’ Recall 
Broad’s imagined Ethical Egoist, who responds to the suggestion that from the 
perspective of the Universe the Principle of Equality holds, by stating quite rightly that he 
is not the Universe. While Broad’s Ethical Egoist might rightfully assert that as one who 
is not the Universe he need not take the perspective of it, Whitehead here points out that 
he cannot coherently deny his connection to the rest of the Universe, nor that his own 
existence is completely dependent on others. So, contrary to Sidgwick, Whitehead has 
demonstrated that it is plausible to suppose that an agent must take into account the 
generality of which he is a part.
There are two important things of note here. The first is that one might subscribe 
to a Sidgwickian style Universal Hedonism and still maintain this conclusion about 
essential relatedness. The second is that one might subscribe to a sort o f self-interest 
theory that is clearly involved with Ethical Egoism and still maintain this conclusion 
about essential relatedness. The former case is clear and has been discussed in the course
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of the explication of Sidgwick's positive argument in favor of Universal Hedonism so 1 
will not dwell on it here The latter bears some further discussion
Suppose 1 am motivated by pureself-interest. Suppose that, like Broad's imagined 
Ethical Egoist, 1 claim that I am not the Universe and therefore need not take the 
perspective of the Universe and apply the Principle of Equity in my dealings with others. 
These two suppositions, it seems, come rather quickly into conflict. Given that 1 am 
ontologically connected with every other actual entity in the Universe, my actions will 
have repercussions beyond myself. True, the more distant the entity to which 1 am 
related, the less influence my actions have on it and its actions on me. For example, my 
typing at a keyboard in my study has little influence on political debate within Indonesia, 
not does that debate have much influence, necessarily, on my typing at a keyboard 
However, actions very near to me may have quite immediate consequences. So, it begins 
to look as if it is in my self-interest to apply the Principle o f Equity in my dealings with 
others because my actions affect them. Further, because I am connected to them, my 
actions necessarily affect me (though perhaps in a diffuse fashion). Thus, by appeal to a 
metaphysical doctrine of essential relatedness with help from examples from Plato and 
mathematics, Whitehead has shown Green's G3 - "The full realization of one person's 
capacities requires him to will the good of other people for their own sake " - to be the 
case.
As noted above, if G3 is so (along with G2 and G1 ), then the Dualism o f Practical 
Reason is overcome rather quickly. However, Whitehead does violate one of Sidgwick's
289 ibid., 670.
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cardinal rules in this demonstration. He mixes metaphysical, epistemological, and 
historical investigations and principles with normative principles. This clearly violates 
Sidgwick’s doctrine o f compartmentalization. And this violation brings our discussion to 
the next section.
5. Relation between Metaphysics and Ethics
As we have already seen, Sidgwick (and his disciple G. E. Moore) constructs rigid 
firewalls between the several branches of philosophy, and especially between 
metaphysics and ethics. Whitehead does not. One of the areas o f Whitehead’s 
philosophy where this is clearest is his discussion of propositions. 1 must note that 1 will 
discuss the status of propositions in Whitehead’s speculative scheme in general and in his 
Theory of Truth in particular in the Theory of Truth section that follows. Suffice it to say 
here that moral principles o f the sort Sidgwick takes to be "really self-evident” would 
count as propositions on Whitehead’s view as well. The statement "2 + 2 = 4” and the 
statement of Principle of E q u i t y , a r e  both propositions, though with perhaps different 
truth-values and expressive of different truth-relations.
On Whitehead’s view, any proposition “refers to a universe exhibiting some 
general systematic metaphysical character. ... Thus every proposition proposing a fact 
must, in its complete analysis, propose the general character of the universe required for
Recall that Sidgwick’s Principle o f Equity is; “It cannot be right for A to treat B in a 
manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are 
two different individuals, and without there being any difference between the natures or 
circumstances o f the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of 
treatment.”
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that fact.” ’^ ‘ The meaning of this claim is quite straightforward. Suppose we take the 
proposition that “the sum of the squares o f the shorter legs of a right triangle is equal to 
the square of the longer side”. This proposition is true only if a certain general system of 
geometry is supposed; namely Euclidean Geometry. In Riemannian Geometry, the 
proposition is false. Thus, at least this proposition refers to the background conditions 
beyond itself though it does not explicitly specify in its formulation. Whitehead extends 
this relationship to all propositions. This seems reasonable. It would seem quite odd to 
suppose that some proposition referred only to itself and to nothing beyond itself. For 
Whitehead, every proposition involves the rest of the universe, either explicitly or 
implicitly. Whitehead’s stance is captured in the following: given some proposition, 
“What must the universe be like for that proposition to be true?”
Clearly, such an approach will apply to ethical theories as well. For example, 
suppose that the proposition is that Sidgwick’s Principle of Equity is true. That 
proposition is true only if the world/universe is a certain way. Now, presumably there 
could be a set o f worlds such that each provides the proper background for the 
proposition to be true. But this does not affect Whitehead’s claim. Notice that the 
emphasis is on the “general systematic metaphysical character” of the universe. Thus, 
while many possible worlds might very well provide the proper background for the 
proposition to be true, those worlds can be groupé together as a set because they have 
the same general systematic metaphysical character relative to the proposition. Suppose 
there are three possible worlds, in two of which the proposition expressed by the
291 Whitehead, Process and Reality. 11.
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Principle of Equity is true. Further suppose that those two worlds are quite different; so 
different in fact that there is no identity across worlds (actual identity, counterpart 
identity or otherwise). However, each of the worlds could still be structured in such a 
way as to make the proposition true. Thus, though they differ greatly, relative to the 
proposition they have the same metaphysical character. Relative to some other 
proposition, they may yield different results, but relative to the proposition expressed by 
the Principle of Equity they yield the same result. The gist of this discussion is that it is 
reasonable to suppose that metaphysics and ethics are related in some way. Whitehead 
sees the two as intimately intertwined. Before moving to discuss precisely what that 
relationship is, 1 first want to discuss why it seems that such a position is to be preferred 
to the one Sidgwick holds.
One benefit this sort of view has over one like Sidgwick’s is that it seems more in 
line with common-sense. Even in fairly common and philosophically naive 
conversations, the difficulty for the ascription of praise and blame that is posed by the 
question of determinism, if it is true, is recognized. That is, even in common parlance, it 
is generally recognized that the answer to the question of determinism has direct 
implications on freedom of choice, moral freedom, and praise and blame. Sidgwick 
dismisses this aspect of common-sense with little in the way of argument. On Sidgwick’s 
view, the investigation of metaphysical questions must proceed from principles that are 
distinctly metaphysical in structure and scope. Similarly, ethical investigation must 
proceed from ethical principles. Hybrid principles are dismissed as improper foundation 
for exploration of either field. Since the question of determinism certainly appears to be
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a metaphysical one and the question of moral praise and blame an ethical one, then given 
the restriction, the question of determinism is excluded from investigations of moral 
praise and blame.
There are some difficulties with Sidgwick's restriction beyond its departure from 
the views of common-sense. The restriction does not seem to meet his own Verification 
criteria, especially in the arena of Social Verification. For example. Kant and a host of 
others who seem quite qualified to judge in this arena have demonstrated the difficulty of 
assigning moral praise and blame absent moral freedom and the difficulty of ascribing 
moral freedom absent real freedom. Thus, failing to satisfy Social Verification should be 
sufficient cause for Sidgwick to question his ready acceptance of the restriction. It does 
not. however.
Whitehead does not fall victim to this particular difficulty For Whitehead, 
metaphysical truths have direct influence on moral reasoning. This is because 
metaphysical principles define the scope within which ethical principles can operate. If it 
were to be shown that a particularly odd determinist thesis holds (say, that every third 
action was determined by a causal link to past actions and all the others were caused 
solely by agent choice), then the scope of ethical principles would be limited by this 
thesis. That is, it would only make sense, for example, to assign moral praise and blame 
to those events that the agent actually had freedom to control. So, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that metaphysical principles influence the scope of ethical ones.
For Whitehead, ethical principles (particularly those divined by direct intuition) 
have some influence on the way in which one investigates metaphysical principles. This
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is not to say that ethical principles determine metaphysical ones or even the scope of 
metaphysical principles. The relationship between the two sets o f principles does not 
seem to be reciprocal.*”  However, it may be that we can come to have insight into the 
structure of the world by first examining the ethical principles that appear true. This is a 
return to the question, '\vhat sort of world must it be for such and such an ethical 
principle to be true?” The set of metaphysical schemes that would allow for the Principle 
o f Equity to be true is probably quite large (or at least plural). The point is that ethical 
investigations provide a starting point for metaphysical investigations and metaphysical 
principles provide limits within which ethical principles can be found to operate. For 
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, such a relationship is inescapable.
6. The Good
Having already discussed in some depth the relationship Whitehead sees between 
mathematics and ’’the Good”, it should come as no surprise that the topic of mathematics 
resurfaces here as we turn our attention to the Good again. The example Whitehead uses 
here is Algebra, rather than Geometry (though the choice of subject matter is of little 
substantive difference). The fundamental notion of the Good, on Whitehead’s view, is 
similar to the fundamental notion of Algebra. He writes, “What is the fundamental
*”  The reason that the relationship between metaphysical principles and ethical principles 
does not seem reciprocal is this. Metaphysical principles seem to determine the scope 
within which ethical principles can operate For example, if the hard determinist thesis is 
true, it limits the things one can rationally say about what one ought or ought not do in a 
given situation. The scope of the ethical principles is constrained by the metaphysical 
ones. However, ethical principles do not seem to have the same status. To know that an 
ethical principle is true is to know that there exists a metaphysical structure that allows 
the principle to be true; it does not determine the metaphysical scheme in every 
particular. Thus, it seems that metaphysical principles have some causal influence over
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notion of Algebra? It is the notion of 'any example of a given sort, in abstraction from 
some particular exemplification of the example or o f the sort.’” ’^  ^ For example, let us 
assume that we have a line described by the equation “f(x) = x”. This function describes 
the relationship between elements in the domain of the function [x] and elements in the 
range of the function [fix)]. Suppose we take a particular element in the domain, say 3. 
Then, f(3) = 3. Thus, the element in the range is 3. This is a particular exemplification of 
the function The function, though, is an abstraction from an infinite series of ordered 
pairs of the form (x, f(x)) each of which represents a discrete point along the line Thus, 
we have a point on the line (which is a particular example) and the statement i(x) = x” 
that describes the line and is an abstraction. That is to say, it is not identical to any 
particular discrete moment along the line.
Similarly, “the Good” is not identical with any particular instance of a good 
action. In a way analogous to the example of Algebra, there is a relationship between 
particular, discrete instances of good (namely, good actions), and the abstraction from 
those instances that is not identical to any particular exemplification of them, namely 
“The Good”. Further, on Whitehead’s account, “Good” is related to Harmony. Simply 
put, those things are good that promote Harmony. The “Good” is the abstraction or the 
qualification by which those individual good things are denoted. However, it is different 
from any particular instance of the Good because good actions are concrete events within 
the actual world and the Good is an abstraction.
ethical ones while ethical principles play an heuristic role relative to metaphysical ones.
Whitehead, “Mathematics and the Good”, 668.
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Beyond this concrete particular/abstract notion aspect, “the Good” refers to those 
ideals “which stretch beyond any immediate realization”. This is to say, “Good” has two 
components - the immediate action that can be labeled “good,” and the ideal or future 
realization of an aim that is embodied in that action On Whitehead’s view, an action that 
is properly labeled “good” has two features. The first is that the action itself promotes 
Harmony. The second is that the action expresses an abstract ideal or aim the realization 
of which would promote Harmony in the future. Perhaps an example will help to clarify. 
Suppose a group of people gather together and commit themselves to walking with a 
dying AIDS patient through the last days, weeks, or perhaps months of his life Suppose, 
further, that they provide all manner of emotional and financial support for the patient 
who, aAer not much time at all, becomes close friends with many in the group. It seems 
fairly clear that the actions of this group would be called good actions by common moral 
sense. How the good action promotes Harmony is a bit more complicated. The death of 
the young man is indeed tragic. While tragedy has its place in the actual world, it is 
disruptive of h a r m o n y B u t  the group’s actions make the end of life a better experience 
than it would have been otherwise, providing a sense of company and comfort to one 
facing a dreaded disease. The dying person experiences a level o f harmony that would be 
absent without the efforts o f the group. Thus, the particular action(s) promote harmony 
in the immediate setting.
For a comprehensive discussion of tragedy in Whitehead’s thought (and in Process 
thought more generally), see Maijorie Suchocki’s Fall to Violence: Original Sin in 
Relational Theologv (New York: Continuum Press, 1995) and/or Joseph Grange’s 
Nature: An Environmental Cosmology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1997) and The Citv: An Urban Cosmology (Albany: State University o f New York Press,
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They also fulfill the second feature. I selected this example because of the social 
stigma that is often attached to AIDS (and was more so during the mid-1980s and early 
1990s). The concerted efforts of some and the blatant ignorance of many made the 
disease and its effects on individuals and families much worse than it would have been. 
The instances of hatred and intolerance directed at people, especially men, who were 
suffering from the disease are well documented. The attitudes and actions (by individuals 
and legislatures) that exemplified the intolerance are in somewhat less evidence as we 
enter the 21* century. This is in part because of actions like the group in the example 
above. This is because through particular acts they exemplified ideals or aims that, if 
realized, would promote greater Harmony. As those ideals were realized. Harmony was 
served. Thus, the actions of the group were good in the particular instance and good in 
the exemplified ideal.
That Whitehead has something like this in mind is clear from a pair of claims that 
he makes in relation to actions and future implications of ideals exemplified in those 
actions. He writes that “whenever we attempt to express the matter of immediate 
experience, we find that its understanding leads us beyond itself, to its contemporaries, to 
its past, [and] to its future."^^^ This actually suggests a stronger position than 1 have 
advanced. On this stronger view, every present action necessarily points beyond itself to 
future actions. Thus, it is not a matter o f supposing that an agent’s action may have 
ramifications for good or ill beyond the particular moment of its commission, but rather a 
view that claims that the agent’s action wUI have ramifications beyond itself. Thus,
1999).
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actions that express an ideal that, if realized, would promote harmony are to be preferred 
over those that express an ideal that, if realized, would promote disharmony.
He connects this view of actions in general to moral actions in particular by 
claiming that ‘Ihe greater part of morality hinges on the determination of relevance in the 
future That is to say, although the particular action is good insofar as it promotes 
harmony in the immediate term, it is more important that the action express an ideal that 
has relevance for future harmony. Thus, for Whitehead, although we can specify two 
features of actions that ought to bear the label “good”, the future-facing feature is of more 
importance than the immediate feature.
This view has at least two obvious benefits. The first is a distinction that allows 
for an analysis of action in the following way. Suppose Action A promotes harmony in 
the immediate term but expresses an ideal that promotes disharmony in the longer term. 
One example could be Benito Mussolini's rule in fascist Italy. The trains ran on time, but 
the disharmony far outweighed any immediate benefits that might have accrued to society 
by the keeping of a train schedule. Suppose Action B promotes disharmony in the 
immediate term but expresses an ideal that promote greater harmony in the future. One 
example might be a case that Sidgwick would employ - forsaking a pleasure or a benefit 
in the present in the hopes o f a greater one in the future. Suppose that Action C promotes 
disharmony in the immediate term and expresses an ideal that promotes disharmony in 
the future as well. This action can be dismissed without further comment. And finally, 
suppose Action D promotes harmony in the immediate moment and expresses an ideal
Whitehead, Process and Realitv. 14.
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that promotes greater harmony in the future. The above example of the caring group 
should suffice here. Clearly we have four sorts of actions and we can specify the ways in 
which they differ given Whitehead’s analysis of “the Good”. The first action, .Action A, 
is not given the label “good” because it fails miserably to exemplify the second feature of 
good actions. The final action. Action D, is given the label “good” for reasons already 
discussed. Action C is rightly dismissed Only Action B seems problematic. Whitehead, 
it seems, is more likely to call this action “good” because it is more important to bring 
about harmony in the future than in the present. This is because “the greater part of 
morality hinges on the determination of relevance for the future.” However, it seems 
important to be able to distinguish between those actions that promote harmony in the 
immediate term and the future from those that promote disharmony in the immediate 
term and harmony in the future. It also seems that we would want to be able to analyze 
actions on the basis of both features to begin to distinguish gradations in both the 
immediate term and the longer term. Whitehead’s scheme allows us to do both of these.
7. Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness
Since the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness is one of the chief tools that 
Whitehead uses both to critique other philosophical systems and to test his own for 
coherence, logical consistency, adequacy, and applicability, it is important to spend a bit 
of time discussing it. As examples, 1 will recall some of Whitehead’s criticisms of 19*- 
century ethical theory (especially Mill’s, Sidgwick’s, and Green’s) to show how this 
informal fallacy is capable of serving as a criticism o f each. I have not mentioned it in
ibid, 27.
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the foregoing discussions, because it is not Whitehead’s only critical tool and I have 
wanted to show that he could and did critique a great many of these theories without 
resort to the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness However, having shown those lengthier 
critiques, it is now possible to show how the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness makes 
the same points, only much more directly. The point of introducing it, though, is not just 
to stump for its inclusion in the logician’s toolbox. It is important to keep in mind that 
Whitehead is applying this same check on his own work. Accordingly, it will be good to 
have a brief examination of it handy as we move into his positive ethical views. Recall 
that Whitehead writes that “the success of a philosophy is to be measured by its 
comparative avoidance of this fallacy [Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness], when thought 
is restricted within its categories.” ®^’
Simply put, the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness is exemplified in the act of 
assuming that a general concept, abstracted from the actual world, is itself actual. For 
example, there are a many, many oak trees, each distinct one from another and each a 
society of actual entities in the actual world. The name “oak tree” is applied to the set of 
all societies that satisfy the condition of being an oak tree. However, “oak tree ”, when 
referring to the class and not a particular tree is a notion abstracted from actual trees. It is 
not itself an actual entity, but rather an abstract notion. Now, if we assumed that the 
abstract notion itself had the properties that any individual oak tree possessed, we would 
have committed the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. That is, we would have taken as 
concrete in the actual world something that is actually abstract. As Whitehead writes.
Whitehead, Process and Reality. 8.
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'Ihe fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual 
entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought
Consider one of Whitehead’s own examples. On Whitehead’s view. Sir Isaac 
Newton’s Scholium is one o f the “statements of cosmological theory” that has had 
significant influence on Western thought. He writes that it can “within certain limits be 
thoroughly trusted for the deduction of truths at the same level of abstraction as itself.” 
Despite this profound influence, the Scholium suffers at least one major defect. Its 
inadequacy lies in that it does not suggest its own limitations with respect to its 
application. The effect of this inadequacy is to lure readers to commit the Fallacy of 
Misplaced Concreteness. One example is space/time Whitehead writes, “space and 
time, with all their current mathematical properties, are ready-made for the material 
masses; the material masses are ready-made for the ‘forces’ which constitute their action 
and reaction; and space, and time, and material masses, and forces, are alike ready-made 
for the initial motions which the Deity impresses throughout the universe.” ’^’ Newton 
describes the work in this way: “When I wrote my treatise about our system, I had an eye 
upon such principles as might work with considering men for the belief o f a Deity.” *^*® 
The following problem anses. The Scholium is insufficient basis for theological 
ruminations/"' Simply put, transcendent divinity is at a level of abstraction far removed
298 ibid., pp. 7-8.
ibid., 94.
ibid, 93. The quotation is fi’om Jebb’s Life of Bentley, chapter 2.
Hume’s criticism of the Argument from Design in Part V of his Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion provides a helpful example. Essentially, the argument from design rests 
on an analogy from the order found in an artifact (e.g., a watch) and its designer (e.g., a 
watchmaker) on the one hand and the world and its “designer”, presumed to be God.
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from Newtonian mechanics, yet is treated as no more abstract than the rest of the 
principles at work in the theory. This is a fairly straightforward commission of the 
Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.^”^
I turn now to address Mill and Sidgwick and, by extension. Utilitarianism as a 
doctrine. In his analysis of Mill’s proof of the principle of utility, Whitehead allows for 
the sake of argument that there may exist something like the "aggregate o f all people”. 
He takes this to be necessary for the principle of utility - the greatest good for the greatest 
number - to make sense That is, there must be an entity that is the “greatest number” or 
else trying to locate the greatest good for the “greatest number” does not make sense 
Whitehead’s criticism then focuses on the first element of the principle, namely the 
“greatest good” or the “general happiness.” Happiness is comprehensible as an 
individual experience That is, it makes sense to say that “John is happy” if it is John that 
is happy. But, if it is Mary that is happy, and not John, it is false that “John is happy ”
Further, it does not look like even if the “greatest number” existed that it could 
possess a “greatest good” or “general happiness” because it does not seem that individual 
instances of happiness can be added up to something that could be called the “general 
happiness”. If individual happinesses are not additive, then there does not exist a
However, the analogy fails because three o f the relata are more closely related to one 
another than any of the three is to the fourth. The watch, watchmaker, and world are all 
finite creatures. The analogy purports to demostrate the existence of an infinite creator. 
Such an attribution of infinitude is at a level of abstraction beyond what the analogy will 
support. As Philo points out to his interlocutors, the most that can be said about the 
“designer” of the cosmos, based on the analogy, is that the “designer” is finite.
Beyond this problem is another As Whitehead could attest from first-hand 
participation, “physics itself has now reached a stage of experimental knowledge 
inexplicable in terms o f the categories o f the Scholium.” 94
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“general happiness”. If there does not exist a “general happiness”, then the principle fails 
even if one assumes that the “greatest number” exists. However, Whitehead sees no need 
to grant even the first assumption The “greatest number” or the “aggregate of all 
people” is an abstraction. It has no counterpart in the actual world to which it refers. To 
assume that it does is to take an abstract concept and mistakenly suppose it to be 
concrete. That is, to commit the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. The same can be 
said for the “general happiness”, mutatis mutandis.
This criticism applies directly to Mill (to whom Whitehead directs it) and to 
Sidgwick who goes unmentioned in Whitehead's critique It is applicable to Sidgwick's 
scheme in the same way it is applicable to Mill’s, because Sidgwick assumes that 
something like the “aggregate of all people” or the “general happiness” exists and exists 
in the actual world. Further, it looks as if the critique is applicable to any Utilitarian 
theory that supposes that the “general good” or “general happiness” or “aggregate of all 
people” is an entity that exists as something other than an abstraction from individual 
people.
Turning now to Green. It will be recalled that I argued that Whitehead’s response 
to Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason is quite similar to Green’s. The Dualism is 
motivated by the following;
SI : A person’s good is her self-satisfaction.
S2: Self-satisfaction consists in maximizing pleasure for the agent, or (to 
avoid begging any questions) in the realization of pleasure by the agent. 
From SI and S2, both S3 and S3* follow.
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S3: The agent has a duty toward the general good.
S3*: The agent has no duty toward the general good.
But, S3 expresses the moral commitment o f the Universal Hedonist and S3* expresses 
the commitment o f the Ethical Egoist. Since S3* and S3 cannot be true together, yet are 
equally supported from the common moral sense, the Dualism of Practical Reason 
results
Green argues that a proper expansion of that notion will solve the Dualism of 
Practical Reason (or more accurately, show that no problem existed in the first place). 
Green recasts the argument as follows:
Gl : An agent has a duty to the general good.
G2: Self-satisfaction consists in the full realization of a rational agent's 
capacities.
G3: The full realization of one person’s capacities requires him to will the 
good of other people for their own sake 
From G l, G2, and G3 we have
G4: Ethical Egoism, as Sidgwick conceives it, is defeated 
After describing the differences, I then argued that Whitehead could be 
interpreted as holding versions of G2 and G3 and thus overcoming the Dualism. 
However, Gl is somewhat more problematic. If my interpretation of Whitehead’s critique 
of Mill and Sidgwick is right, then Whitehead cannot accept Gl because Gl involves an 
abstraction, "the general good”. Clearly, Whitehead would argue that Green’s argument, 
whatever the benefits relative to answering the Dualism of Practical Reason may be.
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cannot be supported because it falls victim to the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. 
However, an argument that preserves Whitehead’s Green-like rejection of the Dualism of 
Practical Reason while avoiding the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness can be developed 
by modifying 01 with SI. The new argument would be something like the following;
Wl : A person’s good is her self-satisfaction.
W2: Self-satisfaction consists in the full realization of a rational agent’s 
capacities.
W3: The full realization of one person’s capacities requires him to will the 
good of other people for their own sake.
From Wl, W2 , and W3 we get W4:
W4: A person’s good requires him to will the good of other people for their 
own sake.
This argument has a number of benefits. For one, it avoids both the Dualism of 
Practical Reason and the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. More importantly, in 
avoiding the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness it focuses the duties of morality on the 
proper objects of morality; namely, actual entities in the actual world, whether they be the 
agent herself or other actual entities. Further, it provides further support for the view that 
Whitehead’s ethical views are character-driven. By casting the agent’s self-satisfaction 
in terms of the realization of rational capacities, one can easily see how that self- 
satisfaction and realization can be understood as virtue. Thus, the Fallacy o f Misplaced 
Concreteness provides critical power to Whitehead’s theory while at the same time giving
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interpreiers of Whitehead a good reason to suppose that he is about the work of proposing 
a virtue theory of ethics.
Chapter 2. The Theory 
A. Whitehead s Theory of Truth
“Logic, conceived as an adequate analysis of the advance of thought, is a fake.” 
This would be quite a serious claim within the halls of epistemology even if it had been 
uttered by a philosopher with minimal background in the philosophies of mathematics, 
the sciences, and metaphysics. That it is one of the Anal written views of Whitehead, a 
well respected mathematician and philosopher, and called “a pioneer” "^^  in the field of 
modem logic by none other than W.V.O. Quine serves only to redouble the appearance of 
scandal. This view is, however, a clue to Whitehead’s theory of Truth.
The “Logic ... is a fake” claim takes place within the lecture “Immortality” 
However, despite the religious connotations that this title would imply, the concern 
within the lecture is to demonstrate an imprecision of language in corresponding to facts 
about the world. In the course of this lecture Whitehead does not depart from his 
metaphysical views concerning the universe, though one change in wording is of some 
note. In this last essay, he states that all things are “relevant” to one another. In his 
earlier work, principally Process and Reality, the word he uses is “relative” . I will not 
dwell on this distinction here because I find no evidence that his view has changed.
W.V. Quine, “Whitehead and the Rise o f Modem Logic”, The Philosophv of Alfred 
North Whitehead. 127.
Since Whitehead is not abandoning his earlier constructions, what new work does this 
essay do? Perhaps nothing. Whitehead could simply be reiterating earlier positions to a
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Having said this, I turn now to the question, “What epistemic principle is it that 
the claim ‘Logic ... is a fake’ refines?” It is found in his conclusion to the Preface to 
Process and Realitv. There Whitehead states that “In philosophical discussion, the merest 
hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly . O r .  in 
another place, Whitehead writes that “The position of metaphysics in the development of 
culture cannot be understood without remembering that no verbal statement is the 
adequate expression o f a proposition.'"^^ This assertion is very similar to the conclusion 
of his essay, “Immortality,” where he concludes, “the final outlook of Philosophic 
thought cannot be based on the exact statements which form the basis of the special 
sciences The similarity of the two assertions would seem to indicate that a similar 
position is held, though in the one case it is directed at the whole of the philosophic 
endeavor (as the statement comes in the preface to his one attempt at a comprehensive 
and systematic philosophy) while the other is made within a critique of the claims of 
religious dogmatism. The final line of his final essay is a rephrasing of the seemingly 
scandalous “Logic ... is a fake” claim. “The exactness is a fake.” “^* This later assertion 
provides the proper qualification of the earlier claim. At the same time it demonstrates
new audience. However, I think this reading is unlikely. Such a reading would leave the 
interpreter of Whitehead in the unenviable position of being forced to explain the jarring 
discontinuity between the forceful indictment of logic, “Logic ... is a fake”, and 
Whitehead's earlier use and support of the very logic which this statement indicts to 
construct his metaphysical system. Oiven that “logic" is one of the guiding metaphysical 
principles that Whitehead sets out for his speculative scheme at the very outset, it seems 
that such an interpretation is the way to go
Whitehead, Process and Reality, xiv.
ibid., 13. (emphasis added) For a more complete discussion of Whitehead’s Fallacy of 
the Perfect Dictionary, see his Modes of Thought. 173.
Whitehead, “Immortality,” 700.
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that the claim is not a departure from the systematized view Whitehead's espoused 
earlier. Hence, the epistemic principle that the “Logic ... is a fake” claim refines is 
something like “In the realm of knowledge, absolute certainty is not possible.”
However, there is more to the claim than simply a moment’s advocacy of 
epistemological humility. Given his claim regarding the impossibility of a verbal 
statement to adequately express a proposition, we can even further refine the view. For 
Whitehead, it is quite impossible to express the whole truth exactly in any sort of 
symbolic way Whitehead is also connecting this epistemological principle to his views 
about the aim and method of philosophy, the role of common-sense. Truth, and ethics 
Indeed, his analysis of formal logic, in particular, and mathematics, in general, provides a 
helpful starting point not only to discuss the connections between the disciplines, but also 
a launchpoint to discuss Whitehead’s Theory of Truth; a theory' he utilizes at several 
points in the development of his positive general ethical views and in the descriptions of 
the several particular virtues.
In addition to the epistemological principle, it is also important to know what 
sorts of propositions can be true. There exists an important distinction between linguistic 
propositions or verbal phrases and what I will call Whiteheadian propositions (hereafter 
W-propositions) The full scope of this distinction will become clearer as this section 
progresses. However, a brief clarification is necessary here By “linguistic proposition” I 
mean those sentences of a language that are commonly called “propositions” in the 
philosophic literature. For example, “All bachelors are unmarried.” This sentence is
ibid
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often given as an example of an analytically true proposition; one whose truth is apparent
given analysis of the terms and independent o f the rest of the world. However,
Whitehead does not hold that such verbal phrases are helpful He writes, 'Ihe language
of literature breaks down precisely at the task of expressing in explicit form the larger
generalities -  the very generalities which metaphysics seeks to express. This is so, in
part, because of the supposed independence of the "fact" that is expressed in the
proposition. W-propositions are different. Whitehead writes.
Every proposition proposing a fact must, in its complete analysis, propose the general 
character of the universe required for that fact. ... The distinction between verbal 
phrases and complete propositions is one of the reasons why the logicians' rigid 
alternative, ‘true or false,’ is also largely irrelevant for the pursuit of knowledge.
Metaphysically speaking, the distinction between linguistic propositions and W-
propositions is this: A complete proposition (W-proposition) insofar as it proposes a fact,
must “propose the general character of the universe required for that fact” and W-
propositions can be true, false, or partially true, (emphasis added) In this sense, W-
propositions are backward looking. That is, they refer to the universal background
conditions required for the proposition to arise. However, they are also forward-looking.
W-propositions reflect not only the state of affairs as they are, but also various states of
affairs that can be. This is one of the reasons for the emphasis above on “general” The
general character of the universe, on Whitehead’s view, is open to many different
avenues o f development. For example, suppose that the general character o f the universe
is such that peaches and pears both exist. If a peach and a pear are both lying on the
309 Whitehead, Process and Reality. 11. 
ibid.
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table, then I can eat one or the other or both Further, I could eat the peach and then the 
pear; or the pear and then the peach; or alternate bites of each. The point is that a W- 
proposition that describes the state of affairs as it currently is would also suggest possible 
avenues of action in the future. Here, Whitehead’s more well-known comments about 
the function of propositions becomes clearer. For Whitehead, propositions function as 
lures for feeling, where “feeling” is as we have been using it to tfiis point. That is, they 
present potentialities that can be actualized in future moments. In this way, propositions 
become the data for proposals -  as statements of what is and suggestions of what could 
be, they present potentialities for future actualizations.
If W-propositions suggest the general character of the universe, then they also 
suggest, generally, what options are not available. Presumably certain features of the 
universe make others impossible to realize. For example, the speed of light is faster than 
the speed of sound. Thus, something traveling below the speed of sound could not be 
traveling faster than the speed of light.
Commonly, linguistic propositions are thought to have one of two logical values -  
“true” or “false.” This is not so for W-propositions. While I will explore this feature of 
W-propositions at greater length later, it is important, at the outset, to point out that 
Whitehead holds that W-propositions can express partial truth The notion of partial truth 
is a critical feature o f his view He writes,
A proposition can embody partial truth because it only demands a certain type of 
systematic environment, which is presupposed in its meaning. It does not refer to the 
universe in all its detail/"
311 ibid.
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The last sentence of this passage is informative A proposition might propose the 
general character of the universe, but fail to refer to the universe in all of its specific 
detail. Indeed, this is likely to be true of any W-proposition. To the extent that a W- 
proposition succeeds In its detailed reference, it is a true proposition. Thus, "partial 
truth” refers to partial successful reference. Thus, Whitehead’s view of propositions 
entails that he holds a gradation view of truth.
Given the epistemological principle and the gradation view in mind, we can see 
how Whitehead clarifies the “Logic ... is a fake” sentence beyond the appeal for 
epistemological humility by writing that “It (Logic) is a superb instrument, but it requires 
a background of common sense This echoes his assertions in another place where he 
writes that “Philosophy has been misled by the example of mathematics.” *^^  The 
“misleading” has two faces. The first Whitehead clearly states in the discussion of this 
statement in Process and Reality. In the arena of mathematical proof, one proceeds 
deductively from premises that are “severally clear, distinct, and certain” to reason to 
conclusions. Should those conclusions prove false, one looks immediately to the train of 
reasoning or the premises to discern the culprit. In mathematics, Whitehead argues, it is 
often quite easy or at least clear after some thought which premise is the problematic one. 
However, “in the absence of a well-defined categoreal scheme of entities, issuing in a 
satisfactory metaphysical system, every premise in a philosophical argument is under 
suspicion.” *^"*
Whitehead, “Immortality,” 700. 
Whitehead, Process and Realitv. 8. 
ibid.
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The second face of the “misleading” is a bit less apparent, though perhaps more 
important. Leaving aside the suspicion of premises in philosophical arguments, we are 
still left with the underlying assumption that one might be able to state, clearly and 
distinctly, the philosophical first principles from which the deductive reasoning could 
proceed, much as one states clearly and distinctly the geometric first principles of 
Euclidean Geometry. Whitehead notes that here assumptions about both mathematics 
and philosophy go astray, though in more problematic ways for philosophy. Even in 
mathematics, he writes, '"the statement of the ultimate logical principles is beset with 
difficulties, as yet insuperable.”^'' The problem in philosophy is fairly clear, though a bit 
more complicated. Centuries after Euclid, it was discovered that there is reason to 
suspect that space is indeed not Euclidean. However, for the most part, geometry 
students familiar with the Elements can make calculations and produce results that by and 
large resemble the actual world. Only at a fairly sophisticated level do the inadequacies 
of Euclidean geometry become problematic for investigative purposes Though the first 
principles (the Elements) of Euclidean Geometry turn out not to accurately correspond 
with the actual world, they are for the most part workable Many philosophers, especially 
Descartes and Spinoza, have taken the example of the Elements and Euclidean Geometry 
as a model for their own work However, it turns out that philosophical first principles 
have even less purchase on the actual world than do the Elements. At the very least, 
alleged philosophical first principles (whatever they have been thought to consist in) have 
failed to approximate the intuitions o f common-sense views about ethics, metaphysics.
315 ibid.
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and epistemology in ways that Euclidean Geometry, and other mathematical systems, 
have not. For Whitehead, philosophical generalizations are the goal, rather than the 
starting point. By supposing that philosophers ought to take mathematical investigations 
as its primary paradigm for philosophical investigations, we go astray.
It should be noted that Whitehead comes to both of these conclusions by an 
appeal to the intuitions of common-sense and the role that he takes common-sense to play 
in any investigation, but particularly in philosophical ones. In the first case, there is no 
"well-defined categoreal scheme” in which to locate the premises o f deductive 
philosophical argument, and in the second, it is perhaps impossible to ever even develop 
such a well-defined scheme with anything like finality or certainty. For that matter, “if 
we consider any scheme of philosophic categories as one complex assertion, and apply to 
it the logician’s alternative, true or false, the answer must be that the scheme is false.” '^^ 
However, there is an interim solution, development of categoreal schemes that hopefully 
reflect the actual world and common-sense intuitions of the actual world ever more 
closely - asymptotically approaching the reality of the actual world. Part o f that scheme 
is a Theory of Truth.
We can already suspect that Whitehead’s Theory of Truth is unconventional in 
some very controversial ways. For one thing, Whitehead rejects the possibility that 
ordinary language has the capacity accurately to express truths about the world. Yet 
ordinary language propositions are the truth-bearers o f most theories of truth. This is not 
so for Whitehead. Or more precisely, while linguistic propositions are truth-bearers, they
ibid
290
are not the only ones, or even the best ones. Instead, on Whitehead’s view, “philosophic 
truth is to be sought in the presuppositions of language rather than in the express 
statements themselves.”^ T h e  obvious implication of this view is that Truth is not to be 
located terms of linguistic propositions, or sentences, or atomic elements of linguistic 
propositions or sentences. The more obscure, though perhaps more important, 
implication is that the analysis of Truth will involve the pre-philosophical intuitions that 
populate common-sense
We now move from background and conditions to a definition of Truth This is 
perhaps the easiest of the steps in the investigation of the Theory of Truth because the 
definition is what Whitehead takes to be a very common-sensical notion of what things 
are true. Truth refers to a conformity of appearance to reality?”* It is important to note 
that Truth qualifies only one side of this relationship; namely, appearance. He writes, 
“Reality is just itself, it is nonsense to ask whether it be true or false.” That is. Reality 
simply is; the actual world is the way the actual world is. Since Truth qualifies 
appearance, then, we can say that an appearance is true if and only if the content of that 
appearance conforms to the real world that the appearance purports to represent. For 
example, suppose an observer is shown a circular blue disk. The disk appears to the 
person to be blue and circular. Thus, the appearance is said to be true. However, there 
are at least two interpretations of this definition • a stronger and a weaker - and both of 
which are supported by the text. So, let us begin with an interim definition as follows:
Whitehead, Modes of Thought, vii. Note that Whitehead here is contrasting the 
linguistic statements of a philosophy with the presuppositions of that philosophy (which 
may or may not be recognized).
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Stronger Definition of Truth: “X” is true if and only “X” conforms to X 
Here “X” refers to “the appearance of X” and X refers to the object in the real world. 
This is the stronger version. Let us consider another example; A is said to be a true 
fhend of B if in fact A is a friend of B Suppose that B is ingratiating himself to A in 
hopes of gaining some favor but upon gaining it will cease to try to appear a fnend. In 
this case, B is not a true fnend, but a false one
These examples indicate the genius of Whitehead’s Theory of Truth 
“Conformity of appearance to reality” certainly seems to be what is commonly meant by 
Truth, at least in common-sense parlance. Thus, in the case of the blue disk and in the 
case of the fiiend, Whitehead is able to give an account of how the word “true” can be 
meaningfully and consistently applied in both cases. Or take an example from 
mathematics, say the proposition “2 + 2 = 4” The proposition “2 + 2 = 4” is true if and 
only if 2 + 2 actually equals 4 Thus, on Whitehead’s account, the use of the word “true ” 
when referring to a true fnend, a true appearance, or a true proposition is not an 
equivocation but a meaningful representation of the same sort in each instance.
Another controversial aspect of Whitehead’s notion of Truth is that there are 
distinct levels or gradations of truth. As he writes, “In the realm of truth there are many 
mansions.” *^’ Some things are more true and some less. Further, on Whitehead’s 
account, the access to reality (and hence likelihood of conformity with reality) is divided 
into three distinct levels. Now, given the stronger interpretation of the definition, such a 
result would be surprising. Clearly, the interim definition above is too strong to admit of
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 309.
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gradations and levels. If “X” is true if and only if “X” conforms to X, then it seems that 
“X” is either true or it is false, with no wiggle-room between the two So we examine the 
weaker interpretation of the definition to discover if it satisfies not only the things 
Whitehead says explicitly about how Truth is defined but also whether it satisfies the 
other Whiteheadian notions about Truth.
Weaker Definition of Truth: “X” is said to be true insofar as “X” conforms to 
X
Clearly this is a weaker interpretation than the earlier one. On this account. “X” 
can be said to be more or less true. Its truth-value varies as the conformity relation 
between “X” and X varies. That is, the more “X” conforms to X, the truer X' is said to 
be. And, in the same way, the less “X” conforms to X, the less true “X” is said to be. 
The benefit o f this sort of view is that it captures the rough and tumble common-sense 
use of the word “true”. The course of a ship is said to be “true” insofar as the course 
projection conforms to the navigation geometry that defines the course between the ship 
and the harbor. A person is placed on the scale o f “true friendship” - “fnend” - 
“acquaintance” - “stranger” - “false fiiend” - “enemy” based on the actions and intentions 
of the person and how those correspond to the actions o f the ideal “true fiiend”.
The weakness of the view is rather apparent. Whitehead will have to supplement 
the view with a way of discriminating between things that have relatively the same 
conformity quotient. That is, suppose A and B are both mostly in conformity with the 
actual world, but in different ways. What sort of analysis is available to decide which is
319 ibid., 314.
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the more true? Given Whitehead’s fallibilism. which we have already discussed at some 
length, this is not overly problematic for his scheme The level o f precision is not at all 
exact and that is the best that can be expected, especially in the realm of ethical 
considerations However, it is not a hit or miss exercise. There is a mechanism for 
deciding at least some of the hard cases The solution rests in the levels of access to 
Truth.
In Adventures of Ideas. Whitehead seems to be saying that there are in fact 
differing types of Truth. I think that though this is the most straightforward reading of 
the text, it is in fact, wrong. An interpretation that harmonizes Whitehead’s statements 
about Truth in Adventures of Ideas. Process and Realitv. and Svmbolism: Its Meaning 
and Effect is that, instead of claiming that there are different levels of truth, he is actually 
claiming that there are different modes of access to the truth, some of which are better 
than others. That is, some truth-bearers express a better truth-relation; or they express a 
closer fit between Appearance and Reality. These levels, from lowest to highest, are ( 1 ) 
symbolic truth, (2) healthy sense-perception, and (3) direct intuition or blunt truth. I have 
assigned these names myself, since Whitehead provides a name for only the first, 
(“symbolic truth”), and the third, (“blunt truth”).
The lowest level o f truth Whitehead calls Symbolic Truth?'" His description of 
this level is the most extensive, covering a few pages in Adventures of Ideas and the 
entirety o f Svmbolism: Its Meaning and Effect, to name but two places in which he takes
I designate Symbolic Truth the “lowest level” simply because the correlation between 
appearance and Reality is most tenuous here In another sense, it is the highest level as 
only a fairly small set o f extremely complex entities have access to it at all. In this sense.
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up the subject. Appearance, at this level, has the least Arm grasp of Reality. His primary 
example of a mode of thought that occupies this level of access is language, particularly 
as words are assembled to form linguistic propositions/'' The very act o f making a 
propositional statement is an act of selecting certain features of the world to which to 
give particular attention and de-selecting others. For example, the linguistic proposition 
“The sum of the squares of the two shorter sides of a right triangle is equal to the square 
of the hypotenuse,” selects particular features of the world and assumes a particular set of 
background conditions but de-selects other features. For example, if we take the
proposition to be true, then it has been assumed that we are limiting the discussion to
Euclidean Geometry. But the Appearance expressed by Euclidean Geometry does not 
unqualifiedly conform to Reality. Certain features of the actual world are de-selected by 
the assertion of the proposition - e.g., curvature of space in gravity wells
Propositions of mathematics are some of the least problematic of the symbolic 
statements. This is because they prescribe a particular and readily identifiable set of 
conditions under which they are true. Propositions of common speech are much less
likely to be so helpful. The meanings of words, syntax, and grammar are all much less
strictly defined. Language can be extremely vague One example of this vagueness is 
captured in the following oft-repeated example. Suppose four people witness an
it is higher than all the others.
I make a distinction between linguistic propositions and Whiteheadian propositions. 
The full scope of this distinction will become clearer as this section progresses. 
However, I feel a brief clarification is necessary here. By “linguistic proposition” I mean 
those sentences of a language that are commonly called “propositions” For example, 
“All bachelors are unmarried” Whiteheadian propositions are different. A 
Whiteheadian proposition can best be described as a “lure for feeling”, where “feeling” is
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accident. Suppose further that they are all standing beside each other so that each has 
roughly the same perspective on the event If questioned separately to determine what 
occurred, it is likely that there will be four different statements, that each conflict with the 
others in some particular or another. Now suppose that for person A, all of her 
statements are combined with “and" operators to form a complex proposition. It will be 
readily agreed that if our only alternatives are “true” and “false” then the truth-value of 
the proposition is “false” But a further problem lies beyond this fairly apparent one. 
Whatever she says about the event will necessarily be incomplete. Some features will be 
emphasized in her account and some will be de-emphasized and perhaps ignored. While 
this may be a case of faulty memory, it also demonstrates the inadequacies of language to 
accurately and completely express the Reality of the event. This is Whitehead's point 
when he says that this type of truth relation is “even vaguer and more indirect" than the 
others. There is, he claims, an “indirect truth-relation of the sounds or of the visual 
marks on paper to the propositions conveyed” *^^  as well as a further disjunction between 
the proposition conveyed and the totality of the event as it occurs.
I turn now to the level of truth-relation that I have called “healthy sense- 
perception”. This moniker is an uncomfortable fit with the way Whitehead describes this 
level, but I hope that it also captures the kernel of his point Whitehead claims that “for 
animals, sense-perception is the culmination of Appearance Of this level, Whitehead 
writes that “the sense-perception may result from the normal functioning of the healthy
as we have been using it to this point, 
’“ ibid., 318-9 
’“ ibid., 314.
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animal body.^’’’* By “sense-perception” Whitehead seems to mean that the relation 
between Appearance and Reality is contained in the actual moment of sensation 
experienced by a percipient. The difference between this level and the preceding, lower 
level can be captured in a very simple example. Suppose that while walking through the 
park, I step on a nail that pierces shoe and foot. While I may very eloquently and in the 
King’s English express the pain experienced, that expression will fail to capture the full 
experience o f the nail in my foot. At the same time, 1 have a quite accurate grasp of the 
situation at hand when 1 step on the nail. 1 feel its point, 1 experience its sharpness, and 
my instantaneous impression of the experience is actually identical with experience itself 
There arc two curious things about Whitehead’s description of this level of truth- 
relation. The first is that he claims that “sense-perception is the culmination of 
Appearance” and so it might be expected that this level should represent the highest type 
of truth-relation - “blunt truth”. The fact that this is not the case can be shown by an 
analysis of the second curious thing about this level of truth-relation; namely that he 
assigns these sense-perceptions to the “normal functioning of the healthy animal body” . 
This seems odd for the following reason. Suppose the foregoing example of the nail in 
the park remains the same with the further addition that I am suffering from walking 
pneumonia at the time. It seems that the experience is much the same - I still feel the 
piercing pain in my foot, it is still the nail that is doing the piercing and the facts that my 
body is not at the moment functioning completely normally nor is it healthy seem of little 
consequence. In one respect, however, this restriction makes a great deal of sense. It
334 ibid., 316
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seems clear enough that certain conditions will cause the percipient to have an experience 
that in no way conforms to Reality A quite obvious example is the well-documented 
experience of “phantom pain” that often occurs in people who have lost a limb. The 
individual is in pain, the locus of the pain is identifted in the area where a limb would be 
if it were not missing, and the limb is missing. Clearly, the Appearance is not in 
conformation with reality. So, it makes sense to include the “normal functioning of the 
healthy animal body” restriction at this level o f truth-relation.
However, this level of truth-relation is not the highest, on Whitehead’s account. 
Whitehead holds this view because he claims that the truth-relation expressed by “healthy 
sense-perception” is more indirect than the highest level; it is “wider, vaguer, and more 
diffuse in its r e f e r e n c e . C o n s i d e r  again the nail in the park. The experience that I 
have when 1 step on the nail is one of pain. But that experience is an incomplete 
representation of the event. While it is true that the pain is not vague at all, in the 
moment that I step on the nail 1 do not know that it is a nail; nor do I know much else in 
the way of details of the event. 1 know only that 1 am in pain and that the cause is 
something quite sharp. However, I may say to myself, “Self, you have just stepped on a 
nail.” And I may be mistaken. Perhaps I have actually stepped on a long shard o f glass 
from a broken bottle. My thought that I stepped on a nail is not in conformity with 
Reality.
Consider a further example. Suppose I have been drinking coke with dinner at a 
restaurant. After I have finished my drink, the waiter comes by and refills my drink, only
325 ibid., 317
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he makes the mistake o f filling it with tea. Not noticing the switch, I take a drink. 
Expecting the sharp taste of carbonation I am instead greeted with a taste of sweet 
smoothness. However, sometimes the first sip that hits my palate is interpreted not as tea 
but as coke, perhaps that has gone flat. My tastebuds are functioning perfectly well, but 1 
have a particular expectation that shifts the way my mind interprets the unexpected taste. 
So, if 1 interpret the taste as that of a flat coke, my experience of the event (the 
Appearance) does not coincide with the Reality of the event (I drank tea instead of coke). 
So, while the truth-relation here is better than the preceding one and represents the 
“culmination of Appearance”, it still is incomplete and liable to error.
This brings us to the highest level o f truth-relation. Whitehead labels this level 
“direct intuition”. Three implications about this level can be drawn from the foregoing 
discussions. The first is that this level cannot represent any higher level of Appearance 
than the “healthy sense-perception” level. That is clear enough since Whitehead states 
that the “healthy sense-perception” level is the “culmination of Appearance”. The second 
is that such a statement does not rule out that the level of Appearance expressed at this 
level of truth-relation is also the “culmination”. That is, both levels could (and I suspect 
do) maintain the same level of Appearance. Since the world simply is the way the world 
is, its status is constant through all three levels of truth-relation. Therefore, the higher 
status accorded this level can not be on account of a grasp of Appearance or a grasp of a 
different level of Reality. We can thus conclude that this level is accorded its higher 
status because of the tightness of the conformity between Appearance and Reality. This 
is the third implication to be drawn from the foregoing discussions.
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It is this conclusion (the third implication) that I will explore at greater length. 
Whitehead offers two examples to illustrate this level - I) the development of “that 
smelly feeling” into the “feeling of that smell”, and 2) the experience of a nursing infant. 
The first example concerns the way in which animal experience takes the sensum as a 
type of subjective feeling and consciousness turns it into a datum. The second, and much 
more telling and much more difficult, example concerns the qualifications of moods that 
are Just beyond the realm of sensa (he calls this “hovering at the verge of becoming 
sensa”) that actually function as sensa for the infant. 1 will deal with these in direct order.
Whitehead describes the “tone” of the perception that a percipient has when 
viewing a green woodland in the spring. He notes that the tone generally carries with it a 
strong aesthetic quality. The percipient is connected with the perceived object in a direct, 
immediate manner that is conveyed through the emotional tone of the event. For 
example, the smell of the green woodland immediately following a sudden spring shower 
is a singular experience. The human consciousness then grasps that scent as a datum for 
experience. Several things may be communicated in that moment (e.g., propositions may 
be coined to describe it, the sense-perception of the scent may be exactly what the 
“normal and healthy” person would perceive). But whatever else may be communicated 
in that moment, the experience is also a qualification of subjective feeling. That is, it 
affects the percipient in an intimate way. As Whitehead says, “The experience starts as 
that smelly feeling, and is developed by mentality into the feeling of that smell.” The 
percipient has an intimate grasp of Reality or a “direct intuition” of Reality.
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This is perhaps more explicitly captured in Whitehead’s next example The
experience of nursing a child is quite an intimate one. However, Whitehead is not
approaching this example from the perspective of the nursing mother; instead it is from
the infant’s perspective. He writes,
the emotional moods of love, or gaiety, or depression, or irritation, are directly 
perceived on the mother’s face by the infant, and are responded to The infant 
feels its mother’s cheerfulness as a datum, and feels it conformally, with that 
affective tone ... For the infant, the Appearance includes the qualification of 
cheerfulness.
Whatever the infant feels, he clearly cannot express as a linguistic proposition; and the 
event of receiving milk from the mother’s breast carries particular sensations of taste, 
tactility, etc., but is still an incomplete description of the experience. But there is a 
qualification of mood that '‘hovers on the verge of becoming sensa ” that is different from 
either of these two things. It has to do with the affective tone of the experience. The 
mood of the mother is perceived directly by the infant and responded to. This is said to 
convey a truth-relation “in the fullest sense of the term ‘truth’”.
Clearly this sort of theory has some difficulties. For one thing, linguistic 
propositions are truth-bearers, but they are not the only ones. Sense-experience and 
direct intuitions that are incapable of being adequately expressed as linguistic 
propositions are bearers of truth as well; and what is more, are considered better truth- 
bearers than linguistic propositions. They are better for two reasons; 1) they more 
accurately convey reality and 2) they are more effective lures for feeling. The downside 
of this view is that analysis becomes somewhat unwieldy. For example, it does not seem
ibid., 315-6.
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to make much sense to use the logical connective “and" to conjoin two direct intuitions. 
Even if one could create such a hybrid, it seems rather straightforwardly true that the 
resulting hybrid [direct intuition]“and"[direct intuition] is not itself a direct intuition 
Consider a direct intuition with the affective tone cheerfulness and another intuition with 
the affective tone depression. Conjoining these two, even if possible, leaves open the 
question what sort of affective tone the hybrid would have or if it would have one at all.
A second difüculty is that much of what is commonly considered knowledge 
seems to rest not on direct intuitions as much as it does on propositional statements. 
Even Whitehead acknowledges this difficulty when, in the course of the nursing-infant 
example, he writes “It certainly is in the highest degree improbable that the subtle trains 
of thought by which our epistemologists obtain their knowledge should have occurred to 
speechless infants.” *^’ Beyond this, if Whitehead’s theory of truth be accepted, we would 
necessarily consign the “knowledge” of the epistemologists to the lowest level of what 
would properly be Knowledge.Whitehead seems ready to accept such a result.
The reason for Whitehead’s acceptance of the difficulties that his theory of truth 
seems to entail is that the theory conforms to common-sense better than its competitors. 
Logical truth is clearly not what is meant when one lover says to another “1 love you,” 
and the recipient of the amorous profession takes the statement to be true. Indeed, in 
common parlance, logical truth seems to account for only a slight fraction of the ways in 
which the word “true” is assigned. Yet, it would be strange indeed to assume that those
ibid., 316.
Note that this means that the lowest level of what would properly be Knowledge is at 
the highest level of abstraction.
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who assign “true” to various things - friendship (a “true” friend), love (“true” love), 
trajectories (a “true” course), e tc . - are simply mistaken or incoherent. As we have 
already noted in the discussion of Whitehead's method, the role that common-sense plays 
in his philosophical speculations is two-fold; first, as the data to be utilized in reasoning 
and second, as the check on the scheme itself. Whitehead’s theory of truth can be seen as 
an expression of that checking procedure. It seems that he is striving for an equilibrium 
between these two poles rather than simply taking common-sense as a point of departure. 
Thus, one strength of Whitehead’s Theory of Truth is that we can begin to recognize a 
common thread in the many uses of “true”. Another is that his Theory of Truth is 
consistent with his philosophical method and aim and with his theory of human nature 
The levels of truth-relation have a sort of correspondence with the levels of human 
intellectual development I explore this in some detail in the following section.
B. Whitehead's Theory of Human Nature
Human beings are not necessarily rational beings but rather are beings that are 
“liable to rationality”. This is so, for Whitehead, because “our consciousness does not 
initiate our modes of functioning. We awake to find ourselves engaged in process.” ”^  
This primary type of human state is termed Instinct. For Whitehead, Instinct is a surd of 
animal existence. It is a drive for food, shelter, and protection. These are the sorts of 
satisfactions and dissatisfactions in which “we awake”. Instinct is also foundational in 
another way; it is never wrong. He writes, “there is no sense in which pure instinct can
339 Whitehead, Adventures o f Ideas. 53.
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be wrong”.*^ ° It is important to note that by the same token it is not “right” either. It 
simply is. In this sense, Instinct can be understood to be something like a natural ground 
state.
Intelligence is a state that arises from Instinct. This, indeed, is one of the 
“effects” of symbolism, on Whitehead’s view He writes “symbolic expression affords a 
foothold for reason by its delineation of the particular instinct which it expresses 
Thus, for Whitehead, intelligence delineates particular instincts and classifies and 
communicates these classifications by use of symbols -  language, etc Which is to say 
that symbolism (language, etc.) makes it possible to communicate and thus for 
intelligence to arise from the foundation of instinct. Intelligence integrates and develops 
modes of communication, literature, critical thought, systematic thought, mathematical 
symbolism, and improved technology In short, intelligence is a coming to understand 
ways in which we can shape the environment within which we have awakened.
Whitehead’s tripartite description of human nature can be summarized in the 
following way;
(1) There is brute Instinct, which is never wrong.
(2) Symbolism facilitates the movement from Instinct to Intelligence.
(3) Intelligence differentiates the particular instincts with symbolic analysis.
This should not be understood to be infallible. While “pure instinct” can never be 
wrong, the analysis can be faulty, which is to say that “symbolically conditioned action
Whitehead, Svmbolism. 8 1 
ibid., 70.
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can be wrong”. If brute Instinct provides the foundation and Intelligence delineates the 
particular instincts, then it is Wisdom that discriminates between the particular instincts 
that are partitioned by intelligence. Wisdom, which involves the persistent pursuit of 
deeper understanding, ever confronting intellectual systems with the importance of its 
omissions, is the culmination of character. That is, the wise person recognizes the 
fallibility o f human reasoning, that “symbolically conditioned action can be wrong.” As 
a result, she is not content with superficial analysis. She understands that speculative 
schemes, however rooted in observation, always omit facts (and with those facts, values). 
Further, she recognizes that such omissions are ultimately fatal to the complete adequacy 
of an intellectual system, whether it be quantum mechanics or moral theory The wise 
person pursues ever-deeper penetration of understanding in the forward-looking service 
of Harmony.
In summary, on Whitehead’s view, human nature has three character states: 
Instinct, Intelligence, and Wisdom. The wise person will possess all three as actualities 
and the intelligent person will possess two actually and one potentially. Instinct is the 
ground state o f all human beings; Intelligence arises from Instinct; and Wisdom can 
develop from these.
Whitehead introduces another distinction that will be helpful; the distinction 
between a ‘subject’ and a ‘supeiject’. This distinction is made in conjunction with a 
fairly traditional conception o f object’ The subject’ is the actual entity that is actually 
experiencing. An object’ is an entity, either eternal object, actual entity or proposition.
33: ibid., 81.
305
that is internally distinct from the subject but which is experienced, either positively or 
negatively, by the subject. It is the ‘datum’ which the subject experiences. It is. in a 
sense, the correlation to the conception of the ‘individual that endures through time 
The actual entity concresces or comes to be and then perishes. Upon perishing, it 
becomes an object for all subsequent actual entities. Whitehead uses “supeiject” to call 
attention to the objective character of the actual entity after it has come to be.
It should be noted that the internal constitution of the society in question plays a 
role in determining which possibilities can actually be prehended positively within each 
succeeding concrescence For example, the society that is a dog cannot select to 
incorporate into its internal constitution the eternal object ‘wall’. This selection would be 
inconsistent with the conjunctions of actual entities and eternal objects that compose the 
dog At the same time, the dog can choose to relate itself more closely to one or the other 
of the couple whose dog it is This selection will in some sense determine the society of 
actual occasions which comprise the dog, but in no way does it preclude the dog from de­
selecting the selection in favor of another at some point in the future. This self-creative 
process belongs to the supeiject of the subject’s experiences.
From this perspective, what then is the Se!f> In the Process model that Whitehead 
develops, the Self is constantly in flux, never fixed or complete It is a continual process
Whitehead, Process and Realitv. 29ff.
Although much of Whitehead’s formulation concerns constituent parts, he actually 
approaches the discussion beginning with the supeiject of the experiences, that is, with 
the completed actual entity. Only then can the constituent parts be examined, and then 
only in the context of the whole. (Whitehead, Process and Realitv. 23) Indeed, the very 
name that Whitehead gives to his speculative scheme, the “philosophy of organism”, 
gives this method of examination away. For Whitehead, proper analysis always begins
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of becoming. Or, as Young puts it, the Self is “a manifestation of emerging possibilities, 
continually being bom and p e r i s h i n g . I t  is not possible for a Self to be completely 
distinct from the world around it. Indeed, "to exist as a self is always to be related, first 
of all, to the intimate world constituted by one’s own body.” “^  A self is a particular 
temporally ordered society of individuals that is in the process of becoming by creating 
itself anew each moment. The approach to understanding the self is reversed from the 
more traditional view of beginning with component parts and constructing the whole.
Whitehead’s system, within which is his conception of the Self, is not without 
controversy. The change in perspective from analysis of constituent parts to analysis in 
terms of the constituted whole is actually a fairly radical shifi. But, as Hartshome has 
noted, Whitehead did not choose this paradigm shifi because he was ignorant of other 
options or because he was “inattentive to its alternatives” ^^ ’ Rather, he chose it precisely 
because those alternatives, attempted almost exclusively from Parmenides forward, have 
failed to account for basic intuitions about the human condition and reality. Whitehead 
believes, and I think rightly so, that the paradigm shifi which he advocates suggests a 
profitable way of exploring questions of personhood and freedom which is unavailable in 
the more traditional approaches. Having explored the background, we can now turn to 
Whitehead’s view of the constitution of virtue.
with the organism as a whole before exploring the constituent parts, if any 
Henry Young, Hope in Process. (Minneapolis; Fortress Press, 1990), 57.
Schubert Ogden, The Realitv of God. (San Francisco. Harper & Row, 1977), 57. 
Charles Hartshome, “Whitehead's Metaphysics”, Whitehead and the Modem World.
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1950) 27,38-40.
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C. The Constitution of Virtue
To summarize, Whitehead takes experience to be primitive and moral tenor to a 
rise from experience by direct intuition. Duty, then, operates on the content provided by 
experience and the attendant intuitions and is in turn confirmed and verified by further 
experience and intuition. Moral virtue, like all excellences, will be excellent relative to 
the Harmony it expresses. Further, the development of character involves the 
development or acquisition of virtue and the virtuous person is the one whose character 
expresses Harmony to a high degree. Some of the conditions necessary for character 
development are Truth and Freedom which are themselves defined, or “bounded,” by 
Harmony. Harmony itself is not a virtue; neither are Truth or Freedom. This is not to say 
that Truth and Freedom are not good, but simply that they do not refer to states o f 
character.
Whitehead thinks that there is a virtue that is directly related to Harmony and 
promotes Freedom. Wisdom is that virtue and it is the highest virtue. Indeed, for 
Whitehead, Wisdom is “that virtue directly derived from the source of all harmony.” ’^* 
Wisdom is the excellence that marks the pinnacle of human nature. As already noted, 
Whitehead takes that nature to be tripartite, consisting of Instinct, Intelligence, and 
Wisdom.
1. Wisdom and Intelligence
That Instinct, Intelligence and Wisdom are states of character is apparent from 
Whitehead’s treatment of the three examples; the Wise person, the Sceptic, and the
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Intolerant person. Each possesses both of the first two states. The first state of character 
is clearly not a virtue because it is not an excellence. The second state of character is not 
a virtue, though it is beneficial to its possessor and necessary for virtue. Only Wisdom is 
a state of character expressing virtue, on Whitehead's view This is because Wisdom is 
the culmination of human nature. 1 will first show the distinction between Intelligence 
and Wisdom and then turn to an analysis of Whitehead’s account o f the constitution of 
virtue This distinction will be important later.
Whitehead writes that people “are driven by their thoughts as well as by the 
molecules in their bodies, by intelligence and by senseless f o r c e s H e  also makes a 
stronger claim. On his view. “The worth of men consists in their liability to persuasion. 
They can persuade and can be persuaded by the disclosure of alternatives, the better and
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 75.
Ibid., 53. For the purposes of this paper, we can understand Whitehead as using 
“reason ” and “intelligence ” interchangeably here. In the main, this is not true, or at least 
not completely without controversy. For Whitehead, Reason has two aspects. That is to 
say, there is the Reason “shared with the Gods” and the reason “shared with the foxes”. 
(Whitehead, The Function of Reason) For a full treatment of this aspect of Whitehead's 
thought, see “Reason and the Claim of Ulysses; A Comparative Study of Two 
Rationalists, Blanshard and Whitehead” by Donald Sherburne, and Brand Blanshard's 
Reason and Goodness. It will suffice here to give a brief analysis. Reason “shared with 
the Gods” is directed at ends and ideals that are beyond the necessities requisite for 
survival. The reason “shared with the foxes” is exemplified, for Whitehead, by Odysseus 
as he cagily contends with the gods to survive and complete his journey home. A. H. 
Johnson, in “Whitehead's Philosophy of Civilization " has argued that the two “reasons” 
are different and that intelligence is a third thing that is descriptive in nature. That is, it 
amounts to knowledge of some subject matter or other. It is my view (and Sherburne's 
and Kenneth MetrilTs) that there is only one Reason, which has two poles that are 
inseparable. Further, it seems that intelligence (or perhaps more properly “insight”, 
though Whitehead does not use that word) is the descriptive function of reason and 
foresight is the normative one. Overall, this seems more consistent with Whiteheadian 
usage o f the terms, in my opinion
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the worse. One issue, then, is the use o f that intelligence. He writes that “the folly of 
intelligent people has precipitated many catastrophes
A reminder of Whitehead’s view of Freedom will be useful at this point. We 
have seen that Freedom, particularly the freedom of individuals, is necessary for the 
development of civilized societies. Civilized individuals also are required for 
civilization. This is so because they possess a state o f character (Wisdom) that is related 
to Harmony and that promotes Freedom. The question to be asked now is “Is Intelligence 
also a state o f character that promotes Freedom?” For Whitehead, the answer is “not 
necessarily”. In showing how he arrives at this answer, we will see how the two 
(Wisdom and Intelligence) are distinct, one virtuous and the other not.
We have the following, so far:
(1) At least one type of character (the type directly related to Harmony) promotes 
Freedom.
(2) Wisdom is directly related to Harmony.
On Whitehead’s view, two types o f character fail to promote freedom. These two 
are the Sceptic and the Intolerant person. The Sceptic fails to promote freedom because 
he despairs of “attaining any measure of truth”.^ ^^  The Sceptic referred to here is the 
extreme sceptic who holds that “the order and connection of ideas” is very radically 
different from “the order and connection o f things Rightly or not, Whitehead takes
340 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 90.
ibid , 55.
Ibid , p. 59.
A.D. Ritchie, “Defence of Speculative Reason”, The Philosophv of Alfred North 
Whitehead. Paul Arthur Schiipp, ed., (New York: Tudor Publishing, 1951), 341.
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Hume to be a sceptic of this sort For Whitehead, such scepticism will not promote 
freedom precisely because it despairs of ideas (like Freedom) having any relationship to 
the world.
The Intolerant person fails because he is immune to persuasion when presented 
with counterevidence to his own view. Here, Whitehead thinks that a character of 
Intolerance will detract from freedom rather than promote it because the Intolerant person 
will not recognize even the freedom of others to disagree with him. While this looks a bit 
strawy at first, Whitehead suggests that a case of such a person is John Milton who 
despite all his equipment of imagination, learning, and literary magnificence in defence 
of freedom,” probably does “as much to retard the cause as to advance it He promotes a 
frame of mind of which the issue is intolerance.” Not surprisingly. Whitehead also finds 
the Intolerant character all too prevalent in institutions like the Church.
Now, there is no reason to suppose that Whitehead holds the Sceptic and the 
Intolerant person to be lacking in intelligence. Indeed, at least the Sceptic may be quite 
intelligent. Though Whitehead is very critical of Hume for his scepticism, he at no time 
denigrates his intelligence. So, we now add the following:
(3) The Sceptical and the Intolerant characters do not produce Freedom.
(4) Failure to promote Freedom is not a deficiency in intelligence (at least the 
Sceptic is intelligent) but a deficiency in character.
(5) Thus, Wisdom promotes Freedom [from (2)] while Intelligence need not 
[from (3) and (4)].
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(6) Thus, o f the two states of character (Wisdom and Intelligence), Wisdom is the 
virtue.
Intelligence a necessary condition of Wisdom. With this distinction in mind, we turn 
now to the analysis o f the constitution of virtue.
2. The Constitution and Acquisition of Virtue 
There is no place within the corpus where Whitehead specifically delineates the 
constitution of a virtue, per se. However, what he says about the various necessary 
aspects of virtue at various places in the corpus can be collected to provide a more 
complete picture of what it is for a trait to be a virtue and how one goes about acquiring 
it. In general, I take it to be Whitehead's view that a virtue is constituted by two aspects 
The first aspect, I will call “Feeling" and the second, “Subjective Aim” and I will address 
these in this order. Each of the two aspects has two components • a descriptive, 
backward-looking element and an active, forward-looking one. Feeling is constituted by 
the descriptive component, “Insight”, and the active one, “Habituation”; Subjective Aim 
by its descriptive aspect, “Foresight ", and its active one, “Intention”
Virtue
Feeling
Insight Habituation
Subjective Aim
 I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Foresight Intention
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a. Feeling and Insight
One of the difficulties students of Whitehead encounter when they first begin to 
explore Whitehead’s thought is his daunting and often highly technical vocabulary. 
Another related difficulty is his use of the secondary meanings for terms. An example of 
this latter difficulty concerns the word “feeling”. The word “feeling” is not meant to 
convey the somewhat hazy sense of emotions of love or hatred which are often popularly 
associated with the use of “feeling” Instead, for Whitehead, one use of “feeling” is to 
convey the sense of “having a feel for something.” For example, an excellent mechanic 
is said to have a feel for automotive maintenance or an artist may be said to have a feel 
for conveying the angst o f life. In both cases, the possibility of a strong emotional 
attachment to the object o f study may be present. However, in Whitehead’s sense, such 
an attachment is not necessary to have a feel for the object This use of the word 
“feeling”, though clearly a secondary sense of the word in popular parlance, does bring 
out a common understanding of what it means to have insight. For example, the painting 
Guernica is a reflection o f the deep insight Pablo Picasso had into the fear, death, and 
destruction during and following Franco’s bombing of the town. It is such insight that 
forms one aspect of “feeling” .
Whitehead rarely uses the word “insight” but he uses similar words to describe 
the experience. One of those we have already encountered, “intelligence”. This he uses
One danger in focusing too heavily on the use of feeling as having a “feel” for 
something is that this use tends to suggest a level of consciousness on the part of the 
feeling agent that Whitehead does not intend. For Whitehead, “feeling" need not involve 
consciousness at all. In fact, it usually does not. For example, the mercury in the 
thermometer feels the ambient air. Thanks to Dr. Merrill for the example.
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most often in The Function of Reason. Another that he uses more often in Process and 
Realitv and Symbolism captures the descriptive function of insight more readily. There 
Whitehead uses “penetration” to express the grasp of the student of the data of sense 
perception or of experience. A student of a particular subject, say mathematics, may 
have only superficial acquaintance with the subject matter. Such a student is not the 
person to ask for an explanation of the importance of the differences between 
Riemannian and Euclidean geometries. The student will not know the relevant options 
available or what selections should be taken from the data presented him as background, 
or how to present the correct selections even if he were lucky enough to stumble upon 
them. However, a student with great penetration of the subject will be exactly the person 
to ask such q u e s t i o n s W h i t e h e a d  extends this metaphor to the whole of the
It would be interesting to the character of the reflection that is necessary for 
penetration of the subject matter I suspect that Whitehead has something like what I will 
anachronistically call a Modified Flanagan View in mind. (See Owen Flanagan’s Self- 
Expression. Suffice it to say here that Flanagan holds that agents need not always 
possess the ability to describe their motives or the virtue in question with high levels of 
articulacy; although it may be necessary in some cases.) That is to say, some disciplines 
will require considerable ability on the part of the student to articulate the most minute of 
details. Geometry, for example, would be one of these. On the other hand, a mechanic 
may very well have a feel for her work but not know the equations that govern the 
chemical reactions o f a catalytic converter, for example. Further, it does not look like she 
would need to know such things to be able to know why the engine does not work and 
what it will take to make it purr like a kitten. Further still, it does not seem that she 
would need to be able to articulate her feel for the ins and outs o f automobile 
maintenance and repair. Still, that feel is surely the product of practice and considerable 
insight into the object o f her study. I call this a Modified Flanagan because Taylor-like 
articulacy is not necessary, in principle, for all virtues. (For a discussion of Charles 
Taylor’s view of articulation, see his Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modem 
Identity^ Suffice it to say here that Taylor holds that the agent, to possess any virtue, 
must be able to articulate their motive desires and the character of the virtue at a fairly 
high level of sophistication.) It may be necessary in some cases and not necessary at 
others. But this is precisely the view that I think Whitehead would want to have because
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educational process in The Aims of Education. In Process and Reality. Whitehead
connects this conception o f penetration or insight to morality.
The selectiveness o f individual experience is moral so far as it conforms to the 
balance of importance disclosed in the rational vision; and conversely the 
conversion of the intellectual insight into an emotional force corrects the sensitive 
experience in the direction of morality The correction is in proportion to the 
rationalit>' of the insight / ^
Here, the student has as data to be selected her own individual experiences The student
with insight will be closer to mastery of knowledge for she will know the relevant
experiences to incorporate into a decision about action.^^^
of his views about Harmony. There is no reason to suppose that articulacy could not also 
be part of the proportionality to be preserved. That is, Whitehead could say that the level 
o f articulacy required for virtue is that level which stands in a proper proportion 
relationship to the virtue itself. There is then no reason to assume a priori that a high 
level of articulacy is required for each and every virtue
Whitehead, Process and Reality. 15
Whitehead here endorses a traditional Platonic and Aristotelian sort of view about the 
relationship between knowledge and virtue. Since Insight is a necessary condition for 
virtue and since Insight is closely related to intelligence, it is impossible for one to 
acquire a virtue without having first the relevant knowledge. Indeed, for Whitehead, 
even virtues like Humility or Tolerance are rooted in knowledge In the first case, 
humility is something like epistemological humility before the fact of human fallibility. 
It is not the self-negating sort of humility against which I have argued strenuously, if not 
always well, in the past. In fact, it does not look like humility is possible without 
knowledge. Suppose that a person appears humble but does not know why he possesses 
the attitude that he does (perhaps he possesses a state o f character that issues in actions 
that resemble humble actions in all the relevant particulars but his state of character was 
acquired as a defense mechanism or as a way in which he can get by in the world or as a 
result of abuse and further that he does not know the difference between the humble 
character and the character he possesses). Such a case is not humility. Instead, it is a 
product of Instinct that has not been reflected on. It looks like for humility to be a virtue, 
it must involve an accurate assessment of the facts and a recognition that even with 
strenuous analysis, human beings sometimes get things wrong It is precisely this sort of 
recognition that also gives rise to Tolerance, which Whitehead also counts as a virtue, but 
which is limited by that very sort of strenuous assessment of the facts in any given case.
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b. Feeling and Habituation
The dependence of virtue on habituation is yet another place where Whitehead’s 
view seems reminiscent of Aristotle. For Whitehead, a person gains initial insight into a 
situation merely by having experiences. However, this type o f “insight” would be highly 
superficial and so not productive of virtue. Thus, it would seem that insight must come in 
degrees, which is consistent with his contention that insight can correct sense experience 
“in proportion to the rationality of the insight”. One deepens insight by practice and 
habituation.
On Whitehead’s view, there are no brute matters of fact that can be understood 
“apart from interpretation as an element of experience.” '^*" This is true of all experience 
and as noted above, there is no guarantee that the interpretation of the experience will be 
accurate. Indeed, even in the natural sciences, human beings experience failure and 
success in the “enterprise of interpretation” Indeed, Whitehead says that “our habitual 
experience is a complex” of just such success and failures/"*^ If this is so in matters of 
science and interpretation of data, it is just as surely true in matters o f virtue. Whitehead 
writes.
The condition for excellence is a thorough training in technique. Sheer skill must 
pass out of the sphere of conscious exercise, and must have assumed the character 
of unconscious habit. The first, the second, and the third condition for high 
achievement is scholarship, in that enlarged sense including knowledge and 
acquired instinct controlling action "*"
148 Whitehead, Process and Reality. 14. 
ibid, 15. 
ibid., 338.
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Thus, it is clear that on Whitehead’s view of the first aspect of virtue (the Feeling aspect), 
both “insight” and “habituation” are necessary.
c. Subjective Aim and Foresight 
The concept of a Subjective Aim is one step removed from Whitehead's 
ontological primitives of subject and object. Every actual entity is a subject of 
experience. Here again, an analogy might be of help. Suppose a person has the 
experience of tasting a blueberry, it is that person and no other who is the subject of that 
discrete experience and no other. Further, that blueberry in question and no other has the 
experience of being eaten by that person in that instant and as such is the subject of the 
experience of being eaten. Every actual entity is also an object in experience, that is to 
say, the blueberry is the object experienced by the person and the person is an object 
experienced by the blueberry Every actual entity is both subject and object/^'
There is one grave difficulty with this analogy - it does not capture a key component 
of Whitehead’s view. For Whitehead, blueberries and people are not actual entities, but 
rather are enduring objects. Whitehead is not always extremely careful with the 
distinction, but it is an important one The danger with using ordinary objects to stand in 
the places of actual entities in the analogy is that one loses the temporal element of the 
relationship. That is, actual entity A experiences actual entity B, first as a subjective 
prehension and then as a conceptual one (as described above). However, A experiences 
B always as an object. Thus, B is in the causal past of A Similarly, the A experienced 
by B is an object, and thus in the causal past of B. So, to say that every actual entity is 
both subject and object is right in a sense. However, the further comment needs to be 
added, every actual entity is both subject and object, but not at the same time and/or in 
the same respect. The problem with glossing temporality, as the above analogy does, is 
that by “actual entity” Whitehead means to emphasize the acting of the entity; that is, its 
becoming and its temporality as an event. “Actual entity” is a theoretical notion that is 
intended to help make sense of our experience in the world. However, we do not 
encounter actual entities themselves, but objects in our causal past. With the analogy, I 
mean to convey something o f a Whiteheadian spirit, though it is not strictly an example 
to which he would give approval.
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Subjective aim is at the next level of analysis. In a move that looks much like 
Aristotle's natural teleology, every actual entity has a goal or end. One thing that 
distinguishes this view from Aristotle's is that the end or aim is not construed by 
Whitehead as a cause in the same way that it is for Aristotle. For Whitehead, every 
actual entity possesses a subjective aim (an end) in virtue of being a subject. This is so 
because every actual entity is a subject, for itself, which holds the world external to itself, 
including its own past, as object. Given foregoing discussions, it should suffice here to 
make two brief points; (1) at the higher levels of mentality, e g .  the level of human 
beings, the subjective aim looks very much like what is commonly called “intention”, and
(2) ever)' society has a subjective aim. (2) is equally true for a blueberry or a human 
being.^’* However, the quality of the subjective aim is quite different. The subjective 
aim of a blueberry is to be a blueberry. The individual human being, however, has some 
say into what her subjective aim will be. This is within limits. For example, the gourmet 
chef cannot decide that she will become a moonrock. at least not intelligibly. However, 
the gourmet chef may very well decide that her goal in life is to become a great novelist.
Subjective aim in human beings can be analyzed in two ways; foresight and 
intention. Both are necessary for a person to attain the highest virtue. Knowledge is 
gained through the exercise of Feeling (Insight and Habituation). But mastery of
Once again, I use a set o f enduring objects as analogues to actual entities. The reason 
I use it here is that in the case of ordinary objects like human beings, the ordinary object 
is a society of actual entities with a personal order. While the actual entities that 
comprise the society each have ends - namely, their own satisAction or completion - so 
do societies like human beings and blud>erries. As it is human virtue in which we are 
interested, using the analogy in a Whiteheadian spirit is more helpful to the overall cause 
o f the project.
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icnowiedge is only gained through the enhancement of Subjective Aim (Foresight and
Intention). That the two. Wisdom and Knowledge, are not co-extensive is clear enough
on Whitehead's view. He writes,
though knowledge is one chief aim of intellectual education, there is another 
ingredient, vaguer but greater, and more dominating in its importance. The 
ancients called it ‘wisdom'. You cannot be wise without some basis of 
knowledge: but you may easily acquire knowledge and remain bare of wisdom?^^
I turn now to the first aspect of the Subjective Aim. On Whitehead's view, human
beings are ignorant of the future; ignorant of cosmic happenings, ignorant of the future of
life on earth, ignorant of the “term set for our own life” However, this ignorance is not
complete. It is not the ignorance of “blank absence of knowledge” People can and do
make accurate predictions about the future based on past and present experience This is
clearly the case in science, where progress depends, in large part, upon the appropriate
use o f scientific induction and predictions to advance and test hypotheses, respectively.
On Whitehead's view, it is no less true in the arena of human interaction that an analogue
of scientific induction is both appropriate and required
Infallibility of foresight is as unavailable to human beings in personal conduct as
infallibility of scientific knowledge. In short, Whitehead's view is that LaPlace was
wrong regarding the natural order and analogously, any sort of Hari Seldon-Iike
knowledge of the future o f human conduct is impossible/^^ What is possible is a much
Whitehead, Aims of Education. 30. 
Whitehead, Adventures o f  Ideas, 94.
LaPIace, of course, is the great I9’*’-century French mathematician and pioneer of 
probability theory who held the view that the world is absolutely determined by laws o f 
nature which can be known, in theory if not in practice. He held the view that should 
someone know every bit o f data, the direction of force vectors, and the complete concept
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more limited activity. Human beings can, in fact, predict some future events with fairly 
reliable accuracy For example, the husband who knows that his wife's favorite dish is 
jambalaya can reasonably predict the reaction that his wife will have when she arrives 
home to find that he has prepared the dish to surprise her. Will his prediction be right 
every time? Of course not and Whitehead does not suppose that it will. He writes that 
the basis for the “defect in foresight is our scant knowledge of the relevant detailed facts 
in past and present.” ’^  ^ This is a defect that can only be partially overcome. Thus, he is 
committed to the much more limited claim that people can and do make predictions and 
that those predictions can be and off en are correct.
The question then becomes, what sort of conditions are required to explain this 
phenomenon. Whitehead notes that “our ignorance is suffused with Foresight”. The 
basis of this foresight is both Insight and selection. The first of these has been addressed 
above, though I will say a bit more here. On Whitehead's view. Insight is the easier of 
the tasks. Collection o f past and present data is considerably easier than knowing which 
of these data are relevant to any given situation at hand. For Whitehead, the fact that 
Foresight is dependent on Insight is obvious and incontrovertible. The assumption that
of every substance, one could predict infallibly the entirety of the future. He also 
supposed that it was not theoretically impossible for finite, temporal beings to have such 
grasp. Hari Seldon, Isaac Asimov's central character in the Foundation trilogy, is 
modeled after LaPlace’s superhuman calculator. Seldon is a “psychological-historian” 
who has a complete understanding of the physical and psychological forces that drive 
human beings to action. With this knowledge, he predicts correctly the actions of people 
hundreds of years into the future. Seldon exemplifies what might be termed absolute 
foresight. For LaPIace, such foresight is possible. It is unclear whether Asimov holds 
that such foresight is possible or not, though Seldon is clearly the hero of the Triology 
That such foresight could be possessed is the sort of view that Whitehead takes pains to 
deny is possible.
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anyone, devoid of personal experience, might provide detailed and useful suggestions for 
conduct is foolish. He writes, “there is no substitute for first-hand practice.” *^’
Of the second of the tasks, Whitehead is committed to the view that Foresight 
requires the “due emphasis on relevant facts from which the future is to emerge” .^ *^ Thus, 
foresight is not just the possession of the right information for addressing the right 
situation at the right time, it is also the ability to determine the right way of selecting 
from the data so as to bring about the right outcome. The habitual selection of the 
relevant data in experience results from a practiced character that has come to understand 
human conduct, one's own and others'. That is, foresight is a habit.
Here, Whitehead car\ es out a niche for philosophy. The role o f philosophy, for 
Whitehead, is to hone the habit; or as Whitehead writes, it is “an attempt to clarify those 
fundamental beliefs which finally determine the emphasis of attention that lies at the base 
of character He expands this view by claiming that “In philosophy, the fact, the 
theory, the alternatives, and the ideal, are weighed together Its [philosophy's] gifts are 
insight and foresight, and a sense of the worth of life, in short, that sense of importance 
which nerves all civilized effort
The next question that we should ask “How is foresight possible?” Whitehead
writes:
Foresight depends upon understanding. In practical affairs it is a habit. But the 
habit o f foreseeing is elicited by the habit o f understanding. To a large extent,
Whitehead, Adventures o f Ideas. 94.
ibid
ibid
ibid., 105. 
ibid
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understanding can be acquired by a conscious effort and it can be taught. Thus 
the training of Foresight is by the medium of Understanding. Foresight is the 
product of Insight.*^’
This begins to address the question, but is somewhat incomplete. It seems that the 'How 
possible?" question goes beyond the fact that foresight is a habit to ask how it is that such 
a habit can be acquired. Here, Whitehead depends on an understanding of human 
interest. People can be forced to do something or they can be coaxed into doing it On 
Whitehead's view, interest can be stimulated by “birch rods or pleasurable activity” Or, 
in other words, one can be forced or persuaded. As we have already noted, the value of a 
human being lies in her ability to persuade and be persuaded. Given this view, it should 
not be surprising that Whitehead sides with the persuasiveness of coaxing over the 
coercion of the birch rod. Indeed, Whitehead holds that “the natural mode” toward self­
development is enjoyment, not coercion. Whitehead then explicates the extent to which 
he understands the natural mode to be operative.
The infant is lured to adapt itself to its environment by its love of its mother and 
its nurse; we eat because we like a good dinner; we subdue the forces of nature 
because we have been lured to discovery by an insatiable curiousity; we enjoy 
exercise; and we enjoy the unchristian passion of hating our dangerous enemies. 
Undoubtedly pain is one subordinate means of arousing an organism to action. 
But it only supervenes on the failure of pleasure. Joy is the normal healthy spur 
for the élan vital I am not maintaining that we can safely abandon ourselves to 
the allurement of the greater immediate joys. What I do mean is that we should 
seek to arrange the development o f character along a path of natural activity, in 
itself pleasurable.’^^
Here, then, we see that for Whitehead, foresight has its roots in the most primitive lures 
that draw individuals into the future - the lure of love, o f discovery, or joy. How the lure
ibid , 95.
Whitehead, Aims of Education. 31.
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is then accepted is o f central concern. Just any old "abandonment" of self to alluring 
alternatives is not appropriate. Rather, foresight requires selectiveness of the proper lures 
at the proper times and in the proper ways. These “lures” are then understood to be 
proper insofar as they play a role in the development o f the character of the individual 
So, foresight is a matter of character.
Whitehead's conception of Foresight begins to shade into what we have called 
Wisdom, though there remains one final aspect to be discussed. It is to Intention that I 
now turn.
d. Subjective Aim and Intention
It is a bit artificial to separate Foresight and Intention completely. This is so 
because they are fairly closely bound up together But, while both are forward looking 
and both are required for wisdom, in particular, and for virtue, in general, it is also clear 
that they play distinct roles in Whitehead's analysis.
Foresight, like its counterpart. Insight, is descriptive The latter involves keen 
analysis of the past and present; the former involves competent, if fallible, selection of 
the options in the present for future exemplification. Habituation and Intention are 
active The former cultivates Insight. The latter provides direction for Foresight. By
One thing that Whitehead seems to have in mind here is close to the distinction that 
Frankfurt makes between the person who is a robust self and the wanton. [Frankfurt, 
"Freedom of the will and the concept of a person”. The importance of what we care 
about, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 11-25.] The wanton, in Whiteheadian 
terms, would not be able to discriminate, in any effective second-order way, between the 
different alluring aspects of his surroundings. The person who possesses a robust self 
would be able to discriminate between the things which lure but are either not promotive 
o f self-development or are only of limited value and those things which would promote 
full self-development.
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Intention, Whitehead does not mean anything particularly different from more 
contemporary philosophical usage. For Whitehead, Intention amounts to the “directive 
agency" of the individual agent. That is. Intention is the cognitively held desire to 
become what the agent presently is not and to bring about that which is not yet actual.
The difference between Foresight and Intention becomes clearer by examining 
their influence on virtue. Suppose there are three people, Ralph, Dick, and Jane. Ralph 
possesses the first aspect of virtue (Feeling) but does not have the ability to figure out 
which of the options available to him will bring about the right outcome. This is, he does 
not possess adequate Foresight Dick and Jane possess both Feeling (in both its aspects) 
and Foresight (possession of the right information for addressing the right situation at the 
right time, along with the ability’ to determine the right way of selecting from the data so 
as to bring about the right outcome)
Ralph is not virtuous on Whitehead's account. When Ralph acts, those outcomes 
which happen to be the right ones for the given situation will be the result of luck, not of 
Foresight.
Let us assume that Dick acts intentionally to bring about the right outcome and 
Jane acts intentionally to thwart it or to bring about some evil end. That Dick is virtuous 
is already established by hypothesis (she possesses all of the aspects of virtue). Jane is 
the more difficult case. I claim that Jane is not virtuous because, for some reason or 
other, she does not possess the proper intent. We might suppose that she is quite good at 
analyzing a given situation; so good, in fact, that no relevant option escapes her notice.
364 Whitehead, Process and Reality. 108.
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Clearly, such adeptness at analysis can only be the product of habituation. To this point, 
Dick and Jane are identical. They differ in intent. Dick intends to bring about those 
outcomes that will tend toward Harmony, and Jane intends those outcomes which will 
tend toward Disharmony. Indeed, Jane will be able to select those options which will 
result in ever greater disharmony, characterized by WTiitehead first as tragedy and then as 
evil.
That such a scenario is possible follows from Whitehead's insistence that both 
positive and negative outcomes are presented to the agent as persuasive lures. In 
addition to experiencing the enjoyment of love and curiosity, we also experience the lure 
of the "unchristian passion” of hatred. If then Jane's intentions are evil and she has 
Foresight, she will be more capable of bringing her evil intentions to fruition. Indeed, 
Jane may very well be quite clever and adept at bringing about those consequences that 
her desires. But Jane is clearly not virtuous even though her possesses Insight that has 
been honed through Habituation and Foresight.
On this account the importance of proper Intention for attaining virtue becomes 
clearer. Virtue is Intention, fully supported by keen Insight and Foresight, and directed at 
Harmony The fully integrated state of character that expresses Harmony is called 
Wisdom, the highest virtue.
e. Conclusion
In conclusion, Whitehead's conception o f virtue intimately involves his views o f 
Harmony and human nature. Virtue is an excellence, and in human beings is an 
excellence o f character. Further, that excellence of character will be excellent in virtue o f
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its expression of Harmony, Virtue ha four components: Feeling and Insight, Foresight 
and Intention. This constellation of connected views allows Whitehead to account for the 
gradations of states of character, from vicious to virtuous. It also allows Whitehead to 
distinguish between Wisdom and Intelligence, In short, Whitehead seems to have a 
coherent account of virtue and how it is that agents become virtuous agents,
D. Whitehead's Cardinal Virtues
Having discussed the constitution and acquisition of virtue, the theory of human 
nature underlying the theory of the constitution and acquisition of virtue, and the theory 
of truth that underpins the entire exercise, it is time now to examine briefly some of the 
virtues themselves. Unfortunately, Whitehead never enumerates the states of character 
he considered virtues. This means we are left to construct a catalogue of virtues from 
arguments, fragments, and comments scattered throughout the corpus One of the virtues, 
obviously, is Wisdom, and Intelligence is the pre-virtuous state of character that precedes 
it.^ ^^  The remainder of Whitehead’s catalogue of Cardinal Virtues is as follows: Peace, 
Sympathy, Tolerance, and Beauty I will treat these in this order, paying particular 
attention to the rather unorthodox construction of each of the virtue concepts and 
considering how the particular conception fits into Whitehead’s larger ethical scheme/^
The inclusion of Wisdom is not at all surprising since those Whitehead follows (e.g., 
Plato, Aristotle) include some notion of Wisdom as not only a virtue, but a Cardinal 
virtue - a class of virtues at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of virtue. Whitehead, too, places 
Wisdom at the summit o f virtue. However, this is also where he parts company with his 
ancient counterparts.
^  In the foregoing discussion of the Constitution and Acquisition of Virtue I used the 
ultimate virtue. Wisdom, as my example and so will not treat it extensively here.
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1. Peace
One of the more obscure virtues is in fact one of the most important in the overall 
development of character. Whitehead s discussion of Peace is obscure not because of a 
lack of clarity, but because the analysis focuses on Peace as a description of a state of 
character and not as a description of a relation between individuals, states, or nations. 
Commonly, “peace” is used to denote a lack of hostility between two discrete entities, say 
India and Pakistan. This use, however common, brings with it some disquiet because it 
seems that “peace” ought to refer to something beyond a mere absence of violence 
Martin Luther King, Jr., echoing the Hebrew prophet Amos, points out the difficulty of 
conceiving “peace” in purely negative terms. On his account, “peace is not the absence 
of violence, it is the presence of justice.” Whatever the merits of his conception, there 
seem to be underlying aspects of the view that are more generally recognized - 1 ) it is not 
possible to adequately capture what is meant by “peace” in purely negative terms and 2) 
“peace” is properly used to describe relations between two or more entities, whether they 
be governments and governments, governments and citizens, and/or citizens and citizens, 
etc Both of these commitments express fairly common intuitions.
Whitehead mines a more obscure intuition; namely that “peace” can properly 
refer to a state of character without reference to any person or relation external to the 
individual under consideration. For example, a person may be said to be a peaceful 
individual. Whitehead further suggests that the same two intuitions to which “peace” 
refers in external relations can, mutatis mutandis, be maintained on his view of Peace 
within an individual. In his explication of this virtue, Whitehead follows Plato. In the
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Reptiblic, there is the famous Platonic example of the charioteer with two horses, one 
light, the other dark.“  ^ In the example, destruction of the self is the result when any 
element o f the team other than the charioteer controls the team. Plato uses the example to 
connect intuitions about the proper functioning of the ideal city with the functioning of 
the soul o f the virtuous person.
For Whitehead, Peace is the self-control exemplified by the virtuous charioteer, 
but it is only a start. One element of Peace is indeed the reining in of heretofore 
unbridled passions and desires. However, were the analysis to end at this point, at least 
two sorts o f character could be supposed to exemplify the virtue that do not. The first 1 
call the Tranquilized Soul, the second the Authoritarian Soul. The Tranquilized Soul is 
calm, to be sure It is under control with no desires pulling it in competing directions. 
However, there seem to be no desires at all. The Tranquilized Soul will tend to remain at 
rest, unmotivated to adventure, novelty, or exploration. In a sense, it is the most inwardly 
focused of the three (Tranquilized Soul, Authoritarian Soul, Peaceful Soul) as the 
external world does not intrude at all on its self-contemplative tranquility. The 
Tranquilized Soul is unaffected and undisturbed. It is narrow to the point of simply not 
engaging the world around it. Such a character is to be excluded from the set of virtuous 
characters.
A similar example appears in the Phaedrus, but for the sake of brevity, I make use 
only o f the one. There are some interesting differences between the two examples, but 
those differences have no impact here and so I have not explored them in this project. 
For a brief discussion of the two examples, see Charles Griswold's Self-Knowledge in 
Plato’s Phaedrus.
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The Authoritarian Soul is similarly to be excluded. In Plato’s example, the 
Authoritarian Soul, exercises rigid control, inhibiting severely the desires of the 
individual. The Authoritarian Soul seeks to control all aspects that in some way might 
affect it. Hence, the Authoritarian Soul is also quite narrow in focus, imposing control on 
desires and seeking to control external influence that might in some way undermine the 
rigid control imposed on desires. In both cases (Tranquilized Soul and Authoritarian 
Soul), the self is narrowly focused inward upon itself. While the condition o f self-control 
is satisfied, Whitehead would not call either of these souls virtuous.
Whitehead conceives Peace as a barrier against the narrowness exemplified by the 
Tranquilized Soul and the Authoritarian Soul. This is because it involves more than 
simple self-control. Peace is self-control “at its widest; at the width where ‘self has been 
lost ” This is not to say that the individual has dissolved into some homogenized 
aggregate of the greatest number Instead, the field of attention has been enlarged so that 
the individual sees herself as one of many, but also recognizes the many The 
Tranquilized Soul is unflappable in the face of the external world; exhibiting an attitude 
that explicitly ignores the value to be found there. The Authoritarian Soul recognizes the 
many as a source of danger to be avoided and controlled. And the Peaceful Soul 
supposes the many to be a locus o f value (or, in fact, a widely diverse field of many 
individual values). Thus, Peace involves the removal o f inhibitions that the Authoritarian 
Soul would impose on the self and guards against the narrowness o f ennui that
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characterizes the Tranquilized Soul. Simply put. Peace is the “removal of the stress of 
acquisitive feeling arising from the soul's preoccupation with itself
Overcoming the preoccupation with self (or destructive selfishness) allows the 
self to participate in creative advance, to develop character, and to affect and be affected 
by others. Peace is the control of self-interest (not its elimination) that moves the soul 
toward harmony within the self and greater harmony in participation in the world.
2. Sympathy
In his discussion of Sympathy, or “the love of humankind as such", Whitehead 
makes one of his most obvious mistakes in historical interpretation He concludes, with 
very little preamble, that Hume's philosophy does not include such a concept. This is 
quite clearly a mistake; made even worse by the fact that Whitehead's own conception of 
the virtue is quite akin to a Humean version
Since I have treated Hume's views in a preceding section, 1 will not treat it again 
here. Instead, 1 will merely point out similarities between the two views as I proceed 
through Whitehead's view
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 367.
Whitehead writes “One of the hnits [of Peace] is that passion whose existence Hume 
denied, the love of mankind as such " He comes to this conclusion by making but one 
reference to the Humean corpus - Book III, Part II, Section I of the Treatise, where Hume 
writes, “In general, it may be affirm'd that there is no such passion in human minds, as 
the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, or services, or of 
relation to ourself." However, from this it does not follow that such a passion does not 
exist. Our earlier discussion of Humean Sympathy should be sufficient to dispel this 
apparent difficulty. I do not think that more needs to be said here regarding the 
interpretive mistake. The mistake itself has no implication for Whitehead's own positive 
view, and so is safely ignored with respect to his positive construction. However, I 
would have been remiss in my treatment o f this notion had I not at least indicated the 
glaring misstep on Whitehead's part with respect to his critique o f Hume
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Whitehead’s view of Sympathy is most substantially developed in Adventures of 
Ideas. In this work he develops the notion as a fundamental element in the development 
of civilization. The recognition of the "brotherhood of man” is a necessary condition for 
civilization to arise. By “recognition o f the ‘brotherhood of man’”, Whitehead means to 
designate two features of the world. The first is that all human beings share a common 
humanity. This is a straightforward appropriation of one feature of the concept of 
common-sense that Whitehead shares with Sidgwick and Hume. If “common-sense” is 
essentially a notion of a common humanity experiencing a common world, then the 
brotherhood of man’ picks out the first element of the notion. “Recognition” of that 
common humanity, however, is much less common. Adventures of Ideas, published 
initially in 1933, appeared in a world in which large groups of people were routinely 
denied the status “human”. Further, it had been less than a century since human beings 
had been regularly bought and sold as chattel^^" and defined legally as three-fifths human 
in the United States. In the interim, much of the rhetoric of Social Darwinism was 
routinely employed to classify races and genders as more or less human depending on 
their proximity to a supposed ideal - often Victorian, male aristocrat. This background 
serves only as an example of the divide between the ascription of common humanity 
generally and the recognition of that common humanity in a particular individual.
Whitehead appropriates the phrase “brotherhood of man” from John Wesley and 
the Methodists of 18*-century England (who had appropriated it elsewhere) and uses as 
his paradigm example of sympathy the concerted effort by the Methodists against the
A practice that continues in many places (e.g., Sudan, parts of Indonesia, Thailand).
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slave trade. Given the prevailing legal and popular opinion of the day, it is odd that a 
group of generally privileged and fairly well-to-do Englishmen should take the stand the 
Wesleys did against slavery. Wliat John and Charles Wesley possessed, it seems, was a 
direct intuition of the humanity of the enslaved. However, the direct intuition was 
insufficient of its own to account for the position taken. Others, presumably, had similar 
intuitions but acted contrary to them and either kept slaves themselves, participated in the 
slave trade, or studiously ignored the p r a c t i c e . S o ,  beyond the direct intuition of a 
common humanity in the person of the slave, there is the further intuition that actions 
contrary to the direct intuition are in fact wrong. This is where Whitehead's Theory of 
Truth can be seen playing a role If direct intuitions are the ultimate truth bearers (fallible 
though they may be), then those actions and propositions contradictory or contrary to the 
content of the direct intuition must be false. But willingly trading in falsehoods and 
presenting them as truth is anathema to the true aim of philosophy, at least since Socrates 
refuted the charges of sophism brought against him by Meletus. So, it seems appropriate 
to interpret Sympathy (or the “love of humankind as such") as involving the direct 
intuition of common humanity, the incorporation of that direct intuition as a critique of 
contrary views held, and as a foundation for positive views of the world. In the case of 
slavery, the direct intuition serves to show that the view that slaves are less than fully 
human is false and as a prod to conceptualize the world in such a way that this direct
Evidence that such is the case is rather substantial in the journals and writings of the 
period. One particularly dissonant case is that o f Bishop McKendree, one of the 
Methodist bishops of Georgia during the early part o f the 19^ century. He not only kept 
slaves but was instrumental in removing anti-slavery language from the Methodist 
Church’s governing document - The Book of Discipline.
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intuition is incorporated - that is, to ask the question, "what must the world actually be 
like for the direct intuition to be true?” . The virtue of Sympathy would thus seem to 
involve, necessarily, the way in which one conducts oneself in relation to one's fellow 
human beings Behaving in a method consistent with the direct intuition is to behave 
sympathetically. Incorporating the direct intuition into one's character (and thus acting in 
conformity with the direct intuition of the actual world) is to possess the virtue of 
Sympathy.
3. Tolerance
Peace and Sympathy give rise rather straightforwardly to the next Whiteheadian 
virtue - Tolerance. Given the developments o f the preceding virtues, it should be clear 
that Tolerance follows directly.
As with Peace and Sympathy, Tolerance begins with a recognition; in this case 
two-fold. The first is that the actual world is awash in possibilities to be realized in a 
future moment, either near or longer-term. The second is that the agent herself is fallible, 
may get things wrong, and that, consequently, can have no assurance that she possesses 
the totality of the Truth either in herself, her tribe, or her race. I shall treat these two in 
reverse order.
Whitehead writes that “intolerance is the besetting sin of moral fervours He 
notes some examples of intolerance, notable not only for the fact of their intolerance but 
for its breathtaking scope. Among these are the Roman Catholic Church of the 
Inquisition and the Crusades (to name but two of many ignoble moments in church
372 Whitehead, Adventures o f Ideas. 57.
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history) and the Protestant Reformers Luther and Calvin. Intolerance is to be condemned 
for a number of reasons that these two examples make abundantly clear • 1) it limits 
freedom, 2) it retards social progress, and 3) it reveals in the intolerant one the 
commission of the Dogmatic Fallacy, which suggests a variance from the Truth. Again, I 
shall treat these in reverse order. It will be recalled from the discussion of Whitehead's 
Theory of Truth that Truth is most simply defined as conformity of appearance to 
reality.^’’
On Whitehead’s view, the intolerant person not only holds his own opinions (or 
those of his self-identified group) to be in conformity with reality, he thinks his opinions 
are infallible, unlike those of others. The presence of such infallibility would entail a 
LaPlacian-like grasp of all actual entities and the interrelations among them. Since this is 
clearly beyond the scope of human grasp, the claim to infallibility is false. So, epistemic 
humility ought to be at least a check against intolerance. That it is not. in the case of the 
intolerant person, is an indication that he has failed to grasp the impossibility of his own 
infallibility. Thus, the position of the intolerant man is at variance with the Truth.
The Dogmatic Fallacy is not strictly an informal fallacy in that its commission 
automatically renders an argument invalid (although the correlation between the 
commission of the fallacy and the failure o f arguments that commit it is one-to-one) The 
Dogmatic Fallacy is related to the Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary. It seems that the 
Dogmatic Fallacy can be extended to include application to the attitude one brings to 
philosophical investigation Accordingly, it would apply to method Whitehead writes, 
“The combined influences o f mathematics and religion, which have greatly contributed to 
the rise o f philosophy, have also had the unfortunate eflfect of yoking it with static 
dogmatism.” (Process and Reality. 9) And in another place, “In philosophical discussion, 
the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality o f statement is an exhibition of folly.” 
(Process and Reality, xiv) Thus, the extended fiülacy is committed in the act of assuming 
that one’s statement (whether ethical, metaphysical, epistemological, etc ) is immune to 
critique.
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On Whitehead's view. Intolerance retards social progress because it arbitrarily 
omits certain possibilities from actualization; possibilities that might actually be of 
benefit. For example, the intolerant view of Afncan-Americans by many in American 
society has retarded the development of the society as a whole For example, during 
World War II, the Tuskegee Airmen were refused the opportunity to serve as pilots in 
combat and other vital activities in support of the war effort purely on the basis of skin- 
color. In other instances, Afncan-Americans were refused the opportunity for service as 
seamen, officers in charge of non-black units, and field officers. In the two former 
instances, judgments made on the basis of skin color retarded American (and Allied) 
efforts to fully staff ships and flight wings in the middle o f combat. The instances of 
intolerance and its effects on American society are simply too numerous to list. From 
Selma, Alabama to the Little Rock Nine at Central High to the Birmingham Jail, the 
cancer of intolerance has stunted the growth of the American experiment.
The foregoing discussion makes it obvious how Whitehead can conclude that 
intolerance limits freedom. The ones discriminated against are excluded from schools, 
jobs, and professional advancement. The intolerant themselves suffer the loss of 
interaction, potential growth, creative involvement, etc In either case, the arbitrary 
limitation of possibilities is a restriction of freedom that limits the possibility of novel 
outcomes and the creative advance of human society.
This brings us to the first recognition with which Tolerance begins; that the actual 
world is awash in possibilities to be realized in the future The intolerant person 
arbitrarily restricts those possibilities. That arbitrary restriction is a dk facto  denial that
335
the rejected possibilities are actually possible. Let us take a rather frivolous example 
Suppose I go to a restaurant and before arriving arbitrarily restrict those things from 
which 1 might select. Perhaps I decide that I will not eat anything that is fish or fowl and 
that I will only eat beef. Now the outside observer who does not know that 1 have made 
this restriction might suppose that I could choose from the chicken special, the seafood 
menu, or the steak selections. However, these first two are not available to me as 
possibilities, at least not in the same way the third option is, simply because of an 
arbitrary decision on my part. 1 have in fact denied that these options (fish, chicken) are 
real possibilities for me. Similarly, the intolerant person makes such arbitrary decisions 
about the wider possibilities presented to him by the world. Thus, Tolerance begins with 
a two-fold recognition: that the actual world is awash in possibilities to be realized in a 
future moment, that the agent himself is fallible, and as such can have no assurance that 
he possesses the totality of the Truth either in himself, his tribe, or his race Or, as 
Whitehead writes, “The duty of tolerance is our finite homage to the abundance of 
inexhaustible novelty which is awaiting the future, and to the complexity of 
accomplished fact which exceeds our stretch of insight
A naive view of Tolerance might suppose that it implies an endorsement of 
relativism. Indeed, the counterpart o f the Intolerant Soul seems to be the Permissive 
Soul. For example, practices like female genital mutilation and denial of education to 
women are often defended as mere outgrowths o f particular cultural customs and 
religious practices and, as such, beyond the pale o f criticism by those who profess to be
374 ibid , 59.
336
tolerant. That is, the argument has been made that since certain practices are perceived as 
valuable to a culture or grow out of religious commitment, they are to be tolerated, 
regardless of the harm they may cause, on pain of intolerance Whitehead's view labels 
this a false dichotomy. Nowhere in the corpus does Whitehead ever come close to 
suggesting that Tolerance is, or ought, to be unbounded That is, the Tolerant Soul is not 
the Permissive Soul.
Whitehead makes a very important distinction that goes to the structure of 
character and the boundaries of Tolerance. A character that issues in intolerance is to be 
deplored. One that exemplifies Tolerance is effective in promoting freedom, a result we 
have seen intolerance incapable of producing. However, this does not mean tolerance of 
every particular Tolerance seems to be bounded by at least three factors: first. Freedom; 
then. Truth; and ultimately. Harmony.
In the first instance, a necessary condition of Tolerance is the promotion of 
freedom. Given the virtues of Peace and Sympathy which were preliminary to Tolerance, 
certain actions are restricted necessarily. These are those actions which deny the full and 
common humanity of all persons. Slavery or the forced denial o f education of women are 
not to be tolerated because they deny the common humanity o f the slave or women. 
Beyond this restriction o f freedom, by which we note the actions that are beyond the pale
Some, for example the Taliban of Afganistan, may answer that women simply do not 
share in a common human nature - that is, that women are by nature restricted to certain 
arenas and from others. To such views, I would simply refer to Mill’s quite damning 
arguments in Subjection o f Women. If it is truly women’s nature that restricts her, there 
is no need of law (written and unwritten) and gun to do so; and if there is the need of law 
(written and unwritten) and gun to restrict her, then it is not nature that does so. We can 
safely conclude that these odious restrictions are thus arbitrary and at variance with the
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of Tolerance, we also note that such actions are not in conformity with reality. If there is 
a common humanity, then actions which deny this are themselves false.^’® So, Tolerance 
is bounded by Tr u t h . F i na l l y ,  and not surprisingly. Tolerance is bounded by Harmony. 
This is not so much because direct appeal to Harmony can be made when examining any 
particular practice but because Harmony is the foundational concept from which the 
definition of Truth is gleaned. To say that Truth is the conformity of appearance to 
reality is to say that appearance harmonizes with reality. Tolerance is thus bounded first 
by freedom, then by Truth, and ultimately by Harmony.
4. Beauty
The inclusion of Beauty as a virtue is one of the more controversial aspects of 
Whitehead's theory of virtue. When Whitehead’s theory receives much recognition at 
all, it is often in the form of questioning this virtue Indeed, Whitehead’s ethical theory 
has been dismissed as an aestheticist conception only. Criticisms like the one leveled by
Truth.
Recall that on Whitehead’s Theory of Truth, linguistic propositions are not the only or 
even the primary bearers o f truth. Whiteheadian Propositions (lures for expression in the 
actualization of an entity) are the bearers o f truth. Thus, truth and falsity are realized in 
actions, intuitions, emotions, etc., because actions, e tc , convey some appearance that 
may or may not conform to reality. That is, they reflect a lure for feeling, which may or 
may not be veridical. To say that the action is false, then, is to say that the lure for 
feeling to which the actual entity succumbs in the action is not in conformity with 
Reality.
Note that Whitehead’s fallibilism is in play here as well. The Tolerant character is 
also restricted from dogmatism as to those appearances that are in conformity with 
reality. However, if the case is made that an action denies, for example, common 
humanity then the onus shifts to the one desiring to perpetuate such actions to show why 
the action does not indeed deny common humanity and is not at variance with the Truth.
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Sidgwick against Aristotle are commonly leveled at Whitehead as well. The claim is that 
he does not sufficiently distinguish between moral beauty and aesthetic beauty
It is true that Whitehead sees something of a fine distinction between moral 
beauty and aesthetic beauty, though two things are important to keep in mind. First, the 
distinction is a substantive distinction (that is, there is a real distinction between beauty in 
the two cases) and second, there is a definite similarity The similarity is due to the fact 
that moral beauty and aesthetic beauty are both instances of beauty, more generally. Just 
as Whitehead strives to develop a theory of truth by which the several uses of the word 
tru e "  can be understood under s single head, so he does with his explication of the virtue 
Beauty
Beauty is related to both the Good and Harmony. The concept of t h e  Good" is 
developed in terms of patterned contrast. The concept of Harmony involves the relations 
that the elements o f the patterned contrast express. Beauty, not unexpectedly, has to do 
with the proportions exemplified in the patterned contrast. Whitehead writes "Beauty is 
the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience."^^’ This is an 
important statement. First of all, it supports my interpretation of the role of Beauty in 
Whitehead’s scheme. “Mutual adaptation" involves the ways in which the elements of a 
particular entity are joined together; and the emphasis on “occasions o f experience" 
suggests a generality of application that allows Whitehead to assess aesthetics and morals 
under the same general head, while investigating them particularly under different ones.
For a prime example of this approach, see William Garland, “What is Whitehead’s 
Highest Good?’’, Third International Whitehead Conference, Claremont University, 
Claremont, C A , 1998.
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That is, given that an occasion of experience - say the viewing of a painting - brings a 
particularly aesthetic pleasure, Whitehead can analyze the experience as one of aesthetic 
beauty Suppose that an occasion o f experience • say the character of an individual - 
exemplifies moral beauty, Whitehead can analyze the experience as one of virtue/"" 
Suppose that an occasion of experience evokes both • for example, a painting that stirs 
both the aesthetic sense of the observer and also tugs at her character - Whitehead can 
analyze the experience under both heads separately and under the more general heading 
o f Beauty. I have mentioned previously an example that seems to apply here as well. 
Take for instance Picasso’s Guernica. The painting, with its odd and disturbing imagery, 
may not be at all what one would consider "beautiful ” aesthetically. However, it is 
renowned for its ability to stir the soul, to communicate something of the horror of war, 
and thus to strike particularly moral chords within observers. In this case, Whitehead”s 
scheme can easily distinguish between the two sorts of beauty
It seems safe to conclude that Whitehead is not subject to the criticism that he 
fails to distinguish between aesthetic beauty and moral beauty, at least the criticism that 
has been leveled by those philosophers who have followed him. However, it may be that 
he is guilty of something like the mistake that Sidgwick attributes to Aristotle. This is so 
because Whitehead’s view of moral beauty is strikingly similar to Aristotle’s doctrine of 
the mean, in some very important ways. Now, we must distinguish between the way in
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 324.
By “exemplifies moral beauty”, I mean to say that moral beauty is the object o f the 
experience.
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which Harmony is similar to the Aristotelian mean and the way in which Beauty is. This 
will be helpful in further clarifying the virtue Beauty.
On Aristotle's view, the virtue exists at the mean between deficiency and excess. 
For example, generosity exists between miserliness on the one hand and wastefulness on 
the other. In this way. Harmony is similar to the doctrine of the mean. The generous 
character is one who exists at a point of equilibrium (or harmony) between the endpoints. 
The generous person is the one who knows when money, for example, ought to be given 
away and when it ought not. Presumably, the desire to give money and the desire to keep 
it exist simultaneously within the generous agent. However, the generous agent 
harmonizes the two desires and performs the actions that spring from a generous 
character.
Beauty is different from Harmony in the following way. One of the common 
mistakes in estimating the mean is to assume that it represents some sort o f average of the 
extremes Aristotle is quite careful to rule out this possibility For example, it is not 
good for a person to go without water; in fact, it is fatal. However, it is also not 
recommended that a person drink 100 gallons o f water in a single day. It would be 
erroneous to conclude that the virtuous mean between these extremes is SO gallons of 
water daily Instead, the proper mean is that amount of water that is best suited to the 
organism under consideration, in tfiis case a human being. The character of the mean is 
one of proper proportion. It is this aspect of the doctrine of the mean that Whitehead 
seems to be emphasizing with his notion of Beauty. Moral Beauty is not simply the 
presence o f equilibrium between competing desires, but a proper proportionality of those
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desires. An example that is markedly aesthetic in nature may make this clearer. Suppose 
we view a great painting that is strikingly beautiful, e.g., the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel 
Now, suppose that all of the lighter colors, instead of being where they are, were gathered 
on one side of the room and all the darker colors on the other. Clearly, the painting is 
destroyed, though a point of equilibrium is maintained. The person whose character is 
beautiful, is the person whose desires and intentions are in equilibrium, or in Harmony
On Whitehead's account, there are two levels or components of Beauty. The first 
level or component is similar to the first level of Peace. The “minor form” of Beauty 
occurs when the competition between the various elements of an actual occasion (e.g., a 
person) has been ameliorated to the point where painful clash between the elements is 
eliminated. The “absence of painful clash” or the “absence of vulgarity” Whitehead takes 
to be the minor form of beauty. An example of a painful clash: Suppose one sees a 
beautiful, historic Victorian-style home with turrets and a wrap-around porch and elegant, 
delicate carving in the framing woodwork Now consider that the house is painted 
orange, black, neon-green, and flame-red with occasional fuschia and purple polka-dots 
I suspect the result is quite painful to consider. Now, a proper sort of color scheme, 
applied by knowledgeable craftspeople could undoubtedly render the house less 
obnoxious. There will still be quite different elements, competing lines of sight and 
perhaps quite baroque woodwork. But the painful clash of elements has been removed. 
For Whitehead, this is the first step toward Beauty
The second component of Beauty goes beyond simply the absence of conflict. 
Beauty, at this level, provides new content, new feelings to be enjoyed by the perceiving
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subject. The difference between this level and the preceding one is the difference 
between the artwork of a new art student who is copying the techniques of the masters 
and thus re-plowing old ground and the work of the masters themselves that evoke in the 
viewer new experiences and new insights. A similarity between Beauty and Harmony 
might have been noticed at this stage. That similarity is not accidental. Indeed, 
Whitehead claims that “the perfection of Beauty is defined as being the perfection of 
Harmony.” *^'
Thus, the question could arise - “How, in fact, are Beauty and Harmony 
different?” A good question and one that requires a distinction and a comparison. The 
distinction is between Truth and Beauty and the comparison is of these concepts. 
Whitehead notes that on his view, “Truth is a narrower concept than Beauty.” This claim 
begins to give a clue to the distinction Whitehead draws between the two concepts. Both 
Truth and Beauty are adaptations o f Harmony Truth, it will be recalled, is a harmonious 
relationship between Appearance and Reality Beauty is, Hrst, the harmonious 
relationship between the elements of an actual entity or occasion and, second, the 
harmonious relationship that itself is productive of new insights for the observer or for 
the actual entity itself. Whitehead takes Truth to be narrower than Beauty in part because 
the relata impose certain restrictions on the truth-relation itself For example. Reality 
simply is, on Whitehead’s view. Now, whether the propositions, sense-experience, or 
direct intuitions express the truth-relation, one side o f the relationship is fixed. This is 
not necessarily the case with Beauty. Take another example from the art world.
381 ibid , 325.
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Consider some o f the later, more abstract work of Picasso. Clearly, the relationships 
between the various elements of one of his works bear little further resemblance to 
Reality. So, from these two examples, it should be obvious that the set of harmonious 
relationships that constitutes the scope of Beauty differs from the set that constitutes the 
scope of Truth. From this discussion we can see that Beautiful things need not be True 
and that Truth is narrower than Beauty.
The final issue relevant to demonstrating this distinction is to show that Truth is 
not a subset of Beauty This is fairly simple to show with an example. Millions of Jews 
were executed by the Nazis during World War II. This can be captured in the 
proposition, “Millions of Jews were killed by the Nazis during World War II.” This 
proposition picks out a particular truth-relation; namely, the one between this proposition 
itself and the fact in the world. This truth relation, though quite close and harmonious in 
the sense of expressing a close relationship between Appearance and Reality, is also quite 
clearly not a beautiful relation. So, we now have that True things are not necessarily 
Beautiful, that Beautiful things are not necessarily True, and that Truth is a narrower 
concept than Beauty since one of the relata in the Truth relation is fixed while neither 
relata in the Beauty relationship is.
5. Wisdom
We have explored Whitehead's concept of Wisdom at some length already. In 
this section, I will summarize some of the foregoing investigation, particularly his 
conception of Wisdom as a virtue. It is clear that Wisdom is the highest o f Whitehead’s 
Cardinal Virtues. We have already seen how Peace precedes Sympathy and how the
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combination of the two can further develop into Tolerance We have also seen how 
Tolerance is not an unlimited virtue but rather is bounded by Truth and Beauty. Wisdom, 
then, must be interpreted as bounding Beauty and Truth. Such a result is not surprising, 
given that Whitehead himself describes Wisdom as that "virtue that proceeds from the 
source o f all Harmony.”
We have also examined Whitehead’s analysis of intellectual development which 
has its highest and best exemplification in Wisdom. Combining these two results (the 
analysis o f Virtue and the analysis of human intellectual development), we now have that 
Wisdom is the pinnacle of intellectual development and connected with the highest good. 
An illustration of the relationship may help.
HarmonyDirect Jntuiti
Wisdom
Symbo^ni
TruthBeautv
Direct Jmui til
Intelligence :nse-|
Sytnl
The illustration shows how the evaluative faculties available to the Wise person and the 
Intelligent person can be compared and contrasted. Whether the Appearance be one of a 
painting or a moral conundrum requiring a decision, the relationships expressed in the 
illustration hold. This illustration has two applications. The first is to the experience of
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Insight. Insight operates on information available at the moment of the presentation of 
the experience. It reveals to the agent, to one degree or another, the character o f the 
situation and the options available. Given a particular Appearance, Wisdom has at its 
disposal the truth-relations expressed by Direct Intuition, Sense-Perception, and 
Symbolism. Insight is the use of these evaluative tools to understand as fully as possible 
the immediate situation. Foresight is the use of these evaluative tools to guide action. 
Foresight is the ability to extrapolate from the present situation to the results of the 
exercise of the options discerned by Insight. The dashed line extending from Intelligence 
to the Harmony, Beauty, Truth triad is one indication of the difference between Wisdom 
and Intelligence. While Wisdom employs all of the various methods of perception and 
holds them in their proper alignment. Intelligence does not. It does not involve the 
complete grasp of the methods of assessing Truth and/or Beauty. Essentially, Wisdom is 
the insight that allows the agent to understand the situation presented along with the 
ability to discern the right thing to do at the right time and in the right way "Right", 
then, is in part a function of Truth. That is, it is true that one action will support the 
advance of Harmony more than another. On Whitehead's view, that Truth exemplifies a 
truth-relation that has as one of its relata a fact about the world; namely that Action A 
will in fact advance Harmony more than Action B. Thus, through foresight, the Wise 
person better understands both the aim of human life (virtue and Harmony) and, through 
insight, the present situation in which she finds herself. So, we have seen how Wisdom is 
related to Harmony and how, by investigating his theory of Truth, Whitehead relates 
virtue to the actual world.
346
Chapter 3. Potential Problems 
A. Introduction
‘‘Nowadays, to be intelligible is to be found out.” ”^  Whitehead’s work, with its 
dense, technical vocabulary and sometimes forbidding language often seems to exemplify 
this sentiment. Surprisingly, Whitehead’s philosophy of civilization is his clearest work. 
Paradoxically, it is the work for which he is least known. However, as A H. Johnson put 
it, “those who had personal contact with Professor Whitehead quickly became aware of 
his great interest in the problems of civilized living, not only in the area of theory, but 
also in the realm of practice.” *^*^ This is not to say that there are not some opaque 
passages and highly technical vocabulary, but in his discussions of civilization, 
Whitehead makes perhaps his most extensive use of examples to illustrate and give 
substance to the attempts at deftnition.^*"* There are at least three potential criticisms of a 
Whiteheadian view; (I) Collective Action problems, (2) A naive [Johnsonian] reading of 
Whitehead’s view, and (3) Social Darwinism, or the Myth of Progress. I will argue for 
the plausibility of Whitehead’s view by addressing these potential criticisms. Within 
those discussions, the general view will take on more definition.
I will limit the scope of this section to three facets o f Whitehead’s view of 
civilization: Ideas, Great Individuals, and Education. The ftrst two are decisive factors
Oscar Wilde, Lady Windermere’s Fan
A  H. Johnson, “Whitehead’s Philosophy of Civilization ”, Whitehead and the Modem 
World. (Boston: The Beacon Press, 19S0), 43. It is also clear to those who bothered to read 
Adventures of Ideas.
ibid. I suspect this contributes to Johnson’s assertion (unargued) that Whitehead 
views of civilization are quite plausible.
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that Whitehead thinks are jointly necessary for a society to become “civilized” In the 
case of Ideas and Great Individuals, it is easier to note the interplay of relations that is 
most reflective of Whitehead’s larger view. This will make critique and response more 
clear. I will address briefly Whitehead’s definition of civilization before turning to 
potential criticisms in sections C, D, and E. I will finally conclude with some thoughts 
about Whitehead’s view of Education in F.
There are some remarks that need to be made in the way of preliminary 
assumptions about Whitehead’s overall project. One distinguishing characteristic of 
Whitehead’s work is the two-fold analysis of the world and/or topic under examination. 
As we have already noted, Whitehead advances theories about both the micro and macro 
levels of reality, but is ultimately committed to causal explanations at both, neither of 
which is strictly identical with the other. That is to say, he develops causal theories at the 
macro level that are not ultimately reducible to the causal theories which he understands 
to be operative at the micro level, and vice versa. This is none too controversial/"^
The other two are Economic Activity and the Inanimate World. I will not address the 
former because it is subject to the same sort o f analysis as Ideas and Great Individuals. I 
will not say much in the latter case because this is fairly well-plowed ground. If nothing 
else, Whitehead is considered a first-rate philosopher of science and logician. For example, 
see Robert Palter, Whitehead’s Philosophy of Science. University of Chicago Press, I960, 
and/or Filmer S C Northrop, “Whitehead’s Philosophy of Science”; Evander Bradley 
McGilvary, “Space-Time, Simple Location, and Àehension”, Joseph Needham, “A 
Biologist’s View of Whitehead’s Philosophy”; William Ernest Hocking, “Whitehead on 
Mind and Nature”; Roy Wood Sellars, “Philosophy of Organism and Physical Realism”; 
and W V O Quine, “Whitehead and the Rise o f Modem Logic” all in The Philosophv of 
Alfi^d Nor* Whitehead. P. A. Schilpp, ed.
Indicative of this position is perhaps Whitehead’s second most famous apophthegm - 
“the many become one and are increased by one ” [The most fiunous being the oft- 
misquoted “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is 
that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato ” (Process and Reality. 39)] This saying
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Whitehead’s Method proceeds at two levels. This is another reason that his work 
seems less than completely penetrable at times. This will be especially true in this section 
and the following section concerning Rational Choice Theory and Collective Action. 
Having said this, there is a final assumption that needs to be addressed before moving on. 
Given his process metaphysics, it is not at all odd that Whitehead should hold something 
like the following;
Civilized Societv Principle: If civilized societies exist (or have existed) at all, they 
have developed from societies to which the moniker “civilized” could not 
appropriately be applied and they have ceased (or will cease) to exist.
Or, more simply put, civilizations rise and fall, come to be and perish.
1. Ideas
Despite the complex language, Whitehead’s notion of “idea”, at least as it is 
relevant to this section, is fairly straightforward. That is not to suggest that it is 
uncontroversial. For the most part, Whitehead equates “idea” with “ideal”, reflecting a 
very platonistic sort of twist. Controversies about ontology aside, it should suffice to say 
that when Whitehead uses “idea”, he tends to mean those ideas of a grand sort, e.g.. 
Justice, Freedom, etc This differentiates “idea” from its more vulgar usage; e.g., the idea
concludes a discussion o f the ontology of compositional objects whose penultimate 
sentence summarizes the foregoing discussion. Whitehead writes, “The novel entity is at 
once the togetherness o f the ‘many’ which it finds, and also it is one among the disjuntive 
‘many’ which it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entities which 
it synthesizes.” Or, put in another way, an object. A/, is a composite of smaller objects, 
nil, m2, ms,...,m„, which can be examined separately, with little or no reference to the 
whole But when the “disjunctive many ”, /»/. m2, ms,....m„, are conjoined into the 
“novel entity”, M, the new object is a separate object from the “disjunctive many ” 
Which is to say, M  is not reducible to its parts. Thus, any explanation must proceed at 
both the micro level - examining the “disjunctive many” • and at the macro level - 
examining the “novel entity ” Note that the micro/macro distinction could also have the
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of half-priced hamburgers after 5;00 p.m. on Tuesdays. The primary characteristic of any 
idea, whether it be grand or vulgar, is the persuasive power which it possesses. This can 
be expressed as follows;
Persuasive Ideas Principle: Any idea possesses a persuasive power.
This should not be understood as some sort of magical power inherent in the idea. 
Rather, the Persuasive Ideas Principle expresses an empirical claim that arises from 
Whitehead's observations of the efficacy of ideas in the realm of science. In Science and 
the Modem World. Whitehead goes to great lengths to show how many of the great ideas 
of science can be traced from humble beginnings to the profound influence they have had 
on the human community. As Johnson puts it, "[Whitehead] contends that as we think, 
so we live.” *^’ Thus, as the ideas with which a society identifies change, so will the 
character of the society. Whitehead is merely expressing the observation that ideas, great 
and small, have within them the power to move people. Or in language that would be 
more congenial to Whitehead, ideas are lures that attract people to the ideals that they 
represent. What then differentiates the great from the small is the sort of attraction In 
the case of Freedom, the lure is a stirring of the intellect - permanent and quite 
persuasive. In the case of the half-priced burgers, to the extent that there is a stirring at 
all, it is of the belly - transient and for the most part ineffectual
2. Ideas and Great individuals 
Ideas on their own and in abstraction from the world are largely ineffectual even 
if they are great ideas For ideas to be actualized in any real way, there must be
following counterparts - actual entity/society of actual entities (ordinary objects).
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individuals who put them into practice. Thus, the role o f individuals is indispensable 
in the development and actualization of great ideas. Yet the question that arises from 
these remarks would seem to be "How is it that great individuals cause ideas to be 
actualized in human society and thus advance a society towards civilization?”
Simply put, great individuals give expression to ideas and, through persuasion, 
lure societies of people to understand, accept, and apply them. So, what does it mean to 
give expression to ideas? On Whitehead’s view, “expression” means "to introduce 
novelty”/ ^  Or, in another way, the introduction of novelty that marks the expression of 
an idea is the drawing out of possibilities for the society that heretofore have been 
unexpressed. This becomes somewhat clearer in the example that Whitehead takes to be 
a paradigm case o f the expression of a great idea by great individuals: the movement 
from society's presupposition of slavery to the presupposition of freedom. He writes, 
"the growth of the idea of the essential rights of human beings, arising from their sheer 
humanity, affords a striking example in the history of ideas.”^^
Because the subject matter is civilization and the lives of individuals living in 
communities, it is not surprising that such supremely ethical notions as Freedom and 
Justice make up the majority of those ideas that Whitehead classifies as ideals. It is also 
not surprising that ethical notions are at the center o f what Whitehead takes to be the 
development of civilization. He sums up the interplay between ideas, individuals, and the
Johnson, 46.
Or, as Johnson puts it, "The ideas must be understood, accepted, and applied by 
human beings " ibid., 47.
*** Whitehead, Modes o f Thought. 26.
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 21.
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social change that the former two can introduce in this way, “In ethical ideas, we find the 
supreme example of consciously formulated ideas acting as a driving force effecting 
transitions from social state to social state Such ideas are at once gadflies irritating, and 
beacons luring, the victims among whom they dwell.
Thus, for Whitehead, ideas and great individuals play a causal role in social 
change and the development of civilization. Ideas represent ideals for which individuals 
and societies can strive. Individuals sense those possibilities, especially those that 
introduce novelty into the society, and strive to actualize them. An example, not used by 
Whitehead, but entirely consistent with his own, is Harriet Tubman - a woman lured by 
the ideal of Freedom who envisioned possibilities for her people who had themselves, to 
varying degrees, dreamed of the ideal, and then sought, through the Underground 
Railroad and at great personal peril, to actualize that ideal in society, one life at a time. 
The following Whiteheadian example of social change brought about through the 
interplay between great individuals and ideas will hopefully illuminate these topics 
further.
3. Example: Slavery to Freedom
Human rights, including the individual right to self-determination, have not 
always been recognized Indeed, Lincoln’s “peculiar institution” - slavery - is one of the 
more pervasive features o f societies from ancient Greece (and earlier) through the 19***- 
century United States (and later). Today, it is considered to be one of the more odious 
features of our ancestors’ legacy, though slavery and other denials of human rights still
J91 ibid., 25.
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exist in much of the world. Clearly significant social change has occurred in some places 
though clearly not all. This is indeed Whitehead’s paradigm example of positive social 
change.
It should be noted that the change did not take place overnight nor is it the product 
of any one individual. Whitehead notes that the Methodist^^^ movement in England in 
the middle 18"'-century and then in England and the United States from the late 18* 
century throughout the 19* played perhaps the largest single role in eradicating slavery in 
Europe and America. Indeed, it was during the Christmas Conference of 1787, that the 
Methodist Church in the United States became the first denomination to incorporate into 
the order of the church a prohibition on the owning and trading in slaves The church 
was not univocal in this and eventually split in half (a northern and a southern) in 1844 
over the question o f slavery It was not re-united until 1939 However, the struggles 
within this church are a microcosm of the struggles over slavery by the larger society
As Whitehead notes, the overcoming of slavery and the embracing of freedom 
was the culmination of thousands of years of fits and starts. Questions about the 
appropriateness of slave-holding date to ancient Greece, a society in which slavery was 
widely accepted if not as widely practiced. But those questions did not issue in the 
overthrow of slavery That would be many years later, when, as Whitehead writes, the 
“right time” had arrived. He notes that, “it is true that the Methodists produced the final
Methodism is a religious movement begun by John and Charles Wesley, who were 
priests in the Church of England. Following the Revolutionary War, the Methodists in 
America were no longer considered part of the Church of England and became a separate 
church. Throughout the 19th century, Methodism was the largest protestant denomination 
in the United States. Currently, it is the second largest.
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wave of popular feeling which drove the anti-slavery movement to success. But the
Methodist movement succeeded because it came at the right time.” ”^
By this, Whitehead is not saying that the overthrow of slavery was somehow
prescribed to occur at a particular time in history. Rather, by the “right time" he means to
suggest that society had become sufficiently persuaded of the virtue of h'eedom and the
vice of servitude for the change to occur Great individuals, driven by high aims, brought
the particular idea of freedom to expression. Whitehead concludes his example of this
developmental feature of civilization in this way;
Thus in the evolution of the strands of thought which constituted the final stage in 
the destruction of the iniquitous slave-foundation of civilization, there are 
interwoven the insights and the heroisms of sceptical humanitarians, of Catholics, 
o f Methodists, of Quakers. But the intellectual origin of the movement is to be 
traced back for more than two thousand years to the speculations of the 
philosophical Greeks upon functions of the human soul, and its status in the world
Thus, by way of summary, the idea of Freedom gains expression in a society in 
which Slavery had previously been seen as foundational through the efforts of widely 
varied individuals to whom the moniker “hero" is properly attached. Social change is 
brought about by great individuals, lured by a grand ideas, seeking to express previously 
unexpressed possibilities.
B. Collective Action and Rational Choice
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that there is a criticism to which 
Whitehead may be particularly susceptible. Given the reliance upon ideas and great 
individuals, beneficial outcomes are even more dependent upon the rationality of agents
Î91 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 3 1.
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and those agents’ choices for the good of themselves and the classes to which the belong. 
On Whitehead’s picture. Great Individuals need not (and often do not) consider 
themselves ftrst and foremost in their decision making. Or, put another way, given 
Whitehead’s picture, there needs to be a way of addressing the Collective Action problem 
of Rational Choice Theory (hereafter RCT). At the same time, it would seem that more 
than great individuals, drawn by grand ideas, are necessary for social change of the sort 
necessary for widespread expression of ideas like Freedom, for example. Within this 
section I will take what I see to be his solution to this problem; that is, given that what is 
good for a class or a civilization may require such actions and risks that are not good for 
any of its particular members, some explanation of individual action in accordance with 
the good for society over his/her particular good is necessary.
I. Ratioual Choice Theory 
Daniel Little and Jon Elster offer two different conceptions of what is at stake in 
Rational Choice Theory. In both cases, individual rational agents are the building blocks 
of a society and explanations of the choices of those rational agents is given in terms of 
utility. On Little’s version, there are three basic logical requirements for RCT:
(Little 1) Utility is a function that takes goods as a variable and specifies the value 
of the good to the agent as a result,
(Little 2) A rational agent always prefers the outcomes with great utility, and 
(Little 3) The utility scale is continuous?^'
ibid.
Daniel Little, Varieties o f Social Explanation. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991)
45.
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Jon Elster offers his own, somewhat different, formulations o f the requirements for RCT;
(Elster 1 ) The person must be able to compare any two options with each other.
He/she must prefer the one, or prefer the other, or think them equally 
good.
(Elster 2) The person must be consistent in his/her preferences: if he/she prefers 
an orange to an apple and an apple to a pear, he/she must also prefer 
the orange to the pear.
(Elster 3) The person must be able to trade off values against each other
Little's formulation differs in some significant ways from Elster's On Little’s 
view, the utility scale must be continuous. This allows the agent to make measurements 
of the utility of particular options with which she is presented and to choose on the basis 
of those measures. For Elster, however, the scale need not be continuous Rather, what 
is necessary is that the agent be consistent and that his preference assignments be 
transitive (from Elster 2). Thus, all that is required is that the agent be able to say that he 
prefers an orange to an apple and an apple to a pear and thus it should follow that he 
prefers an orange to a pear.
At the same time, both accounts have difficulty explaining why it is that social 
change in which there is no significant utility, or even fairly significant disutility, for the 
individual agents involved can and does occur. One might suspect that this is a difficulty 
to which Whitehead’s view will be susceptible as well since one of the integral features 
of his explanation is the presumably rational actions o f agents. Little and Elster
396 Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
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recognize this problem with RCT and both have treatments o f the theory of Collective 
Action.
2. Collective Action Theory
Put in overly simple terms: RCT will not account for social change for a class or 
perhaps even a society as a whole in which no individual in the class has a rational reason 
to anticipate a reward for acting to bring it about. That is, there is a problem between 
private rationality and collective action. Suppose that some class of individuals would be 
better off, as a class, in opposing slavery, for example. Yet, suppose that no individual of 
that class (or only a very few) has the potential for personal utility in acting to overthrow 
slavery. Suppose in fact that there is even potentially great disutility in acting to 
overthrow the status quo. In such a case, it would not be rational for the individuals to 
oppose slavery (because Little 2 fails to obtain). Thus, it would seem that RCT cannot 
explain certain valuable social change. Indeed, as Little points out, the theory of 
collective action provides a ready explanation of social phenomena like \vorker passivity 
in the face of opportunities for revolutionary action.” ’^’ That is, it explains why large 
groups of people will n^î act in order to advance the good of the group when the 
individual utility is sufficiently low or there is in fact disutility in acting.
Consider the following example: Upton Sinclair’s great novel The Jungle, which 
is a call to unionize packing plants in Chicago (among other things) In Sinclair’s 
example, the conditions of the plants are so horrific that anyone who would want to 
initiate unionization can rationally expect the results of his efforts to result in death and
Press, 1989), 23.
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the addition of his carcass to the sausage line. Suffice it to say that disutility for 
individual action is considerable Thus, we have something like the following;
(Union 1 ) The disutility for every individual, taken separately as rational agents, 
is higher than the utility for acting to unionize.
On RCT and Collective Action, we would then expect that there would be no 
unionization effort. Or, in other words,
(Union 2) No individual acts to initiate unionization 
From Union I and Union 2 we get the prediction that 
(Union 3) The unionization does not occur 
Yet, we also have the empirically observable fact that 
(Union 4) Unionization occurs
It does not seem that RCT or Collective Action have available to them the appeals 
to the greater future good, at least in the cases where the individual agent has little reason 
to think that she will be a part of that brighter future. Attempts to solve the problem with 
appeals to ordinal rather than cardinal utility frameworks fail as well. This is so because 
the intensity of desire (for a particular gain for the rational agent) still does not affect 
Union 1. Even accepting that the agent will want X much more than Y still does not give 
us an ability to say what happens when X is not in the individual agent’s interest and the 
agent knows that it is not. Mancur Olson notes that even when the several agents have a 
common interest in obtaining a particular benefit, ’Ihey have no common interest in 
paying the cost of providing that collective good. Each would prefer that the others pay
Little, 62.
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the entire cost, and ordinarily would get any benefit provided whether he had borne part 
of the cost or not .” ’^*
3. The Whiteheadian perspective
Whitehead's view does not succumb to this difficulty. While the discussion in the 
Slavery to Freedom section did not settle this question completely, with a little 
enhancement it will. On the Persuasive Ideas Principle, ideas themselves possess a 
motive power - they are lures. Great ideas, e.g.. Freedom, are greater lures than small 
ideas, e.g., half-priced burgers every Tuesday night. Further, ideas are interwoven in the 
fabric of any particular society at any particular time. Slavery and Freedom are both 
ethical ideas that are present in past societies, first one in ascendancy and then the other. 
And these ethical ideas come to be expressed by human agents whose understanding and 
acceptance of the idea in question leads to their expression of it in the life of the society, 
even when the expression of the idea may entail disutility for the agent. For example, the
idea of Freedom was such a compelling lure that many sacrificed their freedom to express
the idea. Because Whitehead seems to have sometliing like this as his view, then he can 
accept that;
(Wl) Social change happens 
without succumbing to the difficulties of RCT and Collective Action.
It follows from the discussion in Slavery to Freedom section that
(W2) Social change does not begin with a single spark
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 60.
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For example, it is inappropriate to point solely to the assassination of Archduke 
Ferdinand of Austria as the "cause" of World War I. Admittedly, the reactions of and 
interactions between nations following that event led directly to the hostilities But, the 
seeds of war had been sown years before (ideas of Nation-building, Empire, and 
Nationalism) and the assassination came at the “right” time to foment attempts to express 
those ideas
Thus, Whitehead's view is that social change has at least two necessary 
conditions (bracketing out “time” for the moment):
(W3) Social change requires ideas and individuals to occur.
As trivial as that might appear at first glance, we must remember that what differentiates 
this view from RCT is the notion that ideas possess motive power
In a sense, it would seem that Whitehead has something like an ordinal scale in 
mind That is, the idea of Freedom is so much to be desired and the idea of Slavery so 
much to be despised that a rational agent would select the former. However, RCT would 
take note that the disutility associated with the former for individual agents makes it 
unlikely that any will select it. Whitehead must deny (and I think that he does) the notion 
that an agent must act to bring about utility for herself. The idea of Freedom is itself so 
compelling that many rational agents will choose to express it even in the face of 
significant disutility. This view has the happy consequences of providing an explanation 
that seems to fit with the empirical observations o f social scientists and of not 
succumbing to the problem of Collective Action.
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c. Johnson s Reading of Whitehead's View
After claiming that Whitehead’s view is a plausible one, Johnson then advocates a
troubling interpretation of the view. It is troubling because it is a reading that Whitehead
himself explicitly rejects.
On Johnson’s view, all that has been said of Whitehead’s view heretofore holds.
The place where his view diverges from Whitehead is in the relationship between ideas
and great individuals. Johnson recognizes that individuals and ideas do not function in a
vacuum.” ”^  There are the features of the inanimate world and economic activity that
form a context within which ideas and individuals are related. All this is quite consistent
with Whitehead’s view. The difficulty comes in Johnson’s treatment of ideas. On his
view, ideas are quite passive. The resulting position is that the great ideas linger on the
margins of a society until there are enough people to actualize them and bring them to the
center of society’s life .^
The difficulty is that it seems to reduce the plausibility o f the picture of
civilization and its development that Whitehead himself has been arguing. Indeed, he
explicitly denies that the Johnsonian interpretation is his view:
The final introduction of a reform does not necessarily prove the moral superiority 
of the reforming generation. It certainly does require that that generation exhibits 
reforming energy. But conditions may have changed, so that what is possible 
now may not have been possible then. A great idea is not to be conceived as 
merely waiting for enough good men to carry it into practical effect That is a 
childish view o f the history of ideas.'*"'
Johnson, 47.
""ibid.
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 29.
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Since this is surely a passage with which Johnson is familiar and since so much of 
Johnson’s exposition of Whitehead’s view seems in concert with Whitehead, one is 
frankly perplexed by the view that he attributes to Whitehead at this point. Perhaps it is a 
momentary lapse in his understanding
D. Social Darwinism and the Myth of Progress
Whitehead’s broad philosophical position (not just his philosophy of civilization) 
has been criticized from time to time for its seeming consequence of viewing human 
beings as fallible, and yet ever-evolving, entities That is to say, Whitehead has been 
accused of being a Social Darwinist of the Spencerian sort This is not surprising in 
itself. The process model lends itself to such misrepresentations. Given that the world is 
in process and that Whitehead uses a number of very positive metaphors to describe the 
process, one can easily be tempted to equate process with progress. Indeed, the 
slavery/freedom example above would seem to lend itself to such an understanding; that 
is, that things are getting better and better, that “culture” is evolving. This sort of view 
was common in 19‘*'-century Victorian England. It was advanced, in England, by 
individuals like Spencer who appealed to a Darwinian evolutionary model to argue that 
more advanced societies are more intelligent and more productive; and James Hutton, a 
geologist, who saw the very structure of the terrain as beneficial to the development of 
humanity. And it is not completely uncommon to interpret Whitehead this way. As 
Johnson recounts, Whitehead states that “Geography is half of character” and that 
“civilization haunts the borders of w a t e r w a y s F u r t h e r ,  given the emphasis that
^  Whitehead, “Harvard: The Future”, Uk  Atlantic Monthly, 1938 and ‘The Education
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Whitehead places upon the role of ideas, one might be tempted to associate him with a 
sort o f Spencerian view. Indeed, one of those who sees Whitehead as being committed to 
a Darwinistic view of civilization's evolution is actually one of his supporters, Richard S. 
Davis.
In his treatment of what he takes to be Whitehead's moral intuitions, Davis turns 
to Whitehead's understanding of the development and decay of civilizations. From this 
position, Davis argues that Whitehead is committed to the view that morality, in a very 
practical sense, is really a concern with the future He elaborates this a bit to show that 
practical morality, for Whitehead, is particularly concerned with "the usefulness of the 
present to the future.'"*”  ^ From this he then argues to a conclusion that we have already 
seen is a critical aspect of Whitehead’s view. That is that moral interests are self- 
transcending.^'* Or, in another way. great individuals can and oAen do rationally choose 
to express certain ideas which entail some measure of disutility for themselves precisely 
because of the future benefit to society.
However, Davis also takes this to commit Whitehead to something of a Social 
Darwinian position. The key passage in Davis’ analysis is. "this great fact of 
progressiveness, be it from worse to better, or from better to worse, has become of greater 
and greater importance in Western Civilization as we come to modem times.”'*”*
of an Englishman”, The Atlantic Monthly, 1943. I should note here that Johnson is not one 
of those who attribute the Social Evolutionary view to Whitehead Indeed, he argues against 
it quite explicitly when he writes that “It is to be noted that Whitehead is not guilty o f fuzzy 
optimism.” [Joluison, 47]
Davis, 79.
^  ibid., p 80.
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 98.
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From this passage, Davis infers that Whitehead is “speaking of the preparation of 
a social environment for gradual entertainment of the humanitarian ideal It is this 
overarching humanitarian ideal that Davis takes to be Whitehead's view of the future 
culmination of civilization and the human species.
Where Davis’ argument is concerned, I suspect that he has simply not given the 
clause “or from better to worse” its due while at the same time reading too much into the 
“fact of progressiveness”. But it points to the broader question about Whitehead's view; 
namely whether his process paradigm necessitates a commitment to progress. It is to this 
broader question o f whether Whitehead is committed to the Spencerian sort o f world 
view in general that I now turn.
If Whitehead is a Social Darwinist, with a rosy picture of the human animal, his 
view has some rather significant explanatory troubles. Two instances that spring to mind 
are The Troubles between his native England and the five counties of Northern Ireland 
and the Holocaust. The latter is generally presumed by most philosophers and 
theologians of the twentieth century to have finally nailed the cofün of Social Darwinism 
shut once and for all.'*®’ If Whitehead has a Social Darwinist view of cultural evolution, 
then the view is subject to the same coffin. I do not see Whitehead's philosophy of 
civilization ultimately committing him to such a view, however.
““ Davis, 81.
For example, the existentialists of this century (e.g., Paul Tillich, Martin Buber, Elie 
Wiesel). However, Social Darwinism is nothing if not resilient, reappearing in barely 
warmed-over versions like Evolutionary Psychology, to name one late 2(f-century 
incarnation. A current descendent o f Spencer is Mark Schmidt. His “The Idea of Human 
Nature and Mid-Twentieth Century Political Theory” [Arkansas Philosophical Association, 
October 1999] is a contemporary defense of the Social Darwinist views of Spencer, et al.
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It does seem to be true that Whitehead's characterization of civilization is not 
entirely removed from the stereot>'pical late-IQ***-century. British landed-gentry version 
Indeed, he takes civilization to be marked by five features without which a society cannot 
be called “civilized”: art, beauty, truth, peace, and adventure This seems, prima facie, to 
be similar to Edward Tylor’s view that “civilization” is to be defined as the “complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society
However suspiciously Spencerian Whitehead’s view may initially sound, he is not 
in the thrall of the inherited view. The terms are typically Whiteheadian, which is to say 
overly technical at times But his mature view has been forged in the afrermath of one 
world war and in the looming shadow of another. So it should not be seen as odd to 
interpret the mature view that Whitehead advances as being very far from a naïve 
Victorian picture. Indeed, Whitehead has some rather explicit things to say about the 
Myth of Progress and goes to great lengths to separate his own views from the view that 
humankind necessarily is progressing toward a better friture for itself and its world. For 
Whitehead, process does not necessitate progress.
Two indications that this is the case have already been marshalled in the 
discussion of Johnson’s limited reading of Whitehead’s view. One will recall from that
What is at issue is not so much the explicit content of the linguistic statements that are 
themselves similar, but rather the preconceptions and commitments that are not. Tylor, 
Spencer, and Hutton all seem to see an equivalence of sorts between process and 
progress, to the point of considering the age o f Victoria the qualitative culmination of all 
the preceding ages. Whitehead does not explicitly draw this conclusion, nor do I think he 
does so implicitly. To do so would be to All victim to what I have labeled the "Myth of 
Progress”.
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discussion that Whitehead explicitly states that "Ihe final introduction of a reform does 
not necessarily prove the moral superiority o f the reforming generation Also, from 
the Sketch o f the View, it will be recalled that Whitehead allows for the destruction of a 
civilization. Indeed, he spends a great deal o f  time outlining those conditions under 
which it is inevitable that a civilization will perish. For example, when a society loses 
creative initiative or when, as he notes in the preface to Process and Reality, a society 
becomes convinced of its world view and advances it with dogmatic certainty. Such a 
civilization is in danger of the stagnation that precedes decay On Whitehead’s view, 
such dogmatic certainty is an “exhibition of folly” ."*'”
Further evidence that Whitehead’s view does not succumb to the Myth of 
Progress is to be found in the very place from which the accusation could arise in the first 
place: his treatment of ideas. As noted, there are great ideas and small ideas, each with 
persuasive lure. Some progress toward civilization does take place when the great ideas 
like Freedom and Justice are expressed and the small ones like half-priced burgers are 
kept in proper (that is to say, extremely limited) perspective. But great and small ideas 
are not the only ideas available to humanity, on Whitehead’s view. It is precisely 
because vicious ideas are part of the tapestry o f society that any progress that is made is 
made only with fits and starts and over great lengths of time. He notes that along with 
ideals (great ideas) has been interwoven the concept of “Divine Despot and a slavish 
universe, for example; so, too, the notions o f slavery, intolerance, force, and “blind
^  Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 29. 
‘“® Whitehead, Process and Reality, xiv. 
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 33.
366
worship of the good old days” are (or have been) present."*'  ^ Thus, on the basis of this 
evidence, it is difficult to see how Whitehead's view could be ultimately construed as 
Social Darwinist.
F. Education
Finally, and in brief, I will turn to what Whitehead takes to be the necessary 
condition upon which the decisive factors depend: Education. WTiitehead believes that 
without the proper educational system the attempt at civilization will ultimately be (utile 
This should be unsurprising given his assertions concerning ideas and the ways in which 
ideas take hold of a particular society. If it is a necessary condition for civilization that 
ideas must be understood, accepted, and applied, then the educational system must 
facilitate understanding, acceptance, and application. It should be noted that Whitehead 
construes the "educational system” to be something considerably larger than K-12. 
college, and university. Educators need not be connected with the formal educational 
system of a civilization at all. Indeed, some of the educators to whom Whitehead points 
as exemplars of this dissemination of ideas are Socrates, Jesus, and Hume. The 
important fact is that ideas are disseminated. And as Johnson notes, it is Whitehead's 
view that these are men who through the expression of ideas “manifest the ideals [and] 
serve as a stimulus to others " Thus, it would seem that in addition to the inherent 
persuasive lure of an idea there is also the personal example o f a great teacher to 
stimulate interest, understanding, acceptance, and application.
412 Johnson, 44.
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Given Whitehead’s view that understanding and application are two poles o f an
idea's expression, the education process should provide the mechanism by which the
earlier discussed problems of RCT are overcome. And this seems to be the case. As
Johnson describes Whitehead’s view, “There must be a fhiitful balance of theory and
practice, fact and ideal. It must be the type of education which issues in ‘insight and
foresight and a sense of the worth of l i f e . O n  Whitehead’s view, such Insight and
Foresight along with the sense of worth of life will enable the rational agent to choose
those moments when it is acceptable, or perhaps required, to accept great personal
disutility in the interest of great ideas.
This is a view that is consistent with one advanced by Thomas Nagel in his
discussions of economic rationality. As Little notes, Nagel argues that rationality
requires altruism. He then defines altruism as “recognition of the reality of the interests
of others and a direct willingness to act out of regard for those interests Whitehead
would accept this with little in the way of amendment. Indeed, he writes.
In any human society, one fundamental idea tingeing [sic] every detail of activity 
is the general conception of the status o f the individual members of that group, 
considered apart from any special preeminence. In such societies as they emerge 
into civilizations, the members recognize each other as individual exercising the 
enjoyment of emotions, passions, comforts and discomforts, perceptions, hopes, 
fears, and purposes . '
Nagel goes on to argue that it is “perfectly consistent” to reject an egoist line in 
favor of a view in which individuals are understood to define several sets of goals - “from 
narrow self-interest to the interests of the family to the interests o f more encompassing
413 Johnson, 46; Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 125. 
Little. 64.
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groups, and choose their actions according to the degree to which various alternatives 
serve this ensemble of interests.”^'* Thus, it could very well be the case, on Nagel’s view, 
that in assessing the ensemble of interests, some personal disutility is to be rationally 
preferred by agents.
This is consistent with Whitehead’s picture. If it is perfectly consistent to dehne a 
range of goals, then it is also consistent to expect that those goals could be broadened 
given a fhiitful balance of theory and practice in which one is exposed to the novel 
possibilities that great ideas express Indeed, the educational process that Whitehead 
advocates is one that broadens the narrow circles of self-interest and family interest to 
include ever-larger groups. For example, in the Slavery/Freedom example, it is through 
one pole of the education process - that is, understanding - that the circle of humanity is 
broadened to include people of color where they had been considered only 3/Sths of a 
person before (when people bothered to grant even that much). It is through the other 
pole - that is, application - that Freedom actually is experienced by those now included in 
the circle.'*'’ Another pertinent example is that of Women’s Suffrage. It is only through 
a torturous process that the circle of humanity is broadened to include women. And, 
consistent with Whitehead’s view that certain progress once attained is not somehow 
inviolate, the struggle to raise consciousness continues in things as mundane as insistence
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. 17.
Little, 64.
'**’ It seems that Johnson's suggestion that education involves understanding, acceptance and 
application causes one small problem. In Whitehead's treatment of education, as Johnson 
elsewhere recognizes, he posits two poles - theoiy and practice or, in philosophy, 
rationalism and empiricism. [Whhdiead, Process and Reality. 3] My readi^ of Whitehead 
suggests that "understanding" and "acceptance" form som eth^ like the theoretical pole
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upon inclusive language so that the very language we use to speak of the human animal 
reflects the full humanity of women. Thus, education is an ongoing and necessary 
process in any society which is moving toward attainment of the moniker “civilized”.
Part IV. Conclusion
in the foregoing pages, 1 have sketched Whitehead’s general view of metaphysics, 
ethics, and civilization and argued that it is a plausible view. The strongest non-virtue 
competitor to a Whiteheadian ethical theory is the Universal Hedonism of Sidgwick. 
Sidgwick has demonstrated why it is reasonable to reject the theistic deontological 
schemes of the Cambridge Moralists There is no reason to suppose that Whitehead 
would disagree with Sidgwick’s conclusions and those conclusions are congenial to 
Whitehead’s own. The downside of Sidgwick’s quite detailed argument is that ultimately 
both Universal Hedonism and Ethical Egoism are left at the end o f the day. Given the 
incompatibility of these views, Sidgwick concludes that Practical Reason is divided on 
itself.
Green has a very nice argument that one need not conclude that Practical Reason 
is dualistic, and Whitehead can be seen following Green’s lead to a certain degree 
Green’s argument depends on a particular interpretation of Aristotle and Aristotle’s 
concept of the Good Though Green does not present the Aristotelian argument 
necessary for Green’s purposes, Irwin shows that such an argument can be developed. 
The difficulty here is that even if Green is right about the Dualism of Practical Reason, 
his broader view is plausibly rejected by Sidgwick. So, while a part o f the view is quite
while "application" is the practical.
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helpful, the full view falls victim to Sidgwick's criticism. Fortunately, Whitehead’s 
view, as I have presented it, avoids the pitfalls that bedevil Green (and the rest of the 
Moralists as well). Whitehead is able to reject the Dualism of Practical Reason, as 1 have 
shown above.
To present Whitehead’s ethical views required the discussion of his metaphysical 
ones. To discuss his metaphysics, it was necessary to demonstrate his affinity for first 
Plato and then Aristotle. It was also necessary to discuss Whitehead’s methodology at 
some length. In investigating methodology, metaphysics, and Whitehead’s 
interpretations of ancient Greek philosophy, 1 have shown how Whitehead’s approach is 
radically different from Plato’s and Aristotle’s in one sense, although it is strikingly 
similar in another. Whitehead’s conclusions about ethics bear resemblance to the 
ancients in that his position is best categorized as a virtue theory. Like Plato and 
Aristotle, he develops a catalogue of Cardinal Virtues. And like Aristotle, those ethical 
commitments are intimately related to the metaphysical ones. Beyond these similarities, 
however, lies considerable difference. Whitehead rejects Aristotelian substance 
metaphysics in favor of his own process view. Because of the intimate connection 
between the metaphysical foundations and the ethical conclusions, those conclusions also 
differ from Aristotle’s.
The view that metaphysics and ethics are connected in informative ways 
illustrates a further difference between Whitehead and Sidgwick. Sidgwick constructs 
rigid walls between the various disciplines within philosophy. This causes some 
difficulties for his view because he is unable to appeal to potential help from
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metaphysical or epistemologicai arguments to address the Dualism of Practical Reason. 1 
showed why WTiitehead rightly rejects such strict compartmentalization of disciplines.
Beyond their differences about the relationship between metaphysics and ethics 
and the Dualism of Practical Reason, Wliitehead and Sidgwick obviously differ in their 
larger ethical theories' I have shown how Whitehead criticizes utilitarian views from 
Bentham to Mill to Sidgwick. I have done this in two ways, one longer and one shorter 
The first involved in-depth analyses of the views of Mill and Sidgwick, and to a lesser 
extent Bentham. The second involved the informal Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. 
Having shown how Utilitarianism is rejected by Whitehead, I also showed how he rejects 
Ethical Egoism as well With the rejections of Universal Hedonism, Ethical Egoism, 
Theistic Intuitionism, and the Dualism of Practical Reason, 1 turned to argue Whitehead’s 
positive ethical views.
I conclude that Whitehead has a sophisticated ethical system that has character 
development as its chief component and virtue as the goal o f that development. 1 have 
also examined at some length the constitution of virtue in general and the character o f the 
several Cardinal Virtues in particular; demonstrating how they fit together and how they 
are related to Whitehead’s larger philosophical concerns. To address potential criticisms 
of WTiitehead’s views, I have analyzed Rational Choice Theory and Collective Action 
Theory as well as a potential charge that W^tehead was a Social Darwinist. Having 
shown the plausibility o f Whitehead’s view, I hope that I have not, at the same time, 
compromised its intelligibility.
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